Ottomans in Italy

[stevep]

Elfwine

The problem is while the Ottomans are a distant super-power ravaging the Balkans or conquering Egypt their a threat on the horizon but not significant for many rulers in western Europe.

If they start overrunning southern Italy, threatening Rome and with a lot more naval power in the western Med they become an immediate threat to a lot of people. This will focus a lot of attention on the Turkish threat.

If their doing this instead of conquering Hungary and/or Egypt it also means that when one of those states gets a strong ruler, both being conquered during periods of weakness, they also have other threats. Who will have a vested interest in helping defeat an over-stretched empire.

The Ottomans are the most powerful state in the west [using the wider meaning of that word] but they are only a single state. A number of their neighbours are powerful enough to at least give them a bloody tough fight when properly organised. Get too many of them motivated and things become very messy, even for the Ottoman war machine. Their not going to fall apart overnight but you could see a period of prolonged conflict on several fronts which drains a lot of their resources and prevents them making gains they made OTL.

Another factor may be economic. If they gain control of Sicily and Malta then they effectively monopolise trade with the east, a point that OTL they only achieved after the conquest of Egypt. This gives them strength in the short term and weakens Egypt economically but the likely use of this tool also gives a lot more nations motive to oppose them.

Steve

At what point did it become "comparatively distant" to a state with its capital in Constantinople and control of the Balkans?



I'm not sure this is entirely true. Depending on what you define as "decline setting in", but Sicily took quite a while to fall and Southern Italy falling to the Normans was in a situation probably not going to come up here (possible, but unlikely to be duplicated in otherwise very different circumstances than the 11th century).

The Venetians that the Ottomans beat? The Spanish on the other side of the Mediterranean that will be caught up in half a dozen other projects? The lesser powers not even significant enough to name?

I'm not saying this is easy, but it is certainly easier than taking and holding Hungary or Egypt (or Mesopotamia).

 

[Byzantine]

France and the Ottomans had Alliances on Multiple occasions, even when the Ottomans were in Algieria, Hungary and Austria.

The original Franco-Ottoman alliance was established in 1536, following a decade of negotiations. Francis I of France (reigned 1515-1547) and Suleiman I the Magnificent (reigned 1520-1566) basically formed a united front against their common archenemy Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor (reigned 1519-1556). Their goal was to combine their military operations against their opponent.

Earlier in the 1530s, the Ottomans had already helped the French in military operations in Italy, while the French had helped the Ottomans briefly capture the city of Tunis which was held by a vassal of Charles V. Suleiman also financed Francis' efforts to secure alliances with Henry VIII of England (reigned 1509-1547) and the leaders of the Schmalkaldic League (an alliance of Lutheran rulers within the Holy Roman Empire).

The capture of Otranto by the forces of Mehmed II the Conqueror (reigned 1446-1446, 1451-1481) in 1480-1481, precedes the alliance by 55 years. Louis XI of France, the so-called "Universal Spider" (reigned 1461-1483) would probably have a different reaction to the Ottoman forces managing to secure areas of Italy for themselves.

 

[Elfwine]

Elfwine

The problem is while the Ottomans are a distant super-power ravaging the Balkans or conquering Egypt their a threat on the horizon but not significant for many rulers in western Europe.

If they start overrunning southern Italy, threatening Rome and with a lot more naval power in the western Med they become an immediate threat to a lot of people. This will focus a lot of attention on the Turkish threat.

Or not, because France will dance with joy at the idea of weakened Habsburgs and England won't care.

It would take a great deal to get even a temporary anti-Turkish coalition.

More below.

I'm not saying this is completely favorable, but they're not really a threat to anyone who they weren't a threat to OTL - maybe France if they wanted to be one, maybe - in this situation.

If their doing this instead of conquering Hungary and/or Egypt it also means that when one of those states gets a strong ruler, both being conquered during periods of weakness, they also have other threats. Who will have a vested interest in helping defeat an over-stretched empire.

The Ottomans are the most powerful state in the west [using the wider meaning of that word] but they are only a single state. A number of their neighbours are powerful enough to at least give them a bloody tough fight when properly organised. Get too many of them motivated and things become very messy, even for the Ottoman war machine. Their not going to fall apart overnight but you could see a period of prolonged conflict on several fronts which drains a lot of their resources and prevents them making gains they made OTL.

I doubt it, unless said powers are considerably more formidable than OTL - the Ottomans can do Southern Italy and Egypt and Hungary and Mesopotamia. Maybe not exactly at the same time, but close enough.

In the long run, yes, more fronts, more places to worry about - but in the short run, the Ottomans are in a very good position and Western Christendom is in a very bad position to do anything about it particularly given how many interests don't care if the Ottomans grow stronger here.

Another factor may be economic. If they gain control of Sicily and Malta then they effectively monopolise trade with the east, a point that OTL they only achieved after the conquest of Egypt. This gives them strength in the short term and weakens Egypt economically but the likely use of this tool also gives a lot more nations motive to oppose them.

Steve

The problem is that its more likely to mean people look for alternate routes to the East than that people deciding to join the Grand Alliance because an Ottoman Italy (even up to the northern part of Italy, which would be beyond what kasumigenx is suggesting) is not a threat to England or Scandinavia or Poland.

To name three powers (Scandinavia in this sense means either the Denmark-dominated Kalmar Union/Denmark-Norway or Sweden, so I'm counting it as one power for purposes of this) that have every reason to regard central Europe being threatened by the Ottomans as favoring their interests.

Unlike say, Napoleon, who is one of the few conquerors in European history who has seen a pan-European coalition against him.

Louis XIV saw a coalition determined to oppose him - but it boils down to the Habsburgs and the Dutch and England-Scotland, not "All of Europe" or even most of Europe.

The Ottomans are going to most likely fall in the second category.

 

[stevep]

Or not, because France will dance with joy at the idea of weakened Habsburgs and England won't care.

It would take a great deal to get even a temporary anti-Turkish coalition.

More below.

I'm not saying this is completely favorable, but they're not really a threat to anyone who they weren't a threat to OTL - maybe France if they wanted to be one, maybe - in this situation.

See the preceeding post from Byzantine. At this point the great union of Austria, the Netherlands and Spain wasn't in existence yet. In fact as I think someone else pointed out Ottoman occupation of lands in S Italy would clash with France's own claims as well as putting the Ottoman superpower dangerously close.

I doubt it, unless said powers are considerably more formidable than OTL - the Ottomans can do Southern Italy and Egypt and Hungary and Mesopotamia. Maybe not exactly at the same time, but close enough.

In the long run, yes, more fronts, more places to worry about - but in the short run, the Ottomans are in a very good position and Western Christendom is in a very bad position to do anything about it particularly given how many interests don't care if the Ottomans grow stronger here.

Very risky to assume that. Hungary was knocked over in one campaign because of poor leadership coupled with a period under a weak king during which the chief nobles had gained a lot of power. Earlier, under a more powerful ruler it had repeatedly defeated Ottoman incursions.

Similarly the Marmalukes were defeated fairly quickly in 1516-17 but if I remember rightly they had defeated the Ottomans in a clash ~1485 during
which they took Cilicia from them. [Checking Wiki I may have remembered it wrongly as the only period of war it mentioned was 1467, which was a Marmaluke victory]. They do seem to have fallen behind in technology but that's not something that could be relied upon.

They might still have the same favourable circumstances while also fighting a bitter and costly battle in Italy but it could easily get very bad for them.

The problem is that its more likely to mean people look for alternate routes to the East than that people deciding to join the Grand Alliance because an Ottoman Italy (even up to the northern part of Italy, which would be beyond what kasumigenx is suggesting) is not a threat to England or Scandinavia or Poland.

That's a factor but others will seek to reopen the old traditional route. Also a strong drive westward by Ottoman naval power will probably increase the level of Muslim piracy which would also prompt the powers in the western Med to seek to drive them back.

Also this is before the reformation so there is still strong religious connections with the papacy.

Also Poland itself, for both religious and geographical reasons, was a frequent opponent of the Ottomans. This was both in the Balkans, which might be butterflied if Hungary doesn't fall but also in the Ukraine where they clashed with the Crimean Tartars, subjects of the Ottomans.

To name three powers (Scandinavia in this sense means either the Denmark-dominated Kalmar Union/Denmark-Norway or Sweden, so I'm counting it as one power for purposes of this) that have every reason to regard central Europe being threatened by the Ottomans as favoring their interests.

Unlike say, Napoleon, who is one of the few conquerors in European history who has seen a pan-European coalition against him.

Louis XIV saw a coalition determined to oppose him - but it boils down to the Habsburgs and the Dutch and England-Scotland, not "All of Europe" or even most of Europe.

The Ottomans are going to most likely fall in the second category.

That's what I'm thinking of here. [Actually Napoleon I also fell into the same category. It was only because he got so far for so long that the coalition that finally brought him down included every other major power in Europe].

In this case every Christian state in the western Med, including France, will have a vested interest in driving back the Ottomans, even without any religious factors. You might also get some support from northern powers in that a form of crusade is a good way of distracting problematic nobles.

Plus as has been said before S Italy could be a serious problem itself in part because that region was fairly divided. It was riddled with castles and fortifications that could be difficult to defeat as I think the artillery of the time was not that powerful and mobile. Also if I remember rightly their landing in Italy was just after they had suffered a heavy defeat trying to seize Malta so I'm not sure how much they had spare in resources and money.

Steve

 

[KCammy]

My TL has an Ottoman Southern Italy.

 

[Elfwine]

See the preceeding post from Byzantine. At this point the great union of Austria, the Netherlands and Spain wasn't in existence yet. In fact as I think someone else pointed out Ottoman occupation of lands in S Italy would clash with France's own claims as well as putting the Ottoman superpower dangerously close.

Then France's rivals will dance with glee. Europe is far too divided and far too many people will seek to benefit from their rivals suffering.

Obviously if the Ottomans really do seem like a threat to All of the West that's different, but just southern Italy? No. Some people will react with hostility, but most of those are their OTL enemies.

Very risky to assume that. Hungary was knocked over in one campaign because of poor leadership coupled with a period under a weak king during which the chief nobles had gained a lot of power. Earlier, under a more powerful ruler it had repeatedly defeated Ottoman incursions.

And it is not likely that this will be changed by a campaign that sees part of Ottoman strength temporally diverted to take Southern Italy.

I'm not saying Hungary is inevitably easy, just that the Ottomans do have the kind of army to do what they did and Mathias is likely to be replaced by an inferior (not necessarily grossly incompetent, but inferior) ruler.

Similarly the Marmalukes were defeated fairly quickly in 1516-17 but if I remember rightly they had defeated the Ottomans in a clash ~1485 during
which they took Cilicia from them. [Checking Wiki I may have remembered it wrongly as the only period of war it mentioned was 1467, which was a Marmaluke victory]. They do seem to have fallen behind in technology but that's not something that could be relied upon.

They might still have the same favourable circumstances while also fighting a bitter and costly battle in Italy but it could easily get very bad for them.

Theoretically, yes, practically, no.

That's a factor but others will seek to reopen the old traditional route. Also a strong drive westward by Ottoman naval power will probably increase the level of Muslim piracy which would also prompt the powers in the western Med to seek to drive them back.

Also this is before the reformation so there is still strong religious connections with the papacy.

I'm going to respond to this in regards to the Western Med issue in general, if that's alright.

But the religious connections to the papacy are not the same as a concern for Rome the city or even listening to papal plans - otherwise OTL would have been enough for the kind of crusading and anti-Ottoman coalition we're looking at.

Also Poland itself, for both religious and geographical reasons, was a frequent opponent of the Ottomans. This was both in the Balkans, which might be butterflied if Hungary doesn't fall but also in the Ukraine where they clashed with the Crimean Tartars, subjects of the Ottomans.

But those issues are going to be unaffected by the Ottomans controlling Southern Italy. The Ottomans being stronger there if it does mean less in the East is good for Poland. And if it doesn't, it doesn't make Poland more prone to be anti-Ottoman.

That's what I'm thinking of here. [Actually Napoleon I also fell into the same category. It was only because he got so far for so long that the coalition that finally brought him down included every other major power in Europe].

Right, but he did end up in that category and Louis never did. Louis pretty much always had some powers who liked the fact he was beating up their opponents.

In this case every Christian state in the western Med, including France, will have a vested interest in driving back the Ottomans, even without any religious factors. You might also get some support from northern powers in that a form of crusade is a good way of distracting problematic nobles.

Every power including those with a vested interest in their rivals being weakened by this? I doubt it. Never happened OTL.

There isn't a single "Common Christian Interest" even with the issue of Rome in Europe. Let alone the issue of pirates, which are not the same thing as Ottoman armies.

And I'm not entirely sure stronger Ottoman naval power = more Muslim piracy.

Don't know enough about the two OTL to argue that one, but I'm bringing it up in hopes you can provide more.

Plus as has been said before S Italy could be a serious problem itself in part because that region was fairly divided. It was riddled with castles and fortifications that could be difficult to defeat as I think the artillery of the time was not that powerful and mobile. Also if I remember rightly their landing in Italy was just after they had suffered a heavy defeat trying to seize Malta so I'm not sure how much they had spare in resources and money.

Steve

Divided? The North was divided, when is the South divided?

This (the issue of resources) I don't know, but if they have enough to even theoretically inspire a pan-European coalition, they have enough to take Southern Italy.

 

[stevep]

Then France's rivals will dance with glee. Europe is far too divided and far too many people will seek to benefit from their rivals suffering.

Which rivals? Only really England that I'm aware of as just about everybody else is [or in this case would], already worried by the Muslim expansion.

Obviously if the Ottomans really do seem like a threat to All of the West that's different, but just southern Italy? No. Some people will react with hostility, but most of those are their OTL enemies.

Please read what I said. I said all those affected in the western Med.

And it is not likely that this will be changed by a campaign that sees part of Ottoman strength temporally diverted to take Southern Italy.

If the Ottomans get bogged down seeking to hold the area and fighting with those opposing them then that will distract a lot of resources.

I'm not saying Hungary is inevitably easy, just that the Ottomans do have the kind of army to do what they did and Mathias is likely to be replaced by an inferior (not necessarily grossly incompetent, but inferior) ruler.

Possibly but in many kingdoms power was often fairly transient at the time and could easily collapse or revive rapidly. Even after Hungary was largely occupied various smaller regions continued to put up a lot of opposition with varying degrees of success.

Theoretically, yes, practically, no.

You're probably right but even an unreformed Marmaluke state could be a problem if the empire is heavy tied up elsewhere.

I'm going to respond to this in regards to the Western Med issue in general, if that's alright.

OK.

But the religious connections to the papacy are not the same as a concern for Rome the city or even listening to papal plans - otherwise OTL would have been enough for the kind of crusading and anti-Ottoman coalition we're looking at.

Not really as the Ottomans held one town briefly, as opposed to a large scale and permanent occupation.

I'm not saying that everyone will be blindly obedient to the Papacy. The various rulers and nobles have their own interests. However some will be affected by religious matters.

But those issues are going to be unaffected by the Ottomans controlling Southern Italy. The Ottomans being stronger there if it does mean less in the East is good for Poland. And if it doesn't, it doesn't make Poland more prone to be anti-Ottoman.

Please make you're mind up. You were just saying that involvement in Italy wouldn't distract from operations elsewhere.

Poland has a large hostile and expansionist state on its border. Its not going to be friendly to it just because that state is a bit weaker and hence not putting as much pressure on it. Even presuming that the Ottomans can put enough pressure on their Crimean subjects. Hence, even if Poland isn't affected by any urgent appeals from Italy they will probably be fighting the empire. Which will require at least some resources sent from Constantinople to help hold them back.

Right, but he did end up in that category and Louis never did. Louis pretty much always had some powers who liked the fact he was beating up their opponents.

Some did but as I said the repeated conflicts built up an alliance of powers who saw their security in uniting against a common threat. That's all I'm assuming will happen here.

Every power including those with a vested interest in their rivals being weakened by this? I doubt it. Never happened OTL.

Again I never said that. I'm just thinking about the larger number of states that will be threatened by the proposed Ottoman actions.

There isn't a single "Common Christian Interest" even with the issue of Rome in Europe. Let alone the issue of pirates, which are not the same thing as Ottoman armies.

The Barbary pirates were officially subjects of the Sultans and even if not directly involved will be drawn into the vacuum caused by the need to face the Ottoman fleets.

And I'm not entirely sure stronger Ottoman naval power = more Muslim piracy.

Why not? If the Christian powers are being drawn into battles off Sicily and southern Italy they have less resources to protect their coasts and coastal shipping and also a campaign in Italy generates new supply lines that can be raided.

Don't know enough about the two OTL to argue that one, but I'm bringing it up in hopes you can provide more.

What other two.

Divided? The North was divided, when is the South divided?

Possibly I'm wrong but I had the impression that, while there might be a formal unified state the situation on the ground was a lot more scattered with a lot of local lords. Could be wrong there however.

This (the issue of resources) I don't know, but if they have enough to even theoretically inspire a pan-European coalition, they have enough to take Southern Italy.

Apart from the straw man you keep raising, posing a threat is not the same as being able to come through on that threat, especially when it means a long war at the end of a long supply line.

Steve

 

[Elfwine]

Which rivals? Only really England that I'm aware of as just about everybody else is [or in this case would], already worried by the Muslim expansion.

More worried about the Ottomans in Naples than the French in Naples?

As for rivals: This is early modern Europe. Is there any state that isn't a rival to its neighbors by definition? Including Switzerland and the Papal States?

Please read what I said. I said all those affected in the western Med.

I'm not saying that (the All of the West) is what you said, I'm pointing out that southern Italy being taken is going to matter to and only to the people who either a) fought the Ottomans over the Mediterranean issues anyway, or b) have an interest in southern Italy specifically.

That's not the same thing as the Western Mediterranean powers being more anti-Ottoman than OTL.

If the Ottomans get bogged down seeking to hold the area and fighting with those opposing them then that will distract a lot of resources.

Why would they be particularly bogged down here? Are the natives going to resent Ottoman rule more than they did in say, Croatia?

Possibly but in many kingdoms power was often fairly transient at the time and could easily collapse or revive rapidly. Even after Hungary was largely occupied various smaller regions continued to put up a lot of opposition with varying degrees of success.

This is true. But I think OTL indicates how well (or badly) the Ottomans could deal with that. Which brings up a point - I think realistically the scenario lies somewhere between cakewalk and Sealion, though I think it is definitely within their grasp.

You're probably right but even an unreformed Marmaluke state could be a problem if the empire is heavy tied up elsewhere.

Could, yes. There are a lot of possibilities from "the Ottomans decide they want southern Italy", all the way from Sicily as a convenient base to Sicily as an incurable headache. Too much depends on the details rather than something as generic as the number of troops in the Ottoman army vs. how many are in Naples.

Not really as the Ottomans held one town briefly, as opposed to a large scale and permanent occupation.

I should have written my response here better - the OTL efforts elsewhere. The Ottomans taking Constantinople lead to enough hot air to raise temperatures two or three degrees Centigrade, but very little actual campaigning.

I'm not saying that everyone will be blindly obedient to the Papacy. The various rulers and nobles have their own interests. However some will be affected by religious matters.

This is true, and it is conceivable that a threat to Rome would inspire more than was inspired by other things - but I think most of those people are already committed by the Ottomans being heathens.

Please make you're mind up. You were just saying that involvement in Italy wouldn't distract from operations elsewhere.

"If". If it does turn out in the direction of "the Ottomans are distracted from elsewhere", the Poles will have less conflict with the Ottomans than OTL, not more.

I'm not saying that would be the case, just that if it is, it leaves Poland less inclined to care about who the Ottomans are eating.

Poland has a large hostile and expansionist state on its border. Its not going to be friendly to it just because that state is a bit weaker and hence not putting as much pressure on it. Even presuming that the Ottomans can put enough pressure on their Crimean subjects. Hence, even if Poland isn't affected by any urgent appeals from Italy they will probably be fighting the empire. Which will require at least some resources sent from Constantinople to help hold them back.

Its not going to be friendly to it, but it has several states it has to worry about in this regard, and picking the Ottomans over Muscovy is not a given. So I'm not saying the Poles will be "yay, go Ottomans, go!" - but they might regard their other expansionistic neighbors with more alarm and only side with the HRE if it seems that the Ottomans threatening it is a threat to Poland - as opposed to supporting an anti-Ottoman coalition based on the Ottomans doing better in the Mediterranean.

Some did but as I said the repeated conflicts built up an alliance of powers who saw their security in uniting against a common threat. That's all I'm assuming will happen here.

But there isn't a common threat. That's the whole problem for those who do want an anti-Ottoman coalition. Bad news for Aragon is not going to trouble France a bit (or vice-versa).

Using Aragon as the Spanish kingdom which brought Naples into Chuckistan*.

Again I never said that. I'm just thinking about the larger number of states that will be threatened by the proposed Ottoman actions.

Which will be...

Who is threatened by this that isn't on the list that fought at Lepanto (a good sign of who found the Ottomans pushing into the Western Mediterranean worth sending ships to stop)?

If Spain is suffering because of the Ottomans, Spain's rivals will take advantage of that. Spain's rivals will want to see Spain be bled and exhausted even if it is by a heathen.

The Barbary pirates were officially subjects of the Sultans and even if not directly involved will be drawn into the vacuum caused by the need to face the Ottoman fleets.

True, but the other side of this - ironically - is that an Ottoman empire stronger in the Western Mediterranean is likely to want to tighten its control over Barbary (empires tending to do that.)

Why not? If the Christian powers are being drawn into battles off Sicily and southern Italy they have less resources to protect their coasts and coastal shipping and also a campaign in Italy generates new supply lines that can be raided.

See above, otherwise agreed.

What other two.

"I don't know enough about either the Ottoman navy or the Barbary pirates" is how that should have been written.

Possibly I'm wrong but I had the impression that, while there might be a formal unified state the situation on the ground was a lot more scattered with a lot of local lords. Could be wrong there however.

Could be. I don't know enough to dispute that.

Apart from the straw man you keep raising, posing a threat is not the same as being able to come through on that threat, especially when it means a long war at the end of a long supply line.

I'm not intending any strawmen, I promise. But the point is that if they have the resources for taking southern Italy to mean more than...southern Italy to anyone - then they have the resources to take Southern Italy.

So they can't be both intimidating enough to threaten the Western Mediterranean beyond Sicily and weak enough to have trouble even taking Naples.


*: Chuckistan is the inheritance of Charles V, or (depending on context) the Holy Roman Empire as it existed under him as emperor. Its such a mess that trying to consider it one state makes no sense, and so we need a name for The States Which Charles Happened to Inherit, thus the name.

That, and I have a bad sense of humor. Calling one of the more powerful Holy Roman Emperors "Chuck" appeals to my irreverent side.

 

[Admiral Matt]

Reposted due to laziness.

The Ottomans would need to be free to make an attempt at Italy during the reign of a competent man, at or near the height of their strength, and when Europe was weak. I believe Abdul's suggested a wee period where these factors were in place.

Now, the potential military threats to Ottoman conquest are, roughly, the French, the Italians, the Venetians, the Spanish, and the Hapsburgs. The rest of Europe was far too interested in fighting itself in the post-crusades period to bother. They typically became interested when the enemy showed up next door, or next door to their enemies. Otherwise.... who cares?

Of these, the French were perennially trying to lay hands on the north of the place and were a frequent Ottoman ally. At times the Ottomans used French ports to raid Christian states. There were many points in OTL where it would have been greatly in French interests to promote Ottoman efforts, so long as they were south of Tuscany. Any Ottoman Italy would necessarily involve another case of benevolent neutrality or alliance on the part of France.

The Italians can offer some resistance, but their military potential is not terribly impressive. IIRC, their mercenary forces were renowned for their duplicity and lack of ability. The assets they do have are a fair bit of money to hire said condottieri, much better logistics, and (as Faeelin points out) mosquitos.

Though the Ottomans had put the Venetians in decline by the period, they retain a creditable navy, a lot of cash, a uniquely stable polity for Italy, and a strong interest in fighting. They'd be a major problem but were fighting out of their weight as was amply demonstrated in prior wars.

The Spanish will always be the biggest military threat to Ottoman efforts in Italy. Let me modify that. The Spanish will always be the biggest military threat to Ottoman efforts in Italy if Spain exists and is a Power. Neither was inevitable - even in 1400. Aragon is far weaker, Castile doesn't care, and even if it exists, Spain's strength was fed from the New World. The Age of Exploration was not a steady inevitable progression and could easily have been delayed half a century or more. And nothing was inevitable about Spain's ludicrous Columbus-Cortez-Pizarro fumble into imperial greatness. There is no certainty of a threat to the Ottomans from the west - there just happened to be in OTL.

The Hapsburgs are a major power, and at such a logistic distance for the Ottomans, a mortal threat. Would they intervene?

They certainly would if the Ottomans were in the Po Valley, but come on. If the Ottomans are at the fricking Po, you already have Ottoman Italy. By then - how much do they get? - is the real question.

They'd intervene to save Rome (it would spite the French) if they had nothing else to do. Many, many times in their history there were dynastic issues or wars in Northern Europe that would have tied their hands.

Would they turn up to save Sicily? Pfft.

What all this suggests to me was that in our time line there was only a brief window of opportunity for winning any Italian possessions. I'm not as conversant with the period as some, so I'll make only the statements I feel I can back up:

[1] It wasn't that likely to happen when it almost happened.

[2] With a Point of Divergence in 1350, 1400, or perhaps even 1450, the political landscape could be totally altered by the time the Ottomans are ready across the Straits. Some possible arrangements of dynasty, state, and war would probably make partial conquest easy to achieve.

For example, Spain doesn't form, Venice declines faster, and the Ottomans have a series of naval victories, maybe taking Malta. They get a foothold in the heel of the boot, set up an administration, and sit there. If French are currently commited to taking Milan and feel they're stuck, battling a motley of Italian players, the Pope, and perhaps the Hapsburgs, they'll likely turn to the Ottomans for help.

The French Mediterranean fleet can back it up, French and French-occupied ports are usable, and most of Italy already committed to another war. In these circumstances the Ottomans are probably up for taking most of sub-Papal Italy and threatening Rome. If the Hapsburgs are unable to contribute massively by that point, this result is likely a permanent one.

I can imagine other scenarios, but let's take this as a beginning.

So.

 

[Elfwine]

Seems solid enough to me for me to ask what exactly the POD is.

That is, for this part:


With a Point of Divergence in 1350, 1400, or perhaps even 1450, the political landscape could be totally altered by the time the Ottomans are ready across the Straits. Some possible arrangements of dynasty, state, and war would probably make partial conquest easy to achieve.

For example, Spain doesn't form, Venice declines faster, and the Ottomans have a series of naval victories, maybe taking Malta. They get a foothold in the heel of the boot, set up an administration, and sit there. If French are currently commited to taking Milan and feel they're stuck, battling a motley of Italian players, the Pope, and perhaps the Hapsburgs, they'll likely turn to the Ottomans for help.

The French Mediterranean fleet can back it up, French and French-occupied ports are usable, and most of Italy already committed to another war. In these circumstances the Ottomans are probably up for taking most of sub-Papal Italy and threatening Rome. If the Hapsburgs are unable to contribute massively by that point, this result is likely a permanent one.

That seems to be a fairly easy set of circumstances to achieve, if OTL is insufficient.

 

[LordKalvan]

The problem is that the Ottomans have not unlimited resources, and they have - like all empires - a number of very widespread fronts where they need to project power or to manage external threats.

Even disregarding the possibly unsurmontable difficulties of landing an army in southern Italy and keeping them fed and provisioned over the Adriatic (which is plainly not possible in the winter, by the way), the sultan has to take care of the Balkan front, the eastern Anatolian front (Safavids) and the Mamelukes in Syria (who as Stevep mentions, fought him to a standstill in 1485), the Polish commonwealth in Moldavia. Not to mention the fact that the bulk of the Ottoman armies is made up of timars, and these guys cannot simply go to war and stay there: they need to go back to their holds and manage them.

There is a reason for which Otranto was taken (no big deal there), but was also lost soon, and no sultan after that tried again his luck in an invasion of Italy: Ottoman priorities were different. Securing the Balkan border required to defeat decisively the Hungarians, and this happened at Mohacs: however the subsequent siege of Vienna proved that the logistics of the Ottomans would be stretched too thin to go further north and west (and even a successful siege of Vienna would not have changed significantly the equation).
The Safavid problem never had a successful resolution. The Mamelukes went down pretty fast in 1517, but this was the end of the road. No further major expansion was feasible.

 

[Elfwine]

They do not need unlimited resources, and their choice of focusing elsewhere and not bothering is not the same thing as it being beyond their means - why spend the time and effort on Naples when you have other fronts that are more important even if Naples is possible?

Also, the logistical situation of supplying an army in southern Italy are easier than the landward logistics of approaching Vienna. Waterborne is nice like that.

I wouldn't want to try doing it in the winter, but armies have managed to be supplied by states with holdings in both places (the Balkans and southern Italy) before.

From one of the older threads:

Pretty much agreed. Malta, Naples and Sicily were roughly midway between the Spanish and Ottoman power bases, and could have gone either way, whereas the chances of the Ottomans liberating Granada or the Spaniards Cyprus were always pretty remote. Possession of Italy, however, strengthened the Habsburgs vis a vis other Christian powers, and possession of its southern half would have strengthened the Ottomans vis a vis other Moslem ones.

So while I think this is possible, I think it is also getting to the point of maxing out the Empire's disposable resources.

An extreme effort could see even more, perhaps. But such an effort would definitely weaken the Ottomans in the long term and offer their rivals juicy opportunities as the state tries to recover from the extraordinary costs in always-precious resources (trained manpower, loyal and competent generals, and similar hard-to-replace personal).

Not to mention the merely financial issues. Even a cakewalk campaign is still going to require a fair sized amount of spending to defend the place and to govern it.

 

[LordKalvan]

Sea-borne logistics are nice and easy, provided they come with a complete naval superiority. I don't remember the Ottomans ever trying to blockade the mouth of the Adriatic, which would be a major undertaking (OTOH, I do remember at least 4 or 5 instances of Venice blockading the Dardanelles).
The most the Ottomans ever did boils down to a couple of sieges on Corfu, and one of them was quite a poor thing.

There is also the minor matter of horses: it takes a lot of ships to take them across the Adriatic, and more ships to transport fodder for them.

Then it's quite a long way to go from Otranto to Naples: as of today the road distance is 460 km (which is not so different from the 600 km distance between Belgrade and Vienna). I would not care to guess how longer you had to go in the 15th century, but I do know that sooner or later one has to pass the Appennines. It's not impossible, mind: Roman armies did it routinely when going to Greece. It's not so easy when one has to bring along a train siege.
There are narrows in the mountains which can be interdicted easily enough, and the status of the roads in the 15th century was certainly poorer than in Roman age. I would guess that it would take a train siege at least a couple of months (if not more) to go from Otranto to Naples, and it could start not earlier than April (assuming that the Ottoman army can be mustered, march to Epyrus and then be ferried across the Adriatic in time). So the Ottoman army might be in front of Naples by the end of June.

By this time the harvest is in, so the army must bring his own provisions along. How big an army, btw? 100,000 men, out of which 25-30 k cavalry, 10 k auxiliaries and the rest infantry? Add another 30 k for camp followers and servants. This means 130 k overall, and on average a man need 5 pounds of bread per day. Then the supply route must be guarded against raids. I'd say that most of the cavalry will be needed for that, and at least 10-15 k of infantry to garrison towns and casles along the route.

IMHO the Ottomans would be lucky to bring 50 k man in front of Naples, and then there is the small problem to reduce the walls within two months at latest (ok, let's be optimistic and say three months). The usual ratio of strength in a siege was 5:1 in favour of the defenders. 10,000 men, properly commanded and supplied, should be enough to hold the city.

Note that I've not yet gone into the woes of supplying all these people across the Adriatic

 

[Elfwine]

Sea-borne logistics are nice and easy, provided they come with a complete naval superiority. I don't remember the Ottomans ever trying to blockade the mouth of the Adriatic, which would be a major undertaking (OTOH, I do remember at least 4 or 5 instances of Venice blockading the Dardanelles).
The most the Ottomans ever did boils down to a couple of sieges on Corfu, and one of them was quite a poor thing.

There is also the minor matter of horses: it takes a lot of ships to take them across the Adriatic, and more ships to transport fodder for them.

Then it's quite a long way to go from Otranto to Naples: as of today the road distance is 460 km (which is not so different from the 600 km distance between Belgrade and Vienna). I would not care to guess how longer you had to go in the 15th century, but I do know that sooner or later one has to pass the Appennines. It's not impossible, mind: Roman armies did it routinely when going to Greece. It's not so easy when one has to bring along a train siege.

There are narrows in the mountains which can be interdicted easily enough, and the status of the roads in the 15th century was certainly poorer than in Roman age. I would guess that it would take a train siege at least a couple of months (if not more) to go from Otranto to Naples, and it could start not earlier than April (assuming that the Ottoman army can be mustered, march to Epyrus and then be ferried across the Adriatic in time). So the Ottoman army might be in front of Naples by the end of June.

By this time the harvest is in, so the army must bring his own provisions along. How big an army, btw? 100,000 men, out of which 25-30 k cavalry, 10 k auxiliaries and the rest infantry? Add another 30 k for camp followers and servants. This means 130 k overall, and on average a man need 5 pounds of bread per day. Then the supply route must be guarded against raids. I'd say that most of the cavalry will be needed for that, and at least 10-15 k of infantry to garrison towns and casles along the route.

IMHO the Ottomans would be lucky to bring 50 k man in front of Naples, and then there is the small problem to reduce the walls within two months at latest (ok, let's be optimistic and say three months). The usual ratio of strength in a siege was 5:1 in favour of the defenders. 10,000 men, properly commanded and supplied, should be enough to hold the city.

Note that I've not yet gone into the woes of supplying all these people across the Adriatic

Note that the Ottomans have managed things even more removed from their base than this. And land is slower and harder than water even with less-than-absolute control of the sea.

It isn't as if they have to do it in one campaigning season or not at all, either.

Or solely off supplies transported across the Adriatic with not a scrap of local supplies.

How did earlier armies that did manage to take Naples (Sicily being an island means either a separate water trip or a separate expedition) do so? Why can't the Ottomans do at least as well?

This isn't the best argument, I know. But I don't know enough about the Ottomans to point to some specific cure - just that their conquests from OTL do not indicate a power that would be unable to pursue this successfully if it so chose, if circumstances permitted - doing it at the height of a war with another contender (say Hungary for discussion's sake) is not feasible, most likely.

 

[LordKalvan]

Note that the Ottomans have managed things even more removed from their base than this. And land is slower and harder than water even with less-than-absolute control of the sea.

It isn't as if they have to do it in one campaigning season or not at all, either.

Or solely off supplies transported across the Adriatic with not a scrap of local supplies.

How did earlier armies that did manage to take Naples (Sicily being an island means either a separate water trip or a separate expedition) do so? Why can't the Ottomans do at least as well?

This isn't the best argument, I know. But I don't know enough about the Ottomans to point to some specific cure - just that their conquests from OTL do not indicate a power that would be unable to pursue this successfully if it so chose, if circumstances permitted - doing it at the height of a war with another contender (say Hungary for discussion's sake) is not feasible, most likely.

My point is that compared to a campaign in the Balkans - based on a sure supply-and-storage basis like Belgrade - this is even more difficult, because the land route is more or less similar, but there is also a significant amount of ferrying to do.

Note that the previous armies to conquer Naples (the Anjous and Charles VIII come to mind) came from the north, along the Thyrrenian coast and both had significant allies and supplies points along the route, not to mention naval support.

And while there is some chance to forage, southern Italy in the 15th century is no land of plenty: most of the provisions and the forage (and certainly 100% of the gunpowder and armaments) has to be transported along.

There are no winter sieges in this time and age; or if something similar happens, the usual ending is the besieger loosing many more men to cold and plague (in particular what the WW1 infantrymen called corporal Forbus ) than in the actual fighting.

I could also go into the difficulties of ferrying supply and troops from Greece against a determined opportunity, but I cannot but notice that my comment on the impossibility for the Ottomans to gain a real control of the mouth of the Adriatic for a significant amount of time have not been commented.

It's easy to say that the Ottomans are gorgeous and can kick ass, without substantiating the argument. My knowledge (albeit limited) of early Renaissance warfare on land and sea gives the lie to it.
And please do not invoke Mohacs, which was a nice example of Hungarian suicide I think that the wars with Safavid Persia are more to the point: there is a limit beyond which no state in this age can afford to project power.

 

[Elfwine]

My point is that compared to a campaign in the Balkans - based on a sure supply-and-storage basis like Belgrade - this is even more difficult, because the land route is more or less similar, but there is also a significant amount of ferrying to do.

I'm not sure, though it would be rather easy in any given timeline on an attempt to have this go very badly wrong.

Note that the previous armies to conquer Naples (the Anjous and Charles VIII come to mind) came from the north, along the Thyrrenian coast and both had significant allies and supplies points along the route, not to mention naval support.

And the Ottomans will have no naval support beyond the equivalent of Napoleon's leaky barges of 1805? I'm not sure I follow why you're so confident in Ottoman naval weakness.

And while there is some chance to forage, southern Italy in the 15th century is no land of plenty: most of the provisions and the forage (and certainly 100% of the gunpowder and armaments) has to be transported along.

There are no winter sieges in this time and age; or if something similar happens, the usual ending is the besieger loosing many more men to cold and plague (in particular what the WW1 infantrymen called corporal Forbus ) than in the actual fighting.

In southern Italy? And plague killing more than the actual fighting...how long did it take before disease was less effective at thinning ranks than bullets? Well after this period I know that.

Not saying I'd want to face a winter siege as the Ottoman commander, but at worst but the Ottomans can take some part of the area, hole up for the winter, move on in Spring, and continue until something more effective derails their plans

I could also go into the difficulties of ferrying supply and troops from Greece against a determined opportunity, but I cannot but notice that my comment on the impossibility for the Ottomans to gain a real control of the mouth of the Adriatic for a significant amount of time have not been commented.

Because in any scenario in which this comes up, it will either be achieved (and the invasion becomes at least potentially possible) or it won't be (and it won't get off the ground). And your "I cannot remember this happening" is not the same thing as it being impossible - I might be nitpicking a tad there, but failing to recall any occasions and demonstrating repeated failure are distinct enough that I'd like something more to go on before taking it more seriously than that.

No offense, but its uninformative.

It's easy to say that the Ottomans are gorgeous and can kick ass, without substantiating the argument. My knowledge (albeit limited) of early Renaissance warfare on land and sea gives the lie to it.
And please do not invoke Mohacs, which was a nice example of Hungarian suicide I think that the wars with Safavid Persia are more to the point: there is a limit beyond which no state in this age can afford to project power.

I don't know enough about Mohacs to invoke it specifically (if you know enough to be worth sharing I'd greatly appreciate it out of sheer curiosity), but the Ottomans building this: http://rbedrosian.com/Maps/muhamm40.htm indicates that they were very good at taking care of the obstacles in the way of Empire. And those wars by the Safavids are hardly proof of the Ottomans being unable to expand westward - just that they've reached the limit to the East, partially due to Mesopotamia already being quite far away from Constantinople.

Is there a limit? Yes. No one is disputing that - until Eurofed decides that the Ottomans are Roman heirs and he adds them to his hegemon-fantasy scenarios - but is southern Italy outside that limit? That's harder to accept.

The ultimate limit of Empire and the specific impossibility of conquest in southern Italy, which may or may not be pursued as an "instead of" rather than an "in addition to" expansion (the original post gives no indication one way or the other on what he's asking about) are entirely different matters.

This being said, I think it would be difficult for the Ottomans to achieve such a level of superiority as to render it inevitable short of significant sacrifices elsewhere.

Doable, no. Inevitable? They're not that strong.

 

[LordKalvan]

<snip>

There is something funny going on here: by your own admission you don't know much about the period, the way war is waged in Early Renaissance, the history of the kingdom of Naples, the logistics difficulties in managing an invasion with very long supply routes. Notwithstanding this, you're arguing - on very flimsy basis - that it can be done.
Make an outline of a TL, and try to prove your point. Otherwise I've to think you're just being contrary for the sake of it.
I'd also suggest that you check your irony meter, which appears not to be working properly. When I said that "I don't remember the Ottomans achieving control of the mouth of the Adriatic" anyone with a minimum knowledge of history and of the expansion of the Ottoman empire would understand that it never happened.

 

[Elfwine]

There is something funny going on here: by your own admission you don't know much about the period, the way war is waged in Early Renaissance, the history of the kingdom of Naples, the logistics difficulties in managing an invasion with very long supply routes. Notwithstanding this, you're arguing - on very flimsy basis - that it can be done.
Make an outline of a TL, and try to prove your point. Otherwise I've to think you're just being contrary for the sake of it.

I don't know very much about the period, correct. But I do know enough to say that an empire which has accomplished conquests further away against stronger enemies is likely to be able to face the difficulties in the way of success in southern Italy.

There aren't "very long supply routes" by comparison to taking Egypt, for instance - a conquest the Ottomans actually accomplished. The logistical difficulties for a power that controls the sea - which the power that has defeated Venice is capable of doing if it commits the resources to do so - are less than for campaigning into Hungary.

And your assertion that the Ottomans can't do it all in one season therefore it can't be done is treating it as if there is no way they can plan a war that would take longer. How long did it take Castile and Aragon to take out Granada? Was that beyond the campaigning of "the early Renaissance" because it took more than one year?

I am fairly sure we can find other examples without much searching, but as Aragon and Castile are weaker than the Ottoman Empire, and yet they managed to launch such a war in roughly the time period we seem to be looking at specifically, the question of "so why can't the Ottomans?" needs an answer.

Other people have conquered and held southern Italy. With less resources and a less developed state. Them coming down from the north doesn't change the issue of resources and roads that run north-south also do as well south-north.

I'd also suggest that you check your irony meter, which appears not to be working properly. When I said that "I don't remember the Ottomans achieving control of the mouth of the Adriatic" anyone with a minimum knowledge of history and of the expansion of the Ottoman empire would understand that it never happened.

Speaking as someone with a "minimum knowledge of history and the expansion of the Ottoman empire", I didn't know whether they ever accomplished it or not (as doing so for some period of time would not assist their wars in other theaters), and I certainly don't know why you're acting as if the Ottomans are incapable of doing it if they attempt the kind of invasion we're looking at.

One would think the Ottomans were barely holding on to what they have by the tone of your posts.

 

[MAlexMatt]

Otherwise I've to think you're just being contrary for the sake of it.

Elfwine likes doing that.

 

[Elfwine]

Elfwine likes doing that.

I dislike accepting extreme pessimism ("can't be done even though it was never seriously attempted OTL") or optimism ("can be done even though all attempts failed OTL") about empires.

People arguing that the Ottomans can't do it even though they managed campaigns at a greater distance on the grounds that the logistics are problematic is...assuming that solutions cannot be found rather than were not sought. "Obviously, there's no difficulty supplying an army in Egypt, since we all know Egypt is close by and undefended, but southern Italy would make invading China look practical." (exaggeration for illustration of why I'm being "contrary").

If that's the same as being contrary for the sake of it, we must be using two different languages.

Then again, you did associate support for the British government's policies towards the colonies with being a fascist. I'm fairly sure the only thing we agree on is that carnage isn't spelled with a K.