Ottoman Victory in 1877-78 : Effects on Europe ?

Say, if as per Pasha's PoD he used for his TL, Hüseyin_Avni_Paşa survived the assassination, and then he as a capable Minister of War provided the unity of command(what IOTL Ottomans didn't have that time) for the Ottoman Army to successfully repel Russian invasion,.... how will the other powers perceive such result effecting the continental and global Balance of Power ?

Ottoman Empire has just successfully saved its face and power base, while Russia hasn't, for the face part at least. The latter's prestige have taken a severe beating, and considering that her war against Ottomans was in part a diversion attempt from internal problems, interesting time will ensue there.

Without Bulgaria being formed, it means nationalism has taken a setback, and with Russian Balkan ambition killed, both things will effect Austria-Hungary's latter foreign policies, especially since later means elimination of a main point of friction with Russia.

Also, IOTL due to the defeat, Ottomans under Abdul Hamid II underwent a period of despotism, while previously the empire was pretty much a rapidly liberalizing constitutional monarchy with functioning parliament and democracy. This was in part, other than Abdul Hamid's personal nature and the vulnerable state of the post-defeat empire to Padishah's encroachment, also because of Russian pressure who didn't want to be the only autocracy in Europe. ITTL, will it be the Russian Empire instead which will liberalize more quickly ?

What will become of the European alliance system ? As with A-H, Germany also distanced themselves from Russia after the war, and Bismarck played a fierce role in limiting Russian gains from the war. How will Germany take a defeated Russia, however ? Also, how will be France and Britain's take on the matter, respectively ?
 
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Well why thank you very much for your trouble but your respond frankly doesn't relate to my question here.

Oh, and I have known that thread since ages ago.

I think it does a little bit. The Ottomans remained a Balkan-centered state until 1878 when they lost a lot of land. Nationalism can be killed off since the Muslim population in the Balkans is around 43 percent and was growing mostly due to immigration from Anatolia which was a lot poorer than the Balkans. That way you can have a workforce for industrialization which the Balkans are perfect for. France and Britain would remain as 'protectors' of keeping the Ottoman state while I can see Germany setting their eyes on making allies out of the Ottomans.
 
1) I think it does a little bit. 2) France and Britain would remain as 'protectors' of keeping the Ottoman state while I can see Germany setting their eyes on making allies out of the Ottomans.

1) Virtually not.

2) Well I agree that relations with France and Britain will remain not bad. But I don't know about Germany. In this scenario they will have less points of friction with Russia and possibly a chance to pull Russia into their camp as a relatively less equal partner. Of course, I don't see Germany having any reason to alienate the Ottomans either....
 
2) Well I agree that relations with France and Britain will remain not bad. But I don't know about Germany. In this scenario they will have less points of friction with Russia and possibly a chance to pull Russia into their camp as a relatively less equal partner. Of course, I don't see Germany having any reason to alienate the Ottomans either....

And this particular thing is actually my main point of curiosity. Will it be Germany+A-H+Russia VS Britain+France+Ottomans as the most likely camps during this scenario's alternate Great War, or something else ?
 
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And this particular thing is actually my main point of curiosity. Will it be Germany+A-H+Russia VS Britain+France+Ottomans as the most likely camps during this scenario's alternate Cold War, or something else ?

Most likely. I do wonder what side Italy will take.
 
No matter how far along modernization it has come,
The Ottomans will be crushed in this senario.

Russia +AH border the Ottomans and they will be losing territory fast on at least 3 fronts.

Ok they fought on 5 fronts in the OTL but they never faced the undivided attention of a quickly modernizing Russia and the AH at the same time.
 
No matter how far along modernization it has come,
The Ottomans will be crushed in this senario.

Russia +AH border the Ottomans and they will be losing territory fast on at least 3 fronts.

Ok they fought on 5 fronts in the OTL but they never faced the undivided attention of a quickly modernizing Russia and the AH at the same time.

Thank you for your verrry well thoughtfull contribution :)
 
Random thoughts:

Russia might be forced to Liberalize some, but I doubt it will do it to any large extent. We might see something similar to the Kaisarreich-selective adoption of social welfare policies and limited democratic institutions within an authoritarian framework.

The Ottoman Empire will probably be taken much more seriously as a Great Power. "Sick man of Europe" might well disappear from Europe's political lexicon.

As to the alliance system-as was pointed out above, the main point of friction between Russia and Austria-expansion in the Balkans-has been removed. As Russia's limited liberalization will probably make its political system similar to what exists in Austria and Germany, I could see something like the Dreikaiserbund (an OTL abortive alliance of Germany, Austria, and Russia) lasting. Britain will continue to support the Ottoman empire as a counterweight to Russia, and I can ultimately imagine a Britain-France-Ottoman alliance emerging to counter the colossus in Central and Eastern Europe.

As for the second-rank powers, Greece will almost certainly support the Dreikaiserbund (out of anti-Ottomanism and the Megali Idea). Serbia and Montenegro probably will as well, for similar reasons. Romania is harder to predict-they have reasons to want both the Danube delta (in the Ottoman Empire) and Transylvania (in Austria). Of these, Transylvania is the greater prize, so I suspect they will ally with the Ottomans against Austria. Italy is the joker in the deck-they have irredentist claims on France, Austria, and the Ottomans. I suspect they will side with allies for fear of being dominated by Austria and Germany, but we can't really be sure.

If *World War I happens in this TL, its going to be really hairy for the allies-their going to have a lot of long spread out fronts (France, Balkans, possibly Italy), while the Dreikaiserbund will have the three most numerous armies in Europe and an absolutely ludicrous amount of strategic depth. The allies, however, will have a better navy.
 
Most likely. I do wonder what side Italy will take.

Thing is, a crucial point of friction between Ottomans and Russians have just been eliminated. Russia will be left with a deep Balkan-related trauma, especially if their defeat would be followed by a nation-wide unrest in home. This is also behind my question regarding whether we will see a more liberal Russia, or at least just less autocratic, this way....

As for Italy since they have been closer to France and Britain since its formation, if both said powers will be in the same camp most likely Italy will follow.

That raise another little question : what will become of British-French relations ? So far I imagine them to have quite less point of friction, especially if Egypt will be reoccupied by TTL Ottomans....
 
Hrm.... That assumes that Russia could effectively give up on the Balkans. So long as Russia seeks the Straits and leadership of the Slavs, it will be have vastly opposing interests to Austria-Hungary. It'd be hard indeed to extend such an alliance to the turn of the century.
 
Hrm.... That assumes that Russia could effectively give up on the Balkans. So long as Russia seeks the Straits and leadership of the Slavs, it will be have vastly opposing interests to Austria-Hungary. It'd be hard indeed to extend such an alliance to the turn of the century.

Why wouldn't they give up the Balkans if it only brought a political disaster in home ? Pan-Slavism as a Russian tool will be dead for good this way, and the failure and the following shock from the defeat and their shattered prestige in the Balkans will imprint a not exactly very good Balkan-related memory into their later political mindset....

Thing is, that will also make later relations between Russia and Ottoman Empire better contra OTL, which is why I'm not decided about Ottoman-Russia relations in the long run.
 
1) Russia might be forced to Liberalize some, but I doubt it will do it to any large extent. We might see something similar to the Kaisarreich-selective adoption of social welfare policies and limited democratic institutions within an authoritarian framework.

2) As to the alliance system-as was pointed out above, the main point of friction between Russia and Austria-expansion in the Balkans-has been removed. As Russia's limited liberalization will probably make its political system similar to what exists in Austria and Germany, I could see something like the Dreikaiserbund (an OTL abortive alliance of Germany, Austria, and Russia) lasting. Britain will continue to support the Ottoman empire as a counterweight to Russia, and I can ultimately imagine a Britain-France-Ottoman alliance emerging to counter the colossus in Central and Eastern Europe.

3) As for the second-rank powers, Greece will almost certainly support the Dreikaiserbund (out of anti-Ottomanism and the Megali Idea). Serbia and Montenegro probably will as well, for similar reasons. Romania is harder to predict-they have reasons to want both the Danube delta (in the Ottoman Empire) and Transylvania (in Austria).

4) If *World War I happens in this TL, its going to be really hairy for the allies-their going to have a lot of long spread out fronts (France, Balkans, possibly Italy), while the Dreikaiserbund will have the three most numerous armies in Europe and an absolutely ludicrous amount of strategic depth. The allies, however, will have a better navy.

1) Sounds reasonable.

2) It does seem that League of Three Emperors will be a very likely appearance. However, thing is I'm not sure about how their relations with Ottoman Empire will become. Russia won't likely to have anymore direct point of friction with Ottomans. I'm not sure about Austria-Hungary though. As fellow anti-national empires, they will be glad that Ottoman Empire will stay intact. OTOH they will have less to worry about Ottomans, and A-H did aim for expansion for their economic sphere towards Ottoman and Serbian direction.

Interestingly, Pasha once said that South Slavism can actually be a source of conflict between A-H and OE, but I'm not aware of the basis of his argument....

And for Germany I also don't think they will be interested so much to alienate OE, especially if they would want a share in Suez Canal and later, Ottoman oil....

3) I'm not sure that Greece will be as much anti-Ottoman as OTL, as they won't be facing an Empire that has been stripped off their proto-industry, traditional power base and veteran army. And that's not mentioning demographic shift to more Islamic which the Ottoman Balkans was under back then. It'll be more likely when Ottomans have been set to antagonistic stance with Dreikaiserbund, but even by then it doesn't seem to be inevitable that Greece will jump to Dreikaiserbund's camp.

As for Romania, IIRC Dobruja was overwhelmingly Turkish muslim prior to the war.

4) Oh yes, Dreikaiserbund will be stronger than OTL's CP indeed. But again, back to the question of Dreikaiserbund-Ottoman relationship. That, and the possibility of a WW1 analogue will ever occur at all. Much of OTL tensions that led to WW1 owed crucially to the power vacuum left by the declining Ottoman power, after all....
 
Why wouldn't they give up the Balkans if it only brought a political disaster in home ? Pan-Slavism as a Russian tool will be dead for good this way, and the failure and the following shock from the defeat and their shattered prestige in the Balkans will imprint a not exactly very good Balkan-related memory into their later political mindset....

For exactly the same reason that, in the films and such, you have the main character as a child watch their father/relative/friend/anyone they cared about die to the villain, then they stew in hiding and learn to fight etc and return to kill the villain 20 years later: Revenge. Pan-Slavism wouldn't die as the result of one loss. The Russians in this era were far too arrogant about their status as Kings Of All Slavs and Rulers Of All Orthodox Christians to possibly give up their own Manifest Destiny. Instead they would look with vitriol on the unGodly Ottoman Empire as even more of an aberration and anyone with the slightest influence at court would start making repeated calls for a retaliatory attack on the Ottomans. After all, it would be ridiculous to suggest that, political crisis or not, the Russians would be crushed and flattened by a single loss to the Ottomans. They would simply make sure that the next time their attack was overwhelming. It would be akin to Cato the Elder in the times of the Punic Wars of Rome: finishing every speech, no matter how irrelevant to Carthage, with the words "in conclusion, Carthage must be destroyed."
 
For exactly the same reason that, in the films and such, you have the main character as a child watch their father/relative/friend/anyone they cared about die to the villain, then they stew in hiding and learn to fight etc and return to kill the villain 20 years later: Revenge. Pan-Slavism wouldn't die as the result of one loss. The Russians in this era were far too arrogant about their status as Kings Of All Slavs and Rulers Of All Orthodox Christians to possibly give up their own Manifest Destiny. Instead they would look with vitriol on the unGodly Ottoman Empire as even more of an aberration and anyone with the slightest influence at court would start making repeated calls for a retaliatory attack on the Ottomans. After all, it would be ridiculous to suggest that, political crisis or not, the Russians would be crushed and flattened by a single loss to the Ottomans. They would simply make sure that the next time their attack was overwhelming. It would be akin to Cato the Elder in the times of the Punic Wars of Rome: finishing every speech, no matter how irrelevant to Carthage, with the words "in conclusion, Carthage must be destroyed."

Well, Pan Slavism became very little heard of in Russia after their victory IOTL, at least until WW1. A defeat will put the idea away for good it seems.

Not saying that hostilities between two empires cannot reemerge later, but re-forwarding the idea of they being the champion of Pan-Slavism will be too intolerably ridiculous for Russia to do. Their prestige among the Balkan Slavs was already killed in this scenario, remember ?

Especially if A-H is with them in an anti-Ottoman camp.
 
Ridwan Asher

Wouldn't they still have the desire to control the straits, especially with the growing economic importance of the Ukraine and Don basin? It could be argued that the pan-slav case was propaganda for the prime aim of expanding Russian control southwards and especially for the straits.

Steve
 
Ridwan Asher

Wouldn't they still have the desire to control the straits, especially with the growing economic importance of the Ukraine and Don basin? It could be argued that the pan-slav case was propaganda for the prime aim of expanding Russian control southwards and especially for the straits.

Steve
I've read that the Russians urge to control the straits wasn't that strong. Most of the time, they were mearly happy with a friendly power controlling them. In regards to pan-slavism, as Ridwan said before, it becaume a much weaker force in OTL. This was mainly because the Russians realised that expansion elsewhere (such as Asia) was more rewarding then in the Balkans. In TTL, this would be added to the the fact that they cannot militarily beat the Ottomans, so they are likely to try to expand their power elsewhere.
 
I've read that the Russians urge to control the straits wasn't that strong. Most of the time, they were mearly happy with a friendly power controlling them. In regards to pan-slavism, as Ridwan said before, it becaume a much weaker force in OTL. This was mainly because the Russians realised that expansion elsewhere (such as Asia) was more rewarding then in the Balkans. In TTL, this would be added to the the fact that they cannot militarily beat the Ottomans, so they are likely to try to expand their power elsewhere.

Russian campaign to Balkans in 1877-78 proved to bloody and hard and with the rewards that's so not worth the struggle. There was also the thing that Russia arrogantly underestimated Ottoman capabilities, and attacked with insufficient number of troops at first, and that proofed to be almost fatal mistake.

That was why, they were only phyrrically victorious, and Balkans became much less of a priority afterwards. With a defeat, it won't be so weird that the idea of Balkan expansion will may actually become an outright taboo in their political mindset.

And now, to rebound my curiosities up :

2) Interestingly, Pasha once said that South Slavism can actually be a source of conflict between A-H and OE, but I'm not aware of the basis of his argument....

4) Oh yes, Dreikaiserbund will be stronger than OTL's CP indeed. But again, back to the question of Dreikaiserbund-Ottoman relationship. That, and the possibility of a WW1 analogue will ever occur at all. Much of OTL tensions that led to WW1 owed crucially to the power vacuum left by the declining Ottoman power, after all....
 
Wouldn't [Russia] still have the desire to control the straits, especially with the growing economic importance of the Ukraine and Don basin? It could be argued that the pan-slav case was propaganda for the prime aim of expanding Russian control southwards and especially for the straits.
I'd consider that highly likely. Russia had wanted a warmwater port since Peter Veliki. It was also why she wanted Dairen (Korea).

This was mainly because the Russians realised that expansion elsewhere (such as Asia) was more rewarding then in the Balkans. In TTL, this would be added to the the fact that they cannot militarily beat the Ottomans, so they are likely to try to expand their power elsewhere.
This suggests several things to me. One, Russia coming into conflict with Britain in Afghanistan much earlier than OTL. Two, Russia coming into conflict with China & Japan much earlier than OTL. Three, Britain & Japan becoming much closer allies much, much earlier than OTL, &, more important, staying allies (no pressure from U.S. to end AJNT), thus keeping Japan out of an alliance with Nazi Germany. Four, it might well butterfly any Pacific War with the U.S. (for reason #3). Five, if it still happens (by no means certain), it puts Japan on the Allied side against the Nazis. (It also probably means IJN heavily on convoy duty in *WW1, if it hapens) Six, it might mean Japan gets ex-German territories, like the Carolines, after *WW1 (if it happens). Seven, Japan is likely to be peeved by the (stronger:eek:) Dreikaiserbund when it forces her to give up gains in the SJW (presuming she doesn't get Brit support against it), which makes her hostile to Germany & even more hostile to Russia.:eek: (Needless to say, her hostility to Russia was pretty serious even without this.) Eight, it means Japan wouldn't try to push the "21 Demands" on China til much later, if at all. (How Japan reacts to the prospect of taking over Korea IDK.) Nine, it threatens war between Britain & Russia in '30s when (if) it comes to light the Russians are supplying ROC with weapons (& "advisors":eek:) against Japan, which could explode into World War.:eek::eek:
 
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