Ottoman-Mughal Alliance

In 1661, New Ottoman vizier proposes an alliance to Mughal emperor Aurangzeb. The goal; conquest of the Safavid Empire. It would eliminate a rival. As Sunni empires, a Shia empire would be eliminated. Direct trade could occur without a middleman, then they could expand into their respective backwater regions easily, I.e. Arabia and Central Asia. Finally they could return to their ongoing wars of conquest; Europe and the rest of the Indian subcontinent.
 
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I would be interested to see who gets what in the aftermath and where the exact dividing line would be.
 
After a ten year war, the Safavid Empire is conquered. The Ottomans want all their lost territory back. The final dividing line is the old border of the White Sheep Turks. The Ottomans are more than happy. For the Mughals lands that belonged to their ancestors the Timurids have been returned. The Mughals then send an expedition to restore their border on the Aral Sea while the Ottomans send one from Crimea to close off the Black Sea coast turnings it into an Ottoman lake.
 
Iran would not be an easy country to evenly split either. While the Mughals will eye central Asia and the Ottomans eye Arabia, I doubt either would tolerate even a moderately powerful puppet/satellite nation controlling the Persian heartlands.
 
A better time for a Mughal-Ottoman alliance was the seventeenth century, when both countries were involved in various operations against the Portuguese. The Ottomans allied with the Gujarat Sultanate during the Siege of Diu; if they allied with the Mughals that conquered them, it offers a much larger base. According to "Southeast Asia as Seen from Mughal India : Tahir Muhammad's 'Immaculate Garden' (ca. 1600)" by Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam:

Recent research by Ottomanists has done much to consolidate and flesh out this picture. Important work by Giancarlo Casale thus allows us to put together a far more complete narrative of Ottoman dealings with Aceh than had hitherto been possible^12) Casale points to the crucial role of an Ottoman envoy, a certain Liitfi (formerly a sea-captain in the Sultan's muteferrika corps), who was sent out to Aceh in 1564 on a return embassy in response to an earlier Acehnese delegation that had arrived at the Sublime Porte in 1562. Liitfi appears to have returned to Istanbul in 1566 after a two-year stay in Sumatra, with plans for a massive Ottoman intervention in the affairs of the Indian Ocean, which eventually however came to naught. He also brought back a letter for the Ottoman Sultan, apparently from the Acehnese Sultan 'Ala-ud-Din Ri'ayat Syah al-Qahhar (r. 1539-71), but which - in Casale's reasoned view - appears to have been ghostwritten by Liitfi himself in impeccable Ottoman Turkish. This letter, or "report" as Casale more appositely terms it, unambiguously sets out matters in the following terms.

"We sincerely request that His Imperial Majesty should no longer consider me, your servant in this land, to be an independent ruler, but instead to accept him as a poor, humble, and downtrodden slave who lives thanks to the charity of your Imperial Majesty, Refuge of the World and Shadow of God [on Earth], in no way different from the governors of Egypt and Yemen or the beys of Jiddah and Aden (...) with God as my witness, this [city of] Aceh is one of Your Majesty's own villages, and I too am one of your servants. Your official Liitfi can personally attest to our circumstances and to our deeds, to the great endeavours we have undertaken for the sake of holy war, and to our firm and sincere longing to enter your Imperial Majesty's service, although to do so adequately would require so many words that its telling might test the limits of Your Majesty's patience ".(13)
The text set out a grandiose plan, wherein various other parts of the Indian Ocean would fall into a grand alliance around an axis that connected Aceh and the Ottomans, with Gujarat as the third point in the triangle. The rulers of diverse other lands (even those who were not Muslim), were portrayed as eagerly falling into line, and even embracing Islam in their desire to rid themselves of the Portuguese yoke. Thus, another passage of the text runs as follows.

"When the rulers of Ceylon and Calicut received news that His Majesty's servant Liitfi had arrived here [in Aceh], they sent ambassadors to us who proclaimed : 'We [too] are servants of His Imperial Majesty, Refuge of the World and Shadow of God [on Earth]' and then took an oath swearing that if His Imperial Majesty's propitious fleet were to journey to these lands, they themselves would come to the faith and profess the religion of Islam, and that likewise all of their infidel subjects would forsake the way of false belief for the straight path of the one true religion. God willing, with the illustrious assistance of His Imperial Majesty, all traces of the infidels in both the East and the West will be destroyed, and they will finally join the Islamic faith ".(14)
Such statements are of course to be taken with the proverbial pinch of salt and more. However, what is of particular significance for us, is the crucial role of Gujarat in all of these transactions. Thus, we learn that "in the year 972 H. [late 1564], His Majesty's servant Liitfi came here [to Aceh], and on his return journey he loaded sixteen kantars of pepper, silk, cinnamon, cloves, camphor, rosemary and other products from the 'Lands Below the Winds' onto a large and famous ship known as the Samadi and belonging to Chingiz Khan, one of the vezlrs of the land of Gujarat in Hindustan". O5) But equally, on the way to Aceh, former Ottoman subjects now resident in Gujarat had already come to the rescue of Liitfi, and assured his passage. Thus, another passage in the text runs :

" Karamanhoglu 'Abdur-Rahman, one of the vezirs in the land of Gujarat, is a capable and conscientious servant who is worthy of [being entrusted with] further duties [in Your Majesty's service]. While Liitfi was making his outward journey to this land from [Your Majesty's] exalted presence, he became greatly perplexed upon his arrival in Jiddah, because he was unable to find any ships there that would take him the rest of the way. [Thankfully], the above-mentioned 'Abdur-Rahman, out of respect for the illustrious orders [which Liitfi had received] from Your Imperial Majesty, sent Liitfi and all of his entourage all the way here in one of his own ships, and covered all of the expenses for the journey himself".​
It is a matter of debate whether the Ottoman influence in fact was the determining factor behind the anti-Portuguese unrest in various parts of the Indian Ocean in the late 1560s and early 1570s. (16) Whether this is true or not, it is certainly true that the Ottoman empire, Gujarat and Aceh were bound in far closer ties in the 1560s than was the case by 1580. The conquest of Gujarat by the Mughals meant a sharp decline in the influence of figures such as 'Abdur-Rahman and Chingiz Khan mentioned above. Even if Aceh and the Ottomans continued to maintain relations into the seventeenth century, the "Sumatran adventure" of the Sublime Porte did not last more than a brief moment, and appears to have been more a dream of a few persons than an act of sustained policy.​

So, if Mughal-Ottoman relations were better, it's entirely possible that joint Mughal-Ottoman expeditions, with Gujarat as the main base, occur against the Portuguese.
 
While Iran would be difficult to conquer, per say, it'd be easy to render a non-threat: destroy or seize control of the region's irrigation network and you more or less have the settled population by the windpipe. Toss a sack of coin at the Turkic nomads every now and again and let them extract tribute, and they'll probably be willing to leave the Ottoman and Muhgal border populations well enough alone.
 
The Ottomans, as far as we can tell, were completely satisfied with the Peace of Zuhab and had no desire to reengage in war with the Safavids until Iran was outright collapsing in the 1720s.
 
In 1661, New Ottoman vizier proposes an alliance to Mughal emperor Aurangzeb. The goal; conquest of the Safavid Empire. It would eliminate a rival. As Sunni empires, a Show empire would be eliminated. Direct trade could occur without a middleman, then they could expand into their respective backwater regions easily, I.e. Arabia and Central Asia. Finally they could return to their ongoing wars of conquest; Europe and the rest of the Indian subcontinent.

There were times to to attack and gain lands desired. For the Ottomans it was the Caucasus and for the Mughals it was Eastern Afghanistan (Kabul). Dividing the State will get rid of future threats.

Ideally, this should have happened between 1578 and 1639. Before Abbas I the Great, Iran was still a slight majority Sunni. Abbas I, continued Ismail I religious policy while also being succesful at driving the Ottomans to the Euphrates/Syrian desert. It was also during Abbas reign Iran became majority Shia.

So... 1661 is possible and still a decent time. But for long term succes, the reign of Murad III (1574-1595) is the best. You still have opressed Sunni's who might back you It is also the most chaotic era for the Safavids.
 
The Ottomans, as far as we can tell, were completely satisfied with the Peace of Zuhab and had no desire to reengage in war with the Safavids until Iran was outright collapsing in the 1720s.

That maybe, but the Köprülü grandviziers had other ideas. Mehmed IV wouldn't care a lot whom his grandviziers fight, as he spent most of his time on hunting trips.

Suleiman secured Eastern Anatolia as well, but Murad III fear of the Janissaries and the weakness of the Safavids still made him declare war. It happens.
 
Can Aurangzeb even afford a campaign in Iran? I was under the impression he was pretty busy his entire reign with Rajput rebels and fighting in the Deccan.
 
Can Aurangzeb even afford a campaign in Iran? I was under the impression he was pretty busy his entire reign with Rajput rebels and fighting in the Deccan.

Aurangzeb can change his priorities to Northern India frontiers. If he still insists on fighting in Deccan then there is a little help that the Mughals can offer.

The Ottomans will still crush the Safavids but with less gains and one more enemy to fight if the Great Turkish War still happens.
 
Why do the Mughals want to go westward? Ever since Akbar, the Mughals became a state focused in India, and India is vast enough as it is. In fact, the Mughals owe their return to India after being driven out, by Sher Shah Suri to the Safavids.
 
Why do the Mughals want to go westward? Ever since Akbar, the Mughals became a state focused in India, and India is vast enough as it is. In fact, the Mughals owe their return to India after being driven out, by Sher Shah Suri to the Safavids.

Why not? The Mughals never lost the idea to regain Afghanistan. And owing something to the Safavids don't mean shit. The Safavids and Mughals fought frequently in the 17th century.
 
Why not? The Mughals never lost the idea to regain Afghanistan. And owing something to the Safavids don't mean shit. The Safavids and Mughals fought frequently in the 17th century.

Okay, but there is a difference between taking back what they held, and dividing up the place with the Ottomans especially when the Mughals Afghanistan aside where focused on India and Aurangzeb himself is busy in Indian by the suggested POD. The Mughals already rule a large area, I do not see this as anything more than a possibly insane idea, at least with an alliance to oppose the Safavids.
 
One problem with the Mughals actually acting on their alliance and recapturing Afghanistan + Eastern Iran is that the logistics would have been horrible, particularly for an Indianized army that is not living off the land (the Mughals could have of course paid nomads in the north to harass the Persians if they really wanted to). Campaigns from Kabul against Kandahar, Balkh and Herat, for example, had to be rounded off in a few months between the spring snowmelt and winter snowup in the Afghan mountains, and even if conquered would be isolated garrisons vulnerable to nomadic or Turcoman Qizilbash harrassment. Crossing the Baluchi desert is similarly a hazardous endeavor.

I suppose if there was a real need to take out the Persians, the Mughals could have equipped and tried a naval descent on Hormuz or other sections of the Persian coast (but that would mean creating the naval infrastructure to support such an effort, expensive). But that would expose the Mughals to all the risks associated with long-range operations and likely require diplomacy with the Portuguese.

Ultimately, faced with fighting a more-entrenched, more mobile and more-nomadic force in Afghanistan, the Mughals probably found it easier to focus on the more-sedentary, more-infantry intensive (and therefore vulnerable to the mass cavalry archers of Afghan mansabdars) and ultimately richer areas of the Indian subcontinent.
 
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