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ahmedali

Banned
Thoughts?
great CHAPTER


I am glad that the Ottomans defeated the Zaidi rebellion. Now my country, Yemen, will be able to develop well


It seems that with the Baltic crisis, the empire will become an honest and impartial mediator


Portugal supports the restoration of the Brazilian monarchy??? I think France will (the Orleans inherited the Brazilian throne claim after Pedro II's death)


Let's hope the monarchy is restored
 
Chapter 64: The 1926 Ottoman General Election
Chapter 64: The 1926 Ottoman General Election



Ottoman Politics in the aftermath of the Zaidi Yemeni Revolt was filled with cautious and dangerous ups and downs related to national and international stability and events. The Ottoman Government wished for the entire issue to seep down and for stability to return. However, as the Ottoman Electoral Commission gave the go ahead for the 1926 Ottoman General Elections, the ruling government and all of the political parties in the Ottoman Empire became involved in a race against one another, intending to take advantage of the political and internal situation to their benefit. The political situation in the Empire following the Zaidi Revolt did however manage to damage a lot of parties, and led directly to the deaths of the Ottoman Nationalist Party and the Poale Zion party. The 1926 Electoral Law abolished the Ottoman Empire’s rather low electoral threshold of 3% and increased said threshold to 5%, thereby reducing the chances of both the Nationalists and Zionists from getting representation in the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies.

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Enver Pasha

The Ottoman Nationalist Party had basically died when Enver Pasha, the man who made and held the party together left the Ottoman Empire to aid the Russian Central Asian Revolt. After the failure of the revolt, Enver Pasha had entered Chinese Turkestan, and instead was fermenting pan-Turanist and anti-Chinese propaganda in the region instead of returning back to the Ottoman Empire. The Nationalists had no one of the charismatic calibers of Enver Pasha. Though Enver never managed to walk the walk, so to speak, his speeches and charismatic ability were unparalleled, and the only thing that held the Nationalists as a viable political force in Ottoman politics. With the loss of their iconic leader, and the new electoral threshold law, the Ottoman Nationalists knew that their chances at representation were little, and their new leader, Ali Bey Huseynzade, instead decided to focus more on the local elections in the Vilayets instead of focusing on the nationwide general election, admitting that their chances of representation was extremely low. After the 1922 General Elections, Poale Zion had been devolving into factionalism, as new factions cropped up within the party, leading to severe divisions within the party. There were pro-Zionist Congress members, pro-Ottoman Zionists, and ideologically, the Zionist Left and Right began falling out against one another as none of the four prominent factions could come to an understanding regarding their party’s ideological stance. The Zionist Right became more nationalist and tended to lean in favor of the Zionist Congress, whilst also favoring a more moderate leftist economic program and being more hostile to Arabs and Turks. The Zionist Left became more leftist in nature, by turning towards the Ottoman Democratic Socialist Party as an example and leaned in favor of Ottoman Zionism more. The party’s demise came in 1925 when the party fell out over the topic of Yemeni Jews during the Zaidi Revolt in Yemen. The four factions left the party thereby effectively destroying the party as a viable political force within Ottoman politics.

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Insignia of the Poale Zion Party

With the fall of the two minor parties and the merger of the Ottoman Socialist Party and the Ottoman Social Democratic Party, a power vacuum opened up within the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies. This was a power vacuum that the Ottoman Democratic and Ottoman Progressive Parties were eager to use. After Kozmidi Effendi’s retirement in 1923, Stepan Zorian had taken up the mantle as Leader of the Ottoman Democratic Party. Zorian was a household name in the Ottoman Empire. He was born in the Erivan Governate of the Russian Empire and was the founder of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in 1890 alongside Christapor Mikaelian and Simon Zavarian. Zorian had entered Ottoman Politics in 1898 when Abdul Hamid II allowed the ARF and some of its leaders – including Zorian – to stay in the Empire as a face for Armenian regionalist politics for his negotiations for an Armenian Reform Package with Russia and Britain. Zorian had been an avid supporter of the 1908 Revolution and had been a more than enthusiastic leader of the ARF throughout the starting years of the Democratic Era of the Ottoman Empire. When the Ottoman branch of the ARF was dissolved voluntarily in 1915 after the autonomous Armenian Vilayet was formed, Zorian gave up his Russian citizenship in favor of Ottoman citizenship as a means to the end of furthering regionalist ideals in the Ottoman Empire, and to escape persecution from Russia. He joined the Ottoman Democratic Party as a result. His wife, Lisa Melik Shahnazarian was also heavily involved in Ottoman politics, and was a leading female figure in the legislative assembly of the Armenian Vilayet. Similarly, the Progressive Party’s leader, Husrev Bey died in 1922 as a result of infected arthritis and was replaced by Theofan Stilian Noli, or simply Fan Noli. Fan Noli was an Albanian regionalist himself, and despite his theological background, and his part time job as an Orthodox priest, Fan Noli was known for his encouragement of technological progress, and social progressivism. He had briefly stayed in America from 1906-1911 and had thus acquired significant colleagues and political contacts in America as a result, which aided him in his political endeavors. With these two charismatic, and able leaders at the helm of the Progressive and Democratic Parties, both political organizations hoped to increase their political power in the Ottoman Empire for the 1926 General Elections.

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Fan Noli in America

There were many topics that were becoming livelier as a result of the elections. The topic that attracted the most attention was that of Yemen. The CUP under Pancho Dorev was a center-right to democratic right political party and took a hardline stance against the Yemeni rebellion, and believed that the pre-1924 policies needed to be kept in place to keep the Yemenis in place. The Liberal Union and the Ottoman Democratic Party took a lighter and more moderate stance, believing that whilst treason could not be forgiven, they needed to solve and address the grievances of the Yemeni people as well. The Ottoman Progressive Party and the Ottoman Democratic Socialist Party took an outright light stance, not intending to punish anyone, if at all. This stance from the CUP managed to gain them key votes in Hejaz, Palestine and Transjordan, the regions most affected by the Yemeni Revolt. Troops from these areas were the ones used to stamp down on the revolt, and the deaths of thousands of their young troops in the rebellion had not endeared Yemen to these regions. The CUP wanted to outright abolish the Zaidi Imamate and then divide the Yemeni Vilayet into smaller administrative divisions without political unity in Yemen to assert central Ottoman authority in the region, whilst also dealing with the traitors with the full extent of the law. Whilst the Liberal Union and the Ottoman Democrats agreed that traitors needed to be punished, they believed that abolishing the Zaidi Imamate was only going to create further problems down along the line, and that such a line of thought should not be pursued. The Progressives and Democratic Socialists on the other hand wanted to keep a lighter touch, and instead opted for treason trials only for the rebellious leadership, an idea that did not endear the two parties to Hejaz, Transjordan and Palestine.

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Insignia of the Ottoman Bank
The Face of Ottoman Public Finance

Yemen also brought forward the issue of economics back to the political forefront. Yemen was devastated as a result of the rebellion. Almost all of the infrastructure built in the countryside due to Ahmet Riza’s economic acumen was destroyed and burning to the ground. Yemen had turned from one of the fastest growing economic regions of the Ottoman Empire to the poorest region of the Ottoman Empire due to the rebellion. Economists from throughout the parties started to put forward their own economic agenda disguised as suggestions for Yemeni Economic Reconstruction. Though there were new ideas for a Yemeni reconstruction, most of the political parties used the opportunity to reopen the case of reforming the public finance of the Ottoman Empire and reopening the Protectionism Vs Free Trade debate in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire, as a direct result of the fact that the Ottoman Public Debt Administration existed, had to take a deft hand in economics, so that they were able to pay off their debts in time, lest they give up more capitulations to European powers. Britain’s debt was nearly paid in 1926, with only 900,000 pounds remaining in question, whilst the Ottomans still held significant loans from France and Germany. This debt situation made the Ottoman economy a touchy subject in the political arena. For Public Finance Reform, two thoughts grew in the Ottoman political parties. The first was the Economic Thought of Suleyman Sudi (1835 – 1896) and his noted economic treatise of Defter-I Muktesid which was published in 1894 and promptly ignored by successive Ottoman government despites its rather original ideas. Sudi made a clear distinction between the Economic Management of Wealth and Public Finance, something that was rather lacking in the Ottoman Economy. Sudi’s economic thought can be summed up as simply ‘pragmatic’ and the thought subscribed to the idea of allowing for the Ottoman Economy to be secularized. Sudi found out in 1894 that despite all of the economic successes of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman fiscal and public financing system was derived from Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and that was a very complicated field that not every economist of the empire could comprehend, thus muddling the public finance system of the empire. As a result, Sudi instead believed that converting the Ottoman fiscal finance system into a proto-secular system without the need of studying the fiqh would be the pragmatic way forward, especially for the Christian and non-Islamic minorities of the Ottoman Empire in question. In particular, the Liberal Union, Ottoman Progressive Party and Ottoman Democratic Socialist Parties were in favor of this school of economic thought. The second public finance economic thought in the Ottoman Empire followed the Thought of Ahmet Midhat Fehim Effendi (1854 – 1918). Fehim Effendi did believe that the domination of Islamic jurisprudence in Ottoman public financing was clogging up the entire system, but instead of simply going for secularism, Fehim Effendi believed that Islamic economics needed to take a paternal approach towards the religious minorities of the Ottoman Empire, and thus Islamic economics needed to be a compulsory subject for the Empire’s economic officials, by simplifying said jurisprudence for easier understanding. Fehim Effendi also asserted that the Islamic Governmental Tradition of the Ottoman Empire created a sophistical fiscal administrative system that could not be changed without significant downturn in the political economy of the nation and as such, he believed that reforming the system was required, but dropping the entire system of Islamic Economics was not prudent. Fehim Effendi’s most seminal idea was that since the Ottoman Empire was also a Caliphate, an inherently religious state for Islam, no matter how well it treated its non-Islamic minorities, secular economic ideas from Europe could not be applied in the Ottoman Empire fully, and thus needed to be ‘tweaked’, for the lack of a better term, for the situation in the Ottoman Empire. The CUP and the Ottoman Democratic Party were key proponents of this School of Economic Thought in the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the irony of a Coptic Armenian Leader and an Orthodox Bulgarian Leader advocating for Islamic jurisprudence was an irony that was not lost to the Ottomans of the era, and several key jokes were made of it during the 1926 General Elections. [1]

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Akyiğitzade Musa
The Founder of Ottoman Protectionism

But even greater than the public finance issue, the Ottomans were being caught in a generational debate between the economic idea of protectionism and free trade. Indeed, Ahmet Riza had been a key proponent of protectionism, and his ideas and policies had seen the Ottomans invest into their growing manufacturing base, however as a result of his policies, imports into the Ottoman Empire became much more expensive, and living standards stagnated in several parts of the Ottoman nation. As a result, opponents of Protectionism began to make their move as the 1926 Elections became ever closer. Like in public finance, two economic schools of thought were being created in the Ottoman Empire that reared their heads during the 1926 General Election. The first was the Economic Thought of Akyigitzade Musa (1865 – 1925). Musa’s seminal economic work, the Economics or the Science of Wealth: Freedom of Exchange and the System of Protectionism published in 1896 and again in 1903 was a treatise on the debate between protectionism and free trade in the Ottoman Empire. Musa openly declared his stance as a protectionist and attacked the positions of free traders. However unlike Ahmet Riza, who had raised several eyebrows with his ‘hardline’ brand of protectionism, Musa declared himself to be a moderate protectionist, and declared that it was necessary for both short term and long term economic development in any nation. Musa believed in four stages of economic development in history – hunting, animal husbandry, agriculture and finally industry. Within these stages, Musa created subcategories to define what a nation could and could not produce & manufacture. Musa believed that protectionism of moderate amounts through moderate tariffs and customs taxes would be the best way forward for commercial and industrial growth. For this he took the example of the USA, which grew from an agricultural colony of England into a major industrial power due to its clever usage of moderate tariffs to encourage the growth of domestic industries. This thought was shared and encouraged by the CUP and the Democratic Socialist Party, whilst the Liberal Union leaned towards this idea of economics as well. Countering this work in favor of protectionism was the Thought of Mehmed Cavid Bey (1875 – 1948), who had been the Minister of Financial Affairs in the Ottoman Empire from 1908 to 1913. Being an avid supporter of his intellectual mentors, the famous economists Ohannes and Leroy-Beaulieu, Cavid Bey became an ardent supporter of laissez-faire free trade economics. Cavid Bey believed in the principle of comparative advantage in the economy through the means of trading freely, and that international trade agreements between nations were indispensable means for establishing economic and corporate development in the national economy of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Democratic Party and the Ottoman Progressive Parties were key supporters of this idea of laissez-faire economics. [1]

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Gushing oil in Ottoman Mesopotamia

Another burning issue in the Ottoman Empire related to economics before the 1926 Election was the issue of oil. Oil had been struck in the Ottoman Empire in Kirkuk and Northern Mesopotamia, and oil fields were being dug up in Syria, Najd, Lebanon and Anatolia, and all of a sudden, the titans of the oil industry were all looking at the Ottoman Empire with wide eyes as the Ottoman Empire proved to be a treasure trove of oil. The British Empire already had large amounts of influence in the Ottoman Empire in the quest for oil through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Ottoman Oil Corporation Company. As news of a formal oil well being constructed in Northern Iraq became news, the Compagnie Francais des Petroles (CFP), France’s national oil company was already out in Constantinople, hunting for leases and company bonds to try and monopolize Ottoman oil for themselves. Russia, despite its own abundant oil resources in Azerbaijan and Central Asia, also looked at the new source of oil in the Ottoman Empire with unhidden curiosity and also extended an offer of opening a new Russian oil trade company in the Ottoman Empire. Calouste Gulbenkian, the Ottoman Armenian Leader of the Ottoman Oil Corporation Company, also known as Mr. Five Percent disparagingly by foreign corporatists (because of the fact that Gulbenkian never gave more than 5% in shares for the OOCC), was beset with offers throughout the world as the potential of Ottoman Oil became more profound as more time passed. Entering the game, American financier and philanthropist, John D. Rockefeller Jr. representing the American company, Standard Oil was deployed to the Ottoman Empire as well in search for greater American shares in the budding Ottoman oil industry. The Ottoman Empire was ferocious in its fight to keep their newfound oil wealth to themselves. Gulbenkian, who was a tough negotiator in his own right, was told not to give up anything more than 5% in share distribution and that the rest was going to be held by the Ottoman Empire itself. In what became known as the Oil Race, Britain, Russia, France, America, Danubia, Japan all raced against each other to gain the most oil concessions from the OOCC in late 1925 and early 1926. In the end, Britain and France gained the highest share at a measly 3% each, whilst the Americans and Austrians gained 2% each, and the Russians and Japanese gained 1% each. The rest (88%) of the OOCC’s share and income were held exclusively by the Ottoman Empire with only another 3% share in question, as the Ottomans made it clear that 85% of the company was going to remain in Ottoman hands, by hook or by crook.

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Calouste Gulbenkian
The President of the Ottoman Oil Corporation Company

The problem was that many in the Ottoman electorate believed that due to the economic concessions that the Ottomans had given to western powers from 1832 – 1908, the Ottomans had already given up too much economic resources of their nation to foreign powers, and a strong nationalization movement sprang up in the Ottoman Empire which advocated for the nationalization of the OOCC so that only the Ottoman government could reap the benefits of the OOCC’s oil revenue and profits. This was of course opposed by foreign elements in the Ottoman Empire, and foreign consulates began to issue propaganda and leaflets in favor of the de-nationalization of the OOCC. Protests began to grow in the streets of Baghdad, Damascus, Tripoli, Alexandretta, Angora, Constantinople, Smyrna etc asking the Ottoman government to nationalization the OOCC and the oil fields in the Ottoman Empire. The Liberal Union, the ruling government, of course knew that nationalizing the OOCC was completely out of the question, and would bring the entirety of the Anglo-Ottoman Alliance into question, and thus took a compromising position and advocated for reform in the OOCC that would give even greater economic dividends back to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Democratic and Progressive Party supported this position and encouraged it as well. However, the Ottoman Democratic Socialist Party and the CUP went against this and stood out in favor of nationalizing the OOCC completely so that the Ottoman government could have greater control of its oil resources and its profits.

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British Intelligence Officers in the Ottoman Empire during the Oil Race

What followed was an international game of spies in the Ottoman Empire. The British, lured in by their Royal Navy’s insatiable thirst for oil, deployed several agents in the form of newspaper and radio magnates to write good words for the Liberal Union, whilst the Russians, who didn’t want competition in the oil industry in the Caucasus sent agents to write good words for the CUP and the ODSP. Similarly, other agents from France, Japan and America entered the Ottoman Empire during the election campaign to try and tilt the balance in their favor, as the race for oil continued. The Ottoman Special Organization, under the command of Chief Commissioner Rauf Orbay was completely swamped by reports from their own officers regarding foreign agents in the Ottoman Empire to the point that Orbay ordered the review of all foreigners living in the Ottoman Empire, so that their activities could be monitored. Over 28 foreign agents from all nations – Britain, Russia, Austria, Japan, America, Germany – were caught before the 1926 General Elections and deported, and Orbay later admitted to Mustafa Kemal that the Special Organization had only managed to capture what he believed to be a minuscule number of foreign agents in the Ottoman Empire during the so called ‘Oil Race’.

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Mustafa Kemal campaigning in Angora during the elections

With all of these issues burning before the 1926 Elections, the Ottoman Empire’s political apparatus decided to start their political campaigns. Many political analysts believed that the Liberal Union was going to lose a key seats in the elections, mostly because of the fact that the Liberal Union had lost their attraction in many Arabian parts of the Ottoman Empire due to the fact that they did not wish to nationalize the OOCC entirely. This was however offset by the fact that the Liberal Union had managed to gain some amount of national prestige for keeping the territorial integrity of the nation intact, leading to some other political correspondents to believe that the Liberal Union would win a comfortable plurality in the Chamber of Deputies. The CUP under Pancho Dorev was however going through an identity crisis. The party that appealed to Islamists in the Ottoman Empire was being led by a Christian. The irony of which was going to cost a key amount of votes, especially in the rural hinterlands of the Ottoman Empire, where religious attachment of Islam was still something that appealed more to people rather than nationalism, regionalism or patriotism. Dorev personally tried to make the best of his situation, and instead focused more on economic policy and the oil issue rather than bringing up religious issues and also focused his attention throughout the campaign towards the ideas behind the Reconstruction of Yemen. Whilst Zorian and Noli took care of their own campaigns at a sedate manner, Gregorios Anagnost became involved in campaigning in much more involved manner, as the man scoured the entire country giving out speeches and campaign promises. Emphasizing the splits and problems in the other parties, especially in the CUP, Anagnost ran his party platform on the cause of tactical voting, hoping to make sure that the idea of tactical voting could improve the OSDP’s chance at forming a new government in the Ottoman Empire. Kemal attacked this strategy of tactical voting by calling it underhanded and against popular democratic ideals.

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The 1926 Election also saw the first usage of the radio as a means of campaigning during the elections. The Ottoman Empire’s national radio service, the National Broadcasting Corporation or the UYK (its initials in Turkish), which was based on the British BBC, was utilized by the party leaders to give their own opinions regarding popular election topics. The first party leader debate in the Ottoman Empire took place on the 28th of April, 1926 as the five party leaders debated against one another which was broadcasted by the UYK throughout the Ottoman Empire. A second debate was also conducted on the 12th of May, just five days before the country went to polls to elect their new chamber of deputies.

From May 17 to 20, 1926, the Ottoman Empire conducted their balloting and polling, and on the 22nd, the results of the elections were announced. Like anticipated, the Ottoman Nationalist Party and Poale Zion no longer had any popular representation in the Chamber of Deputies. Kemal’s Liberal Union managed to retain their plurality in the Chamber of Deputies despite losing a handful of seats, winning 76 seats in the Chamber. The Democratic Socialist Party made the most gains however, winning 65 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The OSDP had managed to eat up several urban seats throughout the empire through Anagnost’s heavy handed campaigning which had yielded favorable results. Dorev’s identity crisis in the CUP led to a disastrous election for the CUP as the party lost several key seats throughout the empire, and had its seat proportion decline precipitously in comparison to the OSDP, which managed to take advantage of the divisions in the CUP. The Ottoman Democratic Party, which was being transitioned into a Populist party by Zorian won modest gains throughout the nation. Though the Progressive Party managed to increase its share of votes and seats, gains were minor, and Noli’s fixation on Albania was blamed for that. Noli promptly resigned from the party leadership after the elections, and retired into permanent theological occupation instead.

With the elections over, Sultan Abdulmejid II reaffirmed Kemal’s position as Grand Vizier, despite talks about a OSDP-PP coalition, which unfortunately could not come into fruition. Kemal, not wishing to anger his political backers, kept the same cabinet and formed a new ministry based on the previous one, and prepared to tackle the issue of Yemen, the Ottoman Economy and the OOCC. The next few years in the Ottoman Economy promised to be riveting.





[1] – Information on the economic parts from Economics and Capitalism in the Ottoman Empire by Deniz T. Kilincoglu

A/N: As you guys can see, from this chapter, there's going to be a change in writing style, and this style is inspired by @Zulfurium's writing style in his seminal TL 'A Day in July'.


 
Hello,

We will see how things develop from the 1926 Elections onward. Are there efforts for the Empire to develop its science and technology base, particularly focusing on oil extraction, transport, and storage? Also, are the Ottomans beginning to develop related industries such as oil refining and plastics production? Finally, with the potential petro-monies coming in, are there plans to use some of that to diversify the Ottoman economy and/or look into other areas such as infrastructure, commerce/banking, and the environment? I am also interested in seeing if the recent Oil Race may have caused the Ottomans to take a hard look at the state of their intelligence and counter-intelligence services.
 
Hello!
Are there efforts for the Empire to develop its science and technology base, particularly focusing on oil extraction, transport, and storage?
there will be no doubt about that
? Also, are the Ottomans beginning to develop related industries such as oil refining and plastics production? Finally, with the potential petro-monies coming in, are there plans to use some of that to diversify the Ottoman economy and/or look into other areas such as infrastructure, commerce/banking, and the environment?
The Ottomans have a relatively diverse economy with manufactures, armament, textiles, airplanes, shipping, agriculture, mining so there's no real need for that.
I am also interested in seeing if the recent Oil Race may have caused the Ottomans to take a hard look at the state of their intelligence and counter-intelligence services.
It will.
 
Oh well, that's a really tight race indeed between the Liberal Union, OSDP, and CUP. If I were an Ottoman at the era, I would be at the edge of my seat. Nice writing there.

I'm not sure if I should be surprised that Japan is involved in the oil race given their status, but well....here I am.

Hmm. Iraq, Syria, and Transjordan. The future Great War should be interesting. Not sure if Italy still has some leftover grudge from their last failed invasion of Libya, but now that it seems there might be oil discovery in the region, I wonder if they are going to try something if they are involved in the next war.
 
Would the Ottomans will do the same to Mexico, I know it was already discovered and being controlled by the great powers, but it would help them have more economic control since Mexico already becoming somewhat reliant on them.
 
Oh well, that's a really tight race indeed between the Liberal Union, OSDP, and CUP. If I were an Ottoman at the era, I would be at the edge of my seat. Nice writing there.

I'm not sure if I should be surprised that Japan is involved in the oil race given their status, but well....here I am.

Hmm. Iraq, Syria, and Transjordan. The future Great War should be interesting. Not sure if Italy still has some leftover grudge from their last failed invasion of Libya, but now that it seems there might be oil discovery in the region, I wonder if they are going to try something if they are involved in the next war.
Italy's reaction to the Second Great War is indeed going to be a major topic for the Ottomans in the future here ittl.....
 
Would the Ottomans will do the same to Mexico, I know it was already discovered and being controlled by the great powers, but it would help them have more economic control since Mexico already becoming somewhat reliant on them.
The Ottomans will seek to nationalize the OOCC as fast as possible
 
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