Optimize the Axis Navies for WW2

FWIW this is the link to the entry on the German 15in gun on Naval Weapons.
Which includes this sentence.

Though too be fair to Bismarck the rounds-per-gun for Prince of Wales at the Denmark Strait and King George V when Bismarck was sunk may not have been better due to the jammed turrets.
Possibly - but I was not aware of King George V suffering issues during her fight?

Again relying on grey cells my understanding is that KGV managed 30 odd salvos before having any failures etc and that took about 30 mins - which is not bad as few WW2 BB on BB actions lasted that long (if any?)

I would not be surprised if 1 RPM is an effective average RPM for the larger guns?
 
Possibly - but I was not aware of King George V suffering issues during her fight?

Again relying on grey cells my understanding is that KGV managed 30 odd salvos before having any failures etc and that took about 30 mins - which is not bad as few WW2 BB on BB actions lasted that long (if any?)

I would not be surprised if 1 RPM is an effective average RPM for the larger guns?
In action, there's plenty of opportunity for something to affect firing. Damage to guns or jams are fairly obvious factors, but crew casualties, things working less well when manouvering, and corrections to targetting also have an effect.
30 consistent salvos sounds good to me. I still don't like the look of the KGVs but I respect them more now I know that.
 
Earlier in the thread @marathag and @James Ricker suggested building fewer coastal and more long-range U-Boats, which I interpreted as fewer Type VII and More Type IX. My reply was that that would reduce the number of U-Boats that could have been built while the A.G.N.A. was in force. However, I amended the table from Post 175 and the result wasn't as bad as I expected.

AGNA Quotas - Submarines if all Types II & IX.png

As can be seen from the Table Germans would have only exceeded the quota twice. That is on 31.12.37 (by 4,154 tons which was about 6 Type IX boats worth) and 31.08.39 by 3,551 tons (about 5 Type IX boats worth). However, the latter didn't matter as Hitler denounced the A.G.N.A. on 28.04.39 and I think Germany should have placed bulk orders for U-Boats in the Spring and Summer of 1939 instead of ordering the "H" class Battleships and "O" class Battle Cruisers.

According to Conway's 1922-46 crews were: 43 Type I; 44 Types VIIA, B & C; and 48 Types IXA, B & C. Therefore, finding the extra men for the larger crews aught to be no problem. What may be problems are the extra labour and raw materials required. The Type IXC U-Boat displaced about 50% more than a Type VIIC (1,102 tons surfaced v 749 tons according to Conway's 1922-46) and engines that were about 50% more powerful too (2,200bhp/500shp v 1,400bhp/375shp according to Conway's 1922-46).

However, apart from the extra endurance all that would buy is one torpedo tube (6 v 5 because 2 stern tubes instead of one) and 6 extra torpedoes (22 v 16). Or put another way it's about 50% more submarine for 20% more torpedo tubes and 37.5% more torpedoes. (Does anyone know how many torpedoes were for the forward and aft tubes for the Type VII and Type IX?)

Notes.
  • I've make the 2 Type I U-Boats of OTL Type IXs ITTL as well as the 60 Type VII, which changes the OTL totals of 2 Type I, 60 Type VII and 32 Type IX ordered to 31.08.39 to 94 Type IX.
  • Tonnages are the standard displacements quoted in Jane's Fighting Ships 1939. I haven't included the Type XI U-Cruisers because they weren't built and I had to use the displacement for Type IX for the Type X minelayers because Jane's didn't have the standard displacement for the Type X.
    • 250 tons Type II, which Jane's calls a Coastal Submarine.
    • 500 tons Type VIIA, which Jane's calls a Sea-Going Submarine.
    • 517 tons Type VIIB & C, which Jane's call Sea-Going Submarines.
    • 712 tons Type I, which Jane's calls Ocean-Going Submarines.
    • 740 tons Type IX, which Jane's calls Ocean-Going Submarines.
  • The British total at the time the AGNA was signed was the tonnage of submarines allowed under the First London Naval Treaty. The other totals are the standard displacements of the submarines, completed, under construction and on order at the date indicated.
  • The AGNA allowed Germany to have 45% of Britain's submarine strength, but Germany reserved the right to have 100% of Britain's submarine strength. This clause in the agreement was invoked on 9th December 1938 in the wake of the Munich Crisis.
  • The numerical totals for the Royal Navy at the end of August 1939 were: 57 completed; 6 launched; 6 laid down; and 4 projected for a total of 71 against a requirement for 82 submarines.
 
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I would not be surprised if 1 RPM is an effective average RPM for the larger guns.
As posted by me earlier in the thread (according to Naval Weapons) all but one of the British Capital Ship guns had a rate of fire of 2 rounds per minute. The exception was the 16in guns on Nelson & Rodney which fired at 1.5 rounds a minute.

As also posted by me earlier in the thread (according to Naval Weapons) the 16" guns on the American North Dakota to Montana classes had a rate of fire of 2 rounds per minute and the 12" guns on the Alaskas had a rate of fire of 2.4 to 3 rounds per minute.

So 2 rounds per minute seems to be typical for modern Capital Ship guns in the 14in to 16in range. However, that may be under ideal conditions because as @CaptainCalvert wrote:
In action, there's plenty of opportunity for something to affect firing. Damage to guns or jams are fairly obvious factors, but crew casualties, things working less well when manoeuvring, and corrections to targeting also have an effect.
However, also according to the Naval Weapons website.
  • The 15in guns on the Littorio class fired 1.3 rounds per minute, which is less than the 15in guns built for the Francesco Caracciolo class could fire 1.5 to 2 rounds per minute.
  • The 12.6in guns on the Andrea Doria and Conte di Cavour classes after they were rebuilt fired 2 rounds per minute.
  • The 13in guns on Dunkerque and Strassbourg fired 1.5 to 2 rounds per minute. However, it also says that the intended rate of fire was 3 rounds per minute, but, the shell supply arrangements in the shell rooms proved to be inadequate and the designed ROF was never met.
  • The 15in guns on the Richelieu class fired 1.3 to 2 rounds per minute and that the rate of fire was hampered by the slow rate at which the hoists could deliver projectiles.
  • The 18in guns on the Yamato class could fire 1.5 to 2 rounds per minute depending upon how high they were elevated.
Therefore, it looks like 1.5 to 2 rounds was the effective average for modern Capital Ship guns in the 13in to 18in calibre range.

@Cryhavoc101, what started our discussion, was Post 167, where I asked whether the rates of fire for German Naval Guns quoted on Naval Weapons were accurate, particularly regard to the 2.3 to 3 RPM for the 15in gun and the 10 to 12 RPM for the 5.9in guns fitted to Nürnberg. If they were accurate, yes they would have been the rates of fire in ideal conditions and without breakdowns, so were the rates of fire for the British & American guns that I gave for comparison.

If the 15in guns on Bismarck & Tirpitz could have been made reliable enough to fire 2.3 to 3 rounds per minute for long periods under idea conditions and 1.5 rounds per minute in realistic conditions, then it would have fired 50% more shells and scored 50% more hits at the Denmark Strait when the average was one round per minute. That wouldn't have been enough to sink Prince of Wales, but the extra damage received might have reduced the number of time she hit Bismarck.
Link to Post 167 - A query about German Naval Guns.
Edit: It aught to go without saying that when I wrote "If the 15in guns on Bismarck & Tirpitz could have been made reliable enough to fire 2.3 to 3 rounds per minute ..." I meant the whole weapons system (guns, turret and ammunition supply system) and not just the guns themselves. However, I know from experience that one can't assume that everyone will understand that.
 
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thaddeus

Donor
Earlier in the thread @marathag and @James Ricker suggested building fewer coastal and more long-range U-Boats, which I interpreted as fewer Type VII and More Type IX. My reply was that that would reduce the number of U-Boats that could have been built while the A.G.N.A. was in force

my quick glance suggested the choice was between coastal U-Boats such as the Type II and longer range boats? that may be incorrect.
think the KM needed a variety of types and maybe tilted a bit too hard towards the Type VII, which was then not evolved (search "bastard Elektroboot or Elektroboote" for that topic)

not sure if any U-Boat building program is going to be more or less acceptable to the British? they do not want "numbers" or large long range boats (a lot of effort was put into tracking the French Surcouf with just a whiff it might have divided crew loyalties)

I think Germany should have placed bulk orders for U-Boats in the Spring and Summer of 1939 instead of ordering the "H" class Battleships and "O" class Battle Cruisers.

agree, they could or should have had a plan for an earlier war, that could include greater numbers of commercial ships to be quickly converted and an emphasis on U-Boats.
 
Link to Post 183 about U-Boats ordered to 31.08.39 ITTL if more Type IX and no Type I & II.
The tables in Posts 175 & 183 were according to U-Boat Net. However, the numbers of U-Boats that the International Community in general and the British Government & Royal Navy in particular may have thought that the numbers ordered were considerably less than that.

That is, because according to contemporary editions of Jane's Fighting Ships, the numbers of U-Boats completed, under construction and on order in 1938 and 1939 were less than the actual totals.
  • 61 U-Boats (2 Type I, 30 Type II, 21 Type VII & 8 Type IX) of 25,531 tons according to Jane's 1938.
  • 99 U-Boats (2 Type I, 32 Type II, 41 Type VII & 24 Type IX) of 48,211 tons according to Jane's 1939. (However, it only gives numbers to U-71.)
  • 99 U-Boats (2 Type I, 32 Type II, 41 Type VII, 22 Type IX & 2 mine laying boats) of 48,851 tons according to Jane's 1940. (The numbers now go up to U-99.) The minelayers were U-77 and 78 which Jane's said displaced 1,060 tons each. However, U-78 & 78 and 11 of the boats that Jane's said were Type IXs were actually Type VIIs.
The start of the German Submarines section of Jane's 1940 begins with the following Special Note.
Note about German Submarines from P.235 of PDF of Jane's 1940..png


These totals are a lot less than the 111 Boats of 53,969 tons at 31.12.38 and the 130 boats of 66,914 tons at 31.08.39 in the Table in Post 175. In fact the 25,531 tons in Jane's 1938 is less than the 33,396 tons Germany would have been allowed under the A.G.N.A. if it had still been limiting itself to 45% of the British Commonwealth's submarine tonnage rather than 100%.

If Germany had ordered the same number of submarines, but more Type IXs and no Types I & VII then the TTL versions of Jane's would have shown.
  • 61 U-Boats (30 Type II & 31 Type IX) of 30,440 tons according to Jane's 1938. (Instead of 111 Boats of 53,969 tons.)
    • Which, is still well within the 33,396 tons Germany would have been allowed under the A.G.N.A. if it has still been limiting itself to 45% of the British Commonwealth's submarine strength.
  • 99 U-Boats (32 Type II & 67 Type IX) of 57,580 tons according to Jane's 1939. (Instead of 130 Boats of 66,914 tons.)
  • 99 U-Boats (32 Type II, 65 Type IX & 2 mine laying boats) of 58,220 tons according to Jane's 1940. (Instead of 130 Boats of 66,914 tons.)
Therefore, it might have been possible for Germany to have ordered the same number of U-Boats as OTL but with more ocean-going Type IXs and less sea-going Type VIIs without provoking the British into building more ASW craft. However, it may provoke the British into building more ocean-going and less sea-going ASW escorts.

However, it must also be borne in mind that that number of ASW craft as much a function of the amount of trade that had to be protected as it was the number of U-Boats. Therefore, the number of long-range ASW craft the British need would not necessarily increase in proportion to the number of long-range U-Boats Germany built in the 1930s. So, Germany building more Type IX and less Type VII U-Boats might not lead to the British ordering more sloops before World War II and putting the River class frigate into production sooner.
 
My quick glance suggested the choice was between coastal U-Boats such as the Type II and longer range boats. That may be incorrect.
If you are correct (and you may be) I've wasted hours writing Posts 183 and 186.
I think the KM needed a variety of types and maybe tilted a bit too hard towards the Type VII, which was then not evolved (search "bastard Elektroboot or Elektroboote" for that topic).
FWIW I agree. Building no Type IIs before World War II and another 32 Type VII or Type IX in their place is not an option IMO. Firstly, they need some Boats that can be built quickly to start training the crews as soon as possible and they also need some to operate where the larger Boats can't.

More Type IX Boats & no Type VIIs works out at about 50% more submarine for 37.5% more torpedoes, the same number of forward-firing tubes & double the number of stern-firing tubes and I doubt that Germany had the labour & raw materials for a one-to-one substitution.
Not sure if any U-Boat building program is going to be more or less acceptable to the British. They do not want "numbers" or large long range boats (a lot of effort was put into tracking the French Surcouf with just a whiff it might have divided crew loyalties).
It's highly likely that the British wouldn't have liked whatever the Germans did, but as long as the Germans don't exceed their A.G.N.A. tonnage quota ITTL, the British would have had to lump it.
Agree, they could or should have had a plan for an earlier war, that could include greater numbers of commercial ships to be quickly converted and an emphasis on U-Boats.
FWIW I think the Reichsmarine/Kriegsmarine should have had a Two-Part plan.
  • Part One - The largest fleet that could be built in 5 years (i.e. to about 1939) with the emphasis on building designs (and using technology) that was already tried & tested, in order to avoid the delays that would have been inevitable with new designs & technology.
  • Part Two - The largest fleet that could be built in the following 5 years (i.e. from about 1939 to about 1944) which would effectively been the OTL Plan Z, but the back-up Mobilisation Plan of TTL should have included more Auxiliary Cruisers to support the 250-odd U-Boats that were ordered in the first 6 months of World War II IOTL.
Part One should have been prepared during the Weimar Republic era and implemented when the Nazis took power. Planning for Part Two should have begun when the Nazis assumed power and abandoned in the Spring of 1939 instead of the Autumn of 1939. Then the Mobilisation Plan should have been implemented in the Spring & Summer of 1939 instead of the Autumn of 1939 & Winter of 1939-40. To be precise Naval Mobilisation should have been ordered on 28.04.39 the day Hitler denounced the Anglo-German Naval Agreement.

E.g. only 16 U-Boats were ordered between 28.04.39 and 31.08.39 IOTL and these were the first Boats ordered since January 1939. ITTL it would have been 265 boats ordered in the Spring & Summer of 1939 by ordering the 249 Boats ordered between September 1939 & February 1940 IOTL between March & August 1939 ITTL.
 
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thaddeus

Donor
If you are correct (and you may be) I've wasted hours writing Posts 183 and 186.

not a waste! you have an exercise that shows the two different building programs, which is actually pretty cool to have.

FWIW I agree. Building no Type IIs before World War II and another 32 Type VII or Type IX in their place is not an option IMO. Firstly, they need some Boats that can be built quickly to start training the crews as soon as possible and they also need some to operate where the larger Boats can't.

they made provision for overland transport of the smaller Elektroboote, that seems a useful feature for the Med and the Black Sea if a similarly sized boat had been available earlier? meaning something more advanced than the Type II.
 
FWIW I agree. Building no Type IIs before World War II and another 32 Type VII or Type IX in their place is not an option IMO. Firstly, they need some Boats that can be built quickly to start training the crews as soon as possible and they also need some to operate where the larger Boats can't.
They made provision for overland transport of the smaller Elektroboote, that seems a useful feature for the Med and the Black Sea if a similarly sized boat had been available earlier? meaning something more advanced than the Type II.
I was thinking of the places like the Baltic, North Sea and English Channel.
  • The Germans sent full-size U-boats to the Mediterranean via the Strait of Gibraltar. However, it was a hazardous journey because several were forced to turn back or were sunk.
  • They did send small U-boats to the Black Sea, but it was a time-consuming process, as they were effectively dismantled and reassembled.
In the "Optimize German army for the ww2" thread I suggested constructing the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal. This war primarily because it would make it easier for Germany to import raw materials from the Balkans. The secondary reason was that it would make it easier to supply the German forces in the Balkans, Greece and the southern part of the Russian Front. The tertiary reason was that the warships as large as the Type VII U-boat, T-22 class small destroyer and Type 1935 large minesweeper could be sent via it to the Black Sea.
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From Post 166 of the thread.
It [the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal] can take boats with maximum dimensions of 623ft x 38ft (190m x 11.45m).
According to Conway's 1922-46 the dimensions of a German T22 class torpedo-boat/small destroyer are.
334ft oa x 32ft 10in x 10ft 7in max (97.00 x 10 x 3.22m)​
And the dimensions of a Type VIIC U-boat are.
220ft 2in x 20ft 4in x 15ft 9in (67.10 x 6.20 x 4.80m)​
Furthermore, the dimensions of a Type 1935 M-boat (large minesweeper equivalent to the British Halcyon, Bangor and Algerine classes) are.
224ft 5in oa x 27ft 10in x 8ft 8in (68.40 x 8.50 x 2.65m)​
Plus, the locks are a smidgeon too narrow to take a Z23 class full-size destroyer
416ft 8in oa x 39ft 4in x 13ft 1in (127.00 x 12.00 x 4.00m). If the locks on the TTL Canal were 2 or 3 feet wider it would be large enough to take one.​
According to its Britannica.com entry the OTL Rhine–Main–Danube Canal ...
... thus creates a 3,500-km (2,200-mile) waterway that runs through 15 countries and can accommodate barges carrying up to 2,425 tons of bulk cargo.
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I think the preparatory work could have been done by the Weimar Republic and if the Nazis could have it completed by 1939 provided that work began in 1933 as part of their public works programme. I discussed the feasibility of doing it as some length in that thread. Here are some extracts from and links to that thread.
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Part of Post 207.

It's not a Barge Canal. It's a Ship Canal. The locks of the OTL Canal (completed in 1993 which I'm suggesting is dug 1933-39) can accommodate German T-22 class destroyers.
This is a Link to Post 127 where I first suggested digging the canal.
This is a Link to Post 166 where estimated how long it would take to dig and how much it would cost using the Manchester Ship Canal as a guide.
Extract from Post 166.
According to the Bank of England inflation calculator £15 million in 1893 was the equivalent of £27 million in 1933 so my guess is that the German Canal would have cost £81 million.

£81 million x 14.3609 RM to the Pound Sterling in February 1933 = 1,163 million Reichsmarks
Exchange Rate is from: https://canvasresources-prod.le.unimelb.edu.au/projects/CURRENCY_CALC/
Edit: The Manchester Ship Canal (including the locks) is 75% wider than the German Canal so the above may be an overestimate.
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Edit: I've ninja'd myself!
Link to Post 28 which is when I first suggested digging the Rhine–Main–Danube Canal in this thread.
 
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The last paragraph of Post 100.
For instance @NOMISYRRUC went through about about 3 dozen posts on German oil situation in recent thread, Germany better able to share fuels with Italy is worth more in wartime than some jointly developed DP gun?
For what it's worth I'm regarding this thread as complimentary with the "Optimize German army for the ww2" that you mentioned above. Therefore, everything that was done to improve Germany's industrial capacity, production of raw materials (including natural oil) and access to raw materials (including natural oil) from nearby countries in that thread applies to this thread.

Furthermore, I'm regarding this thread as an improved German Navy thread, because we've had threads about the Italian and Japanese Navies and what I want to say about them is in those threads.
 

thaddeus

Donor
they made provision for overland transport of the smaller Elektroboote, that seems a useful feature for the Med and the Black Sea if a similarly sized boat had been available earlier? meaning something more advanced than the Type II.

I was thinking of the places like the Baltic, North Sea and English Channel.
  • The Germans sent full-size U-boats to the Mediterranean via the Strait of Gibraltar. However, it was a hazardous journey because several were forced to turn back or were sunk.
  • They did send small U-boats to the Black Sea, but it was a time-consuming process, as they were effectively dismantled and reassembled.
In the "Optimize German army for the ww2" thread I suggested constructing the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal. This war primarily because it would make it easier for Germany to import raw materials from the Balkans. The secondary reason was that it would make it easier to supply the German forces in the Balkans, Greece and the southern part of the Russian Front. The tertiary reason was that the warships as large as the Type VII U-boat, T-22 class small destroyer and Type 1935 large minesweeper could be sent via it to the Black Sea.

agree with the use of smaller u-boats in all of the above areas, and the completion of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal would be optimal, but was posting in the context of worse (or worst) scenarios.

the French Atlantic u-boat bases created something of a mirage for the u-boat warfare, or a disappearing asset, maybe prudent to have continued development (and use) of the smaller boats. secondarily building the u-boat bunkers along the French coast complicated any treaty arrangements with the Vichy regime and eclipsed building them in Norway and the Channel (which would have been useful later)

my scenario would be MFPs/AFPs able to transport S-boats, "1943 M-boats" and "Type XXIII" u-boats in some component form, and be able to use railways where necessary. the MFPs had cement added as "armor" so planning for that to be done at the destination? (the vessels in quotations are to represent the type desired)
 
Agree with the use of smaller U-boats in all of the above areas, and the completion of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal would be optimal, but was posting in the context of worse (or worst) scenarios.

The French Atlantic U-boat bases created something of a mirage for the U-Boat warfare, or a disappearing asset, maybe prudent to have continued development (and use) of the smaller boats. secondarily building the U-Boat bunkers along the French coast complicated any treaty arrangements with the Vichy regime and eclipsed building them in Norway and the Channel (which would have been useful later).

My scenario would be MFPs/AFPs able to transport S-boats, "1943 M-boats" and "Type XXIII" U-boats in some component form, and be able to use railways where necessary. The MFPs had cement added as "armour" so planning for that to be done at the destination? (The vessels in quotations are to represent the type desired.)
FWIW I don't disagree with any of that. However, I think the most important thing to do for the U-Boats is make sure the torpedoes have detonators that work and after that get homing torpedoes into service sooner. That being written a coastal FBD submarine line the Type XXIII (and for that matter the full-size Type XXI) would be a good idea. Maybe they could do the planning for a prototype during the Weimar Republic, it's built in secret when the Nazis come to power and tested in a secluded area of the Baltic. That would, for example, give them time to develop a better snort to use the British terminology.

However, if the Germans did dig the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal, your third paragraph would be unnecessary. Furthermore, IOTL the Germans had plans to build Type 1943 M-Boats at Vienna and could have built vessels of that size there from late 1938 if they wanted to. Or they could have done more to help the Romanians expand their shipyards. (As it happens I thought of that for the "Fourth (Major) Axis Power" thread that we had earlier this year.) The Italians could have built more MFP/AFP-type vessels, S-Boats, large minesweepers and coastal submarines if they'd started earlier IOTL and they will in my version of the complementary "Alternative Regia Marina" thread. Plus the Germans were able to send S-Boats of the smaller type to the Mediterranean via the French canal system IOTL.
 
Earlier in the thread I suggested that the Weimar Republic builds all the ships that it was allowed by the Treaty of Versailles. One of the reasons was that Germany needs all the warships it can get even if they aren't built to optimal designs. The other reason was to increase Germany's capacity to build warships so that it can build more of the ships that it was allowed under the Anglo-German Naval Agreement.

Another thing that the Weimar Republic needs to do is build as many large merchant ships as possible. At the larger end of the scale it needs to build more large passenger liners to increase it's capacity to build large warships. That is more slipways that are big enough to build large warships on and to increase the machinery making capacity. It also needs to encourage the yards to invest in large-scale production methods so it can build smaller surface warships, auxiliaries and U-Boats in larger numbers.

In earlier threads on this subject I mentioned the German plans to mass-produce the FBD Submarines and large minesweepers of the M-Boat type later in the war. I suggested that the German Navy should have a contingency plan to mass produce U-Boats and as many of the other warships & auxiliaries as possible upon the declaration of war or even better the day after the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was denounced.

However, it was pointed out to me that few of the pieces fitted correctly due to poor quality control. Since then I've learned from watching Dr Clarke's videos that the performance of different U-Boats of the same class varied considerably according to which shipyard built them.

Therefore, the Weimar Government (either directly or through the German equivalent of the British Standards Institute) needs to get the German shipbuilding industry to standardise and improve it's quality control.
 
Link to Post 124 which is what I think Germany should have built 1919 to c. 1932.

What I think the Kriegsmarine's Destroyer Policy should have been.
Part One.
The Destroyers the Kriegsmarine built 1933-45 IOTL.
It is a continuation of Post 124, which is what I think the Reichsmarine's Building Policy should have been.

Large Destroyers

From June 1935 to April 1939 the size of the Kriegsmarine's Destroyer Force was a function of the size of the British Commonwealth's Destroyer Force. Initially, it was 52,500 tons which was 35% of the British Commonwealth's First London Naval Treaty Destroyer Quota of 150,000 tons. However, the British Commonwealth had 204,809 tons when that Treaty expired which meant that Germany could have 71,683 tons of Destroyers under the A.G.N.A., and at the outbreak of World War II it had grown to 256,752 tons which if the Agreement had still been in force would have given Germany the legal right to 89,683 tons of Destroyers. The growth in the size of the British Commonwealth's Destroyer Force and the permitted size of the German Destroyer Force is illustrated by the following table.

AGNA Quotas - Destroyers.png

The Kriegsmarine had 9,600 tons of Destroyers at 18.06.35 (the 12 Small Destroyers of the 800-ton type built by the Weimar Republic) so the amount of tonnage available for new construction was:
  • At 18.06.35 - 42,900 tons
  • At 31.12.36 - 62,083 tons and 22 Z-Boats with an official displacement of 36,866 tons were ordered by that date.
  • At 03.09.39 - 80,263 tons and 42 Z-Boats with an official displacement of 73,086 tons were ordered by that date.
Therefore, Germany wouldn't have been in breach of the A.G.N.A. on 03.09.39 if it had still been in force.
  • The 42 Z-Boats ordered to 03.09.39 consisted of 4 Type 1934, 12 Type 1934A, 6 Type 1936, 8 Type 1936A and 12 Type 1938B.
    • The 12 Type 1938B (Z31-Z42) were ordered in the Summer of 1939 and re-ordered as Type 1936A Z-Boats on 19.09.39, of which:
      • 7 (Z31 - Z34 & Z-37-39) were built the Type 1936A design;
      • 2 (Z35 & Z36) were built to the Type 1936B design and;
      • 3 (Z40 - Z42) were re-ordered as Spähkreuzer 1 - 3, but none were completed.
    • Therefore, only 39 of the 42 Z-Boats ordered to 03.09.39 were built.
  • Another 14 Z-Boats (Z43 - Z56) were ordered during the war:
    • 3 Type 1936B (Z43 - Z45);
    • 5 Type 1936C (Z46 - Z50);
    • 1 Type 1942 (Z51) and;
    • 5 Type 1944 (Z52 - Z56);
    • Z43 was the only ship out of the 14 ordered to be completed.
  • At total of 40 large destroyers of the Z-Type was completed.
The faults of the Type 1934 and 1934A designs were cured in the Type 1936 design, but unfortunately (for the Kreigsmarine) 5 out of 6 were lost in the Narvik battles. This included reliable machinery because according to (Whitley who I got the above information from) the sole surviving Type 1936 destroyer (Z20 Karl Glaster) had a good reputation including a good serviceability record. According to him the Type 1936 Z-boats also had a marginally greater range than the Type 1934 and their machinery was more economical than the subsequent Type 1936A because their engines were modified at the insistence of OKM.

Then the Kriegsmarine went "back to square one" with the Type 1936A, which was the Type 1936 hull & machinery mounting five 5.9in guns instead of the five 5in guns that had armed Types 1934, 1934A & 1936. The Type 1936B returned to an armament of five 5in guns but unfortunately (for the Kriegsmarine) only 3 out of the 5 boats could be completed. The Type 1936C was the Type 1936A hull & machinery with a main armament of six 5in guns in three twin DP mountings. Types 1942 & 1944 were new designs with diesel engines in place of the previous high-pressure steam machinery.

Small Destroyers

10 F-Boats & 12 T-Boats with an official displacement of 13,200 tons were also ordered to the end of 1936 which was increased to 10 F-Boats and 30 T-Boats with an official displacement of 24,000 tons by 03.09.39. These ships were built to exploit the section of the First London Naval Treaty that allowed unlimited construction of surface torpedo-craft displacing less than 600 tons. Therefore, they weren't counted as part of Germany's Destroyer tonnage. If they had Germany would have exceeded its A.G.N.A. allowance on 31.12.36 and (if it had still been in force) on 03.09.39 too.

Another 39 T-Boats were ordered during the war, which increased the total to 69, as follows:
  • 12 Type 1935 (T1 - T12);
  • 9 Type 1937 (T13 - T21) - 18 (T13 - T30) were ordered but the last 9 were built to the much better Type 1939 design;
  • 15 Type 1939 (T22 - T36);
  • 15 Type 1941 (T37-T51);
  • 6 Type 1944 (T52-T57);
  • 12 Type 1940 (T61-T72) which were ordered from Dutch yards.
However, only 36 (T1 - T36) were completed.

The Type 1935 & 1937 T-Boats (along with the Type 1934 F-Boat) were rubbish. They were so bad that Whitley (in his German Destroyers of World War II book) spends several paragraphs discussing whether they were a waste resources. It was fortunate (for the Kriegsmaine) that T31 - T36 were built to a different design because the Type 1939 T-Boats were Germany's best destroyers.
 
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thaddeus

Donor
However, if the Germans did dig the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal, your third paragraph would be unnecessary. Furthermore, IOTL the Germans had plans to build Type 1943 M-Boats at Vienna and could have built vessels of that size there from late 1938 if they wanted to. Or they could have done more to help the Romanians expand their shipyards. (As it happens I thought of that for the "Fourth (Major) Axis Power" thread that we had earlier this year.) The Italians could have built more MFP/AFP-type vessels, S-Boats, large minesweepers and coastal submarines if they'd started earlier IOTL and they will in my version of the complementary "Alternative Regia Marina" thread. Plus the Germans were able to send S-Boats of the smaller type to the Mediterranean via the French canal system IOTL.

my only cautions on the huge canal project being the lynchpin are that it is such a huge project over years whether it would/could be sustained and whether it could be targeted as the British especially targeted transport of oil.

NOT saying it should not be pursued to the utmost but it seems prudent to have vessels that could be transported using rail and "lesser" waterways.
 
My only cautions on the huge canal project being the lynchpin are that it is such a huge project over years whether it would/could be sustained and whether it could be targeted as the British especially targeted transport of oil.

NOT saying it should not be pursued to the utmost but it seems prudent to have vessels that could be transported using rail and "lesser" waterways.
FWIW.
  • (1) Point taken.
    • Although the British don't target. They attack. The use of target as a verb is a bête noire of mine. It's not a synonym for aim, attack, bomb, concentrate, fire (a gun) and spend. E.g. I often hear politicians say "I want to target the money where it's most needed" when they should say "I want to spend the money where it's most needed".
    • Yes they will attack it sooner or later. However, how successful those attacks will be is another matter. I suspect that it will be late 1943 or early 1944 before those attacks are effective. And if the war's still on in late 1943-early 1944 Germany's still going to loose canal or no.
    • But the Allies resources are finite too. If they're bombing the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal what aren't they bombing?
  • (2) I did examine whether it could have been done in the other thread. My conclusion was, yes it could.
 
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