The U-2 shootdown was not by Cubans, it was done on the orders of the Soviet Air Defense Command in Cuba. The book Operation Anadyr even has the account from the SA-2 battery commander getting the order from his chain of command.
While I dig out the OB stuff for the USN and USAF, here's the outline of the invasion: (from Dino Brugioni's Eyeball to Eyeball and the recent book Defcon-2)
Prior to A-Day Army SF teams were to insert into Cuba and disable several Air Defense radars. After the radars were knocked out, the first waves from Florida and the carriers (four attack carriers were on station) were to hit SA-2 sites, AAA batteries, and the air bases where MiGs and Il-28s were based. After the air defense had been suppressed, the main strikes on the SS-4 and SS-5 sites were to go in, with each site attracting the attention of at least a squadron of F-100s or A-4s, with 500-lb. bombs and napalm. Continuous sorties throughout the day were to be flown until the Soviet/Cuban AF and air defenses were knocked out, and all known missile sites destroyed. The pattern would continue with Soviet and Cuban ground forces and beach defenses (including the coastal defense SS-C-2 batteries) being hit, and intensive post-strike recon by U-2s, RF-8s, RF-101s, and SAC RB-47Es to determine if any missiles survived, with info being passed to the targeteers at STRIKCOM (MacDill AFB). After 8 days, CINCLANT would have had an evaluation done as to whether or not to continue to the maximum period of 18 days. (You can bet that XVIII Airborne Corps and II MAF would want the full 18-day preparation period before putting boots on the ground)
Upon CINCLANT order, the invasion would go in.
West of Havana (XVIII Airborne Corps): The 82nd Airborne Division was to jump on Jose Marti IAP and the San Antonio de Los Banos AB, with the 101st Airborne Division jumping on Baraoca airfield and Mariel NAS. Prior to the jump, SEAL teams were to insert into the port of Mariel to disable any demolitons set on the port facilities and to seize any ships in the port to prevent their scuttling to block the harbor and port facilities. Upon Mariel being declared Secure, the 1st Armored Division would be put ashore, one Brigade at a time, using 15 LSTs shuttling from Port Everglades and Miami (it would take 30 hours to put the whole Division in Cuba). Elements of the 1st ID (The "Big Red One") were to be flown in to the captured airfields and reinforce the 82nd. One brigade of 1st Armored was to strike to Pinar Del Rio and take the SS-4 sites at San Cristobal, while the remainder of the Division was to push east to link up with the 82nd. After 1st AD, the rest of 1st ID and the whole of the 4th ID were to be put ashore to fully control Western Cuba from the outskirts of Havana all the way west to the Western Tip of Cuba. Havana was to be isolated, not seized. Guanajay IRBM site was to be overrun by either the 101st elements out of Baraoca, or by elements of 1st AD.
East of Havana (II MAF): 2nd Marine Division was to assault several beaches from Varadero Beach all the way West to Tarara Beach, with a full Regimental Landing Team assigned to each. Upon securing beachheads and linking up, the Marines would seize the port of Matanzas. This would allow the 2nd ID to land. Once the 2nd "Indian Head" ID was ashore, the Marines would head west to link up with XVIII Airborne Corps and complete the isolation of Havana. 2nd ID was to head east to the Sagua la Grande and Remidios missile sites. Regimental Landing Team 5 would conduct an assault near Santiago de Cuba to fix Soviet and Cuban forces in Eastern Cuba and take pressure off of Guantanamo. Upon the securing of all missile sites, and the isolation of Havana, the rest of the island was to be secured with a combination of overland attacks and amphibious end-arounds. Organized resistance expected to end by L+18. Upon the island being secured, two Army National Guard divisions were to be called up for occupation duty, while some of the invasion forces were to return to CONUS for rest and refit, as they were tasked also with the reinforcement of Europe.
Two notes: it was estimated that 1,190 sorties would be flown on the first day, with some pilots making at least two, if not three missions on Day one. Likely sortie rate would likely be 700-900 on average for the full air campaign and the invasion itself.
Also, Fort Benning, GA, was to house any Soviet or Soviet bloc POWs brought from Cuba.