The VVS was far less competent than the Wallied air forces and badly outnumbered, not to mention technically outclassed and undertrained.
Except not sufficiently for the WAllies to instantly achieve air superiority.
All of these were advantages the WAllies had over the Luftwaffe, after all (in fact, their numerical advantage was even more crushing with the LW then it would be against the Soviets). Yet it still took them over a year to break German air power.
By 1944-45 they were facing less than half of the LW and outnumbered it 4-5:1, yet were still suffering 3:1 losses.
Irrelevant. They could afford those losses and the LW could not.
Why would it take a long time to kill an air force that is far worse trained, badly outnumbered, technically and doctrinally inferior,
Because it isn't
that badly outnumbered, technically, and doctrinally inferior.
The Wallies have a ton more and theirs are far better trained with an average of 400 flight hours before showing up at the front; the Soviets even in 1944-45 had no more than 100.
Which would only be relevant is both side were starting with their air forces consisting entirely of trainees. But they are not: instead they are starting with air forces made up of battle hardened and experienced pilots. Now as attrition progresses and pilots are lost, the Soviets inferior pilot training program will start to have an effect but as with the LW this will take time.
Plus the Soviets made their bones against a declining LW that was being murdered in the West,
Wrong, the Soviets were able to reorganize and seize air superiority against a still-powerful Luftwaffe in late-1942/early-1943, well before the LW really started getting put through the murder machine.
leaving them the left overs to deal with; their combat experience was not as tough as the Wallies from 1943 on.
Except it was. As Chris Bergstrom nicely points out in his books, the fighter squadrons the Luftwaffe left behind in the East during the latter-half of the war were composed of the overwhelmingly best pilots the LW had to offer. So in qualitative terms, the VVS was facing the best the Germans had out there.
Its a doctrinal limitation you mentioned in another thread that cost them the chance to hurt the LW worse and would be a fatal flaw against the independent Allies air forces.
Ultimately, yes. But as with the LW, this flaw won't instantly end them and they'll be able to successfully contest the air space for some time.
Maskirovka worked against the LW in the period it was mostly not on the Eastern Front, rather it was being killed in the West.
In 1942 and '43 the LW still had significant assets in the East. It did not help them.
45 year later info is not relevant to 1945, as that is over two generations of refinements and multiple war experience later.
Except it is. All of the techniques and tactics used by the Serbs were largely the same as those developed by the Soviets during the 2nd World War. The only modifications made were those to take account of advances in sensors technology.
Athey have nothing set up in July 1945
Despite having advanced warning.
after the war ended to deal with the hordes of enemy aircraft unlike they've ever experienced before;
Except in 1941 and 42.
Maskirovka took a long time to prepare for an entire front and you don't build up a massive set of deceptions from May-July across the entire frontage of Europe when no preparations existed prior to that due to lack of need.
Except the Soviets routinely put together masses of decoys and deception measures in just that amount of time. The entire build-up and associated deception measures for Bagration took about the same amount of time as the interim between the end of World War 2 and that proposed start date for Unthinkable.
And you should note too that the Germans used deception and camouflage measures against the Wallies too with minor success.
That German deception measures were inadequate is non-indicative of the far more sophisticated Soviet deception measures.
The reality is that if you have a large aerial recon capability ground based deception efforts during WW2 did not work all that well,
Except what were essentially the same techniques worked perfectly against a vastly more advanced and dominant aerial recon capability 45 years later.
You can't hide rail lines and rail yards.
Except the Soviets did. Repeatedly. They were able to successfully able to protect not just rail lines and yards, but also bridges and tunnels from German air attack.
Despite Soviet deception efforts the Germans were able to successfully bomb Soviet rail infrastructure during the 1944 retreat, but didn't have enough bombers to make it stick
Except there is no evidence for this. Soviet deception efforts worked perfectly in '43 and '44. The Germans repeatedly bombed the wrong targets while missing the real infrastructure. The build-up for every Soviet operation in the latter half of '43-1944 was completely unaffected by all German attempts at logistical severance.
Anti-Soviet partisans still drew off Soviet security forces
So not combat forces.
Mind you, I can see anti-Soviet partisans managing to become something akin to a threat with time when the WAllies are able to get enough aid and advisers, but that is yet another long-term advantage which may not be able to come into play before a negotiated peace is settled.
and German stragglers were being scooped up for months after the war ended by everyone.
Best I could tell, pretty much all German soldiers who actually wanted to fight were dead or captured by the end of May. The only ones who persisted afterwards were those deployed in the boonies, way the hell away from anything or anyone, who were simply forgotten about so no-one ever bothered to go out and take them prisoner.
Right, because pointing out the Soviets weren't supermen that could counter anything and everything before the threat appears means they lack agency.
Because the Soviets won't learn of Operation Unthinkable and it's implementation ahead of time despite having the WAllies decision making apparatus largely riddled by Soviet spies.
Considering how long it took them to adapt to the Germans, it will probably take them a while to respond to a radically different opponent that fights a different way.
And considering how long it took for the WAllies to adapt to the Germans, it will probably take them a while to respond to a radically different opponent that fights a different way.
Right, because a minor bungled Nazi operation in 1939 is completely the same as a Wallied one in 1945 when their propaganda machine is tuned up to 11.
Said propaganda machine has been overwhelmingly pro-Soviet, something which can not be turned around 180 in an instant. And a minor incident is going to be insufficient to pull it off. There were multiple minor incidents in 1944-45 that comprehensively failed to cause a war between the Soviets and WAllies. The WAllies are going to need to pull off a
big false-flag operation in order to convince their own people and such big operations leave tons of points for a security breach.