Operation Unthinkable if Soviets Weren’t Allies

I'd recommend folks look at the complete set of numbers for both Lend Lease and Soviet production before posting anything on the subject here. Fragments gleaned off the History Channel, or the internet are useless for understanding anything this complex.
 
It's important to note that when the "enemy was at the gates" Lend-Lease was in its infancy and its impact was negligible and came in smaller amounts than materials the Soviets bought from the United States. In the Battle of Moscow, for example, American equipment was limited to a single fighter wing.

I was playing devils advocate
 

Wimble Toot

Banned
Just like the Germans deserted when all that Japanese lendlease never came?

Was the Third Reich expecting any?

I'd recommend folks look at the complete set of numbers for both Lend Lease and Soviet production before posting anything on the subject here.

The tables in post 11 come from 'Feeding The Bear' , by Hubert P van Tuyll, pretty much the definitive work on the subject.

The USSR is doomed by late 1943, without Lend-Lease.
 
It’s not clear whether the Soviets would have managed to tough it out or whether they would have collapsed. Both scenarios are possible. By all rights, they probably should have collapsed as it was even with lendlease. The problem with the idea is, regardless of whether the Soviets manage to survive or not, the WAllies are neatly shooting themselves in the foot by not assisting the Soviets. Lend lease allowed the Soviets, at the very minimum, to maximize their capacity to gut the fighting power of the Heer. Without that, the German Army will be quite a bit more powerful when the WAllies land on D-Day, even if the Russians pull through. Hence, not assisting the Soviets is a strategic mistake that they’ll pay for with the blood of their own men.

There’s be even less appetite after the war then OTL for Operation Unthinkable. Not only would the Soviet threat, having barely intruded into Eastern Europe if at all, be not regarded as worth it but the Anglo-Americans would be too busy mourning their own much more numerous dead.
 
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FBKampfer

Banned
It’s not clear whether the Soviets would have managed to tough it out or whether they would have collapsed. Both scenarios are possible. By all rights, they probably should have collapsed as it was even with lendlease. The problem with the idea is, regardless of whether the Soviets manage to survive or not, the WAllies are neatly shooting themselves in the foot by not assisting the Soviets. Lend lease allowed the Soviets, at the very minimum, to maximize their capacity to gut the fighting power of the Heer. Without that, the German Army will be quite a bit more powerful when the WAllies land on D-Day, even if the Russians pull through. Hence, not assisting the Soviets is a strategic mistake that they’ll pay for with the blood of their own men.

There’s be even less appetite after the war then OTL for Operation Unthinkable. Not only would the Soviet threat, having barely intruded into Eastern Europe if at all, be not regarded as worth it but the Anglo-Americans would be too busy morning their own much more numerous dead.

I actually don't think the Germans could have put up a significantly stronger fight regardless of the situation.

Simply manning the Eastern Front sucked up about 60 of the Wehrmacht. Never mind force concentrations to make or meet attacks.

Then you've got Italy, and all their other little side escapades sucking up another 5-10%.


Even if the Soviets are dragging ass compared to OTL, and say the Stalingrad-esque turning point comes a year later, the sheer size of the front requires ungodly numbers to properly man.

The only way for the Germans to significantly bolster their other fronts is for the Soviets to completely come apart at the strings, in which case we're looking at no OP: Unthinkable in the first place.


By my guess, the Allies clear Europe by September of '45 instead of May.


And regardless of any troops they're able to shift, the presumed defense completely ignores the fact that Allied bombings had crippled German capability to support an offensive. L
 
I actually don't think the Germans could have put up a significantly stronger fight regardless of the situation.

That's basically wishful thinking which ignores that not only did the East absorb the bulk of German ground forces, but also the bulk of German replacements, the bulk of German supplies, and the bulk of their CAS aircraft. The 60% figure you cited was DOWN from what it had been just six months earlier. If a million fewer Germans die in 1943, then a million more Germans are available to fight the WAllies in 1944. Every shell and every bullet that is not expended against the Soviets as it was OTL is instead expended against the WAllies, potentially taking with it another American or British soldier. Furthermore, the safer the Germans feel in the East and the more they feel threatened in the west, the more forces will move from one to the other. If it means the Soviets resume advancing for awhile, then so what? Their still much further away then OTL, less threatening then IOTL, and the Germans have a lot more of the Eastern Steppe to trade for time then they did historically.

There is no way for the WAllies to screw over the Soviets without also screwing over themselves. They recognized this fact and hence endeavored to aid the Soviets to the best of their efforts.

By my guess, the Allies clear Europe by September of '45 instead of May.

Even this admission means far more will die then historically lived, particularly in the East. Even in the west, at the OTL rates, it's another 50,000 American soldiers dead. That's 50,000 more too many as far as the WAllied political leadership is concerned. Good luck being the western politician who has to explain to their grieving mother or child that their husband or father or son had to die not for the sake of beating the Germans in the war, but to ameliorate an abstract idea (as it would appear IATL) of the Soviet Union conquering Eastern Europe. Not only is the idea strategic stupidity, it is political suicide even if we presume a greater hostility to Russia within the western public then existed IOTL.

And we haven't even gotten to the additional death toll implicit in the next stage, invading the Soviet Union itself, would entail.

And regardless of any troops they're able to shift, the presumed defense completely ignores the fact that Allied bombings had crippled German capability to support an offensive. L

The Germans were able to conduct offensives, if unsuccessful ones, in both west and east long after not only the bombing campaign was in full swing but the effects of raw material shortages, manpower losses on all fronts, and the breakdown from overmobilization all were collapsing the German war economy. Hell, their very last offensive of the war in Hungary occurred while German factories within Germany itself were being overrun. Their ability to sustain their offensive over a longer period of time is less relevant to my argument then the fact they will occur, they will inflict heavier losses upon the WAllies then occurred historically, . This further ignores that not only will Germany be able to fight offensively for longer but also they will be able to fight defensively for longer, extracting a higher blood price from the WAllies in the process.
 
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FBKampfer

Banned
That's basically wishful thinking which ignores that not only did the East absorb the bulk of German ground forces, but also the bulk of German replacements, the bulk of German supplies, and the bulk of their CAS aircraft. The 60% figure you cited was DOWN from what it had been just six months earlier. If a million fewer Germans die in 1943, then a million more Germans are available to fight the WAllies in 1944. Every shell and every bullet that is not expended against the Soviets as it was OTL is instead expended against the WAllies, potentially taking with it another American or British soldier. Furthermore, the safer the Germans feel in the East and the more they feel threatened in the west, the more forces will move from one to the other. If it means the Soviets resume advancing for awhile, then so what? Their still much further away then OTL, less threatening then IOTL, and the Germans have a lot more of the Eastern Steppe to trade for time then they did historically.
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You miss the point entirely. By its simple existence, the Eastern Front took 60% of the Wehrmacht just to PUT BODIES IN THE FUCKING TRENCHES. If you're fine with division-sized gaps in the lines, or paper-thin lines and no strategic reserves, yeah, maybe you can drop that down to 45%.

But then the Russians, all their faults not withstanding, would go through them like a plasma torch through sheet paper.

And you're ignoring the continually dwindling numbers of troops in the east which resulted in ever increasingly catastrophic German defeats. Yeah, maybe a million less Germans die in the east. But you still need them on the Eastern front, 1,000,000 fewer casualties doesn't suddenly result in 1,000,000 more troops to redeploy to other fronts.. Best case scenario, Von Rundstedt gets maybe another 100,000 over the course of the campaign. And any extra troops in place in France will be units that were put in the line until the they became combat ineffective from casualties alone, or paper divisions that were entirely annihilated somewhere else, and in the process of being reconstituted.

The ONLY way to get significant reinforcements is to magic away the Eastern Front, which as I already stated, changes the game entirely.

There is no way for the WAllies to screw over the Soviets without also screwing over themselves. They recognized this fact and hence endeavored to aid the Soviets to the best of their efforts.
sure there is. Feed em enough to keep them shooting Germans, and not a slice of bread more.

A lack of Soviet strategic victory does not mean significantly lighter casualties. The formations that were coming apart and surrendered en mass in 44 and 45 were already shadows of what they had been in 41, 42, and even 43. They sustained most of their casualties and ground themselves down while achieving perhaps the most astonishing, and complete operational successes that humankind may ever see in our history.


Even this admission means far more will die then historically lived, particularly in the East. Even in the west, at the OTL rates, it's another 50,000 American soldiers dead. That's 50,000 more too many as far as the WAllied political leadership is concerned. Good luck being the western politician who has to explain to their grieving mother or child that their husband or father or son had to die not for the sake of beating the Germans in the war, but to ameliorate an abstract idea (as it would appear IATL) of the Soviet Union conquering Eastern Europe. Not only is the idea strategic stupidity, it is political suicide even if we presume a greater hostility to Russia within the western public then existed IOTL.

And we haven't even gotten to the additional death toll implicit in the next stage, invading the Soviet Union itself, would entail.
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You mean to tell me you believe me approximately 12% of total US deaths from all fronts will be sustained over the course of 3 months in one front against an ever increasingly beleaguered, hungry, demoralized, and poorly supplied army, literally using improperly zeroed rifles at the end of things, despite US performance only improving as time went on? You're insane, or lack an appreciation of just how far gone the Heer was by 45. To call it an army is even a stretch, given most of its composition were relabled militia units and paper tank divisions. Hell, at the end of it, they had trouble scraping up 100 tanks for entire Panzer armies. Germany was utterly fucked in 45 and everyone knew it.



The Germans were able to conduct offensives, if unsuccessful ones, in both west and east long after not only the bombing campaign was in full swing but the effects of raw material shortages, manpower losses on all fronts, and the breakdown from overmobilization all were collapsing the German war economy. Hell, their very last offensive of the war in Hungary occurred while German factories within Germany itself were being overrun. Their ability to sustain their offensive over a longer period of time is less relevant to my argument then the fact they will occur, they will inflict heavier losses upon the WAllies then occurred historically, . This further ignores that not only will Germany be able to fight offensively for longer but also they will be able to fight defensively for longer, extracting a higher blood price from the WAllies in the process.


Every time they attacked, it was followed by a period of near-collapse as out of position units scrambled to get back to properly cited defensive positions while abandoning much of their heavy equipment and transportation. Their own officers hated orders to attack because they knew it was counter-productive.

And that situation won't change in the West, regardless of what happens in the East. Because Germany couldn't get enough material from A to B fast enough to keep anything going.

Supplies and fuel would end up on rail sidings and in warehouses and stockyards because they couldn't get where they needed to go.

Once you hit the front, were near a river or canal, or came within practical wagon range of a major depot, things improved. But getting fuel from Romania over Frankfurt was a hell of a chore. Same situation with coal, or steel, or anything else you needed to ship further than the next town over.

They could get fuel to the front. But they had to stockpile it like they did for Wacht am Rhine for it to matter.


As for the defensive fighting, that was rarely a problem OTL. By the time the units at the front had had to pack it in, the situation had usually deteriorated to the point of further defense from those positions being untenable.


Will the Allies take more casualties? No shit. But will it cripple their will to fight, or degrade their military capabilities? Not in the slightest.

The only question as to whether or not the Soviets take it on chin is the political situation. Which frankly we all know is pretty outlandish IOTL.

Some causes might stray towards ASB, but then again "nope, can't happen, people don't like their families getting shot" is well beyond the scope of hypothetical discussions.
 
You miss the point entirely. By its simple existence, the Eastern Front took 60% of the Wehrmacht just to PUT BODIES IN THE FUCKING TRENCHES.

Put bodies in the trenches, plus maintain a degree of operational reserves. The German lines were stretched thin, yes. But a weaker Red Army does mean they can be stretched thinner.

But then the Russians, all their faults not withstanding, would go through them like a plasma torch through sheet paper.

And the Germans will give ground, yes. But then they'll have more ground to give.

Yeah, maybe a million less Germans die in the east. But you still need them on the Eastern front, 1,000,000 fewer casualties doesn't suddenly result in 1,000,000 more troops to redeploy to other fronts.

It does mean that a million Germans who historically were sent East to replace them are now available to send west though.

sure there is. Feed em enough to keep them shooting Germans, and not a slice of bread more.

Without the trucks to prosecute deep enough offensives, fewer Germans die to Soviet offensives. That means more Germans to fight the Anglo-Americans. Without the provisions to industry to produce weapons, fewer Germans die. Which means more Germans fight the Anglo-Americans.

A lack of Soviet strategic victory does not mean significantly lighter casualties. The formations that were coming apart and surrendered en mass in 44 and 45 were already shadows of what they had been in 41, 42, and even 43.

And they were so because the Soviets in 1942-43 with their offensives inflicted huge casualties upon the Germans.

They sustained most of their casualties and ground themselves down while achieving perhaps the most astonishing, and complete operational successes that humankind may ever see in our history.

In 1941 and 1942, the Germans lost perhaps 1.5 million men in their offensives. Their losses to German offensives in 1942-43 is in the range of 2 million.

You mean to tell me you believe me approximately 12% of total US deaths from all fronts will be sustained over the course of 3 months in one front against an ever increasingly beleaguered, hungry, demoralized, and poorly supplied army, literally using improperly zeroed rifles at the end of things, despite US performance only improving as time went on? You're insane, or lack an appreciation of just how far gone the Heer was by 45. To call it an army is even a stretch, given most of its composition were relabled militia units and paper tank divisions. Hell, at the end of it, they had trouble scraping up 100 tanks for entire Panzer armies. Germany was utterly fucked in 45 and everyone knew it.

If it was insane, then explain how it happened. Because 10,000 men a month is roughly the actual KIA rate for US formations in 1945. In fact, for 10,000 KIA is the roughly the monthly rate for US forces in the European theater of operation from June 1944 through to April 1945. Using the IOTL KIA rate is literally all I did. I didn't even make allowance for additional German men and material being available to the Western Front.

Every time they attacked, it was followed by a period of near-collapse as out of position units scrambled to get back to properly cited defensive positions while abandoning much of their heavy equipment and transportation. Their own officers hated orders to attack because they knew it was counter-productive.

And every time they attacked, they killed American and British men.

And that situation won't change in the West, regardless of what happens in the East. Because Germany couldn't get enough material from A to B fast enough to keep anything going.

Supplies and fuel would end up on rail sidings and in warehouses and stockyards because they couldn't get where they needed to go.

Except they did. Throughout the entirety of 1944-45, what was produced from the factory generally made it to the front. Even as late as April 1945, German formations were still receiving the last trickles of output from the German war economy. Air interdiction may have reduced the flow of supplies, but it never outright stopped it. They were able to get keep fighting and killing to some degree right up until Hitler put a bullet in his brain... and even for about a week after that.

They could get fuel to the front. But they had to stockpile it like they did for Wacht am Rhine for it to matter.

And, by and large, they did do it. They did manage to get supplies to their forces in Normandy and they did manage to get supplies to their forces in Wacht am Rhine, in spite of Allied air superiority. What did them in was an absolute lack of supplies, not an inability to get it forward.

As for the defensive fighting, that was rarely a problem OTL. By the time the units at the front had had to pack it in, the situation had usually deteriorated to the point of further defense from those positions being untenable.

Cold comfort for the American and British corpses laying in front of their positions.

Will the Allies take more casualties? No shit.

And that is enough for American politicians to never even contemplate it. Even leaving aside the moral issue that they actually gave a damn about the lives of the soldiers they sent into battle, from a practical standpoint, politicians in western democracies face re-elections and people are not going to vote for someone who got their friends and family killed for a abstract what-might-have-been.

But will it cripple their will to fight, or degrade their military capabilities? Not in the slightest.

A nice strawman. Hurting the Soviets doesn't do a thing to the WAllies ability to fight. It does, however, enhance the Germans ability to fight.
 
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FBKampfer

Banned
Put bodies in the trenches, plus maintain a degree of operational reserves. The German lines were stretched thin, yes. But a weaker Red Army does mean they can be stretched thinner.
Hardly to any significant degree. As you noted, 60% is one of the lower estimates. And if we're only talking frontline combat units, it spikes to closer to 80%.

And when it starts to dip, the Germans start taking it in the east.


And the Germans will give ground, yes. But then they'll have more ground to give.

I hope you're able to realize what an impermanent solution that is.

It does mean that a million Germans who historically were sent East to replace them are now available to send west though.

Assuming they were replaced at a 1:1 ratio IOTL, and assuming that that extra million isn't just kept in the East to begin with.

France was seen as a backwater, remember.


Without the trucks to prosecute deep enough offensives, fewer Germans die to Soviet offensives. That means more Germans to fight the Anglo-Americans. Without the provisions to industry to produce weapons, fewer Germans die. Which means more Germans fight the Anglo-Americans.
1) Not the primary cause of German deaths prior to 1944 (or even captures, for that matter, given the generally defensive nature of the Soviets until the end of 1943)


2) less and less dependent on LL the longer things drag on

Weapons and food, perhaps valid. Though this makes the assumption that the Soviet field performance is directly correlated to supplies received.

And they were so because the Soviets in 1942-43 with their offensives inflicted huge casualties upon the Germans.
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You mean the huge casualties from June 22 1941 until 12 July 1943.

Soviet offensives in 42-43 winter didn't do much more than the Germans attacking did, especially considering they failed to encircle and destroy much more than the 6th army.



In 1941 and 1942, the Germans lost perhaps 1.5 million men in their offensives. Their losses to German offensives in 1942-43 is in the range of 2 million.
So 3.5 million dead from when they held the initiative.

Thanks for illustrating my point.

it was insane, then explain how it happened. Because 10,000 men a month is roughly the actual KIA rate for US formations in 1945. In fact, for 10,000 KIA is the roughly the monthly rate for US forces in the European theater of operation from June 1944 through to April 1945. Using the IOTL KIA rate is literally all I did. I didn't even make allowance for additional German men and material being available to the Western Front.
because the Germans had almost nothing left by May of 45, from industry, soldiers, food, fuel, etc.

Your assumption that the Germans will be able to maintain the same level of effectiveness throughout the campaign is simply false.


And every time they attacked, they killed American and British men.

And still a little bit irrelevant for a what-if.



Except they did. Throughout the entirety of 1944-45, what was produced from the factory generally made it to the front. Even as late as April 1945, German formations were still receiving the last trickles of output from the German war economy. Air interdiction may have reduced the flow of supplies, but it never outright stopped it. They were able to get keep fighting and killing to some degree right up until Hitler put a bullet in his brain... and even for about a week after that.

By April the fronts were almost the factories themselves. Their ability to move goods had almost nothing to do with that at that point.


And I never said it was a complete halt. But it was slowed to a trickle, which was more than enough to get the job done, which was my point from the beginning.

And, by and large, they did do it. They did manage to get supplies to their forces in Normandy and they did manage to get supplies to their forces in Wacht am Rhine, in spite of Allied air superiority. What did them in was an absolute lack of supplies, not an inability to get it forward.
Normandy was concurrent with the air campaigns. The noose was around the neck, but the door hadn't fallen yet.

And for Wacht am Rhine, they were hoarding supplies for weeks, and still ran out. Fuck, from the out set they planned to rely on captured fuel. That alone should speak to how critical their supply chain was.



Cold comfort for the American and British corpses laying in front of their positions.

Once again not particularly the point. Especially for this phase of things.

And that is enough for American politicians to never even contemplate it. Even leaving aside the moral issue that they actually gave a damn about the lives of the soldiers they sent into battle, from a practical standpoint, politicians in western democracies face re-elections and people are not going to vote for someone who got their friends and family killed for a abstract what-might-have-been.
The whole damn thread is a might have been.

We all already know that Unthinkable is pretty damn unlikely, and politically hard to sell.

Your entire argument is centered around the premise that it just can't happen because it's politically unsellable, and frankly that's never been under question. Hell OP gave us the choice to remove a popular sitting US president in wartime, so mucking with US politics completely fine.

The US house and congress collectively drink the crazy juice, McCarthy gets elected president somehow, etc, whatever it takes

In any case, it's pretty clear you really don't like OP unthinkable, think it's ASB, and generally want these threads to end as quickly as possible. Point being piss or get off the pot. Tell OP to take it to the ASB forums, or say your piece about the matter and drop it, I don't care either way. But you're the only one hung up on political feasibility.

A nice strawman. Hurting the Soviets doesn't do a thing to the WAllies ability to fight. It does, however, enhance the Germans ability to fight.

Somewhat true. Though you seem to be of the position that worse Soviet strategic performance in 1941-43 significantly reduce German casualties, this being the lynch pin of a stronger German defense.

I am not.
 
I'm getting sucked in, at least for this post.

...
The tables in post 11 come from 'Feeding The Bear' , by Hubert P van Tuyll, pretty much the definitive work on the subject. ...

A single table is a snapshot & in this case there not much context. Do those items represent 1% of total Soviet consumption for a item? 5%, 20%, 50%. when were the items delivered or used. Items used against the Japanese for two weeks in 1945 were less important than what was on hand in 1942.

... Simply manning the Eastern Front sucked up about 60 of the Wehrmacht. Never mind force concentrations to make or meet attacks. ...

Think the one through. How much of that 60% was during the years the W Allies were not much engaged? Second consider if the losses ion the germans were the same per man or per capita for the Red Army, the Commonwealth, or the US Army. Its claimed that in 1943 68% of the German air forces losses were in the west. This link is to a thread picking at that claim:

https://forum.axishistory.com//viewtopic.php?f=49&t=208284&p=1878952&hilit=Air+Losses#p1878952

Here are two of the core sets of numbers: They scratch the surface slightly. What they don't show are the numbers of Allied aircraft facing the Germans in each of these fronts. Neither do they show the losses of the Allies on each front. What it does suggest & only suggests is the RAF or US AAF were more efficient at destroying German aircraft than the Red Army. 'If' this is the case then were the Germans to shift aircraft west if allowed by a weaker Red AF then the German losses accelerate vs a deadlier enemy. If in fact the W Allies are more efficient at killing Germans then it is possible the Germans lose faster than if more engaged in the east.


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Hardly to any significant degree. As you noted, 60% is one of the lower estimates. And if we're only talking frontline combat units, it spikes to closer to 80%.

No, you don't understand. 60% wasn't the "low estimate". It was the low point. As in, the lowest point of the proportion of ground forces being in the east was in December 1944 at 60%. If your keeping track, that means prior to December 1944 it was higher. It was something like 75% in 1943.

I hope you're able to realize what an impermanent solution that is.

Sure. The Nazis don't care. So long as they can drag out their Gotterdammerung as long as possible and take as many of... well, literally everyone down with them.

Assuming they were replaced at a 1:1 ratio IOTL, and assuming that that extra million isn't just kept in the East to begin with.

Why would they be kept if they weren't sent in the first place?

France was seen as a backwater, remember.

By Spring of '44 it wasn't. German concerns over the mounting WAllied threat meant they began shifting in serious formations starting in April of 1944, despite the devastating casualties in the East.

1) Not the primary cause of German deaths prior to 1944 (or even captures, for that matter, given the generally defensive nature of the Soviets until the end of 1943)

"Defensive nature of the Soviets until the end of 1943"? The totality of the time span of German offensive operations in 1943 comes out to about a month. It's seven times that number for the Soviets.

2) less and less dependent on LL the longer things drag on

At a slower rate then IOTL, even assuming they don't collapse outright. A part of lend-lease was the provisioning of machine tools the Soviets used in their

Weapons and food, perhaps valid. Though this makes the assumption that the Soviet field performance is directly correlated to supplies received.

To a degree it was. Western trucks didn't enable Soviet maneuver advances, but it allowed them to push them faster and deeper then they would have been otherwise, killing or capturing more German men and machines then they would have otherwise and forcing the Germans to expend much more ammo . Lend-lease radios gave the Soviets enough so that they could provide effectively communication and coordination for formations below the divisional level. Without these, they would have definitely performed more poorly.

You mean the huge casualties from June 22 1941 until 12 July 1943.

No, I mean the huge casualties from November 21st 1942 until June 6th 1944. The Soviet counteroffensives starting on July 12th cost the Germans three times more in human and material casualties then Operation Citadel did.

Soviet offensives in 42-43 winter didn't do much more than the Germans attacking did, especially considering they failed to encircle and destroy much more than the 6th army.

Which is nonsense since it focuses entirely on the 6th Army and ignores the entire front throughout the entire period. Innumerable suffered horrendous German infantry divisions got gutted in the desperate fighting retreats from Stalingrad onwards and it was the Soviet offensives of July-August 1943, not Citadel, which gutted the German Panzerwaffe, destroying three times as many tanks and four times as many men. For the subsequent autumn Soviet offensives to and across the D'niepr in September-November 1943, The low end of German casualty estimates from Army Group South alone is 400,000 men, the equivalent of the entire German army deployed against the WAllies at Normandy. And then there's the winter of 1943-44, where the Soviets achieved multiple encirclements, some of which the Germans managed to break out of... but even then at the cost of much of their heavy equipment.

So 3.5 million dead from when they held the initiative.

Thanks for illustrating my point.

Are you even reading my post? The Germans had the initiative in 1941-42. They didn't in 1942-43, despite their delusions at Kursk. They lost 500,000 fewer men then they did when they lost the initiative in 1942-43. I haven't even counted the losses from the first half of 1944, which adds even more.

because the Germans had almost nothing left by May of 45, from industry, soldiers, food, fuel, etc.

They'll have a bit more IATL, both from holding back the WAllies longer and having been able to exploit the resources of the East for a bit longer.

Your assumption that the Germans will be able to maintain the same level of effectiveness throughout the campaign is simply false.

Everything you listed above was the case in April 1945 as well. 10,000 Americans still died that month. Multiply that out over an additional 5 further months, as you yourself suggested.

And I never said it was a complete halt. But it was slowed to a trickle, which was more than enough to get the job done, which was my point from the beginning.

Not really in evidence. German formations at Normandy reliably received ammunition and fuel throughout the battle. They didn't receive replacements, but largely that's because there were no replacements to send.

Normandy was concurrent with the air campaigns. The noose was around the neck, but the door hadn't fallen yet.

And for Wacht am Rhine, they were hoarding supplies for weeks, and still ran out. Fuck, from the out set they planned to rely on captured fuel. That alone should speak to how critical their supply chain was.

It speaks to an absolute lack of supply, not an ability to get supply forward. IATL they have more supply since they don't need to expend as much defeating the Soviet offensive. That's gonna last longer.

Once again not particularly the point. Especially for this phase of things.

Ah, but it very much is the point. With the Germans having expended less resources in the East holding back the Soviets, there would be more doomed offensives. More Bulge's. The Battle of the Bulge cost the US a 100,000 casualties.

The whole damn thread is a might have been.

To us. Not to the people IATL. To the people of IATL, OTL is a might have been and one that is a whole lot better given that millions of additional people didn't have to die in pointless wars.

We all already know that Unthinkable is pretty damn unlikely, and politically hard to sell.

Your not just trying to sell Unthinkable here, though. Your trying to sell a longer and harder war against the Germans

Your entire argument is centered around the premise that it just can't happen because it's politically unsellable, and frankly that's never been under question. Hell OP gave us the choice to remove a popular sitting US president in wartime, so mucking with US politics completely fine.

The US house and congress collectively drink the crazy juice, McCarthy gets elected president somehow, etc, whatever it takes

There's altering the politics of the matter and altering an entire society. This is rather more the latter. Basically we're positing a US that more resembles the Nazis or Soviets then the actual United States of the 1930s/40s. Your positing American leadership that is as uncaring of their own countries lives and as morally bankrupt as Adolf Hitler or Joseph Stalin.

Somewhat true. Though you seem to be of the position that worse Soviet strategic performance in 1941-43 significantly reduce German casualties, this being the lynch pin of a stronger German defense.

I am not.

The problem is that your assumption doesn't actually have a real basis in reality. That a worse Soviet strategic performance reduces German casualties is pretty evident. Additionally, if Soviet performance isn't altered by lend-lease, then the Soviets are still just as powerful and still just as able to take on Operation Unthinkable as they were IOTL. Which means no easy victory and even indeed the real prospect of some early defeats for the first year or so.
 
A single table is a snapshot & in this case there not much context. Do those items represent 1% of total Soviet consumption for a item? 5%, 20%, 50%. when were the items delivered or used. Items used against the Japanese for two weeks in 1945 were less important than what was on hand in 1942.

From Hunger and War: Food Provisioning in the Soviet Union during World War II:

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If in fact the W Allies are more efficient at killing Germans then it is possible the Germans lose faster than if more engaged in the east.

This line of logic literally makes no sense, as you're claiming they'll lose faster despite having more resources. Whether or not the Western Allies are better are fighting the Wehrmacht is irrelevant in the face of the fact the pool of the Wehrmacht they have to fight just got expanded twofold while the rate they can remove them from the board remains the same.
 
It's important to note that when the "enemy was at the gates" Lend-Lease was in its infancy and its impact was negligible and came in smaller amounts than materials the Soviets bought from the United States. In the Battle of Moscow, for example, American equipment was limited to a single fighter wing.

But British tanks composed around a fifth of those used by the Soviets in their counterattack. I think it needs to be said we're assuming all Lend Lease, be it Commonwealth or American, isn't happening according to OP.
 
It's not ideal but this is already what the Soviets were doing and would have continued to do without American help acting as a supplement.

Besides the food I've pointed out, around 70% of Soviet rolling stock and over half of their AV gas was Western in origin. These three facts alone should suffice to drive home the point of how critical Western aid, particularly American, was.

As noted, a reduction in mobility doesn't translate to human wave attacks.

That'd come as shock to the commanders and soldiers of the Great War.
 
https://books.google.com/books?id=n...8uDikQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=Lend Lease&f=false

That is very useful as brief as it is. It does start out with solid numbers for the Red Army & calories. The last paragraph seems to be extending the data base to the entire population, but is not clear and does not provide numbers. Theres some other questions, perhaps answered in the rest of the text. I'll leave those for others to ponder.


This line of logic literally makes no sense, as you're claiming they'll lose faster despite having more resources. Whether or not the Western Allies are better are fighting the Wehrmacht is irrelevant in the face of the fact the pool of the Wehrmacht they have to fight just got expanded twofold while the rate they can remove them from the board remains the same.

You are absolutely certain of that?

Heres another general question for folks. How many tons of cargo can be delivered to western Europe if the ships are not delivering to the USSR? Remember to reduce the days per ton as the UK, French Atlantic, and Mediterranean ports are not as far as Murmansk or the Persian Gulf.
 
That is very useful as brief as it is. It does start out with solid numbers for the Red Army & calories. The last paragraph seems to be extending the data base to the entire population, but is not clear and does not provide numbers. Theres some other questions, perhaps answered in the rest of the text. I'll leave those for others to ponder.

If you're wanting overall food production numbers, in so far as whats available to the economy, I can supply that as well:

The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR during World War II, by William Moskoff -

"The central fact behind the increased importance of the collective farm market was the drastic drop in food production, especially in 1942 and 1943, and the diminished proportion that went to the civilians. In 1943 overall agricultural production was only 38 percent of the 1940 level. In 1943, however, the Red Army began to recapture agricultural areas of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Caucasus and by the next year, 1944, agricultural output had risen to 54 percent of the 1940 level. Not surprisingly, the collapse of the food economy led to astonishing increases in prices. The most rapid rate [Emphasis by author] of increase in prices took place in 1942 and began to taper off in mid-1943."

The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945, by Walter Scott Dunn -

"By November of 1941, 47% of Soviet cropland was in German hands. The Germans had 38% of the grain farmland, 84% of the sugar land, 38% of the area devoted to beef and dairy cattle, and 60% of the land used to produce hogs. The Russians turned to the east and brought more land into cultivation. In the fall of 1941, the autumn and winter crops increased sharply in the eastern area. But despite all efforts, farm yields dropped from 95.5 million tons of grain in 1940 to 29.7 million tons in 1942. Production of cattle and horses dropped to less than half of prewar levels and hogs to one fifth. By 1942, meat and dairy production shrank to half the 1940 total and sugar to only 5%. Farm production in 1942 and 1943 dropped to 38% and 37% of 1940 totals."

You are absolutely certain of that?

Yes; if the Western Allies can kill a 1,000 Germans a day for 30,000 a month, then doubling the number of Germans they face in a month does not mean they kill more of them. You're increasing the German abilities, not the Allies. To get them to burn through the Germans faster, you must increase the Allied lethality.
 
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