Operation Unthinkable - best possible outcome for both sides?

What would be the best possible outcome for both the Western Allies and the Soviets if this were launched? And which would be more likely to occur, and under what circumstances?
 
Well, there is no "best possible outcome for both in unthinkable" since what each would consider the best outcome, is the opposite of what the other considers. So I think OTL is as best as a "best compromise" you will ever get.

Best possible realistic outcome for Soviets is to have the entirety of Europe minus Britain under their control as well as a puppet China and occupied Korea. Best possible realistic unthinkable outcome for the Allies is what Churchill wanted, with the USSR limited past Poland.

I think the best balanced compromise peace post unthinkable you would have would be the Soviets having all of Germany, Korea and a puppet China. The only reason Japan gets spared is because the Soviets simply do not have the navy to take it. So overall the Soviets end up being better than OTL, as the allies would be willing to give up Germany and Asia (minus Japan) in exchange for preserving the integrity of France and the rest of Western Europe, however the Soviets under no circumstances would give up an inch of Germany or anything else further East.
 
Oh no, I don't mean what is simultaneously the best possible outcome for both. I mean what would be the best just for the Allies; and what would be best just for the Soviets?

Hence why I said 'which is most likely'.
 
I don't see the Soviets taking all of Germany or puppeting China. They didn't have the logistics to get much further in Europe, especially in the face of Allied airpower.
 
The Western Allies: A successful push out to Danzig-Krakow line followed by the Soviets suing for peace before the political shitstorm in the US-UK gets truly furious.
USSR: Destruction of WAllied attack and occupation of the rest of Central Europe followed by the WAllies suing for peace as the political shitstorm at home undermines the war effort.

I don't see the Soviets taking all of Germany or puppeting China. They didn't have the logistics to get much further in Europe, especially in the face of Allied airpower.

Soviet logistics did a perfectly fine job shipping record numbers of supplies in Central Europe, with their rail-lines running all the way out to the Oder. As for air power... well, the fact it'll have to contend with Soviet air power will take a lot of the pressure off for quite some time. It took the allies two years of relentless operations on the Eastern, Western, Mediterranean, and German fronts to grind down the Luftwaffe to the point where they could maintain the sort of air superiority over it for seriously limiting logistical interdiction, and even then they weren't ever able to really halt the resupply of German armies. And the VVS/VPO of 1945 is in a far superior position to that of the Luftwaffe in 1942-43.
 
Soviet logistics did a perfectly fine job shipping record numbers of supplies in Central Europe, with their rail-lines running all the way out to the Oder. As for air power... well, the fact it'll have to contend with Soviet air power will take a lot of the pressure off for quite some time.

Which ignores the fact those Soviet logistics were receiving massive amounts of rails and trucks from the US.

It took the allies two years of relentless operations on the Eastern, Western, Mediterranean, and German fronts to grind down the Luftwaffe to the point where they could maintain the sort of air superiority over it for seriously limiting logistical interdiction,

It took one year, from Spring of 1943 to Spring of 1944.

and even then they weren't ever able to really halt the resupply of German armies.

Utterly false.

And the VVS/VPO of 1945 is in a far superior position to that of the Luftwaffe in 1942-43.

You mean the VVS that got anywhere from 40-60% of its AV Gas from the Americans? Sure.
 
Yes, but the Soviets never had to deal with strategic airpower used competently against their logistics. As for fighters and tactical air power, I will defer to your expertise (although I bet Wiking would disagree with you), but my understanding is that the Soviets primarily operated at lower altitudes, did not produce sufficient domestic high octane gasoline, and had nothing with which to counter the P-80 or Meteor.

As for halting the supply of the Heer, I suspect certain Heer formations would take exception to that, particularly the ones which were raped by Allied air power, although I will concede that the Soviets would contest the skies in a way the Luftwaffe never did post Overlord.
 
Which ignores the fact those Soviet logistics were receiving massive amounts of rails and trucks from the US.

Had received. Most of those rails and trucks are still there in 1945, along with expanded Soviet productive capabilities.

It took one year, from Spring of 1943 to Spring of 1944.

Two years... well, really, it took four years. The Germans demonstrated their inability to handle attrition from prolonged air battles as early as the Battle of Britain and their air strength went nowhere but downwards afterward, but it still took until the Spring of '44 before it broke. Even then, the breaking was never fully complete and the Germans were able to run sorties all the way until Berlin. Still Strategy for Defeat identifies the rough period of the spring-summer of 1942 as when the imbalance of forces arrayed against it started to become unmanageable.

Utterly false.

The hundreds of thousands of Americans and British killed or wounded by German shells and bullets in 1944 would be quite amazed to hear that those bullets and shells which killed or wounded them, in fact, never reached the frontlines.

You mean the VVS that got anywhere from 40-60% of its AV Gas from the Americans? Sure.

And which still has much of those high quality avgas supplies in 1945, plus the acquisition of German refining industries on the order of production capacity of 1 million tons of avgas shipped out to Siberia, more then 250,000 tons in excess of it's annual consumption during the war.

Yes, but the Soviets never had to deal with strategic airpower used competently against their logistics.

Soviet offensives in 1942-44 had to a deal with a number of logistical interdiction attempts by the Germans carried out by long-range bombers. The Luftwaffe was a constant factor in their planning.

As for halting the supply of the Heer, I suspect certain Heer formations would take exception to that, particularly the ones which were raped by Allied air power,

The Heer may have blamed WAllied air forces for their logistical difficulties, but post-war studies have found that, as usual, this was mainly them seeking scapegoats and happening to have a very credible one. As per Feeding Mars: The Role of Logistics in the German Defeat in Normandy, 1944, the Geman dumps were much too far behind the lines, too small, and too few resources were allocated to transport what supplies there was forward. Allied air attacks certainly exacerbated this problem, but the root cause was the basic German logistic plan in France was woefully inadequate. Even had the Allies not flown a single fighter bomber sortie, the Germans would have been in trouble. Even with all this logistical trouble, however, the Germans were able to get enough supplies for their forces to bottle up overwhelmingly superior WAllied forces in Normandy until their own were attrited to pieces through nearly two months of brutal ground combat. So even a force with a much more dysfunctional logistical set-up then that of the Red Army was able to ferry supplies in to fight the WAllies under conditions of their air supremacy, much less superiority or parity. Moving to the period after WW2, air supremacy, and in a few cases outright dominance, did not prevent Korean, Chinese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and Serbian forces from keeping their forces logistical lines open enough to sustain resistance and these forces (save, perhaps, the Serbians) were in many cases vastly more deficient in both the assets available to them and maybe (definitely, in the case of the Iraqis) their use of said assets compared to Soviet forces in 1945.
 
Last edited:
Had received. Most of those rails and trucks are still there in 1945, along with expanded Soviet productive capabilities

Were still receiving; Lend Lease didn't terminate until late in'45. It's also notable that despite these alleged expanded production capacities, they were still taking shipments of such.

wo years... well, really, it took four years. The Germans demonstrated their inability to handle attrition from prolonged air battles as early as the Battle of Britain and their air strength went nowhere but downwards afterward, but it still took until the Spring of '44 before it broke. Even then, the breaking was never fully complete and the Germans were able to run sorties all the way until Berlin. Still Strategy for Defeat identifies the rough period of the spring-summer of 1942 as when the imbalance of forces arrayed against it started to become unmanageable.

You're being deliberate disingenuous here by claiming the ability to fly a few sorties is tantamount to not breaking the Luftwaffe.

Tooze states that from January 1942 to April 1943, the German War economy grew by an average of 5.5% monthly. 8th Air Force finally hits Germany in January of 1943 and then begins bombing in earnest that spring, and then from May 1943 to March 1944 armaments production effectively grinds to a halt. As I said, one year.

The hundreds of thousands of Americans and British killed or wounded by German shells and bullets in 1944 would be quite amazed to hear that those bullets and shells which killed or wounded them, in fact, never reached the frontlines.

And again, you're being disingenuous here because by your logic, which is that as long a soldier at the front is getting just a single bullet, his logistics are intact. No serious historian or military official would use this logic. The documentation is clear that by 1944 the Germans were having to pack all sorts of things in shells just to keep up production and that armored forces were constantly running out of gas; 12th SS during the Mortain Counter-attack is a good example of this.

And which still has much of those high quality avgas supplies in 1945, plus the acquisition of German refining industries on the order of production capacity of 1 million tons of avgas shipped out to Siberia, more then 250,000 tons in excess of it's annual consumption during the war.

No they did not, as evidenced by your own source the last time you tried to argue this point; there's also the problem here in that you don't seem to understand time exists as a concept. Just because you have gas right now doesn't mean it will always be there, especially when you're using it. As for those German facilities, again, you are lying; they had been bombed to hell and were operating at about 5% of their overall capacity by the Fall of 1944.
 
Certainly you aren't equating the Luftwaffe's long range bombers with the 8th Air Force and RAF Bomber Command?

The effectiveness and volume differed by an order of magnitude.

I agree German supply difficulties were largely self inflicted. What I am referencing is more along the lines of the destruction of the German transportation network on a strategic scale, and the destruction of motorized transport, AFVs, and artillery on a tactical scale. The Soviets may have a counter for the latter, but certainly not the former.

Are you saying that massed B-29 raids on Soviet rail nexi and supply depots wouldn't have significant knock on effects at the front?
 
Were still receiving; Lend Lease didn't terminate until late in'45. It's also notable that despite these alleged expanded production capacities, they were still taking shipments of such.

Free resources and tech is free resources and tech.

You're being deliberate disingenuous here by claiming the ability to fly a few sorties is tantamount to not breaking the Luftwaffe.

If "by a few sorties" you mean "sporadic surges of possibly up to 2-3,000 sorties a day, which is a number comparable to that of the Luftwaffe's heyday's, for a period of a week or so" then yeah, sure.

Tooze states that from January 1942 to April 1943, the German War economy grew by an average of 5.5% monthly. 8th Air Force finally hits Germany in January of 1943 and then begins bombing in earnest that spring, and then from May 1943 to March 1944 armaments production effectively grinds to a halt. As I said, one year.

Ah, so your goalpost shifting. We were, after all, discussing the destruction of the Luftwaffe, not strategic bombing's effect on German industry, and the Luftwaffe had been engaged in considerable attrition before the 8th flew a single mission.

In any case, Tooze says that German armaments production didn't grind to a halt until 1945 and that was as much due to the occupation of German soil and effects of over-mobilization as it was to strategic bombing. He does make the claim that the strategic bombing campaign caused German armaments production growth stalled in 1943 and didn't begin again until 1944, but a glance at the figures show it doubled in 1943 as it had in 1942 and would go onto in 1944 so it's unclear where the logic is there. He also attributed the 1943 stall to Bomber Command’s efforts, whose own efforts also go back to 1942, and not the 8th.

And again, you're being disingenuous here because by your logic, which is that as long a soldier at the front is getting just a single bullet, his logistics are intact.

No, that's just you deliberately ignoring the point. In order to inflict casualties, maintain resistance, and meaningfully stop even overextended Allied advances the Germans (like the Allies and Soviets) need a lot more then a single soldier at the front getting a single bullet... they need masses of ammunition of all sorts in order to do it, since much of what was fired generally missed, and that required a constant flow of supplies.

12th SS during the Mortain Counter-attack is a good example of this.

Eh? 12th SS was stopped by massive artillery barrages and (unopposed) air strikes, not by any shortage of fuel.

No they did not, as evidenced by your own source the last time you tried to argue this point; there's also the problem here in that you don't seem to understand time exists as a concept. Just because you have gas right now doesn't mean it will always be there,

None of the sources I had last time said anything about what stockpiles the Soviets had left by 1945 or their productive capabilities after the reception of lend-lease. They talked about Soviet productive capabilities in 1941-42, but you seem to have difficulty grasping that 1941 and 42 were different years from that of '45. That compounds your rather specious claim about me not understanding time when your the one assuming those avgas supplies vanish into the ether upon the WAllied declaration of war and are not, ya know, used up vigorously fighting the WAllies over however long they last as their supplemented by the increased Soviet production capabilities.

As for those German facilities, again, you are lying; they had been bombed to hell and were operating at about 5% of their overall capacity by the Fall of 1944.

I'm just citing the figures provided by The German Chemical Industry in the Twentieth Century, although upon further review that appears to have been just one of the plants relocated and enhanced with parts from another two. A fourth plant (from Kemerow-Westbirien) was also relocated, although no information was provided on it's productive capacities. That you don't like that doesn't mean it's a lie. Plus, the proportion of capacity those plants were operating at when they were constantly going through the bomb-repair-bomb cycle is obviously going to be at 5% of capacity then that when they've not been bombed for many months and have been relocated beyond any further bombing range to boot.

Certainly you aren't equating the Luftwaffe's long range bombers with the 8th Air Force and RAF Bomber Command?

The effectiveness and volume differed by an order of magnitude.

It might? Many of the methods used by the Soviets to mitigate German interdiction efforts were later also employed against much more sophisticated and capable Western air forces by the Chinese, Koreans, and Serbs, where they worked quite as well.

I agree German supply difficulties were largely self inflicted. What I am referencing is more along the lines of the destruction of the German transportation network on a strategic scale, and the destruction of motorized transport, AFVs, and artillery on a tactical scale. The Soviets may have a counter for the latter, but certainly not the former.

Their historic methods of maskirovka have generally worked out quite well, as would intercepting the bombers as they make their approaches at the medium or low altitudes they need to do to ensure any degree of accuracy while building up their high-altitude intercept forces...

Are you saying that massed B-29 raids on Soviet rail nexi and supply depots wouldn't have significant knock on effects at the front?

Certainly not immediately. Overtime, sure. But how fast those knock-on effects are, how severe they are, and how much time do the WAllies have to wait before they do so are quite questionable.
 
Last edited:
The Chinese, Koreans, and Serbs were not attempting to supply massive armored and mechanized formations with supply lines stretching hundreds of miles, nor was the American/Allied heavy bomber offensive in Korea or Serbia even close to the scale of WW2.

I generally have a ton of respect for your positions, but this one is flat out disingenuous.

Tactically, it would come down to the ability of Soviet fighters to successfully dogfight with P-51s, and increasing numbers of jet aircraft, and then interdict the superb Allied tactical CAS forces. Would they be more effective than the Luftwaffe? Of course. Would they win? I doubt it.

Finally, and you can answer this better than I - because I honestly don't know. What were average supply levels in a Soviet motor rifle or tank division in 1945? In other words, for how long could they operate without resupply? I'm not implying the average US division could operate indefinitely, but I do think we agree Soviet logistics would be more at risk than Allied logistics, yes?
 
Free resources and tech is free resources and tech.

Not supported by the evidence.

If "by a few sorties" you mean "sporadic surges of possibly up to 2-3,000 sorties a day, which is a number comparable to that of the Luftwaffe's heyday's, for a period of a week or so" then yeah, sure.

So by your logic, if they can have one good week every few months, they're not beat? Again, no historian or military official uses this logic.

What's with this non-sequitur? I thought we were discussing the destruction of the Luftwaffe, not strategic bombing's effect on German industry?

Because it demonstrates the Luftwaffe lost the ability to protect the Reich rapidly the moment the Americans came into play.

In any case, Tooze says that German armaments production didn't grind to a halt until 1945 and that was as much due to the occupation of German soil and effects of over-mobilization as it was to strategic bombing. He does make the claim that the strategic bombing campaign caused German armaments production growth stalled in 1943 and didn't begin again until 1944, but a glance at the figures show it doubled in 1943 as it had in 1942 and would go onto in 1944 so it's unclear where the logic is there.

No, this is false; industrial production had collapsed by the fall of 1944, not until 1945 and quite clearly due to the Allies in part shutting down the transportation net, which Tooze goes into detail about.

No, that's just you deliberately ignoring the point. In order to inflict casualties, the Germans (like the Allies and Soviets) need a lot more then a single soldier at the front getting his single bullet... they need masses of ammunition of all sorts in order to do it, since much of what was fired generally missed, and that requires a constant flow of supplies.

No, I fully understood the point; the problem is the point is devoid of all logic. You're arguing that even if a force goes from, let's say, 1 million shells to the front a month to just 10, then their logistic remain unbroken. This is not the logic of any historian or military official, once again.

Eh? 12th SS was stopped by massive artillery barrages and (unopposed) air strikes, not by any shortage of fuel.

They had run out of gas and then got hit by the Canadians during Totalize.

None of the sources I had last time said anything about what stockpiles the Soviets had left by 1945 or their productive capabilities after the reception of lend-lease. They talked about Soviet productive capabilities in 1941-42, but you seem to have difficulty grasping that 1941 and 42 were different years from that of '45. That compounds your rather specious claim about me not understanding time when your the one assuming those avgas supplies vanish into the ether upon the WAllied declaration of war and are not, ya know, used up vigorously fighting the WAllies over however long they last as their supplemented by the increased Soviet production capabilities.

You've missed the point; I have no doubt they will use up what they have on hand. The problem is what comes after they use that up? Your citations last time made it clear they were unable to source all of their needs, particularly high octane.

I'm just citing the figures provided by The German Chemical Industry in the Twentieth Century. That you don't like that doesn't mean it's a lie. Plus, the proportion of operation those plants were operating at when they were constantly going through the bomb-repair-bomb cycle is obviously going to be at 5% of capacity then that when they've not been bombed for many months and have been relocated beyond any further bombing range to boot.

It would come as one hell of a shock to the people of 1945 that they were in fact living in 1951:

RULlO5hK_o.png

It might? Many of the methods used by the Soviets to mitigate German interdiction efforts were later also employed against much more sophisticated and capable Western air forces by the Chinese, Koreans, and Serbs, where they worked quite as well.

You're literally comparing a limited air war over Korea where the USAF inflicted disproportionate losses upon the Communists, as well as a campaign in the 1990s that resulted in the near destruction of the Serbian state with literally the loss of a single plane, to an all out air war in 1945.
 
The Chinese, Koreans, and Serbs were not attempting to supply massive armored and mechanized formations with supply lines stretching hundreds of miles, nor was the American/Allied heavy bomber offensive in Korea or Serbia even close to the scale of WW2.

The Chinese and Koreans were very much supporting massive combat formations, if not precisely mechanized ones, with supply lines stretching hundreds of miles against bombing offensives very much on a WW2-scale. The Serbs were in fact supporting a totally mechanized army in Kosovo and against a bombing campaign that possessed capabilities that made WW2-scale bombing raids redundant. It is not at all disingenuous to compare the success these forces had in preserving both their supply lines and their forces combat capability against air attack to the Soviets, who possess even greater resources then either of these combatants.

Tactically, it would come down to the ability of Soviet fighters to successfully dogfight with P-51s, and increasing numbers of jet aircraft, and then interdict the superb Allied tactical CAS forces. Would they be more effective than the Luftwaffe? Of course. Would they win? I doubt it.

I rather doubt that the WAllies would have time to field their increasing number of jets and seriously beat down the VVS/VPO, given the political problems their dealing with andhow fast they'll explode. Hell, just the prospect of carrying out Unthinkable would probably cause Churchill's government to collapse. I've seen one historian who has even gone so far that the wording in the planning documents suggest that the Imperial General Staff were a subtly British way of threatening their resignation if Churchill had pushed implementation rather then be party to the disaster their considerable expertise suggests such a attack would be.

Finally, and you can answer this better than I - because I honestly don't know. What were average supply levels in a Soviet motor rifle or tank division in 1945? In other words, for how long could they operate without resupply? I'm not implying the average US division could operate indefinitely, but I do think we agree Soviet logistics would be more at risk than Allied logistics, yes?

I actually don't know that one. Closest I have are Cold War figures, which amount to about a week's worth of supplies, but I'm not 100% sure that applies to WW2. It might, since Soviet Cold War figures are based on their WW2 experience, but I can't say for sure. I'll get back to that one after a night's rest

Not supported by the evidence.

Oh please, what evidence? Are you seriously arguing that the Soviets were going to turn down shit the WAllies were shipping them for essentially free? You've got no evidence that the L-L.

So by your logic, if they can have one good week every few months, they're not beat? Again, no historian or military official uses this logic.

Yes and yes they do? Being able to generate the force to achieve shit is the main purpose of air forces and the Luftwaffe being able to do that every so often very much indicates they weren't "out of the war" until the war was actually over.

Because it demonstrates the Luftwaffe lost the ability to protect the Reich rapidly the moment the Americans came into play.

The Americans were already in play and making their contribution to the air war even before 1943 and your hyperfocus on the strategic bombing campaign totally ignores the contributions the attrition suffered to the tactical campaigns over the Med, Western, and Eastern Fronts in 1941-43 contributed to the eventual collapse of the Luftwaffe. It's reductionistic to the point of uselessness. The American daylight bombing campaign kicking off put another nail in the coffin, but it did not cause the Luftwaffe to lay in said coffin. The Luftwaffe wasn't beaten on any specific front or by any specific air force in any short period of time. It was beaten through years of hard attritional fighting across multiple fronts.

No, this is false; industrial production had collapsed by the fall of 1944, not until 1945 and quite clearly due to the Allies in part shutting down the transportation net, which Tooze goes into detail about.

Tooze says that German armaments production was on the verge of collapse by 1944, but that isn't the same as collapse. He, like anyone else whose studied the German war economy, says that German armaments production peaked in December 1944 before crashing in 1945. He says the transport plan was a part of this, but also attributes it heavily to losses in the ground war and mobilization fatigue which had been building since 1942 which he likewise goes into detail about.

No, I fully understood the point; the problem is the point is devoid of all logic. You're arguing that even if a force goes from, let's say, 1 million shells to the front a month to just 10, then their logistic remain unbroken. This is not the logic of any historian or military official, once again.

No, because again you clearly demonstrate you don't understand the point. The Germans didn't just inflict casualties, but they did so on a scale consistent throughout the entire war. WAllied casualty rates shoot up in 1944 and then remain flat all the way to the very end of the war. That strongly suggests that the Germans were still getting just as many bullets and, even more importantly, shells and mortar rounds (the main casualty generators) to the front as they always were.

They had run out of gas and then got hit by the Canadians during Totalize.

Christ, you keep goalpost shifting. First you claim they ran out of gas at Mortaine now it's Totalize. Nevermind that the armored charge that characterizes 12th SS's main action at Totalize in order to upset the British bombardment plan and then the following series of armored counterattacks which forced the Canadian advance to halt and beat off through hard anti-tank work would have been rather hard to accomplish for the 12th SS had it been out of gas. Best I can tell, German mechanized formations at Normandy didn't show any signs of running out of gas until WAllied (mainly American) ground forces were the ones interdicting their LOCs.

You've missed the point; I have no doubt they will use up what they have on hand. The problem is what comes after they use that up? Your citations last time made it clear they were unable to source all of their needs, particularly high octane.

Again, since you seem unable to understand this: those sources last time mainly talked about their inability to source in 1941-42, they say nothing about sourcing in 1945 with the acquisition of new refineries both through lend-lease and from Eastern Europe. Given that the Soviet air force spent some years in the late-40's flying considerable number of aircraft (including the Western designs that were the biggest guzzlers of that high octane stuff) in massive exercises so as to work out some kinks in their army organization, their octane supplies evidently could probably last quite some time.

It would come as one hell of a shock to the people of 1945 that they were in fact living in 1951:

RULlO5hK_o.png

As anyone who bother to reads that page can tell, the timestamp for 1951 is for the lifting of the West German governments ban on coal hydration. No year or time period is given for the Soviet relocation of German oil plants. Near the bottom, they talk about the Poles restarting ammonia production at the Leuna plant in 1947, so anyone with basic reading comprehension could tell that the events described in this paragraph do not follow a strictly temporally-linear format.

You're literally comparing a limited air war over Korea where the USAF inflicted disproportionate losses upon the Communists, as well as a campaign in the 1990s that resulted in the near destruction of the Serbian state with literally the loss of a single plane, to an all out air war in 1945.

Disproportionate? Against the Russians, the exchange ratio was near 1:1, hardly disproportionate. Now it was 3:1 against the Chinese and Koreans, which is disproportionate, but given their lower standard of training and experience that is hardly surprising. The 1990s air campaign saw the Serbian state, and military, emerge quite intact, if economically battered, and (more minorly) cost NATO two aircraft and not one. You seem to be unable to get some rather basic facts straight, in addition to reading comprehension failure and goalpost shifting.
 
Last edited:
Russian chances go way up if they can keep America out of conflict whit britan.How likely is that scenario? It much more likely to happen if Rusovelt still alive. So 3 think have to go good for Russia before Britan and allies attack. Rusovelt have to stay alive. Britan or 1 of her allies have to be proven aggressor. So politically Soviet have to play defense to keep a chance at separate peace whit America. Historical fact in before 1945 Russia and USA never been on difrent sides in war. If I am mistaken point to war or cobelgerence between them. And 3 they need diplomat of extra class and nice honey and carrot to satisfy USA neutrality. Promise to still help whit Japan if attacked by brittan. But would Britan attack if USA promises no support aganst Russia. What kind of alliance USA and Britan have after Germany out of war.
Is at Americans prespective russia Still ally? If yes America may not chose side before 2 allies.

Hipoteical quastion if 2 nato country end at war. If non nato country attack precived agressor. How nato respond? Example Poland attack Litva. Belarus attack Poland. What be rest off nato responde?
 
Top