The Chinese, Koreans, and Serbs were not attempting to supply massive armored and mechanized formations with supply lines stretching hundreds of miles, nor was the American/Allied heavy bomber offensive in Korea or Serbia even close to the scale of WW2.
The Chinese and Koreans were very much supporting massive combat formations, if not precisely mechanized ones, with supply lines stretching hundreds of miles against bombing offensives very much on a WW2-scale. The Serbs were in fact supporting a
totally mechanized army in Kosovo and against a bombing campaign that possessed capabilities that made WW2-scale bombing raids redundant. It is not at all disingenuous to compare the success these forces had in preserving both their supply lines and their forces combat capability against air attack to the Soviets, who possess even greater resources then either of these combatants.
Tactically, it would come down to the ability of Soviet fighters to successfully dogfight with P-51s, and increasing numbers of jet aircraft, and then interdict the superb Allied tactical CAS forces. Would they be more effective than the Luftwaffe? Of course. Would they win? I doubt it.
I rather doubt that the WAllies would have time to field their increasing number of jets and seriously beat down the VVS/VPO, given the political problems their dealing with andhow fast they'll explode. Hell, just the prospect of carrying out Unthinkable would probably cause Churchill's government to collapse. I've seen one historian who has even gone so far that the wording in the planning documents suggest that the Imperial General Staff were a subtly British way of threatening their resignation if Churchill had pushed implementation rather then be party to the disaster their considerable expertise suggests such a attack would be.
Finally, and you can answer this better than I - because I honestly don't know. What were average supply levels in a Soviet motor rifle or tank division in 1945? In other words, for how long could they operate without resupply? I'm not implying the average US division could operate indefinitely, but I do think we agree Soviet logistics would be more at risk than Allied logistics, yes?
I actually don't know that one. Closest I have are Cold War figures, which amount to about a week's worth of supplies, but I'm not 100% sure that applies to WW2. It might, since Soviet Cold War figures are based on their WW2 experience, but I can't say for sure. I'll get back to that one after a night's rest
Not supported by the evidence.
Oh please, what evidence? Are you seriously arguing that the Soviets were going to turn down shit the WAllies were shipping them for essentially free? You've got no evidence that the L-L.
So by your logic, if they can have one good week every few months, they're not beat? Again, no historian or military official uses this logic.
Yes and yes they do? Being able to generate the force to achieve shit is the main purpose of air forces and the Luftwaffe being able to do that every so often very much indicates they weren't "out of the war" until the war was actually over.
Because it demonstrates the Luftwaffe lost the ability to protect the Reich rapidly the moment the Americans came into play.
The Americans were already in play and making their contribution to the air war even before 1943 and your hyperfocus on the strategic bombing campaign totally ignores the contributions the attrition suffered to the tactical campaigns over the Med, Western, and Eastern Fronts in 1941-43 contributed to the eventual collapse of the Luftwaffe. It's reductionistic to the point of uselessness. The American daylight bombing campaign kicking off put another nail in the coffin, but it did not cause the Luftwaffe to lay in said coffin. The Luftwaffe wasn't beaten on any specific front or by any specific air force in any short period of time. It was beaten through years of hard attritional fighting across multiple fronts.
No, this is false; industrial production had collapsed by the fall of 1944, not until 1945 and quite clearly due to the Allies in part shutting down the transportation net, which Tooze goes into detail about.
Tooze says that German armaments production was on the verge of collapse by 1944, but that isn't the same as collapse. He, like anyone else whose studied the German war economy, says that German armaments production peaked in December 1944 before crashing in 1945. He says the transport plan was a part of this, but also attributes it heavily to losses in the ground war and mobilization fatigue which had been building since 1942 which he likewise goes into detail about.
No, I fully understood the point; the problem is the point is devoid of all logic. You're arguing that even if a force goes from, let's say, 1 million shells to the front a month to just 10, then their logistic remain unbroken. This is not the logic of any historian or military official, once again.
No, because
again you clearly demonstrate you don't understand the point. The Germans didn't just inflict casualties, but they did so on a scale consistent throughout the entire war. WAllied casualty rates shoot up in 1944 and then remain flat all the way to the very end of the war. That strongly suggests that the Germans were still getting just as many bullets and, even more importantly, shells and mortar rounds (the main casualty generators) to the front as they always were.
They had run out of gas and then got hit by the Canadians during Totalize.
Christ, you keep goalpost shifting. First you claim they ran out of gas at Mortaine now it's Totalize. Nevermind that the armored charge that characterizes 12th SS's main action at Totalize in order to upset the British bombardment plan and then the following series of armored counterattacks which forced the Canadian advance to halt and beat off through hard anti-tank work would have been rather hard to accomplish for the 12th SS had it been out of gas. Best I can tell, German mechanized formations at Normandy didn't show any signs of running out of gas until WAllied (mainly American) ground forces were the ones interdicting their LOCs.
You've missed the point; I have no doubt they will use up what they have on hand. The problem is what comes after they use that up? Your citations last time made it clear they were unable to source all of their needs, particularly high octane.
Again, since you seem unable to understand this: those sources last time mainly talked about their inability to source in 1941-42, they say nothing about sourcing in 1945 with the acquisition of new refineries both through lend-lease and from Eastern Europe. Given that the Soviet air force spent some years in the late-40's flying considerable number of aircraft (including the Western designs that were the biggest guzzlers of that high octane stuff) in massive exercises so as to work out some kinks in their army organization, their octane supplies evidently could probably last quite some time.
It would come as one hell of a shock to the people of 1945 that they were in fact living in 1951:
As anyone who bother to reads that page can tell, the timestamp for 1951 is for the lifting of the West German governments ban on coal hydration. No year or time period is given for the Soviet relocation of German oil plants. Near the bottom, they talk about the Poles restarting ammonia production at the Leuna plant in 1947, so anyone with basic reading comprehension could tell that the events described in this paragraph do not follow a strictly temporally-linear format.
You're literally comparing a limited air war over Korea where the USAF inflicted disproportionate losses upon the Communists, as well as a campaign in the 1990s that resulted in the near destruction of the Serbian state with literally the loss of a single plane, to an all out air war in 1945.
Disproportionate? Against the Russians, the exchange ratio was near 1:1, hardly disproportionate. Now it was 3:1 against the Chinese and Koreans, which is disproportionate, but given their lower standard of training and experience that is hardly surprising. The 1990s air campaign saw the Serbian state, and military, emerge quite intact, if economically battered, and (more minorly) cost NATO two aircraft and not one. You seem to be unable to get some rather basic facts straight, in addition to reading comprehension failure and goalpost shifting.