Operation Typhoon called off by November 1941

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
  • Start date

Deleted member 1487

I've asked this question before, but in doing more reading for my TL on an alternate Barbarossa, I've come across more information that I believe changes the discussion we had last time.

By late October it was clear the things were peetering out in front of Moscow with the rains, but the generals insisted on having another go at the city before winter arrived; what if Hitler vetoed that request and ordered AG-Center to go on the defensive for the winter in late October once the mud set in?

The Soviets were in no position to go on the offensive until December, as they were still forming the units they would use to attack after the 5th, so the Germans would have all of November to prepare defenses and make tactical retreats as necessary to shore up the lines, not to mention bring up winter clothes. IOTL the attacks in November wore down the Germans proportionally more than the Soviets and left them wrong footed for the Soviet counter offensives.

So how would the Soviet counter offensives then play out against a prepared German force that wasn't as far forward and had made tactical retreats prior to the December Soviet attacks?
 
Quite likely the soviet counteroffensive gets defeated by better prepared, bettre supplied and not as stretched german lines. The soviets would probably take some ground initially, but they'll probably end up losing almost all their troops commited.
Of course, it would be mighty interesting to see what will happen in early 1942, are the germans going for Moscow (wich will have more defences, but also the germans would in theory be better prepared), or ar they going south as in OTL? They have a much better chance to take Moscow in spring, it will be a heavy blow if so but whether it will be decissive i don't know. Certainly soviet moral will be rock bottom at this time.
 
Quite likely the soviet counteroffensive gets defeated by better prepared, bettre supplied and not as stretched german lines. The soviets would probably take some ground initially, but they'll probably end up losing almost all their troops commited.
Of course, it would be mighty interesting to see what will happen in early 1942, are the germans going for Moscow (wich will have more defences, but also the germans would in theory be better prepared), or ar they going south as in OTL? They have a much better chance to take Moscow in spring, it will be a heavy blow if so but whether it will be decissive i don't know. Certainly soviet moral will be rock bottom at this time.
Hitler was thinking of grabbing resources to plunder, so probably he'll go OTL route, whether he can do something with it will make another matter.
 

Deleted member 1487

Quite likely the soviet counteroffensive gets defeated by better prepared, bettre supplied and not as stretched german lines. The soviets would probably take some ground initially, but they'll probably end up losing almost all their troops commited.
So a worse version of the Timoshenko offensives? The big difference from that is in November 1941 IOTL most of the 2nd Air Fleet supporting AG-Center was sent to the Mediterranean, leaving German forces with 3 operational aircraft by December 8th (of course serviceability would be a LOT higher if they took November off to recover; IOTL they had several hundred serviceable by January once they recovered from the December bottom).

Of course, it would be mighty interesting to see what will happen in early 1942, are the germans going for Moscow (wich will have more defences, but also the germans would in theory be better prepared), or ar they going south as in OTL? They have a much better chance to take Moscow in spring, it will be a heavy blow if so but whether it will be decissive i don't know. Certainly soviet moral will be rock bottom at this time.
I suppose that depends on how badly the winter goes, but really given the German fuel situation after Barbarossa they needed to get the Caucasian oil in 1942, so that's probably a given that they have to go south.
 
So a worse version of the Timoshenko offensives? The big difference from that is in November 1941 IOTL most of the 2nd Air Fleet supporting AG-Center was sent to the Mediterranean, leaving German forces with 3 operational aircraft by December 8th (of course serviceability would be a LOT higher if they took November off to recover; IOTL they had several hundred serviceable by January once they recovered from the December bottom).
You meant 3 (three) aircraft operational for Luftflotte 2 by Dec.8, or you meant 300?

As for the rest, unfortunately i am not that versed into the eastern front battles to offer a competent comment to what you said, though i'm thinking now, it's going to be a winter offensive again, so perhaps things are going to get tougher for the germans than i initially thought it would, but of course still not tough as in OTL, given the better supply situation, prepared positions, better serviceability of aircraft and tanks etc., though the cold will still be a killer. The front will end up closer to Moscow in eraly 1942 compared to OTL though.

I suppose that depends on how badly the winter goes, but really given the German fuel situation after Barbarossa they needed to get the Caucasian oil in 1942, so that's probably a given that they have to go south.

How about the romanian oil? Isn't that going to cover a good part of their needs? Of course going south still makes sense if only to deny said oil to the USSR.
 

Deleted member 1487

You meant 3 (three) aircraft operational for Luftflotte 2 by Dec.8, or you meant 300?
3(!) operational by Dec. 8th. That increased by January by a lot due to better weather and maintanence work.

As for the rest, unfortunately i am not that versed into the eastern front battles to offer a competent comment to what you said, though i'm thinking now, it's going to be a winter offensive again, so perhaps things are going to get tougher for the germans than i initially thought it would, but of course still not tough as in OTL, given the better supply situation, prepared positions, better serviceability of aircraft and tanks etc., though the cold will still be a killer. The front will end up closer to Moscow in eraly 1942 compared to OTL though.
Cold and over-extension; the Germans suffered every badly from being out in the open when winter hit vs. being in prepared winter lines; also with the 1 month pause the savings in needing to bring up ammo could be used to get winter clothing up (IIRC only 20% of German forces were prepared for winter). Also the lines wouldn't be as badly extended giving the Soviets gaps to crack open. Plus with more time for the Luftwaffe to do maintanence they wouldn't be at that 3 aircraft bottom come December; IOTL in January the Luftwaffe was a massive help when it could return to the fight.


How about the romanian oil? Isn't that going to cover a good part of their needs? Of course going south still makes sense if only to deny said oil to the USSR.
It was a fraction of German needs. 2 million tons at most per year out of a need of a minimum of 8 million, the rest made up by increasing synthetics and existing Austrian/Czech/Hungarian production for a peak in 1943-44 before bombing set in and wrecked it. In 1942 it was insufficient causing major 'savings' by cutting deeply into training hours for the Luftwaffe and Panzerwaffe.
 

Ian_W

Banned
It was a fraction of German needs. 2 million tons at most per year out of a need of a minimum of 8 million, the rest made up by increasing synthetics and existing Austrian/Czech/Hungarian production for a peak in 1943-44 before bombing set in and wrecked it. In 1942 it was insufficient causing major 'savings' by cutting deeply into training hours for the Luftwaffe and Panzerwaffe.

Unfortunatly, this is where hilarious comes in.

The Germans do not have enough tank cars to rail significant amounts of oil out of Russia.

Any captured Caucus oil - and oil facilities are quite easy to damage via concrete and/or an explosive charge dropped down the well, but lets assume wells are back in production - is therefore going to need to go across the Black Sea, and use the same Danube barges that are already overstretched by that Romanian, Hungarian and so on.

Even if they capture the Caucus oil, it's going to take a significant amount of time, effort and steel to get it anywhere it can help the Luftwaffe and Panzerwaffe ... maybe by 1944. Maybe.
 
We had a thread about it here: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=318463

The result is no Rhzev salient. This means that reserves are available and more mobile. Hitler might strike at the center and perhaps win the war effectively in the east (but still lose it in the west).

However, if he goes the resource route this is the likely result:

-Stalingrad may not fall (simply because the roads do not allow for much more men and supplies than OTL.) However, the Russians might prove incapable of a decisive breakthrough, as the Germans would be capable of having better troops manning the lines the Italians, ROmanians, and Hungarians were. Further, they would have more men in reserve to commit to stop break throughs. So Germany might avoid the collapse of AGS which makes for a very deadly 1943, where eventually the effects of Lend Lease, Wallie war effort, and what not will lead to a significant collapse there.

-Leningrad might fall by early 1943. In OTL, the Russians were able to pund their way through and open a corridor to supply the city. ITTL, the Germans have only so many reserves that they can commit to AGS, which means that they will be deployed in AGN. They will be able to repulse the Russians as the men in AGC in 1942 were able to OTL. I don't think Leningrad can survive another winter being cut off. However, even if the Germans take the city, the most they hold onto it is 12 months.

Honestly, Hitler's best move ITTL is to go for broke and take Moscow in 1942, as the failed Russian counter-offensive would have left them weak, the Germans would have been capable of a breakthrough, and it was the only move that would end the war in the East quick enough to then focus on keeping the West out of Europe.
 

Deleted member 1487

Unfortunatly, this is where hilarious comes in.

The Germans do not have enough tank cars to rail significant amounts of oil out of Russia.

Any captured Caucus oil - and oil facilities are quite easy to damage via concrete and/or an explosive charge dropped down the well, but lets assume wells are back in production - is therefore going to need to go across the Black Sea, and use the same Danube barges that are already overstretched by that Romanian, Hungarian and so on.

Even if they capture the Caucus oil, it's going to take a significant amount of time, effort and steel to get it anywhere it can help the Luftwaffe and Panzerwaffe ... maybe by 1944. Maybe.

We weren't talking about practicality of oil extraction, rather what Hitler's next move was and his motivations in 1942 were.

Honestly, Hitler's best move ITTL is to go for broke and take Moscow in 1942, as the failed Russian counter-offensive would have left them weak, the Germans would have been capable of a breakthrough, and it was the only move that would end the war in the East quick enough to then focus on keeping the West out of Europe.
With hindsight sure, but Hitler was operating with a vastly different perspective and nothing changes ITTL in terms of his fixation on oil. If he died and Goering were in change than maybe things play out differently, but maybe not. Regardless even being closer it would be extremely costly to try and cut off Moscow given the reserves massed there.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Why does Hitler do this? His view was in perfect alignment with his generals: the enemy was on his last legs and one more push would topple them. From his perspective, difficulties in the field could be overcome by strength of will. Once again we are positing a scenario where Hitler.

In any case, stopping where they are is impractical as they are beyond the limits of effective resupply. The Germans need to withdraw 1-200 kilometers in order to put up a coherent defense. And even then their going to lose tons of men fighting from static positions like OTL, not to mention without the initial massive success, Stalin is liable to call the offensive off by the end of February at the latest.

With all that taken into account, 1942 is liable to not be at all different.
 
Last edited:
Why does Hitler do this? His view was in perfect alignment with his generals: the enemy was on his last legs and one more push would topple them. From his perspective, difficulties in the field could be overcome by strength of will

You hit the nail right on the head!

In any case, stopping where they are is impractical as they are beyond the limits of effective resupply. The Germans need to withdraw 1-200 kilometers in order to put up a coherent defense.

Not exactly. The Germans OTL were able to hold the positions in which they already were in Nov 1941. Why would this change, Soviet magic?

And even then their going to lose tons of men fighting from static positions like OTL, not to mention without the initial massive success, Stalin is liable to call the offensive off by the end of February at the latest.

Not as many as OTL and they will lose much less mobile elements. THe USSR would be attacking far away from significant railheads, which in effect stifles the punch that their counter-offensive will have.

With all that taken into account, 1942 is liable to not be at all different.

This sort of wishful thinking ruins alternate history. Fan boys from both sides will respond to PODs that blatantly help one side and then through mental gymnastics claim that it will somehow have no effect.

Its like in the Bible when the Angel destroys an Assyrian army of 100,000 men there would be people saying here, "Well, if the angel did not do that the Assyrians still couldn't take Jerusalem and they'd still lose a ton of men." Sorry, I don't buy it.*

1942 would be way different, though the Germans will not win the war.

*Just my version of a literal ASB and how some people here might still respond to it if it is against their side.
 

Deleted member 1487

Saving >200k veteran troops around Moscow from December-February would be pretty huge, especially if most of OTL losses to the Soviets still occur while the German equipment losses don't. And Stalin is not going to call off the Kharkov/Izium offensive because the progress around Moscow isn't there.

The big question is if the Soviets don't create Rzhev what then happens around Moscow come 1942 in terms of offensives? If the lines are straighter then both sides have a lot more manpower to use. Stalin is going to want to push the Germans back from Moscow, even if he has to wait until May-June 1942 to launch his offensives somewhere. But then the Germans have an extra >200k men, so will be a lot closer to full strength than IOTL, especially without equipment losses like around Klin over the winter. In the long run the Soviets might well bleed a lot more around Moscow with that much savings on the German side and lack of progress on the Soviet side during the winter.
 
Not exactly. The Germans OTL were able to hold the positions in which they already were in Nov 1941.

Uh... no they weren't. They were forced west of those positions, back to positions they had held around mid-October.

Not as many as OTL and they will lose much less mobile elements. THe USSR would be attacking far away from significant railheads, which in effect stifles the punch that their counter-offensive will have.
If the Germans withdraw as I noted above, sure. If they stay put, the Soviets will still have plenty of punch as their railheads will be further west as well. The devastation of railroads is a thing.

This sort of wishful thinking ruins alternate history. Fan boys from both sides will respond to PODs that blatantly help one side and then through mental gymnastics claim that it will somehow have no effect.
Less a case of "no effect" and more a case of "an inadequate effect". As David Glantz noted when writing about these "a single decision changes everything" PODs on the Eastern Front:

... during war there are fundamental factors at work, which seem to overcome episodic and transitory events and govern the course and outcome of combat. In the case of the Eastern Front (and I suspect, to some extent, elsehwere), these fundamentals included the military correlation of forces, the will of a nation's population and political leadership, the style (kultura) of commanders and staffs (style of war), and psychology of a people, and the economic strength of the state. When these factors are weighted and permitted to operate, while the details of the scenario frequently change, the general outcome does not.
...
The course of history reflects a certain momentum derived from what the Soviets often call "objective reality." While they tend to use the term subjectively to explain an ideological process of inevitable change with predetermined ends, there is some truth in this description. The Russians themselves are today falling victim to the very same imperatives of objective reality, stripped of its ideological glitter.

There were such imperatives at work once the war on the Eastern Front was unleashed. It was an uncontrolled struggle for survival on the part of both German and the Soviet Union.
...
In such a struggle, in the last analysis, a single faulty or intelligent decision pales against the vast scale and intensity of combat. The rapier's thrust had a telling effect in the chess-like war in North Africa. In Russia, a rapier's thrust granted temporary advantage but in a war waged with meat axes that advantage was only fleeting. While there was still art in battle in the end strength, will, instinct, and sheer power prevailed...
Plus it isn't entirely clear that this exclusively favors the Germans: the Soviets initial offensive will be better planned and organized (as the OTL one was by necessity a rather ad-hoc affair) while the lack of much in the way of initial success will have Stalin to be more inclined to call the whole thing off several months earlier then OTL. Not to mention the mechanism through which straighter lines frees up troops work both ways.

And Stalin is not going to call off the Kharkov/Izium offensive because the progress around Moscow isn't there.
It actually could. Leaving aside that the different development of the winter campaign of '41/'42 might mean there isn't a Izium bridgehead to launch 2nd Kharkov from, the lack of much success in the winter may lead Stalin to be more defensive thinking and less inclined to launch premature offensives. The results of OTL December 1941 really distorted Stalin's thinking for the first half of OTL 1942.
 

Deleted member 1487

As David Glantz noted when writing about these "a single decision changes everything" PODs on the Eastern Front:
That's his opinion. I don't agree with it because of the knock on effects of decision changes, especially one as big as this. Granted convincing Hitler here is the challenge, but IIRC he was having misgivings and it was the generals driving the charge, which then led him to distrusting them after it failed.
Nevertheless this single decision could change everything in the coming year, as you point out below

It actually could. Leaving aside that the different development of the winter campaign of '41/'42 might mean there isn't a Izium bridgehead to launch 2nd Kharkov from, the lack of much success in the winter may lead Stalin to be more defensive thinking and less inclined to launch premature offensives. The results of OTL December 1941 really distorted Stalin's thinking for the first half of OTL 1942.
Exactly a counterpoint to what Glantz wrote; butterfly effect of even relatively minor decisions.
 
Uh... no they weren't. They were forced west of those positions, back to positions they had held around mid-October.
I'm going by memory, but the Rapitusa did not end until the beginning of November, which means, OTL the Germans held to the positions which you speculate they somehow would have to withdraw 100-200KM from ATL. That makes no sense.

If the Germans withdraw as I noted above, sure. If they stay put, the Soviets will still have plenty of punch as their railheads will be further west as well. The devastation of railroads is a thing.
I think you are presuming the Germans stop Nov 25th or something. The OP suggests that Hitler goes against the final push for Moscow when the roads freeze. If that's the case, Rhzev is cut off and the Russians really are not close to significant railheads to mount a serious counteroffensive. In OTL, the Germans were at the gates of Moscow, which were coincidentally the best railheads the Russians had. This advantage does not exist ITTL.

Plus it isn't entirely clear that this exclusively favors the Germans: the Soviets initial offensive will be better planned and organized (as the OTL one was by necessity a rather ad-hoc affair) while the lack of much in the way of initial success will have Stalin to be more inclined to call the whole thing off several months earlier then OTL. Not to mention the mechanism through which straighter lines frees up troops work both ways.

Well, it pretty much does favor the Germans. It leaves German mobile elements better repaired and able to respond to the Russians which really did not have all that much left. After Nov, Russian losses versus German losses were not all that unbalanced, and it put the Germans at the disadvantage of being at the literal end of their rope. Take that away, and the Russian counter-offensive comes against a prepared, dug in, enemy with tanks that were not frozen to death, and it will fail.
 
I'm going by memory, but the Rapitusa did not end until the beginning of November, which means, OTL the Germans held to the positions which you speculate they somehow would have to withdraw 100-200KM from ATL.

The Germans did manage to advance, albeit slowly, during the Raputitsa and hence were rather further east of it then they were at the start. It is that line they would be unable to hold against a concerted Soviet assault because it is too far forward too reliably supply. Like OTL, they would have to withdraw to a line just east of Rzhev-Vyazma-Bryansk in order to adequately repel the Soviet assault.

I think you are presuming the Germans stop Nov 25th or something.
Nope. I'm going by the OP: advance was suspended start of November. That leaves the Soviets with major railheads at places close to the front such as Tula and Kubinka that OTL they were unable to take advantage of because the Germans captured it and then wrecked it when withdrawing in December.

Take that away, and the Russian counter-offensive comes against a prepared, dug in,
And lacking adequate ammunition and supplies, assuming they have not withdrawn to within their limit of effective resupply.

enemy with tanks that were not frozen to death,
Why would the German tanks not freeze? It is going too be just as cold where the Germans are halting (and withdrawing too) as it will be on the outskirts of Moscow.
 
The Germans did manage to advance, albeit slowly, during the Raputitsa and hence were rather further east of it then they were at the start.

Did they manage "100 to 200 KM" during that time, because you claim that they would need to withdraw about that much. According to wiki, there was a stand down order between Oct 31st to Nov 15th. So, my point still stnads. The Germans if they dug in on their Nov 1 positions would be covering positions similar to the OTL Rhzev salient, not 100-200KM behind this point.

It is that line they would be unable to hold against a concerted Soviet assault because it is too far forward too reliably supply.

Even though they did OTL with less men? Unlikely.

Like OTL, they would have to withdraw to a line just east of Rzhev-Vyazma-Bryansk in order to adequately repel the Soviet assault.

But, that's where they were OTL on Nov 1, not 200 KM east of that point. So, I do not see where you get this idea that there would be a massive withdrawal.

That leaves the Soviets with major railheads at places close to the front such as Tula and Kubinka that OTL they were unable to take advantage of because the Germans captured it and then wrecked it when withdrawing in December.

True, but those railheads are still not as substantial as Moscow.

Why would the German tanks not freeze? It is going too be just as cold where the Germans are halting (and withdrawing too) as it will be on the outskirts of Moscow.

Because OTL Guderian and others pushed their tanks hundreds of KM of their effective resupply, losing a ton of them to mechanical breakdowns before the Russians counterattacked. ITTL, all of this equipment and their men are allowed to rest up and repairs can take place. There would still be substantial problems with breakdowns due to lack of low temp antifreezes and lubricants. However, IOTL the equipment was so far passed resupply that there was no chance to get anything of the sort to their tanks and trucks. ITTL, the Germans are knowingly hunkering down in winter positions...so they will get some of this stuff to the front (and they must've OTL, or the Germans wouldn't have been able to hold where they were to begin with.)
 

Deleted member 1487

Nope. I'm going by the OP: advance was suspended start of November. That leaves the Soviets with major railheads at places close to the front such as Tula and Kubinka that OTL they were unable to take advantage of because the Germans captured it and then wrecked it when withdrawing in December.
Tula was never taken; a company advanced into it, but were pushed out in a matter of hours. It was however nearly surrounded.
 
Top