Operation Sea Lion: The Invasion Itself

[Saphroneth]

If one wishes to examine the second world war from the point of view of purely optimized, post facto game theory, then one runs into a problem.
It shouldn't have happened at all from that point of view. Germany kicking off WW2 put it at war with nations with an aggregate war potential significantly exceeding it.
If you cherry-pick the moment after the Fall of France to start your optimized, post facto game theory run, then you're basically being dishonest - and, if you allow the enemy to also use optimized post facto game theory, then the Germans are going to face the Transport Plan starting in early 1941. They simply cannot knock the British out of the war without the Brits being, literally, blind. I don't mean "without the British screwing up". I mean without the British being literally blind, given the incredible disadvantage one is at attempting to prosecute a major waterborne invasion with no navy.
As such, unless one heavily weights things so that Germany may do whatever it wants and the British are only allowed to react in specific, predefined ways, then using game theory post facto is not a recipe for victory.
And if you're not using post facto game theory, but instead applying the realistic fog-of-war and understandings of the timeframe, then to Germany the USSR looks like an easy target. After all, 1916-7 Germany managed to defeat Russia despite also being heavily engaged on the Western Front - and destroying the USSR clears their exposed eastern border and lets them concentrate on besieging Britain.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

The way I would look at the question of Germany's overall strategy is this.

Hitler's pre-war vision of events ran something along the lines of ... First, prepare for conflict, second, create living space in the East, third deal with any backlash from the West once the war in the East was over.

So he prepared, he took step one in his quest for living space when he invaded Poland and that was his first gamble, the gamble that the West wouldn't react. His gamble didn't pay off and therefore his plans were already straying wildly from his initial vision. Now he had to deal with the West before he could create the living space he needed in the East.

Norway is a sideshow, it needs to be done to secure resources ... but France and Britain NEED to be knocked out of the war and quickly before world opinion, namely the USA, is swayed to provide the Western allies the help they need. France and the Low Countries are easily beaten, quite possibly too quickly ... a longer conflict might well have seen more and more of Britains resources being dragged in making a victory over Britain easier in the long run.

Now Hitler has to beat Britain quickly or face the risk of the US entering the war. It needs to be done before attempting to conquer Russia or there will always be a two front war. As far as I see it there were four options:

1. Negotiated Peace - The lowest risk option, no further threat from the West, little chance of the USA getting involved BUT quite possibly war at a later stage, more than likely after living space has been gained in the East though.
2. Forced Peace - Continual bombing and disruption of the British mainland might force the Government to sue for peace if and when it considers its citizens have had enough. This is a medium length strategy with a low risk militarily except for the loss of a few bombers, that may or may not work. It does have the added benefit of retarding Britains ability to wage war due to loss of production etc.
3. Siege/economic warfare - By preventing resources from reaching Britain it may be possible to bring the country to its knees. Militarily very low risk as the assets needed have been specifically for the purpose and aren't really required in any other theatre. The main problem is that it has the pottential to be a very long drawn out campaign which means the likelihood is the USA will be drawn into the war before Britain crumbles.
4. Invasion - Militarily a higher risk than any of the other options which may also impact on other aspect of the German war machine/economy but a success would almost assure the USAs absence from the war at least until after the Russians have been defeated.

In my opinion it isn't a question of either/or (Sealion or Barbarossa) its a question of how to knock Britain out before the USA gets involved and before tackling the Eastern expansion. And for those that insist the grand strategy was the quest for living space I agree, but actual events meant that to be able to do that the Germans needed to lay all other enemies to rest before even contemplating this.

So of the four options above Germany tried the first, which was never going to happen while Churchill still drew breath and of the other three they opted to used a combination of choices 2 and 3 would have taken too long. In hindsight their most realistic chance of success, although the riskiest militarily, would have been an invasion of Britain ... because Germany's defeat came down to fighting on two fronts (more if you count the middle east and Italy) and the arrival of US resources, industrial capacity, men and machines.

 

[Derek Pullem]

It's still a hindsight driven logic.

We know that Germany could not defeat the Soviet Union whilst fending off the US & UK. We don't know that Germany couldn't do Sealion (according to some posters). Ergo the only strategy must be for Germany to try Sealion.

Postulate an ATL where Sealion was attempted and the German Army gutted to the point where Barbarossa was impossible until 1943. It's not unlikely that Stalin would pre-empt the invasion by this point and all the post war strategists would be saying how Barbarossa was the only possible winning strategy and if only Hitler hadn't done Sealion........

After all as Saphroneth points out, Germany did beat Russia in 1917

 

[Ian Hathaway]

It's still a hindsight driven logic.

We know that Germany could not defeat the Soviet Union whilst fending off the US & UK. We don't know that Germany couldn't do Sealion (according to some posters). Ergo the only strategy must be for Germany to try Sealion.

Postulate an ATL where Sealion was attempted and the German Army gutted to the point where Barbarossa was impossible until 1943. It's not unlikely that Stalin would pre-empt the invasion by this point and all the post war strategists would be saying how Barbarossa was the only possible winning strategy and if only Hitler hadn't done Sealion........

After all as Saphroneth points out, Germany did beat Russia in 1917

Ohhh gawd yeah it is completely hindsight driven ... Sealion was the biggest gamble militarily with the odds of success slim to none. But as it turns out terror bombing and economic warfare had those same odds as well but took longer. I think what may have swayed the Germans at the time is that a defeated Sealion DOES have consequences for Barbarossa whereas the other two options don't.

 

[Glenn239]

....The tow units would have to sail against the tide for only a short time and after the course change the tide would increase their cruising speed by about 1 to 1.5 knots....

...After an order via radio an hour later, speed was to be increased to 5 knots.”

Is this saying that the maximum possible rate of advance of the invasion force was 6.5kt?

 

[teg]

BTW - still waiting for that big list of German opportunities to win WW2 other than Sealion. Do you believe Germany should have been picky about who to take to the prom when only one date ever presented itself?

My big moments when Germany could win the war are:

i) Capture the BEF and commit more troops to North Africa in 1940 [although not more than the total sent in OTL at the peak]. Don't try the Battle of Britain. A series of defeats in Africa and the loss of most of its army would probably undermine British morale enough to get rid of Churchill and force a negotiated settlement.

ii) A more intelligent political strategy in Russia. Build up native regimes in the Ukraine and other outlying areas. Actually study how British India functioned rather than the imperialist parody the Nazis tried to develop.

iii) Get lucky and have the USSR have another political collapse in late 1941, which isn't implausible. I think this is one of the key moments, along with getting Britain out of the war and keeping the US out altogether.

iv) Don't declare war on America.

v) Start total war in 1940.

teg

 

[Derek Pullem]

Operations are subordinate to strategy. Strategy does not flow from operations. If the proper strategy is to risk an attack, then regardless of operational factors, the attack must occur. That is the part that some posters short circuit on; Sealion was the stupidest, most rediculous, idiotic, inane, off the wall proposal in the history of warfare that should have been attempted.

Some posters don't 'get' that strategy isn't choosing the easiest thing to do from a shopping list of easy things to do. Strategy causes operations, not vice versa. No matter how bad the operational conditions are, if a strategic imperative forces the conclusion an operation should be attempted, then that operation must be attempted. No matter how good the operational conditions, if that operation violates strategy, it must not be attempted.

It's not about the chances for Sealion - they were crappy. It's about the strategic imperative - the situation called for the attempt, regardless of the poor odds.

BTW - still waiting for that big list of German opportunities to win WW2 other than Sealion. Do you believe Germany should have been picky about who to take to the prom when only one date ever presented itself?

How about Germany being stood up for that prom?

There wasn't a way for Germany to win WW2 against the USA, USSR and UK & Commonwealth.

Just because you failed one way does not mean that the alternative strategy was better.

The only way for germany not to lose WW2 is for its opponents to choose not to fight.

 

[Saphroneth]

My big moments when Germany could win the war are:

i) Capture the BEF and commit more troops to North Africa in 1940 [although not more than the total sent in OTL at the peak]. Don't try the Battle of Britain. A series of defeats in Africa and the loss of most of its army would probably undermine British morale enough to get rid of Churchill and force a negotiated settlement.

ii) A more intelligent political strategy in Russia. Build up native regimes in the Ukraine and other outlying areas. Actually study how British India functioned rather than the imperialist parody the Nazis tried to develop.

iii) Get lucky and have the USSR have another political collapse in late 1941, which isn't implausible. I think this is one of the key moments, along with getting Britain out of the war and keeping the US out altogether.

iv) Don't declare war on America.

v) Start total war in 1940.

teg

i) may be very tricky, especially politically - Italy didn't want help until when it asked for it. Without the Battle, more forces go to Egypt and Compass works.
ii) They did the best they could, and doing any more would mean less oomph out of the Panzers (because of no Hunger Plan).
iii) This is probably the key.
iv) Doesn't stop America supplying Britain due to their mutual war against Japan.
v) Germany was resource-limited, not production-limited. Read Tooze.

 

[Saphroneth]

The idea that a "two front war" is what destroyed Germany is also ahistorical for the time. In fact, what happened in 1914-8 was the opposite - Germany deeply feared a two front war, but comprehensively defeated Russia and lost during the one front war phase.

 

[Glenn239]

If one wishes to examine the second world war from the point of view of purely optimized, post facto game theory, then one runs into a problem.
It shouldn't have happened at all from that point of view. Germany kicking off WW2 put it at war with nations with an aggregate war potential significantly exceeding it.
If you cherry-pick the moment after the Fall of France to start your optimized, post facto game theory run, then you're basically being dishonest....

I'm familiar with the tactic of thrashing around for complexity in order to confuse simplicity and precision. Anything but to admit that from a strategic perspective, Sealion made sense, right?

 

[Saphroneth]

I'm familiar with the tactic of thrashing around for complexity in order to confuse simplicity and precision. Anything but to admit that from a strategic perspective, Sealion made sense, right?

It made sense only in the utterly ridiculous sense that, if it magically worked, then it would simplify things for Germany.
Which is shared with Barbarossa. For that matter, it's shared with Operation Invade The United States and the Japanese Operation Kill Everyone In China.

Actually, the earlier comparison you made with Hannibal is a good one.
IF Hannibal could take Rome, then that would have won the war. But to take Rome, one has to overcome a city of about a million people, with the manpower to raise two entire new armies, and which is walled. And Hannibal had no siege train.
If he'd had a siege train, his strategic mobility would be impaired, and he'd never have reached Cannae to win the battle in the first place.
In a similar way, a Germany which has the capability to actually invade Britain has to have that capability come from somewhere. Like the ability to defeat France, in which case invading Britain is moot.

 

[TheYoungPretender]

It's always quite ironic - the one reed you can build a German victory on is one that has nothing to do with the glamorous sexy kit, the trim black uniforms and big blond man of fantasy, or the cool futurey weapons. It's Lord Halifax, and the very real panic in Parliament in the few weeks in the middle of the Battle of France. That may have it's plausibility problems too, but they were very scared. A negotiated settlement, which would leave Germany able to trade for some critical resources with anyone they could sail a ship to with no blockade, is a potential game changer for a few years at least (until they run out of looted cash).

But no, it just_has_to_be the big blond men with their big cool guns, nine timelines out of ten. It always seems... indicative, indicative would be the best word.

 

[Derek Pullem]

I'm familiar with the tactic of thrashing around for complexity in order to confuse simplicity and precision. Anything but to admit that from a strategic perspective, Sealion made sense, right?

It did not make sense because it could not work.

You have not established the strategic objective that would be gained by launching Operation Sealion. The only strategic objective worth having would be the neutralisation of the UK in Germany's war against the world and this would only occur if the Operation had a credible chance of success.

No credible chance of success = no sense from a strategic perspective.

 

[Saphroneth]

"Makes sense"... cripes. It's tautological on that level.
"If Germany could defeat Britain in 1940, then it would no longer be at war".
It's no more useful a statement than "If the Germans built jet engines in 1936 and no-one else did, they'd have the upper hand in air to air combat."

In fact, arguably, the chances of Sealion working if launched are less than the chances of the threat of Sealion causing a British surrender.

 

[Glenn239]

Hitler's pre-war vision of events ran something along the lines of ... First, prepare for conflict, second, create living space in the East, third deal with any backlash from the West once the war in the East was over.

So he prepared, he took step one in his quest for living space when he invaded Poland and that was his first gamble, the gamble that the West wouldn't react. His gamble didn't pay off and therefore his plans were already straying wildly from his initial vision. Now he had to deal with the West before he could create the living space he needed in the East.

Hitler's objective was almost certainly to achieve European hegemony through military victory, after which territorial expansion would follow from that. To argue that his strategy pursued territorial expansion at the expense of European hegemony puts the cart before the horse. To paraphrase Scarface,

you gotta make the victory first. Then when you get the victory, you get the power. Then when you get the power, then you get the women.

Not quite the punch of the original, but you get the idea - women being territorial expansion. Military victory causes hegemony, then hegemony can be used for territorial expansion. IMO, that's why Hitler had no problem with a non-aggression pact with Russia - after hegemony was achieved, he'd have done as he pleased.

Now Hitler has to beat Britain quickly or face the risk of the US entering the war. It needs to be done before attempting to conquer Russia or there will always be a two front war. As far as I see it there were four options:

1. Negotiated Peace - The lowest risk option, no further threat from the West, little chance of the USA getting involved BUT quite possibly war at a later stage, more than likely after living space has been gained in the East though.
2. Forced Peace - Continual bombing and disruption of the British mainland might force the Government to sue for peace if and when it considers its citizens have had enough. This is a medium length strategy with a low risk militarily except for the loss of a few bombers, that may or may not work. It does have the added benefit of retarding Britains ability to wage war due to loss of production etc.
3. Siege/economic warfare - By preventing resources from reaching Britain it may be possible to bring the country to its knees. Militarily very low risk as the assets needed have been specifically for the purpose and aren't really required in any other theatre. The main problem is that it has the pottential to be a very long drawn out campaign which means the likelihood is the USA will be drawn into the war before Britain crumbles.
4. Invasion - Militarily a higher risk than any of the other options which may also impact on other aspect of the German war machine/economy but a success would almost assure the USAs absence from the war at least until after the Russians have been defeated.

1. - A negotiated peace is possible in the long run. Trying (4) does not eliminate the possibility for (1) and may increase it depending on how close (4) came to succeeding. (4) is complementary to (1). Note that this outcome precludes eastern expansion.

2. - Cannot work.

3. Also cannot work. The methods to force Britain to her knees are USW, which will cause friction with the US and draw it into the war, like in 1917.

4. If it fails (1) becomes the new strategy.

So 2,3 are out because they can't work. That leaves 1,4 as possible strategies, with the logical order of execution being 4, then 1.

In my opinion it isn't a question of either/or (Sealion or Barbarossa) its a question of how to knock Britain out before the USA gets involved and before tackling the Eastern expansion.

Politically, Stalin was the joker in the deck. Sealion preserved the US's strategic risk (a German-USSR-Japanese alliance) while Barbarossa ended it (no possibility of a German-USSR alliance). Just another way of saying that Sealion was Germany's correct choice while Barbarossa was its certain defeat.

So of the four options above Germany tried the first, which was never going to happen while Churchill still drew breath and of the other three they opted to used a combination of choices 2 and 3 would have taken too long. In hindsight their most realistic chance of success, although the riskiest militarily, would have been an invasion of Britain ... .

(3) on your list is certainly riskier than (4), because it makes war with the US inevitable whereas (4) does not.

 

[TheYoungPretender]

You've forgotten the First Law...

"Makes sense"... cripes. It's tautological on that level.
"If Germany could defeat Britain in 1940, then it would no longer be at war".
It's no more useful a statement than "If the Germans built jet engines in 1936 and no-one else did, they'd have the upper hand in air to air combat."

In fact, arguably, the chances of Sealion working if launched are less than the chances of the threat of Sealion causing a British surrender.

Bingo. But the golden commandment of After 1900 "No Napkinwaffe, No Hugo Boss, no WWII timeline." The Scarface quotes are somewhat indicative of the "anything but diplomacy" bent of the PoDs...

 

[Garrison]

I'm familiar with the tactic of thrashing around for complexity in order to confuse simplicity and precision. Anything but to admit that from a strategic perspective, Sealion made sense, right?

Only if you think throwing away all those men and all that materiel on an invasion that cannot succeed constitutes sense.

 

[Glenn239]

It's still a hindsight driven logic.

No, that's just your latest shopping trip for a plausible reason to never post the sentence,

"operationally it was *totally* stupid but in terms of grand strategy I can see how Sealion made sense".

We know that Germany could not defeat the Soviet Union whilst fending off the US & UK. We don't know that Germany couldn't do Sealion (according to some posters). Ergo the only strategy must be for Germany to try Sealion.

[/QUOTE]

Sealion wasn't just strategically superior to Barbarossa because it had an inherently higher chance of success (due to the luck factor of compressed timescale). Sealion was superior because it was not fatal to Germany if it failed and because it did not escalate the war, which is the British path to victory.

Bolded reasons why Sealion was better than Barbarossa do not assume Sealion succeeds - they were also true whether it failed or not.

 

[Glenn239]

There wasn't a way for Germany to win WW2 against the USA, USSR and UK & Commonwealth.

The USSR and USA have to be in first.

 

[cpip]

Sealion wasn't just strategically superior to Barbarossa because it had an inherently higher chance of success (due to the luck factor of compressed timescale). Sealion was superior because it was not fatal to Germany if it failed and because it did not escalate the war, which is the British path to victory.

Bolded reasons why Sealion was better than Barbarossa do not assume Sealion succeeds - they were also true whether it failed or not.

Excepting, of course, the possibility that a failed Sealion may well be fatal to the German government; and that the invasion of Britain significantly increases the chances of either Soviet or American intervention in some fashion.

I'm speaking not as a patriot; and to be perfectly frank, between those attributing Nazi sympathies to the people discussing the possibility of Sealion and those attributing blind British patriotism to those who believe that the discussion is over, I'm really wondering if anyone is capable of having a rational discussion on this without descending into name calling childishness.