Operation Sea Lion fails - is a counter-invasion of France now possible?

That's right, it's everyone's favourite sea mammal - but the topic of this thread is not about how Sea Lion would go if launched (it would fail miserably), but rather its aftermath. Namely, after Sea Lion ends in a British victory and the German forces are repulsed/surrounded and captured, then is Germany weak enough and Britain strong enough that an early D-Day can be launched?

Let's assume that Operation Sea Lion progresses under similar circumstances to the war game conducted by Sandhurst in 1974. Here's a link to its Wikipedia article, but the bottom line is that, between September the 22nd to 28th, the attempted German invasion of Britain unfolds, with the Wehrmacht advancing several miles inland before being pinned down and repulsed by British forces, while the Royal Navy successfully intercepts and destroys the second German wave. This leaves the Germans facing (of the 90,000 soldiers who participated in the invasion) casualties consisting of 33,000 prisoners and 41,000 deaths (either falling in battle or drowning in the Channel).

Now, personally, I think that a subsequent British counter-invasion of France, landing at either Calais or Normandy, in early to mid 1941 is entirely possible in this scenario, for the following reasons:

(1) Germany has just sustained grievous losses which have damaged the Wehrmacht and left the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine in a state of disrepair,

(2) Occupied nations (including France) are seething with resentment against the Nazis and, after the failure of Sea Lion, will almost certainly be close to open revolt - the seemingly invincible Nazi war machine has been not only repulsed by wholly crushed by Britain,

(3) The Atlantic Wall has not yet been built, so German defences along the coast of France are not as strong as they were in 1944, and

(4) The Royal Navy is now virtually unchallenged in the Channel with the destruction of the Kriegsmarine and so can easily transport a British and Commonwealth invasion force to France.

What are your thoughts? Could such a counter-invasion take place and, if it does and succeeds, then how would the war progress from there?
 
With what kit? Dunkirk did a number on that and the British have had to work like crazy to build the necessary replacements and not all of them are much to look at. Hobart's funnies have not even been thought of yet as Dieppe has not ironed out the kinks in effecting a contested landing. And the Wehrmacht has gone through a massive expansion which, if it will not compensate for the loss of veterans in Britain, will more than make up for the manpower loss on British beaches. And with what men? British and Dominion manpower alone against Germany probably is not sufficient without the American soldiers and equipment, not even taking into consideration the tying off most troops East against the Soviet Union.

By 1941, France can hardly be said to be 'seething'. Suffering, certainly, but the worst of the collaboration is yet to come and, crucially, Barbarossa is not yet launched, so the Communists will mostly not be in the Résistance, and the STO has not been implemented, so there is no widespread attempts to evade it and join maquis or networks from the French youth. Most operations are not sabotage-level but more or less targeted assassinations of mid-level officers, followed by brutal repression. There is still the fiction of an autonomous Vichy regime, with the zone libre not yet under occupation as under Case Anton and Pétain is himself quite popular. There is still resentment over Mers-el-Kébir and de Gaulle is still a figure of suspicion when he is known at all, with Jean Moulin having yet to be sent in and organise the CNR.

This will be Greece and Crete on a grander scale.
 
What are your thoughts? Could such a counter-invasion take place and, if it does and succeeds, then how would the war progress from there?

Erm no, it would fail and however the war progressed the British would look like glue sniffing idiots.

The 90,000 men who you referred to are just the first wave of assault infantry and a small amount of artillery and armour. The panzer forces of the German Army are essentially intact even the infantry is not much reduced with another 109 divisions to draw upon. The Army has lost a battle but is still very much in the war. The Luftwaffe is likely to have suffered proportionally heavier losses but is hardly likely to be wiped out and is still likely to be numerically superior to the RAF in bombers and attack aircraft and have a strong force of single and twin engine fighters which would love to be able to have their revenge on the defensive.

The KM is temporarily a non-factor but the British have much the same problems in a lack of assault landing craft as the Germans, having lots of destroyers is no help in landing tanks.

The big loss for the Germans is those Rhine barges, motor boats, trawlers and transports. The British deciding to risk a chunk of their Merchant Navy off the coast of France for a half arsed version of Dieppe multiplied makes little to no sense.

The British will need to be build an amphibious assault capacity first and practice using it which would take a while yet.
 
I would hope to god that British planners wouldnt be stupid enough to retaliate against a failed Sea Lion with an unspeakably stupid act of their own.

Its important to realise that materially the wehrmacht would not be gutted by Sealion losing primarily infantry troops (heavy equipment wouod be limited in the first two waves of the invasion).

I could however see a 1942 operation Roundup with American backing being more seriously persued than historically where it was seen as either a joke, evidence that General Marshall didnt know anything about war, or evidence American involvement in the war was primarily with the attempt of breaking Britain.
 
Alas I also have to say any improvised British Invasion of France in 1941 would end in as Big a disaster for the British as the failed Sealion was for Germany. Indeed seeing how badly the Germans did with an improved invasion should be enough to even quiten Churhill from launching one of his little ideas!

The big difference to OTL in this scenario is the lessons the British would learn in amphibious warfare so when the time does come less mistakes will hopefully be made.

Also the myths of the German supermen soldiers will have been quashed and of the very green British army would have a little combat experience. British civilian and military morale would be much higher than OTL.

Now I feel that nothing will happen until Barbarossa (apart from OTL lunacy in Greece). But after the Germans commit their forces to the east would a failed Sealion and the increase in confidence it would bring not encourage the British to be more aggressive. OTL Starlin wanted a second front ASAP and even offered Russian infantry to be transported by British ships to open a front in Norway. Here the British might decide to attempt to invade Norway themselves.

Yes Norway is a strategic dead end but holding the north is operationally very useful when running supplies through the Baltic to Russia. It also denies the Uboats useful bases. If nothing else it would act as a big diversion to the Germans and would need to be countered by increasing forces in Norway at the expense of forces elsewhere.

Another option is the proposed recapture of the Channel Islands which I could see being considered more due to Greater British confidence.

Even if the British decide against direct action due to the failed invasion making a second attempt extremely unlikely the invasion panic that caused the British to waste resources on building defences and to continue to produce obsolete equipment will be much less TOTL. I would also expect the British to keep less resources at home which can only help the Commonwealth forces in the Middle East and even in the Far East pre December 1941.
 
Dill & his predecessor had a better grip on things in 1940-41. They had effectively sat on Churchill. One of the major reasons he got rid of them. However Dill does appear to me to have been seriously examining what it would take. A lot of the foundation for the Continental campaign was laid during his tenure.
 
No.

The British don't have enough modern equipment or men at this time to equip an army big enough to liberate France.
 
Fair enough - it seems as though I was quite optimistic in the possibility of Britain liberating France immediately after Sea Lion.
 
it is not possible for Britain to invade Nazi Europe at that time. We have neither then men, the weapons nor the required equipment.
 
A year later, in June 1941 the German leaders were so confident they had no armor or motorized corps in France or Belgium, a few foot moblie infantry, and a bare minimum of static Garrison units.
 
A year later, in June 1941 the German leaders were so confident they had no armor or motorized corps in France or Belgium, a few foot moblie infantry, and a bare minimum of static Garrison units.
Well, I mean they had a few recuperating units in 1941 but there was nothing stationed there. It wasn't until 1943 that some units had been placed there for "extended operations" before returning to the east, and that only a handful had really been placed there in the reserves.
 
They can't do it. period. They have just seen a demonstration of how an inadequately planned and resourced invasion goes, even Churchill is not that demented and the military will tell him no if he even suggests it. With the wrecking of the German economy due to the loss of the barges and trashing the transport system, the German war effort going forward will be substantially weaker, even in Speer is given authority much sooner. Very likely no German involvement in Greece, and even less aid to Italy in North Africa as Barbarossa will still be prioritized by Hitler.

The problem for the UK/USA is even with a weakened Germany they need to build their own forces and the LSTs and landing craft they need to not only invade but manage supplying the invasion until they can get a working port. Shipping/amphibious craft is the big bottleneck, and a failed Sealion does not change that.
 
Got to wonder if Churchill will have to be sat upon to stop something like this form being attempted.

He might be more busy dealing with the possibility of getting back access to the Treaty Ports given the potential of Ireland joining in the event of SeaLion given the discussions between the two.
 
Got to wonder if Churchill will have to be sat upon to stop something like this form being attempted.

I think Churchill would be more likely to put more resources into Med and the Middle East once the threat of invasion was lifted.
 
Well, I mean they had a few recuperating units in 1941 but there was nothing stationed there. It wasn't until 1943 that some units had been placed there for "extended operations" before returning to the east, and that only a handful had really been placed there in the reserves.

I think it was earlier than that. My memory is three burnt out armored or motorized divisions were recovering in France in July 1942, & several infantry divisions. Shortly after that personnel for two SS divisions arrived and begain training for conversion to armor divisions.

In October 1942 when the fleet departed the UK for Op TORCH the two Pz Corps in France we're alerted and moved to anti invasion assembly areas. IIRC the SS Corps was assembled near Rennes.
 
I think it was earlier than that. My memory is three burnt out armored or motorized divisions were recovering in France in July 1942, & several infantry divisions. Shortly after that personnel for two SS divisions arrived and begain training for conversion to armor divisions.

In October 1942 when the fleet departed the UK for Op TORCH the two Pz Corps in France we're alerted and moved to anti invasion assembly areas. IIRC the SS Corps was assembled near Rennes.
I was referring to the units that were deployed for extended periods of time but recuperating units could also definitely fit under that description.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
To reverse an old Sealion question, what would the British give up in order to build the amphibious armada required?

Roskill comments that although the need for a "light, reasonably fast and well-protected LCA" was appreciated and designs prepared, contracts were not placed for a substantial number until April 1939. I don't know what priority this had OTL but there was a shortage of landing craft that particularly bedevilled Mediterranean and mid-war Pacific amphibious landings, and that was with the resources of Uncle Sam available.
 
...
Roskill comments that although the need for a "light, reasonably fast and well-protected LCA" was appreciated and designs prepared, contracts were not placed for a substantial number until April 1939. I don't know what priority this had OTL but there was a shortage of landing craft that particularly bedevilled Mediterranean and mid-war Pacific amphibious landings, and that was with the resources of Uncle Sam available.

There was the manufacturing priority question. Its under examined in my opinion. The mid war 'shortage' was as much the result of shifting strategic direction as production. Construction goals set in 1941-42 were aimed at a general goal of invading NW Europe in 1943 & a Central Pacific offensive later that year. At the start of 1943 that was erased and a much more extensive series of amphibious operations were substituted, in the Mediterranean and South Pacific. While the proposed single amphib op in NW Europe was canceled the US insisted on keeping the Central Pacific offensive on the table. Effectively the Allied leaders added between 25% & 50% to the load for the amphib fleet for its planned size. Expansion to meet that requirement was possible, but priority was already on construction of light ships for ASW. Concern over the losing the Battle of the Atlantic had caused construction of ASW ships to slow production of amphibs by 1943. Reversing the priority back to amphibs could not overcome lost time in latter 1942.

Bottom line here is certain Allied leaders lacked focus and wanted to add strategic projects without regard for existing conditions and plans. Ultimately the blame lay at the top in that the hand full of key leaders lost discipline & focus and for the next two years Allied strategy went in to many directions.
 
Top