Operation Sea Lion (1974 Sandhurst Wargame)

a quick look at the chart says all harbours on isle of wight are useless for supply and seeing as you have no landing craft you get no heavy gear and resupply is labour intensive.as mentioned before supply by landing aircraft is not practical so you are left with air dropping.
 
My experience tends to be that if such detail is provided and proves accurate and well thought out, the reaction is hostile. If the detail is not accurate, then the reaction is hostile. See the pattern?

The request for specific beach information is not appropriate to the level of discussion we are engaged in, and any time a poster zooms too far into the weeds looking for this type of detail isn't really interested in finding out what the actual candidates are, they're interested solely in whether or not you pick the wrong beach at the wrong time. The only thing that actually matters for the purpose of this discussion is that there were beaches on IOW accessible from the south that were viable for assault between about July 10 and July 30th. Since this was probably the case, why not just grant the premise and move on? .
Problem is Glenn , from memory of my trips to the IoW, cannot actually think of a beach on the South Coast that does not have rocks in front and/or a cliff behind. So you having to find a spot is pretty important.
 
Problem is Glenn , from memory of my trips to the IoW, cannot actually think of a beach on the South Coast that does not have rocks in front and/or a cliff behind. So you having to find a spot is pretty important.
So? The first wave just needs to bring a really big trampoline to vault everyone up over the cliff.

Problem solved.
 
My experience tends to be that if such detail is provided and proves accurate and well thought out, the reaction is hostile. If the detail is not accurate, then the reaction is hostile. See the pattern?

The request for specific beach information is not appropriate to the level of discussion we are engaged in, and any time a poster zooms too far into the weeds looking for this type of detail isn't really interested in finding out what the actual candidates are, they're interested solely in whether or not you pick the wrong beach at the wrong time. The only thing that actually matters for the purpose of this discussion is that there were beaches on IOW accessible from the south that were viable for assault between about July 10 and July 30th. Since this was probably the case, why not just grant the premise and move on? .
You are literally ignoring everything, different beaches take different times to get across in different conditions. You are also ignoring the point, you NEED to provide a logically based argument with historical backing, and not your ‘Barbarossa failed’ stuff, but stuff that shows US that YOU aren’t making a land based power run up AGAINST the MOST DOMINANT NAVAL POWER OF THE WORLD. You have not provided ACCURATE DATA, you have provided ,AT MOST, wishful thinking, that is you are applying a different situation to this one. I will happily admit you have a point IF YOU MAKE ONE WITH BACKING AND NOT JUST IGNORE THE INFORMATION THAT COUNTERMANDS YOUR POINTS.
Sorry for the caps but I need you to meet me halfway and entertain the POSSIBILITY that you are wrong or have malformed arguments.
In short, you meet us in the debate as either bringing forwards an argument based on the time’s logic and we can actually debate, not just have your arguments shot down by data you misinterpret (willingly, and I doubt you are willingly misinterpreting people’s arguments, you are smart) or take out of context (or, flat out ignore) from what is actually said.
 
In Tunisia the Germans had air superiority
In the IOW their Airfields are in artillery range You’ve read. lol on Dien Ben Phu perhaps?

Checked a map. It's as I remembered. The French there had an airfield a few thousand yards from overlooking hills. The Viet artillery was literally right on top of their airfield. Now, you check a map. The central part of Isle of Wight is over 20,000 yards from positions on the English shore. Heck, some points are 30,000 yards from the opposing shore. That's why they were talking about 15" battleship rounds fired from Portsmouth, and naval bombardments from warships offshore. Because they had already looked at the map and realised that airfields on IOW are basically outside the artillery range of the mainland otherwise. Zounds man, this was literally the first thing I checked during the preliminary feasibility phase.
 
Checked a map. It's as I remembered. The French there had an airfield a few thousand yards from overlooking hills. The Viet artillery was literally right on top of their airfield. Now, you check a map. The central part of Isle of Wight is over 20,000 yards from positions on the English shore. Heck, some points are 30,000 yards from the opposing shore. That's why they were talking about 15" battleship rounds fired from Portsmouth, and naval bombardments from warships offshore. Because they had already looked at the map and realised that airfields on IOW are basically outside the artillery range of the mainland otherwise. Zounds man, this was literally the first thing I checked during the preliminary feasibility phase.
so i guess those 15" guns are immobile?
 
The RN has to be driven from Portsmouth as a pre-requisite.
This isn't the historical scenario where the Germans idled around for a month deciding what to do - in this sketch the decision to invade IOW as the prelimary to Sealion is made much earlier, in early or mid June, before the surrender of France. There is no Kanalkampf in July. There is no sustained assault on RAF 11 Group in August. The LW needs to rapidly establish the single-engine bases up on the coast, and the bases for air landing operations as close as possible to the target. Twin engine bomber bases can be further back, especially for those units flying at night - the target is the British ports. Training of Stuka and ME-110 units for ship attack in preparation for the battle of the SLOC. The Knickebein system needs a transmitter as close as possible to IOW by mid-July. Coordination with the Italians on their role in the offensive. On the Mediterreanean front, the objectives of Malta and Egypt are on hold into 1941. The immediate drive in July is into Spain for Gibraltar, with primarily Italian airpower. That's the sketch.
Yes, I think the LW could have knocked out the facilities at Portsmouth in repeated massed raids done mostly at night without losing significant numbers of aircraft, provided that driving the RN from the southern ports was the primary LW objective for over 4 weeks of heavy, sustained bombings. Daylight raids at Portsmouth would have been more costly, but not rising to the level of "crippling" numbers of planes.
I think there's a bit of a problem with your timetable.

They should invade Wight in early or half june before the fall of France, but you admit it needs at least 4 weeks of heavy bombardment to drive the RN out of Portsmouth (which is a bit optimistic IMO). This means they've got to start the bombardment of Portsmouth about 4 or 5 days into their campaign in France. While they haven't even reached the Channel with their forces and the victory in France is by no means certain!!! And the planes they use to bombard Portsmouth, can't be used in drive to Dunkirk. The paratroopes have just been decimated in The Hague. And the lost Ju-52s will not yet be replaced.

I think you've found a way to shorten the war. With your plan the germans probably won't even win the battle of France.
 

Ramontxo

Donor
Speaking as one of the people who initially speculated this course of action, I would say peace can only be offered, not negotiated. Even if Churchill was not in charge, once the panic subsides, I really can't see there being any complex terms that both sides would find acceptable. The trust level on the British side is effectively nil, and despite the Hess adventure, I have to think the German government is not going to be in the mood to offer sweeping concessions straight after their dramatic victory against France. This is not auspicious for negotiations.

Consequently the only way out of this I can see is if Germany intentionally and from the outset draws a very hard and clear line at the English Channel, does not take the Channel Islands, and explicitly says, "Look, this is the new border: the ocean. We are a land power and we now have the land. Britain, it is up to you to accept this new border or not to accept it, but take it or leave it, we are done fighting. As far as we are concerned, this is now over." And then it is simply a matter of waiting until the British government accepts that reality.

Not a risk-free scenario by any means, nor, I would point out, is it the sort of diplomatic alternative that the Nazi leadership is likely to see as remotely feasible. But Glenn is attempting to maneuver us here into the same position as every other thread where I have read his work, which is that Barbarossa was clearly impossible and therefore Sea Lion should have been considered. Well, Sea Lion is impossible too. That leaves my route, because at least it isn't impossible, merely unlikely.

I do agree with you in the Hitler offers a peace treaty being the best possible strategy for the Nazis. The problem with that being that this is summer 1940 less than two years after the "This (the Sudetes) is my last territorial ambition in Europe" and nobody (even less in Belgium the Netherlands Norway Poland Tcheckoslovakia or France) believe him anymore...
 
So Glenn, let me get this right...

Having sacrificed the FJ on the IOW - I'm not counting those untrained infantrymen who are tossed out of burning JU-52s - what are you going to use to get behind the beach defences when your flat-pack fleet turns up weeks later off Kent & Sussex after 48 hours at sea? And your idea of supplying the Sea Lion beachhead from the air - are we talking zombie Aunt Tu's and HE111s?

The garrison of Isle Of Wight rapidly loses the battle because it was far too small and not of high enough quality. The FJ takes the port on the north shore, and you remember all that talk about not being able to land heavy equipment without a port? Guess what, that applies to the British too! Put the entire 4th Infantry division on Isle of Wight in June 1940 with an armored regiment in reserves, then give me a call.

The idea the LW can't supply from the air? During these weather months, from the airbases available in France, with the whole Luftwaffe in France? Please. Under those conditions, on the best days, with an all-out effort, using air dropped canisters and as many bombers, they might even have hit 1,000 tons by air per day at peak.
 
The idea the LW can't supply from the air? During these weather months, from the airbases available in France, with the whole Luftwaffe in France? Please. Under those conditions, on the best days, with an all-out effort, using air dropped canisters and as many bombers, they might even have hit 1,000 tons by air per day at peak.
No they can't do it from airbases in France, because you literally said that they should invade before the fall of France. So they won't have many operating airbases there (if any).

You really need to put your story together.
 
I think there's a bit of a problem with your timetable.

They should invade Wight in early or half june before the fall of France, but you admit it needs at least 4 weeks of heavy bombardment to drive the RN out of Portsmouth (which is a bit optimistic IMO). This means they've got to start the bombardment of Portsmouth about 4 or 5 days into their campaign in France. While they haven't even reached the Channel with their forces and the victory in France is by no means certain!!! And the planes they use to bombard Portsmouth, can't be used in drive to Dunkirk. The paratroopes have just been decimated in The Hague. And the lost Ju-52s will not yet be replaced.

The timetable takes no action on the scenario before mid-June 1940. If by mid-July the RN has not been driven from the required ports, then the IOW operation would have to be suspended until they were. The key determinant to timeframe otherwise is the strength of the garrison on Isle of Wight. Crete had 40,000 troops on it. IOW didn't until - maybe - 1941. IOW is right under the nose of 11 Group, and the RN is still far closer than at Crete, even if having been driven from the local area. IOW can't have even a third the number of troops on it as did Crete, otherwise the defenses are getting too strong for the proposed airborne op.
 

Deleted member 94680

When you read about the battle of Crete, did you ever notice the number of Axis troops on the island wasn't the same on Day 1 as opposed to Day 10?
In terms of shipping, where is the list of all Axis controlled warships and shipping on the north coast of Europe in the summer of 1940?

No, you were referring to 30k troops being airdropped in and suddenly spoke of only 5k. I was querying the discrepancy.

I was referring to land based radar for ship detection, not ship based.

Best I can find was references to FuMO 1 & 2 (Calais) as a land based surface detection radar and that had a range of appx 20 miles. If you have better information, I’d love to hear it, but it seems land based radar wouldn’t be much use for this plan.

Yes, its called contingency planning because future action depends on contingencies at that time.

Contingencies come after an event not before. The bombing of Portsmouth would need to occur before wightlion - hence describing it as a delay.

The important question is, could the Luftwaffe defeat the RAF in Soutern England if the British started a gas war? I'm not up on LW gas or RAF anti-gas doctrine or how well 11 Group, aircraft factories, etc., would function under such conditions. If a gas war breaks out, whose in the better position to go on the attack? Is it likely Germany invades Russia? This sort of thing.

Very good questions. I get the impression the British were better prepared in the immediate term (wide issue of gas masks, plans to use chemical weapons, etc) but going forward I’m not sure. Did the Germans even have stocks of air-droppable gas?
 

hipper

Banned
Checked a map. It's as I remembered. The French there had an airfield a few thousand yards from overlooking hills. The Viet artillery was literally right on top of their airfield. Now, you check a map. The central part of Isle of Wight is over 20,000 yards from positions on the English shore. Heck, some points are 30,000 yards from the opposing shore. That's why they were talking about 15" battleship rounds fired from Portsmouth, and naval bombardments from warships offshore. Because they had already looked at the map and realised that airfields on IOW are basically outside the artillery range of the mainland otherwise. Zounds man, this was literally the first thing I checked during the preliminary feasibility phase.

its a pity you are planning to land in an island surrounded by 9.2 inch costal artillery I Count 6 guns in portsmouth and another 6 on The IOW itself. i'm not counting the 6” guns on the Sea Forts in the Solent or the 12” Railway guns, onshore.

a 9.2 inch gun has a range of 29,000 yards. the IOW is within artillery range

Zounds was good though pity you did not think that the RN might have defended their main base.
 
Wow, 160 pages - who would have thunk it?

I am enjoying this thread though, it's the most in-depth one I've seen as to why IOW won't work:

1) Unsuitable beaches
2) Very little area to land transports and gliders, or even drop paratroops
3) Too much opposition far too close
4) No reasonable way to reinforce whatever German forces get ashore

It got me wondering about what if someone tried to do a landing on Virginia beaches. Many are sand but you've got sand bars, rip tides and all sorts of man-made obstructions. Some are water-logged and would pose a hazard to vehicles and heavily-loaded troops. Unless you have excellent knowledge of what's there and tide conditions you could have real troubles, especially if your landing is contested and like the Germans are using a lot of unpowered barges being towed in by tugs.
 
The request for specific beach information is not appropriate to the level of discussion we are engaged in, and any time a poster zooms too far into the weeds looking for this type of detail isn't really interested in finding out what the actual candidates are, they're interested solely in whether or not you pick the wrong beach at the wrong time. The only thing that actually matters for the purpose of this discussion is that there were beaches on IOW accessible from the south that were viable for assault between about July 10 and July 30th. Since this was probably the case, why not just grant the premise and move on? .

No, you choose the beach:

https://www.wightlink.co.uk/do/beaches-isle-of-wight/
 

hipper

Banned
The idea being the RN could be driven from the southern ports only by sustained, heavy, air and mining attacks, as the primary pre-invasion objective. You're assuming day raids, but I mean much also at night against the port facilities. If the LW engaged instead in its more skittish historical pattern, the necessary weight would not be achieved and the pre-condition would fail. If Portsmouth was still a fully operational, fully stocked RN fleet base at the moment the invasion of IOW was due to occur, then the IOW operation would have to be postponed.

Doy ypu think there was a Reason eagle day was in August?
the LW had to rebase its bombers in france before 5hey could mount heavy sustained raids.

tje IOW had a bigger Garrison in August however.
 
You said the RAF could contest the raids and engage the LW in aerial combat. The RAF was useless in night air combat in 1940. Ergo, you either did not know the RAF was useless at night combat in the summer of 1940, or you meant day raids. Now, you will notice one thing about my posting style that is different than a lot of posters around here - I made the list of the two things that I thought you could have meant, and I chose the more flattering option.



Yes, I think the LW could have knocked out the facilities at Portsmouth in repeated massed raids done mostly at night without losing significant numbers of aircraft, provided that driving the RN from the southern ports was the primary LW objective for over 4 weeks of heavy, sustained bombings. Daylight raids at Portsmouth would have been more costly, but not rising to the level of "crippling" numbers of planes.


Wait you said summer of 1940 but that's of dubious merit since the "Battle of Britain" didn't start in any large degree until July 10th and Germany was using day bombing primarily until the end of September. If the RAF was bad at night fighting and the LW decent at it why launch a huge daytime attack on London on the 15th of September? Also why can Germany on the fly make major changes but the UK is stuck with their historical abilities? If the LW attacks Portsmouth dozens of times in a month then is it possible that the RAF would makes changes?
 
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