Combat loading is more an ocean freight thing than a coastal barge thing.
And as has been previously pointed out a very high proportion of the freight would have been carried on ships - not barges. Ships that need to be offloaded in ports too.
Combat loading is more an ocean freight thing than a coastal barge thing.
Yes because the same mine barrages laid over weeks/months in Med stopped the RN from occasionally driving entire convoys of merchant ships past them IRL to Malta or Egypt?If a beachhead is established, the top KM priority is getting minefields in the Channel along the flanks of the route so that the RN is barred from entering into the shipping channel. And, getting coastal artillery on both sides of the Channel route to cover the minefields. The pattern at Tunisia and in Libya was numerous small convoys, not big ones.
In terms of air cover, since the Channel is narrow, it should be possible to do night supply runs once the mine barriers are in place.
The logistics push model says you oversupply the beachhead. For any crucial shortages, night delivery air transport.
Do you rally think air or barge can carry what is required to 'oversupply' the beachhead?Combat loading is more an ocean freight thing than a coastal barge thing.
Only these thing are trying to resupply through the RN & RAF and Auxiliary right? Every time one gets sunk in any leg of the back and forth trip that's one less available to continue the supply run. On top of these you also trying to land the 2nd wave who will nee those transports (if there are any left for them)
If they're not sunk or shot down, miss their drops, are actually there at all what with the issues the LW are having with air crew availability and spare parts by Sep40
What no RAF again? So no not Air vs. Sea but Air vs. Air & Sea
Also where has this 6,000 sorties figure come from, and over what time scale?
During the BoB in the period 10th July - 31st 0ct (113 days) the LW ran 67k sorties including all aircraft in all mission types (figs from download at bottom of this story) or approx 600 per day over the entire period. Obviously there were lulls and periods of heightened activity during that period*. However you talking about doing this in mid / late Sep which is after the attrition of the BoB has begun to takes it toll. You are also talking about doing this at the same time as landing Paratroopers and all that air supply drops you mentioned above?
How are what ever bits of the first wave that makes it ashore going to hold out for months?
Meanwhile, the British have lost Gibraltar and Malta, the Germans have occupied Tunisia and are pushing through to Egypt in strength, the Italians are holding on in East Africa, the Soviets have occupied Iran. In the Atlantic, the British are watching the Twins and Bismarck run rampant because the Admiralty thought it would be a good idea to commit the KGV's and BC's to the Channel.
If it last more than 72 hours........ what do you expect WWI repeat on a British beach? The Germans win in a week or they are all lost.Sealion is 72 hours. The supply chain battle could last into 1941 or even 1942.
If they don't stop RAF just how much of the invasion fleet gets destroyed by them? 1%....10%....25%.....50%..........?Fighter command cannot stop the Luftwaffe from generating massive numbers of combat sorties in the Channel in September 1940. They can attrite, they can degrade, they can screen, but they cannot stop. The LW cannot stop the RAF either.
I somewhat agree that ramming is a red herring; the RN has the ability to deny invasion without it. The weather tops were mostly wooden, and had little structural strength, though. Mounting things on it would be tricky.
The German gun crews are equally exposed, if not more so - the AA crews and bridge crews could at least duck behind the plating of the gun tub/bridge.
Where does this 500 yard number come from? In any case, remember that the typical destroyer has a lot more light firepower than a barge, in addition to its heavy firepower.
The RN and RAF want to defeat the invasion, however they can. But a drawn-out engagement is one they will win; once the escort is destroyed, the RN can savage the supply lines at will, with nothing the Germans can do about it.
That's mostly because you have absolutely no conception of the critical importance of logistics.
If the British close that sea line, it's over.
And blockading an enemy from resupply is something that the RN has had a lot of practice at.
If by "20 kt barges" you mean high-speed motor launches escorted by destroyers, then sure!And you've got me reading about the Raid on St. Nazaire. Looks like a bunch of RN 20kt barges tackled a fortified port with about 50 guns of 20mm and up in a head on gun battle at point blank ranges.
Taken a look twice the last two months at the Italian Minefields in the Sicilian Channel, & I'm not seeing a good argument for a minefield massacre. In terms of ships actually damaged or sunk they are the dog thats not barking. /quote]
The point of Axis minefields was to prevent Allied surface ships attacking the Axis supply route to Tunisia. During the Tunisia campaign, 7% of all Axis shipping was lost to warships because of the minefields. If you think the British can win Sealion with only 7% of supply losses to warships, that is quite wrong.
Yes they can sadly then its winter and they have to wait till 41 to start and by then the British army is rebuilt as is Fighter Command.....Build hundreds of MFP's and Siebels per month, and get thousands of mines into the Channel with coastal artillery.
But the RN was trying to minimise losses that's not the case defending Dover and just who won the battle for Tunisia.....?The point of Axis minefields was to prevent Allied surface ships attacking the Axis supply route to Tunisia. During the Tunisia campaign, 7% of all Axis shipping was lost to warships because of the minefields. If you think the British can win Sealion with only 7% of supply losses to warships, that is quite wrong.
A crossing from Calais and Boulogne to Southern England sounds the same to me. Some nay-sayers may disagree…
All quotes from this article:
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcon...le.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1230&context=cmh
How about this for a historically backed model for Sealion?
A crossing from Calais and Boulogne to Southern England sounds the same to me. Some nay-sayers may disagree…
The operation in question was, I believe, an evacuation, not an assault.Hardly being a nay-sayer to say crossing a river is different to crossing the English Channel. Also, it appears from the article there was hardly any opposition to the crossings (it makes little mention of air attacks) and there is no mention of naval opposition at all.
The Germans aren't lugging over any coastal artillery worth a damn, Glenn. The Marines on Guadalcanal used 5" guns, and while they were useful in fending off any destroyers that wanted to take a shot at Henderson, they couldn't prevent the Japanese from landing what reinforcements and supplies they could bring, nor could they prevent the Japanese from operating in Ironbottom Sound. They definitely didn't do a damn thing to stop bombardments from cruisers or battleships. Similarly, 5" guns in the landing zone aren't going to stop the Royal Navy from sweeping the minefields and then running in ships to hit the resupply efforts.If a beachhead is established, the top KM priority is getting minefields in the Channel along the flanks of the route so that the RN is barred from entering into the shipping channel. And, getting coastal artillery on both sides of the Channel route to cover the minefields. The pattern at Tunisia and in Libya was numerous small convoys, not big ones.
In terms of air cover, since the Channel is narrow, it should be possible to do night supply runs once the mine barriers are in place.
Indeed. If you see that as evidence that Sealion could be succesful, then Dynamo proves that the UK could have invaded France in september 1940.The operation in question was, I believe, an evacuation, not an assault.