Operation Sea Lion (1974 Sandhurst Wargame)

If a beachhead is established, the top KM priority is getting minefields in the Channel along the flanks of the route so that the RN is barred from entering into the shipping channel. And, getting coastal artillery on both sides of the Channel route to cover the minefields. The pattern at Tunisia and in Libya was numerous small convoys, not big ones.

In terms of air cover, since the Channel is narrow, it should be possible to do night supply runs once the mine barriers are in place.
Yes because the same mine barrages laid over weeks/months in Med stopped the RN from occasionally driving entire convoys of merchant ships past them IRL to Malta or Egypt?

The logistics push model says you oversupply the beachhead. For any crucial shortages, night delivery air transport.
Combat loading is more an ocean freight thing than a coastal barge thing.
Do you rally think air or barge can carry what is required to 'oversupply' the beachhead?
 
Only these thing are trying to resupply through the RN & RAF and Auxiliary right? Every time one gets sunk in any leg of the back and forth trip that's one less available to continue the supply run. On top of these you also trying to land the 2nd wave who will nee those transports (if there are any left for them)

There's two phases, Sealion itself, and then the battle of the supply chain to the beachhead. Sealion is 72 hours. The supply chain battle could last into 1941 or even 1942. In terms of the KM vulnerability, it's more vulnerable for Sealion than during the supply phase. This is because (a) shipping density is very high for the invasion, very low for the daily supply requirements; (b) once the beachhead is established, the mine barriers on each flank get thicker and thicker, the coastal batteries on the English side get more numerous and more effective, and the RN becomes less and less able to get into the shipping channel, (it doesn't appear to me Sandhurst simulated this aspect of Sealion, the increasing difficulty the RN encounters just getting into the shipping channel as time goes on. If not, this would borders on outright diingeniousness on the part of the game masters). As the minefields evolve and Siebel Ferry/MFP production ramps up to the 100's per month, the British are in trouble.

If they're not sunk or shot down, miss their drops, are actually there at all what with the issues the LW are having with air crew availability and spare parts by Sep40

Figure that air supply must be done by night to avoid the RAF fighters and that the standard radio navigation aids are used to ensure drop accuracy. I don't think these can be jammed because the drop zones are on the coast with no British territory between the transmitters and the receiving aircraft.

What no RAF again? So no not Air vs. Sea but Air vs. Air & Sea

What, this RAF with AIM-9L sidewinders again? Get it through your head. Fighter command cannot stop the Luftwaffe from generating massive numbers of combat sorties in the Channel in September 1940. They can attrite, they can degrade, they can screen, but they cannot stop. The LW cannot stop the RAF either. The Pacific War in 1942 - fighter defenses could not stop bomber attacks being made even from 500 miles away.

Also where has this 6,000 sorties figure come from, and over what time scale?

I love how in this Sealion battle the RAF and RN are making all-out efforts with suicidal levels of determination, but the Luftwaffe is, what, on vacation or something? The LW for Sealion has 2,000 or more combat aircraft of all types, plus more that can fly in from Norway and Italy. They have a massive, well supplied, well prepared air base network on the coast of France capable of generating large numbers of combat sorties for the entire LW. Their invasion picks a sunny day with calm waters. The RN attacks at or before dawn into waters less than 50 miles from practically the entire Luftwaffe. How do you figure that 2,000 aircraft can't generate an average of 3 combat sorties each on game day in those conditions?

During the BoB in the period 10th July - 31st 0ct (113 days) the LW ran 67k sorties including all aircraft in all mission types (figs from download at bottom of this story) or approx 600 per day over the entire period. Obviously there were lulls and periods of heightened activity during that period*. However you talking about doing this in mid / late Sep which is after the attrition of the BoB has begun to takes it toll. You are also talking about doing this at the same time as landing Paratroopers and all that air supply drops you mentioned above?

There is nothing in the Battle of Britain analogous to the levels of effort the LW and RAF would devote into the first 72 hours of Sealion. For Bob, half a sortie per day was fine - the campaign was lasting months. For Sealion, game day is 24 hours, not 90 days. It's not about a series of programmed raids stretched out over the course of months. It's a winner take all slugfest in the Channel where the absolute maximum number of sorties needs to be generated in 72 hours.

How are what ever bits of the first wave that makes it ashore going to hold out for months?

Because the resupply effort can be made strong enough that the British can't collapse the pocket. Meanwhile, the British have lost Gibraltar and Malta, the Germans have occupied Tunisia and are pushing through to Egypt in strength, the Italians are holding on in East Africa, the Soviets have occupied Iran. In the Atlantic, the British are watching the Twins and Bismarck run rampant because the Admiralty thought it would be a good idea to commit the KGV's and BC's to the Channel.
 
The supply chain battle lasting till late 1941 or even into 1942? That is honestly one of the biggest loads of shit I’ve ever read. It’d be over in days not weeks. The Brits will inflict such attrition on German shipping that the poor troops landed will find themselves without sufficient supplies or reinforcements and will eventually have to be evacuated.
 
Meanwhile, the British have lost Gibraltar and Malta, the Germans have occupied Tunisia and are pushing through to Egypt in strength, the Italians are holding on in East Africa, the Soviets have occupied Iran. In the Atlantic, the British are watching the Twins and Bismarck run rampant because the Admiralty thought it would be a good idea to commit the KGV's and BC's to the Channel.

Please stop wanking.
 
Sealion is 72 hours. The supply chain battle could last into 1941 or even 1942.
If it last more than 72 hours........ what do you expect WWI repeat on a British beach? The Germans win in a week or they are all lost.

Fighter command cannot stop the Luftwaffe from generating massive numbers of combat sorties in the Channel in September 1940. They can attrite, they can degrade, they can screen, but they cannot stop. The LW cannot stop the RAF either.
If they don't stop RAF just how much of the invasion fleet gets destroyed by them? 1%....10%....25%.....50%..........?
 
I somewhat agree that ramming is a red herring; the RN has the ability to deny invasion without it. The weather tops were mostly wooden, and had little structural strength, though. Mounting things on it would be tricky.

Well no, it's not. I'm being told that the RN mindset is fanatical. If that is the case, then some captains will ram. You can't just narrate away the features of the RN mindset that's being painted. Either they were or they were not.

The German gun crews are equally exposed, if not more so - the AA crews and bridge crews could at least duck behind the plating of the gun tub/bridge.

At 200 yards both sides are exposed. At 500+ yards the Germans are vulnerable and the RN are not. So why should the RN fight closer than 500 yards?

Where does this 500 yard number come from? In any case, remember that the typical destroyer has a lot more light firepower than a barge, in addition to its heavy firepower.

Under 500 yards ad hoc mounts can increasingly hit targets. Over 500 yards they can't.

The RN and RAF want to defeat the invasion, however they can. But a drawn-out engagement is one they will win; once the escort is destroyed, the RN can savage the supply lines at will, with nothing the Germans can do about it.

Build hundreds of MFP's and Siebels per month, and get thousands of mines into the Channel with coastal artillery.
 
That's mostly because you have absolutely no conception of the critical importance of logistics.

If the British close that sea line, it's over.

And blockading an enemy from resupply is something that the RN has had a lot of practice at.

The Channel is too narrow, and with too many minefields and coastal guns, for the RN to be able to close the supply lines.
 
And you've got me reading about the Raid on St. Nazaire. Looks like a bunch of RN 20kt barges tackled a fortified port with about 50 guns of 20mm and up in a head on gun battle at point blank ranges.
If by "20 kt barges" you mean high-speed motor launches escorted by destroyers, then sure!

And I'm not sure if you noticed but despite having local naval superiority, which the Germans won't have in Sea Lion, those forces still got shot up pretty awful.

I love how almost every "precedent" cited by Glenn239 turns out to have been an operation in which the Royal Navy operated more or less at will in achieving its objectives, but, according to Glenn, wouldn't be able to do it in the Channel for some narrow reason or another. "I'll get you next time, you meddling sailors!"
 
Glenn just to ask is your general idea is that Germany uses Sea Lowe as a diversion that might get lucky? So that while 100000 German soldiers are in a pocket in England being supplied enough that they are to "difficult" (not sure what term you are thinking here) for the UK to defeat Germany is doing other things? Like taking Gibraltar (is Spain a German allie or not) and mopping up in the Mediterranean while the UK is distracted on their Southeast coast? While hoping that Germany has a very favorable kill to loss ratio (even equal would be a win for the UK) air and naval exchange during the initial sea Lion invasion?
If I am misunderstanding you I apologise and would like an explanation of core points.
 
Taken a look twice the last two months at the Italian Minefields in the Sicilian Channel, & I'm not seeing a good argument for a minefield massacre. In terms of ships actually damaged or sunk they are the dog thats not barking. /quote]

The point of Axis minefields was to prevent Allied surface ships attacking the Axis supply route to Tunisia. During the Tunisia campaign, 7% of all Axis shipping was lost to warships because of the minefields. If you think the British can win Sealion with only 7% of supply losses to warships, that is quite wrong.
 
Build hundreds of MFP's and Siebels per month, and get thousands of mines into the Channel with coastal artillery.
Yes they can sadly then its winter and they have to wait till 41 to start and by then the British army is rebuilt as is Fighter Command.....
 
The point of Axis minefields was to prevent Allied surface ships attacking the Axis supply route to Tunisia. During the Tunisia campaign, 7% of all Axis shipping was lost to warships because of the minefields. If you think the British can win Sealion with only 7% of supply losses to warships, that is quite wrong.
But the RN was trying to minimise losses that's not the case defending Dover and just who won the battle for Tunisia.....?
 
How about this for a historically backed model for Sealion? It has German pluck and derring-do, Seibel ferries, MFPs, and 28cm railway guns. Between the 7-21 of September 1944, the German 15th Army made a water crossing of the Scheldt Estuary, the longer of the 2 crossing points being 20km. All under constant air attack. The transport was an improvised gaggle of minesweepers, fishing boats and ferries. Planning for the operation started on September 6, one day before the crossing actually began.

“In retrospect, Knuth could look back
on a very successful operation. Thanks to his
activity, 100,000 men, 6,000 vehicles, 6,000
horse-drawn wagons and 750 artillery pieces
(from 2 cm cannon to 21 cm railway guns) were
ferried across to fight again. In total, nine
divisions were brought across- the 59th, 70th,
245th, 33lst, 344th, 346th, 7ll th and 712nd
Infantry Divisions and the 17th Luftwaffe Field
Division.”

"The ferries were equipped with 2 cm anti-aircraft guns (the Queen Wilhelmina with four guns and the Queen Emma with two). The Artillerietragers travelling with the ferries were responsible for their air defences. … There were eight to ten KFKs and six motorboats of the Rhine flotilla active here, also a Siebel jahre (a type of landing ship vehicle transport) and five or six navy lighters (MarineFahrprahme). … The inner harbour of Terneuzen proved to be an ideal place for the loading of heavy railway artillery (21 cm)."

The 15th Army then immediately deployed to defeat Operation Market-Garden, the elite airborne forces of the British and American Armies.

A crossing from Calais and Boulogne to Southern England sounds the same to me. Some nay-sayers may disagree…

All quotes from this article:

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcon...le.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1230&context=cmh
 
This debate - sorry, 'debate' - reminds me of Ransom and the Un-man in Perelandra. Every time a clear rebuttal of a pro-Sealion point is made, the Un-man just drops the subject and starts a new tangent.

"Ammo expenditures!" ::math showing how a high speed chase across the Mediterranean isn't the same as destroyers vs towed barges:: "LW is launching 10 sorties a day!" ::math showing 10 sorties is impossible:: "Heer can get by on 100t of supplies a day!" ::math showing they need far more than that:: "Build more ferries and ships over the winter!"
 
A crossing from Calais and Boulogne to Southern England sounds the same to me. Some nay-sayers may disagree…

All quotes from this article:

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcon...le.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1230&context=cmh

image.jpg
 

Deleted member 94680

How about this for a historically backed model for Sealion?

A crossing from Calais and Boulogne to Southern England sounds the same to me. Some nay-sayers may disagree…

Hardly being a nay-sayer to say crossing a river is different to crossing the English Channel. Also, it appears from the article there was hardly any opposition to the crossings (it makes little mention of air attacks) and there is no mention of naval opposition at all.
 
Hardly being a nay-sayer to say crossing a river is different to crossing the English Channel. Also, it appears from the article there was hardly any opposition to the crossings (it makes little mention of air attacks) and there is no mention of naval opposition at all.
The operation in question was, I believe, an evacuation, not an assault.
 
If a beachhead is established, the top KM priority is getting minefields in the Channel along the flanks of the route so that the RN is barred from entering into the shipping channel. And, getting coastal artillery on both sides of the Channel route to cover the minefields. The pattern at Tunisia and in Libya was numerous small convoys, not big ones.

In terms of air cover, since the Channel is narrow, it should be possible to do night supply runs once the mine barriers are in place.
The Germans aren't lugging over any coastal artillery worth a damn, Glenn. The Marines on Guadalcanal used 5" guns, and while they were useful in fending off any destroyers that wanted to take a shot at Henderson, they couldn't prevent the Japanese from landing what reinforcements and supplies they could bring, nor could they prevent the Japanese from operating in Ironbottom Sound. They definitely didn't do a damn thing to stop bombardments from cruisers or battleships. Similarly, 5" guns in the landing zone aren't going to stop the Royal Navy from sweeping the minefields and then running in ships to hit the resupply efforts.

Granted, the Germans will probably be using 15cm guns instead of 5", but functionally there's not much of a difference. And good luck lugging over anything heavier on a Siebel Ferry.

Then there's the fact that lugging over coastal guns and their ammunition means you're just making the resupply situation worse. Quite a lot worse, actually.

Tl;dr the English Channel is not the Dardanelles, German coastal artillery is not going to be able to stop the minesweepers from doing their job. Nor Royal Navy warships from interdicting the minelayers.

Actually, hang on, what the hell are the Germans using to lay these minefields? They only have two dedicated minelayers (started the war with three, but one's sunk already), anything else is going to be some kind of conversion, and thus horribly vulnerable to British ships and aircraft.
 
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