Operation Sea Lion (1974 Sandhurst Wargame)
- Thread starter Not James Stockdale
- Start date
I see that now. The barges had front line units and a reserve. When I said "1,200", this was not inclusive of the reserve which I believe was about 800, total of around 2,000.
The potential shipping losses were tolerable in the context of a war with Great Britain alone, though too heavy losses may preclude any further Sealion attempts. They were not tolerable within the context of a war with the United States or USSR. On a related note, Germany loses that war anyways.
Ah yes, the General with the most credentials w/r/t Naval Invasions. I'm sure you can find more People that supported it. Model if I recall correctly was convinced that they should have landed Paratroopers immediately after the Fall Of France.
They were also convinced of a lot of other things(attacking the Soviet Union being a good idea is the big one). And even that General Staff, that from time to time seemed to consist of insane Gamblers with a serious Cocaine problem took a look at Sealion and went "Nah". Now, of course there'll be "we coulda's" and "we shoulda's" in their autobiography's but that just means they were full of shit, not that anything was actually viable
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Apologies if this has been discussed, but if not:
Has the impact of a heavy bombing campaign by the British (Harris) on marshaling yards and marshaling harbors been noted? Gathering such a force will take time and make the Germans vulnerable in these areas to determined British bombers. Spoiling attacks on German barge shipping, particularly in the 24 hours prior to attempted crossing, might be catastrophic.
They did make some air raids on the harbors, and the air fileds the Germans used. Not read any details on results.
Let's just say Sea Lion works to an absolutely absurd degree. 2/3s of the forces land in the UK. The air battle is even with 300 losses on both sides. The Royal Navy not only somehow misses the barge invasion (letting the Wehrmacht land) but blunders into some mines and Uboats losing 5 destroyers so what?
There would be what 60000 German light infantry with limited supplies on the coast of England. The UK will have FAR more soldiers and supplies. Just box the German soldiers in.
This is like "planning" a poker game by saying "as long as I get above a full house the next 5 hands I am good". At best the Germans will only lose 2 or 3 times as much soldiers as the British. Why would a massive British win make Churchill come to the negotiating table with anything other than "go back to your 1937 borders and we will stop kicking your ass?"
There would be what 60000 German light infantry with limited supplies on the coast of England. The UK will have FAR more soldiers and supplies. Just box the German soldiers in.
This is like "planning" a poker game by saying "as long as I get above a full house the next 5 hands I am good". At best the Germans will only lose 2 or 3 times as much soldiers as the British. Why would a massive British win make Churchill come to the negotiating table with anything other than "go back to your 1937 borders and we will stop kicking your ass?"
No, they're not tolerable even against just Great Britain. Britain outproduced Germany during the war in every major war category except armored vehicles, mortars, and ammunition, and all three categories come with asterisks. Considering how badly Britain outproduced Germany in vehicles in general, there was probably room for Britain to expand tank production; being outproduced in mortars isn't a bad thing when you have a superiority in standard artillery; and ammunition production was counted through cost, and Britain was ahead in 1941-1943 anyway.
And then Lend-Lease kicks in March 1941 and the gap widens further.
The potential shipping losses just make things worse. It cuts into iron imports from Sweden. It cuts into coal shipping across the Rhine. It cuts into general Rhineland industrial production. And all of this is on top of the fact that the Germans were already suffering from serious resource shortages. Iron was running scarce in Germany even in 1940; Sea Lion sending a very large chunk of the ore shipping to the bottom would've badly compounded the problem. And Germany's military production was flatly unsustainable; even as early as 1936 the civilian economy was contracting due to massive armaments spending, and by 1939 there were serious concerns within Germany about the civilian economy. Conquering large chunks of Europe pushes the collapse back, but it is coming and the shipping losses of a lost Sea Lion only accelerate that.
As an example, a handy chart of the ammunition production the Germans could achieve in 1939:
IOTL, the Germans matched their projections pretty well - by dipping into material reserves and looting France and Poland. But Sea Lion is going to send that number tumbling again - right as the British themselves are ramping up production.
Then you toss in British bombing, which will be matched by less flack and fewer fighters due to the lower production capacity.
Can the British build up to a cross-Channel invasion? Given OTL manpower constraints, probably not successfully. But Britain, with a more balanced economy, access to world markets, and an opponent lacking a strategic air arm, is in a very good position to simply outlast Germany.
And this completely ignores the US deciding to get involved beyond Lend-Lease.
Actually he did as he recognized that sustained air supremacy over the channel was impossible and was a prerequisite for an attempt to be within possibility of success.
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Um, no, what Manstein actually said was that since air superiority could not be achieved the operation should have been started earlier, without air superiority. That Hitler failed to ruthlessly execute the correct strategy because Hitler was fearful of taking personal responsibility for the potential defeat. Manstein indicated that this weak nerve was a failure of his war leadership. He was not interested in the potential shipping losses on the German economy, or any other such nonsense. To Manstein, Sealion was the logical culmination of the war Hitler started in 1939, and Hitler had to be prepared to see his aggression through, that he should not have triggered the war in the first place otherwise. The attack on the SU as an alternative was a strategic calamity of the first order that ruined Germany's chances and threw away the initiative.
I'd come to all the same conclusions before reading Manstein.
Oh my, a Wehrmacht General not thinking through the logistical consequences of his actions and favouring blind aggression. How shocking.
Britain's production alone vs. Germany's alone, whether exceeding it or not, was simply not sufficient to win the war without the United States or USSR in the war against Germany. This is why shipping losses in Sealion were strategically irrelevant, save for the fact that they might preclude another Sealion - or an insane invasion of Russia - anytime soon. Even a 50% reduction in Germany's military production in 1941 is not decisive, provided Germany is not at war with the USSR or USA at the end of the year.
The biggest consumer of German industrial resources in WW2 were explosives and munitions, most of which were consumed on the Eastern Front. IIRC, we're talking a huge chunk of the German effort, like, 70%. Would have to check Tooze.
Lend Lease on its own, without the US in the war, would make no difference as to the ultimate outcome. Britain simply could not win without Allies.
After the fall of France the German industry undertook a crash preparation program for the invasion of the Soviet Union, in order to prepare 30 mechanized/panzer divisions and significantly increase the firepower of the infantry divisions. If Sealion had been chosen instead, the German army would not have received this boosted production, nor would have required it. The same crash program could have gone into production for war in the west alone. For example, Germany consumed about 500,000 tons of steel just for ammunition production in 1941. If at war with Britain alone, that could have been slashed by at least 250,000 tons - enough steel to produce over 1,000 landing craft. Simply breaking up ONE infantry corps would provide the manpower to crew them.
British bombing? If you're arguing against Sealion, argue against Sealion. If you are arguing for Sealion, then talk about the effects of an RAF strategic bombing campaigns after 1940 that is allowed to occur.
British war strategy of WW2 foundered unrecoverably in France in May and June of 1940. When the USA entered the war, the British won it with them, but their empire and finances were finished.
What part of Sealion did you confuse for an invasion of the United States?
Nice distraction.
The poster said that Manstein said something that was exactly opposite to what Manstein actually said. Either he's never read Manstein, or he assumed I haven't.
You did however go out of your way to state that you reached the same conclusions as Manstein in what was pretty openly an appeal to authority. Manstein was overly aggressive and did not sufficiently take logistics into account. These two flaws are the same flaws that your arguments have.
Yes they could. The Empire easily outnumbers Germany. It wouldn't be easy but considering how passionately you've argued for possibly the most stupid strategies man has ever considered it's amazing to see you write off an Empire that spans a third of the globe and something like 25% of the global population...
Half trained infantrymen against the Royal Navy? You're a genius Glenn and it really is a great shame you didn't have control of German's forces in World War 2...
(Stunned silence)
You would put infantrymen onto landing craft as crewmen? And then expect them to be good enough seamen to cope with the Channel, even with training? You do realise that the Channel can be one of the most difficult and treacherous stretches of water in the world at times?
Look, I get it. You like to argue from a contrarian position, against the run of orthodox thinking.
Can I ask a question? Do you hate Britain for some mysterious reason, think that the Empire was led by idiots and are really, really sad that Sealion didn't happen? Because your disdain for the British contribution to the war effort seems to leap off the screen.
Manstein had a very strong penchant for blaming Hitler for all the mistakes...
The whole lot did. Convenient that a dead man can't defend himself.
Can someone help here. Before the Germans kicked off the invasion of France, did they have a plan for what to do with Britain if France was defeated? I cannot find reference to plan, and Sealion seemed like a kitbash afterthought after France had already fallen. Did they not think that far ahead?