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Germany should have immediately pivoted after the fall of Paris on June 14 1940 and attacked the Soviets in August 1940 before the Soviets had further time prepare for war. The Soviets had begun making threatening moves after the fall of Paris, such as occupying Lithuania on June 15 1940. Hitler had the instinct and desire to attack the Soviets in July 1940, but he acted on the instinct too late and his generals persuaded him against an attack in 1940.

The Axis was racing against time because Britain, the US, and Soviets were rapidly mobilizing their economies for war. In order to ultimately win the war Germany must decisively defeat the Soviets before lend lease becomes a flood of equipment to the Soviets and the war devolves into a battle of attrition as in WWI. Once the Soviets are defeated Germany can negotiate a peace with Britain from a position of unrivaled strength as the continental hegemon.

War between Soviets and Germany was inevitable. Neither Britain nor the Soviets would tolerate a single power in control of Western Europe. Since June 1940 Stalin had ordered the Soviet economy and general staff to work overtime preparing for war. The Soviets were much weaker in 1940 than in 1941 and were still recovering from purges and in the middle of reforming their army after the Finnish debacle. The more the Germans delay the attack the better prepared the Soviets are.

The invasion would have launched in August 1940 at the earliest to allow time to concentrate forces in the east. The German General staff believed that the Soviet army would collapse within 10 weeks, which was before the November mud season. The invasion presumably would have been based on the Marcks Plan with the main thrust north of the Pripet Marshes to Moscow. The main Soviet army dispositions were are also north of the Pripet in August 1940. With the main Soviet force crushed Germany would have had clear path to Moscow. There would not have been any delay caused by the Kiev pocket diversion as in the 1941 Russian campaign.

Although the Soviets wouldn't have collapsed in 1940, they would have been in a weaker position in 1941 than in 1942. In 1941 the Soviets would have had access to lend lease but it would have been far less access than they had in 1942. The Soviets also don't have mass production of the T-34 in place by 1941. Germany would have mobilized for war in Autumn 1940 after Germany realized the Soviets were not the weaklings anticipated. If German campaigning had been successful enough, by July 1941 the Japanese may have also been induced to strike north against the Soviets, instead of south, to deal the final death blow in 1941.

Other add on benefits may have been a German armored force in North Africa earlier than February 1941, which would have avoided the Italian collapse in December 1940. Mussolini would have been more likely to accept the offer of a German armored division in North Africa in September 1940 if Mussolini believed the armored force was in reciprocation for Italian contributions to the Eastern Front. Germany had an incentive to tie down British forces in North Africa to prevent them from being used in other theaters. With Italian forces tied up on Eastern Front in 1940, Mussolini may have also decided to delay war with Greece. One German armored division probably would have crushed the British forces defending Egypt in December 1940.

Please tell me why an immediate German pivot to the east in June 1940 isn't the best chance for Axis victory in WWII.
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