Operation Moscow

What if Nazi Germany had decided that Moscow must be captured first before diverting resources to Leningrad and Stalingrad?
 
The Germans overextend themselves in the center, exposing their flanks. Regrouping Soviet forces counterattack in these areas, causing severe damage to leading German elements and forcing them back.
 
The Germans run out of supplies as IOTL, around the same place they stopped IOTL. They lose more men due to having sent a larger force. Russian end up with more German land at the end.
 
Didn't Napoleon try that once?

Well, if they hit the center hard enough, the Nazis might be able to topple Stalin's regime, but then what? Even without an organized government, the Soviets still have the Germans a thousand kilometers inside their borders in the middle of winter.
 
I think the general agreement is that indeed Moscow could have fallen in 1941 IF all resources were pooled at it. But even that would have been with consequences.

There would not be a "wedge" with the tip hitting Moscow, more a lance or needle. Such an effort could have been pinched off.

In essence, without a broad front, an offensive with Moscow as the only objective, is too "thin" to be sustainable in the long run. It would be Napoleon all over again.

... and then the effort will be hit by the horrible truth about such things: Logistics.

If AG Centre would be better equipped and manned, then everything would have to be carried across limited roads and railways to AG Centre (only). Great difficulty ahead.

So, yes. It could have happened but then the war might have been a bit shorter.

I think that is where Russia is descibed as a "funnel". But it opens up the wrong way. As anybody goes further into Russia, more and more troops will be required.

Leaving Leningrad alone with its immense industry is not an option.

Leaving Moscow out of it with its armaments factories and railway hubs is not an option

Leavng Donbas and the oil alone is not great either.

Attacking all of it in one go is a dangerous proposition.

Despite this, Germany nearly managed the impossible.

Ivan
 
1. the germans cant supply that far foward in a single campaign season
2. the germans can't advance that far without advancing in the north and south otherwise their flanks would be in the air

that is all
 
I think the general agreement is that indeed Moscow could have fallen in 1941 IF all resources were pooled at it. But even that would have been with consequences.

Glantz in "Barbarossa Derailed" makes a good argument why Germans really could go for Moscow earleir. For one they stalled around Smolensk due to logistic overstretch, lack of infantry (mostly due to casualties) so they couldn't close encirclement rincgs as tightly as they wanted to and wear & tear on aroured forces. Plus Soviets threw additional forces behind Smolensk which gave Germans some WTF moments. These factors combined with Soviet willingness to engage in counter attacks of various scope and size put Germans in several tight spots and while counter attacks were eventualy defeated they came with a price.

Going after Kiev was path of least resistance and removed large body of troops fro Soviet table. That, combined with losses Soviets suffered in their failed counter attacks, and improved position allowed Germans to advance on Moscow in October and achieve initial successes as they did (e.g. Vyazma encirclement). In September Germans would advance against much stronger Soviet forces.

Now, the question is different planning for Barbarossa. But if you strenghten AGC at the expense of AGS and/or AGN you weaken those forces giving the less punch which leads to worse performance. And you increase logistical strain on AGC, which was big as it was. So the problem is more of logistics rather than "one more battalion".
 
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