Operation Miko: Could there have been an anti-war Japanese coup in WWII?

Could there have been a Japanese counterpart to Valkyrie? Doubtless it would be unsuccessful, but I would be interested in who would be in favor, and how it would even be started. Obviously it would not seek to overthrow or assassinate the Showa emperor. However, it may try to coerce him in some way to end the war. Yes I know near the end of the Pacific War there was almost a pro-war coup. I'm asking if the opposite could have occurred.
 
It would be extremely unlikely, if not impossible. The major problem with an anti-war coup taking place is the length of the period in which proponents of extreme militarism had first shaped, then controlled, and finally shut out all other voices in Japan's internal political discourse.

While Japan had experienced several "spasms" of political violence like the 1936 Army "mutiny" in Tokyo in the two decades leading up to the war, there was no "Night of the Long Knives", no sharp, one-time shock which partially silenced critics for a period of time. Instead, beginning with the Red Scares immediately following WW1, Japan had experienced a long "drum roll" of small scale but constant political violence and threats of violence in the cause of extreme militarism.

The Nazis had reshaped Germany's internal political dialogue with a relatively small number of large "blows" of political violence over a period of less than a decade. Japan's militarists, on the other hand, had shaped her internal political dialogue with a much larger number of relatively smaller "blows" of political violence over a period of about twenty years. What's more, there were many militarist factions, all trying to out do the other, involved in that "work" within the Empire and, prior to the war beginning, the militarists had more actual "successes" to point to than the Nazis did.

The militarists in Japan had both the numbers and time to beat down and out any factions and individuals who even seemed to disagree with them. That left very few individuals and next to no groups who didn't toe the party line.
 
I would think that your best bet would be to have the pro-war faction win out in the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, prompting an anti-war (counter)coup. Without a strong motivation like that, an anti-war coup might be rather hard to pull off, given the massive cultural stigma attached to surrender and the rather intense nationalism within Japan at the time.

Also, for Japan's sake I really hope said anti-war coup succeeds. A failed anti-war coup will almost certainly make Japan stay in the war for longer than it did in OTL, which can only end badly for them.
 
I just find it impossible that there was no one in the Japanese government or military that was opposed to the ongoing suicidal nature of the war. That just smacks of Orientalism, to claim that they were that fanatical. In general I think there's a popular conception that the Japanese were crazier than the Germans.
 
I would think that your best bet would be to have the pro-war faction win out in the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, prompting an anti-war (counter)coup.


That's most likely as close as you could get, although the counter-coup faction would probably be best described as anti-pro-war instead of anti-war.

You cannot even label the sides pro and anti Emperor because both would claim to be supporting the Emperor's true wishes.

One result indication of how screwy Japanese politics of this period were is that any discussion of them usually ends up using Newspeak! ;)
 
I just find it impossible that there was no one in the Japanese government or military that was opposed to the ongoing suicidal nature of the war.


Plenty of people were opposed. Hell, even Yamamoto was opposed and had to be given command of the Combined Fleet in order to send him to sea where he couldn't be assassinated.

What twenty years of killings, assassinations, beatings, mutinies, and other nastiness by a myriad of nebulous factions whose only links were a belief in extreme militarism had produced were people who automatically self censored.

They'd literally been scared by decades of low level violence into not thinking about certain things and, if they did think about them, most certainly not to mention them.
 
Plenty of people were opposed. Hell, even Yamamoto was opposed and had to be given command of the Combined Fleet in order to send him to sea where he couldn't be assassinated.

What twenty years of killings, assassinations, beatings, mutinies, and other nastiness by a myriad of nebulous factions whose only links were a belief in extreme militarism had produced were people who automatically self censored.

They'd literally been scared by decades of low level violence into not thinking about certain things and, if they did think about them, most certainly not to mention them.
Quite so; IIRC, historians going through the private letters diaries of the kamikaze pilots discovered that some of them were not at all happy with the war, but were still under enough cultural pressure that they felt compelled to go through with their attacks.

If there's a popular conception that the Japanese were crazier then the Germans, then it's probably because there is some truth to it. The Japanese Army's actions in China were at least a match for the worst the Nazis did on the Eastern Front, and while not every member of the Japanese military bought into the "death before dishonor" attitude when it came to surrendering, enough did that the number of Japanese prisoners taken in any major battle with Allied forces was minuscule compared to most other World War II battles.

Also, as Lardo pointed out, the Militarists were very good at marginalizing and killing off any potential opposition leaders. Most of the military leaders opposed to the war quickly found themselves assigned to frontline duty, where they couldn't possibly oppose the militarists, and had a tendency to wind up KIA.
 
Quite so; IIRC, historians going through the private letters diaries of the kamikaze pilots discovered that some of them were not at all happy with the war, but were still under enough cultural pressure that they felt compelled to go through with their attacks.


Exactly. I wish I had made the point as well as you.

Also, as Lardo pointed out, the Militarists were very good at marginalizing and killing off any potential opposition leaders. Most of the military leaders opposed to the war quickly found themselves assigned to frontline duty, where they couldn't possibly oppose the militarists, and had a tendency to wind up KIA.

Again, exactly.

Also, Japan's militarists had been imposing their reign of terror for twenty years compared to the Nazis' six or seven and the militarists were comprised of an ever changing mix of individuals and small groups compared to the Nazis' more formal and more easily identified party structure.

So, Japan's political terror went on for far longer and the perpetrators of that terror couldn't be picked out beforehand by clues like arm bands or membership cards.
 
To have a coup you need someone willing to commit treason, or at least someone who can convince themselves that the faction in power has already committed treason. Problem is, in Japan treason meant going against a figure that most of the government really believed was a living god. So that's pretty well out. Seeing yourself as conducting a counter-coup is a lot easier... but it requires someone who isn't part of the ruling faction but could be seen by the public as having legitimacy. You'd also absolutely require the emperor to at least remain silent but clearly have had the opportunity to speak against the 'counter coup'. If he actually denounces the 'counter coup' the plotters themselves would probably fall on their swords. If he isn't seen to at least be giving consent by silence to the new government they have no legitimacy.

So it isn't just "who wants to have a coup" but "who will the Emperor at the very least not denounce for seizing power"?

Remember also that the vast majority of the people outside the ruling circle were being fed stories of victory after victory; often at heavy cost, sadly, but victories almost across the board. The Japanese were getting bombed late in the war, but they were using balloons to bomb the US right back. Oh, and did we mention those raids clearly show the US wants to burn all the Japanese alive? Surrender to them means certain death!
 
To have a coup you need someone willing to commit treason, or at least someone who can convince themselves that the faction in power has already committed treason.


The latter happened often enough, especially when the "The Emperor has been led astray be evil advisers" winkle was added. During the 1936 army mutiny in Tokyo for example, Hirohito spoke to the mutinous troops directly by loud speaker and they still didn't return to their barracks.

We're looking at a political climate in which low ranking officers could freely admit to murdering cabinet officials and then receive suspended prison sentences. Coming up with excuses to commit what might be viewed as treason was already old hat.
 
I just find it impossible that there was no one in the Japanese government or military that was opposed to the ongoing suicidal nature of the war. That just smacks of Orientalism, to claim that they were that fanatical. In general I think there's a popular conception that the Japanese were crazier than the Germans.

Whether the popular conception is "racist" or "Orientalist" (which applies more to the Middle East, not East Asia) not shouldn't matter--what matters is if it is true or not.
 
What if the Emperor turned against the war, either before or after the atomic bombings?


What makes you think he hadn't in the OTL before and during the war?

Is that possible, and could it lead to an anti-war coup?

Examine Japan's history. The emperor was worshiped, venerated, held up as an icon, and routinely ignored. People and governments did things in the emperor's name far more often than they did the emperor's actual bidding. Even when an emperor made his wishes crystal clear, Japanese culture regularly allowed people to ignore those wishes for the emperor's own good.

While just how much power an emperor had depended on their personality and political skills, the emperor was very often a rubber stamp wielded by someone else than a player in their own right.

Please don't misunderstand me, I'm not suggesting Hirohito wasn't complicit in the wars and atrocities committed during his reign, far from it actually. What I am suggesting is that the Japanese emperors "ruled" a very different manner and in oddly circumscribed manner compared to their European counterparts.
 
Examine Japan's history. The emperor was worshiped, venerated, held up as an icon, and routinely ignored. People and governments did things in the emperor's name far more often than they did the emperor's actual bidding. Even when an emperor made his wishes crystal clear, Japanese culture regularly allowed people to ignore those wishes for the emperor's own good.

While just how much power an emperor had depended on their personality and political skills, the emperor was very often a rubber stamp wielded by someone else than a player in their own right.

Please don't misunderstand me, I'm not suggesting Hirohito wasn't complicit in the wars and atrocities committed during his reign, far from it actually. What I am suggesting is that the Japanese emperors "ruled" a very different manner and in oddly circumscribed manner compared to their European counterparts.

Actually, that's probably the best summary/analysis on this thread, far better than mine.

It isn't that there couldn't have been someone in a position to grab power who would have wanted to make peace, but AFAIK there simply wasn't anyone like that prior to the atomic bombings and the Soviet invasion.
 
You probably need the militarists to fuck up in China against a stronger KMT, and after a couple years of not getting anywhere (they would be stuck around the Yellow River or somewhat south of it), Japan tries attacking the USA. The opening bout fails, and the militarists are discredited. A couple years into the Pacific War, an anti-war coup can succeed.
 
Examine Japan's history. The emperor was worshiped, venerated, held up as an icon, and routinely ignored. People and governments did things in the emperor's name far more often than they did the emperor's actual bidding. Even when an emperor made his wishes crystal clear, Japanese culture regularly allowed people to ignore those wishes for the emperor's own good.

While just how much power an emperor had depended on their personality and political skills, the emperor was very often a rubber stamp wielded by someone else than a player in their own right.

Please don't misunderstand me, I'm not suggesting Hirohito wasn't complicit in the wars and atrocities committed during his reign, far from it actually. What I am suggesting is that the Japanese emperors "ruled" a very different manner and in oddly circumscribed manner compared to their European counterparts.


I see that Japan's Emperor is a figurehead, but my reasoning is that were our POD to be that the Emperor was slightly more outspoken against the war than IOTL, could it give the motivation for an anti-war coup? I understand that for decades before WWII, dissenters had be cowed out of opposition, or killed. Could the Emperor's words give them the backbone they need to take action?

That said, I don't know the actual, physical position of Emperor during WWII. Was he always surrounded by militarists?
 
There was at least one Valkyrie-like plot to replace the Emperor and the militarists and end the war. It just didn't get very far.
Wikipedia said:
Prince Higashikuni remained steadfast in his opposition to the war with the western powers, and was part of the conspiracy (with Prince Asaka, Prince Takamatsu, and former Prime Minister Konoe) which finally ousted Tōjō in July 1944 following the fall of Saipan to American forces. The American researchers with SCAP also found out that he had planned towards the end of the war to depose Hirohito, placing the minor Akihito on the throne instead, governing the country with himself as regent

PM Konoye actually recommended Prince Higashikuni as his replacement for Prime Minister when he stepped down. He knew Prince Higashikuni was opposed to war with the western powers, and he thought that only a prince (he was also an uncle of the Emperor) would have the clout as PM to resist the militarists. Unfortunately, the militarists managed to block the appointment, mostly by saying that no member of the royal family should be PM during wartime, since he might be blamed if the war went badly.

Wikipedia said:
Prince Takamatsu bitterly opposed the Kwantung Army's incursions in Manchuria in September 1931, the expansion of the July 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident into a full-scale war of aggression against China and in November 1941 warned his brother, Hirohito that the Imperial Japanese Navy could not sustain hostilities for longer than two years against the United States. He urged Emperor Shōwa to seek peace after the Japanese naval defeat at the Battle of Midway in 1942; an intervention which apparently caused a severe rift between the brothers. After the Battle of Saipan in July 1944, Prince Takamatsu joined his mother Empress Teimei, his uncles Prince Higashikuni, Prince Asaka, former prime minister Konoe Fumimaro, and other aristocrats, in seeking the ouster of the prime minister, Tojo Hideki[...]In 1975, the Bungei Sunjū literary magazine published a long interview with Takamatsu in which he told of the warning he made to his brother Hirohito on November 30, 1941, the warning he made to him after Midway and that, before the surrender, he and Prince Konoe had considered asking for the emperor's abdication.

This group of notables did manage, finally, to bring about a conspiracy to remove Tojo from office. At least two of them were "considering" trying to ask Emperor Showa to step down. I think if they managed to get a new emperor on the throne (with the plotters as the power behind the throne, since the new Emperor would still be a child), and get rid of Tojo's cabinet, they would have a good chance at putting a new anti-war government in place. The real problem with a Japanese Valkyrie, in my mind, is that power was never clearly delineated in Japan. Even if the Emperor, the PM, and the new cabinet all call for peace, there is no guarantee that the army and navy will listen.

I don't know if it ends up mattering, though. Prince Higashikuni did eventually become PM during the occupation, and he ended up resigning when the US repealed the 1925 Peace Preservation Law. Even with the militarists out of power, I don't think the US is going to be able to reach an agreement with the new government in Japan.
 
Even with the militarists out of power, I don't think the US is going to be able to reach an agreement with the new government in Japan.

I have to agree that getting an acceptable peace deal could be quite a hurdle for the anti-war faction. The US won't be interested in negotiating terms that would be remotely favorable to Japan, and giving up too much at the negotiating table could make the anti-war faction very vulnerable to a militarist counter-coup. That was the big flaw of the Valkyrie plot as well; both plans require that the Allies are willing to negotiate reasonably soft terms rather than sticking to their position of unconditional surrender.

The anti-war faction might find themselves in a difficult position when they discover that the US isn't interested in a negotiated peace where Japan gets to keep Korea, Taiwan, and their puppet states in China.
 
I just find it impossible that there was no one in the Japanese government or military that was opposed to the ongoing suicidal nature of the war. That just smacks of Orientalism, to claim that they were that fanatical. In general I think there's a popular conception that the Japanese were crazier than the Germans.

There were individuals in the government who late in the war wanted out before the war was lost, but they were always too few in number before the atom bombs were used, and when there were peace feelers made towards Washington, the preconditions sought by Japan demonstrated that "unconditional surrender" was for them unacceptable. The peace party that there was is bolstered if Washington decides earlier that Hirohito can stay and Japan can revert to its 1912 frontiers, but even then, the militarists, who again are in majority, wiuld likely reject any peace that fell short of their war aims.
 
Extremely unlikely, given the climate of political assassination prevailing at the time in Tokyo. I've read the officers who negotiated for Japan at the 1922 Naval agreement, and who secured a very favorable naval ratio for their country, suffered at least one assassination attempt because some people thought they had not wrung enough from the British and Americans.

A plot to stop the war, admit defeat and negotiate what Japanese-held territory could be kept postwar wouldn't have much of a chance IMHO. And even if the coup succeeded, the Japanese Army's record in "obeying orders from the civilian government" isn't exactly stellar. Look at the Kwantung army marching into Manchuria more or less on its own, of the Marco Polo bridge incident. Basically senior Japanese officers weren't timid when it came to writing up their own marching orders. So unless you secure the Emperor's authority a successful "Peace" coup might find itself under attack by army hotheads.
 
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