Operation Judgement (11–12 November 1940) the attack on the Italian battle fleet at Taranto is often seen as a stunning success and quite rightly so.
However recently I have read a 'paper' by Lieutenant Colonel Angelo N. Caravaggio of the Canadian Forces and this made me think a bit about how the attack and subsequent activities could have been more decisive
https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment...Taranto,-The--Tactical-Success,-Operatio.aspx
In it he claims that far from being a success the attack was actually a failure as the advantage that the British gained from the attack was very short lived and actually made the situation worse.
I disagree with this conclusion in that it made things worse, but he does make some interesting points that I did find myself agreeing with and its this that I wanted to discuss.
Firstly - Why only 1 carrier? - granted HMS Eagle was due to join Illustrious in making the attack but mechanical issues forced her to drop out - But Britain had the Ark Royal in the Western Med and possibly had they wanted her - the Furious who shared duties operating in the North Atlantic and the Med. They could have made the attack with up to as many as say 60 Swordfish and perhaps 1 or 2 dozen Skuas.
Given the damage caused by 11 Torpedoes and about 60 light bombs (a quarter of which failed to explode) resulting in the loss of 3 Italian Battleships one can only speculate what the case would be had more aircraft taken part.
Secondly - the original plan had called for Wellington Bombers to attack the harbour installations, Fuel tanks and Stores as well as the Amphibian plane facilities. This in an effort to distract the Searchlights and AAA from the slower and lower Swordfish. In the event 1/2 of the 21 Swordfish that conducted the strike filled this roll and/or acted as flare carriers.
With Skua dive bombers and/or Wellington Bombers conducting the bomber/flare/diversion role this would free up all of the Torpedo bombers to be...well...torpedo bombers.
Thirdly why no serious attempts at subsequent strikes either on subsequent or even the same night?
I appreciate that the weather conditions on the evening of the 12th were considered to bad enough to cancel the planned second raid but an attack on the 13th or 14th could still have been contemplated if not to attack further ships then to degrade the port facilities still further and making it useless as a Naval base.
Fourthly - why no all out effort to deliver a major amount of supplies and equipment to Malta to coincide with the attack - which even if the attack was unsuccessful would have probably have created a week or so before the Italians could mount any sort of Major fleet sortie.
Cunningham had wanted to turn Malta into a base from which Submarines (10th Flotilla) light fleet (Force K?), MTBs, Squadrons of Recon and anti shipping aircraft - protected by at least 4 fighter Squadrons could reach out and dominate the supply routes used to supply the Axis forces in North Africa.
In order to have this completed by April 1941 - at least 40 Freighter 'loads' would have to have been delivered
As it was the 16 freighters that did make the journey before April 1941 all did so unmolested.
Shortages of munitions particularly in air dropped torps made it difficult for the few aircraft on Malta to subsequent find and interdict Italian convoys supplying Axis forces in North Africa - between June 1940 and March 1941 about 98% of Supplies got through.
So have a plan to increase the amount of supplies to reach Malta in order for it to act its part earlier and this might see a much greater loss in Axis shipping and therefore fewer supplies reaching the Axis forces in North Africa with the knock on effects that this would entail for that campaign.
So while I disagree that the attack made things worse - I do agree that the British could and should have made better use of the period of time where they did retain the initiative
So use 3 Carriers - Illustrious, Ark Royal and Furious to conduct the attack
Make use of RAF Wellington bombers during the attack freeing up the Swordfish to deliver torpedoes with the Skua's acting as flare bombers and dive bombers.
This should result in serious damage to all of the Battleships and very likely some of the Cruisers, Destroyers as well plus damage to the port facilities
Subsequent attacks could and should have been made against other ports on the south of Italy - at least for the remaining suitable moon period of Nov with repeat performances in later months.
And an all out effort should have been made to build up Malta's offensive capability - perhaps an initial surge of supplies in late November and subsequent efforts to coincide with future strikes.
All this should reduce the need for the costly convoy battles that were subsequently necessary to simply keep the island from starving while allowing it to act as a base for which to interdict the Axis supply convoys.