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X: First Suva (8/42)
X: First Suva, August 1942

The Suva Defence Zone, designed long before Pearl Harbour, was where General Mead decided he would make the stand for control of Fiji. Beginning ten kilometres west of Suva and extending north into the hills, then east to the coast, the defence zone covered all major installations in the eastern half of Viti Levu, most importantly the airfield, port and supply stores. Originally designed to be manned by a brigade, it was now defended by 10,000 New Zealanders, equipped with two to three months’ supplies. The lack of coordinated command that had troubled the garrison throughout early 1942 had finally been solved in July, when General Mead was appointed Supreme Commander, Fiji. His position gave him authority over both the New Zealanders and the Americans on the island, a decision made in light of the fact that the New Zealanders had been building defences since early 1940, while the Americans had only been there for two months.
Much has already been written about the abysmal standard of the Japanese supply system, operating more than three thousand kilometres from their major bases. What is often ignored is that the Allies had it little better. While Fiji was a friendly territory, the local agriculture could not feed close to 20,000 Allied soldiers as well as their own people, and there was no weapons industry on the islands. New Zealand had a small amount of industry, barely enough to keep the original garrison in supply, and anything coming from Auckland would have to travel two thousand kilometres by sea. With Australia’s industries desperately working to reinforce MacArthur’s “Brisbane Line” before a feared Japanese landing could occur, anything beyond small arms and a few old artillery pieces would have to come from the US West Coast.
In spite of the difficulties, Mead and his predecessor William Cunningham had built a formidable defence. Barbed wire surrounded the defence zone by land, and a small minefield protected Suva Bay by sea. Inside the perimeter he had eight Bofors AA guns, which had already seen success destroying Japanese bombers in the first days of the invasion. Sixteen howitzers were also available, although nearly all dated from the Great War. At the last moment before the Japanese move on Suva began, Mead was also informed that the USS Wasp had been repaired at Tongatabu. Under Fletcher’s command, the carrier could provide much-needed air support to Suva’s besieged garrison.

After waiting a day to survey the Allied position, General Yi ordered his army to attack on August 9th. Breakdowns and guerilla attacks from the Fijians had reduced his force to just 39 tanks, which now made short work of the first-line defences. Yi sent the infantry in behind them, while the New Zealanders fell back to the second line on the Tamavua River. While the first line served as little more than a warning system, the second line was a true defensive position. The Tamavua is around fifty metres wide, with both banks heavily forested, and was within the range of several of Mead’s artillery pieces. Knowing that this would be the main Japanese attack, Mead moved half of his infantry to the river line, where trenches had already been prepared.
Yi’s assault of the Tamavua line began around 1300. With the tanks providing covering fire in place of proper artillery, the Japanese infantry attempted to storm across the river, only to be met with heavy shelling from Mead’s guns. Trained on the location, the guns provided a bombardment more accurate than most, and within minutes Yi had lost several hundred men. Most casualties were merely wounded, but with no hospitals on the island under Japanese control, any casualty was a man out of the fight for Fiji. Yi made a second attempt to cross in the late afternoon, with similarly disastrous results. With ammunition beginning to run short, an end to the effort was called in the evening. The sole Japanese success that day came when the submarine I-11 sank an American destroyer that had been sailing towards Fiji.

Rather than continue wasting men attempting to cross the river, Yi decided that Suva could be more easily taken if the river position was outflanked, as had been done successfully at Efate. Throughout the night, the bulk of the Japanese infantry moved north into the hills and forests. A small unit of Fijian guerillas was encountered, and a fierce fight began. The Fijians alerted General Mead in Suva, but were soon overwhelmed by the much larger Japanese force. The Japanese heavy equipment, most importantly the tanks, had to be left near the coastal road.
It would be the New Zealanders that launched the next offensive the following morning. Now able to call on aircraft from the Wasp, General Mead was under pressure from the Fijians to push the Japanese away from Suva. Mead dismissed any notion of storming the west bank of the Tamavua: the Japanese tanks could ruin any crossing just as easily as his own machine-gun crews had. Instead he chose to send his reserves to the north, meeting the Japanese in the forests, where the Tamavua is just a small creek. Wasp’s aircraft, as well as land-based planes operating out of the airfields near Nandi, were directed towards the entire Japanese line.
Wasp’s aircraft were largely ineffective, more often bombing empty forest than enemy force while under fire from the small Japanese AA guns, and on the ground the engagement was a draw, with both sides retreating in the afternoon. The Japanese by this time were down to perhaps 60% of their original effectiveness, and supplies, most importantly ammunition, were almost out. Had the New Zealanders known this, they could have probably defeated the Japanese force the following day. Instead, General Mead decided to fall back to his own lines. He had used up a lot of supplies of his own, and overestimated Japanese capabilities (unsurprising, given their endless list of successes until now). Both sides called for reinforcements. In Rabaul, the second half of the Japanese invasion force was just about to leave port, while Auckland had very little available. General Yi also reported sightings of larger numbers of F4F Wildcats than had previously been seen over Fiji, and Yamaguchi made preparations for the long-awaited decisive battle.

- BNC
 
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General Yi also reported sightings of larger numbers of F4F Wildcats than had been seen over Fiji, and Yamaguchi made preparations for the long-awaited decisive battle.
Surely you mean Efate or Espiritu Santu here, or perhaps "previously"?

Also, so that I'm completely clear: what the Japanese have done is land somewhere west of Suva and south of Nadi (was "Nandi" a typo or just the World War II-era name?), then marched east to encounter the New Zealanders holding Suva itself, resulting in this battle? Meanwhile the Americans are just sort of off in their own world at Nadi, and not really doing anything except flying air missions?
 
Surely you mean Efate or Espiritu Santu here, or perhaps "previously"?
I meant previously (and thought I'd added that word too before posting it :oops:)

Also, so that I'm completely clear: what the Japanese have done is land somewhere west of Suva and south of Nadi (was "Nandi" a typo or just the World War II-era name?), then marched east to encounter the New Zealanders holding Suva itself, resulting in this battle? Meanwhile the Americans are just sort of off in their own world at Nadi, and not really doing anything except flying air missions?

Pretty much what you said, yeah. Direct communication between the two zones was difficult at the time owing to the poor road and thick forests and hills - the Allies planned to make their stands in the zones and more or less ignore the rest of the island (which doesn't have anything useful on it anyway).
fiji battle.JPG

Nandi is the WW2 era name.

- BNC
 
XI: Under Siege (8/42)
XI: Under Siege, August 1942

As the fight for Suva stalled, attention in Tokyo turned from the battles on Viti Levu to a decisive battle with the remaining American carriers once more. Believing that the Americans had only two aircraft carriers remaining in the Pacific, one of which was confirmed to be operating near Fiji after it was sighted by a submarine, Yamaguchi decided to form the largest concentration of forces that the offensive had seen so far. Four carriers: Shokaku, Zuikaku, Akagi and Kaga, and the two Nagato-class battleships would seek battle with whatever the Americans had in the region. (Yamato, Japan’s mightiest warship, was still in the Home Islands at the time). The fleet would also bring two dozen destroyers, loaded at the last minute with some high-explosive shells to bombard the defences at Suva, as well as two heavy cruisers and the supply ships necessary to deploy the second wave of invasion forces to Fiji and Samoa.
Yamaguchi had originally intended for the fleet carrying the Navy forces to Samoa to leave Rabaul three days earlier than those dedicated towards Fiji, so that both invasions would land on the islands on the same day, confusing the Allied commands and hopefully shocking them into surrender. The chaos at Suva put an end to that plan, as it was becoming apparent that the forces already on Fiji could not afford three days of delay. When the fleet did leave port in the early hours of August 11th, they were to follow a new plan, drafted by Yamaguchi as he was receiving General Yi’s reports.
This latest rewriting of FS ordered the task force to move as one giant unit towards Fiji, where it was expected that they would meet both US carriers. The surface fleet was to locate and sink the American carriers while Japan’s carriers provided air cover and destroy the remaining Allied airforce on Fiji. Once the Allied navy had been defeated, two of the carriers and their escorts would continue on to Samoa, while the Army landed in Fiji. When the Samoan operation was completed, that detachment would rejoin the rest of the Navy to return to base as one large group. Like most IJN plans, it was needlessly complex and contained a specific and demanding timetable for each stage of the operation. If Samoa was to be reached at all, that timetable would have to be met – the islands were at the extreme edge of the IJN’s range, and only a day’s fuel could be spared near the islands.

In Washington and Auckland, debate raged on about how to continue defending Fiji. It was known to be considered the most important objective by none other than Yamamoto himself, and although the New Zealanders had beaten back the first Japanese wave, the Japanese were sure to try again. A considerable amount of transport had by now been sent to the Atlantic in preparation for the invasion of Northwestern Africa, leaving the Allies with the capability of sealifting just 5000 men and their supplies within the region at a time. Fiji currently held around 18,000, ruling out the possibility of an evacuation before a second Japanese landing. A request was made to bring even more equipment out of New Zealand, but the home defences could only spare small arms – there was considerable fear of an imminent Japanese invasion among the population, and fake wooden guns had only just been replaced with actual weapons again.
When intelligence discovered that a large Japanese fleet had left Rabaul, including four carriers, any plans for relief of Fiji were scrapped. Auckland was hardly closer to Suva than Rabaul, ensuring that the two fleets would run into each other. Japan’s fleet was larger than anything the Allies could realistically bring to bear against it, and neither Coral Sea nor Kandavu Passage suggested that gambling the fleet would be a wise move. Fletcher had been willing to use Wasp when Yamaguchi was in the Solomons, but even with Saratoga he believed that fighting the ‘decisive battle’ as the Japanese desired would be dangerous at best. To raise morale in Suva, the Allies decided to send loads of small-arms ammunition by air, ending the ineffective bombardment of Japanese-controlled jungle so that B-26s could fly between Auckland and Suva. Despite the presence of Japanese soldiers just twenty kilometres to the west of the airfield, the airlift was a complete success.
After three days, continuing the airlift was considered too risky as the IJN approached, and Wasp, which had been providing fighter escorts for the B-26s, was ordered south. Codebreakers had still found no Japanese plans to attack Tonga, and plans to turn the archipelago into a forward base were decided as the best way to resist the Japanese thrusts into the South Pacific. Elements of the 1st Marine Division, once considered for an attack on the Japanese airfield on Guadalcanal and now based in New Zealand, were now sent to the island of Tongatabu to build up a defence there while the Seabees continued work on an airfield near the town of Nukualofa. The town itself would be transformed from a reserve fuel storage base to an island fortress, from which it was hoped an offensive to retake Fiji could one day be mounted.

The commitment of four carriers to the second landing on Fiji also finally convinced the Americans that the Japanese were no longer thinking of attempting an invasion of Midway. Two carriers, Hornet and Enterprise had been stationed in Pearl Harbour since May to stop such an attempt as well as provide the opportunity for some much-needed training of carrier crews. Admiral Nimitz did not want to continue the retreat in the South Pacific forever, and on August 14th finally gave the order that would send Enterprise to Noumea, via (Free) French Polynesia to avoid encountering any Japanese forces. The 10,000 kilometre journey would take the better part of a month, but it ensured that the Allies would not be falling back forever.

- BNC
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
Gulp! Hang in there Fiji!

So I guess Rarotonga has little of use at this point in time? Not even enough fresh water to resupply a couple of carrier groups?
Some Catalinas to be based at Nuku'alofa (Tonga) pronto (if not already).
 
So I guess Rarotonga has little of use at this point in time? Not even enough fresh water to resupply a couple of carrier groups?
Raro would be seeing some buildup as a resupply base now that Fiji is effectively useless and Samoa under threat, but its too far away from the action to be used as a "forward" base (Auckland is closer to Fiji than Raro is!). Tonga makes much more sense as a staging base for any potential counterattacks, and if a 2000km-away-base must be used then Auckland already has facilities and population available that Raro doesn't.

Some Catalinas to be based at Nuku'alofa (Tonga) pronto (if not already).
Not just PBYs. Wildcats and bombers too.

- BNC
 
The Japanese by this time were down to perhaps 60% of their original effectiveness, and supplies, most importantly ammunition, were almost out. Had the New Zealanders known this, they could have probably defeated the Japanese force the following day. Instead, General Mead decided to fall back to his own lines.

... And in 75 years, there will be half a dozen threads a year on the ATL AH.com: "WI the allies on Fiji had realised how desperate the Japanese situation really was? If the first wave is forced to capitulate, what is Japan's next move?"
 
Per the US Army's records: https://history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/cbtchron/cc/037id.htm


The fact that this was mentioned in a paragraph-long summary covering the divisions service over the entire war indicates to me that someone in the US command believed that the division specifically needed the extra training (if it was just the usual drills that every unit goes through when not actively fighting, a record that short probably would just assume that anyone reading would know that stuff goes on). I'm not dismissing the unit as bad men or anything, but in this case at least it was a consideration that Allied planners would have been looking at.

- BNC

You are over thinking this. Training is continious, when you are not at administrative matters like vehicle maintenance of getting vaccinations updated. What else would you have them do? Scrounge for beer & set up sports fields? I was in some very well trained units, but that did not mean training ceased when we hit a point on a checklist, or scored close to 100% on our combat readiness evaluations. The next Monday morning we were training again. Between operations the Marine divisions set up firing ranges and ran tactical exercises, did that make them deficient somehow? Member of the 101st AB Div remarked on being put through the paces with a series of tactical training op between the battles in Holland and the Battle of the bulge. That they were 'training' hardly challenges their elite status. Oe could use the items cited to argue the 37th ID was better than average because they were paying attention to training. Vs having a beach party, or lying about their tents complaining about the weather.
 
...Vs having a beach party, or lying about their tents complaining about the weather.

They're in Fiji. Doing something wrong if you're not having a beach party there :p:p. (Come November or December, when the cyclone season starts, won't much want parties any more but the weather will be foul enough to complain about).

... And in 75 years, there will be half a dozen threads a year on the ATL AH.com: "WI the allies on Fiji had realised how desperate the Japanese situation really was? If the first wave is forced to capitulate, what is Japan's next move?"
Seeing how active that Midway thread is at the moment, such a thread would probably be going around in circles between "the second wave could definitely take Fiji all on its own" (probably not realistic TBH) and "the Japanese were stupid for even attempting it in the first place".

I'm a bit more concerned about that TL that says "what if FS instead of being a total bloody mess, went perfectly to plan" and then has an invasion of the Cook Islands or Brisbane or something else ridiculous to follow on.

- BNC
 
XII: Second Suva (8/42)
XII: Second Suva, August 1942

The Combined Fleet returned to the waters around Fiji on August 19th. Cargo ships had only had a minimum of time to refuel and rest the crews at Rabaul, before being loaded with the second wave of invasion troops and supplies and ordered to join the four carriers sailing out of Truk. Some ships would carry on to Samoa, but all were to be present for the long-awaited decisive battles. On land, the situation around Suva remained uncertain, and the second wave was expected to join with the first to launch an overwhelming attack while air and naval support distracted and neutralised the remaining defences. Once the town was taken, supporting submarines were expected to have located the enemy fleet, which would be destroyed before the task force divided in an effort to take Nandi and Samoa simultaneously.
The landings were conducted during the dawn low-tide on the 19th near the village of Navua, territory occupied by the Japanese earlier in the month. What few Allied bombers remained on Viti Levu were directed to attack the transport ships, damaging several but none critically, while Japanese pilots once again proved that the Zero was a fearsome opponent. By the end of the day’s air battles, Allied air forces on Fiji were eliminated as an effective force, and the few surviving aircraft were withdrawn to Tongatabu. Too far from Fiji to provide an effective escort for offensive operations, the fighters on Tongatabu would defend the growing Allied base to the south.
General Takeo Ito would command the second wave, made up of the 228th and 229th Regiments which together made up a force almost 10,000 strong. Even for an IJA officer, Ito already had a reputation for being ruthless, having murdered civilians in China and then executed prisoners again in the East Indies campaign. In contrast to Yi’s careful advance along the southern coast of Viti Levu, Ito would begin a wild rampage through the villages, unafraid of killing those who he believed to be in the way. His methods would earn him some time with the hangman after the war, but they would also get him to the edge of Suva’s defences within forty-eight hours.

Admiral Yamaguchi sent six destroyers and the heavy cruiser Kumano to positions just a few kilometres off the Fijian coast. Loaded with 50% HE shells, instead of the usual load of mostly armour-piercing shots, they would be less effective in any battle with the Allied navy, which had yet to be located. Instead, they were tasked with bombarding Suva into submission while the ground forces finished the job. At the beginning of the Fiji campaign, Suva had been defended by just sixteen artillery pieces and a few coastal defence guns. Much of the equipment was already old, and had been worn by near constant use in the preceding days. The crews manning the guns continued to give good account of themselves, scoring several hits and eventually sinking the Japanese destroyer Kuroshio, but the day-long bombardment and a large air raid weakened Suva’s struggling defences considerably.
When the ground offensive began on the 21st, the Japanese once again overestimated their previous success. While the naval bombardment had knocked out several of the defenders’ guns, the remaining artillery could still count on adequate stocks of shells, and only minimal damage had been done to the frontline positions. General Ito attempted another bloody charge of the Tamavua line, finally establishing a position on the eastern bank of the river, but it was only after Yi’s force broke through the northern defences in the forests that the position became untenable.
Suva’s fall after the Tamavua breakthrough was only a matter of time. Ito’s force, having greater stocks of supplies available, was chosen to lead the march into Suva, while Mead ordered his forces to retreat in the hopes of forming a new position a few kilometres to the southeast in a desperate attempt to keep the Japanese out of the town. Pinned down by Japanese attacks near the Tamavua, the New Zealanders’ attempt to retreat was not as successful as they had hoped, and it was only after nightfall that the final line of defence was adequately manned. That position too was overrun the next morning, and as Japanese infantry stormed Suva, Mead felt as though he had no choice but to surrender.

The surrender of Suva is among the greatest tragedies in New Zealand’s history. 10,000 of the country’s soldiers, roughly one man in every twenty that the country contributed to the war, were lost as either battle casualties or prisoners of war in the fight for Fiji. Furthermore, the fall of Suva made the possibility of an invasion of New Zealand more real than ever before (the fact that this was well beyond the IJN’s capabilities was unknown at the time and is appreciated by most New Zealanders even today). In recognition of the disaster, New Zealand’s Prime Minister Peter Fraser declared that August 22 of every subsequent year be made into a national day of mourning and remembrance, eventually known as ‘Soldiers’ Day’. In recent years, Soldiers’ Day has come to replace Anzac Day for most New Zealanders, with people preferring to remember a uniquely New Zealand sacrifice instead of Gallipoli where a majority of the troops instead came from Australia.

As the fight for Suva had turned in Japanese favour, the Imperial Navy had been searching the waters around Fiji for the American carriers. Yamaguchi wanted to attack the American navy near Fiji, where he had four carriers available to provide strike aircraft, and could only spare a couple of days around Fiji before he would have to move part of the fleet to support the attack on Samoa. Floatplanes and submarines were sent in every direction to locate the US Navy, but with the exception of one US submarine heading towards New Caledonia, nothing was found within range of the bombers. Reluctantly, Yamaguchi ordered part of the Navy to carry on to Samoa on the 22nd, conceding that the decisive battle could not be fought at this time. He hoped that when the Navy returned from Samoa a week later, he would be able to fight the Allies then. What he did not know was that Fletcher was preparing to fight him further east.

- BNC
 
XIII: Samoa (8/42)
XIII: Samoa, August 1942

A thousand kilometres east of Fiji, the Samoan islands were Japan’s most distant objective. At the extreme edge of the IJN’s logistical capabilities, and now defended by no fewer than five battalions of American and Samoan troops (the latest having arrived only weeks earlier as Japan’s intentions in the South Pacific became more clear), they would also prove to be among the most difficult. Operating so far from their bases, the Navy could only keep its ships in Samoan waters for a couple of days at most, leaving no time to wait for favourable tides. Reconnaissance efforts of the islands and their surrounds had also been poor, as had intelligence efforts which still indicated the presence of less than 1000 US Marines on the islands.
Yamaguchi’s final version of Operation SA reflected both Japan’s increasingly impossible logistics and also their continued belief that anything could be accomplished. Having taken a longer route by traveling via Fiji in order to keep all four carriers available for the decisive battle, the fleet would have less fuel available, giving them less time around Samoa. The plan to take Wallis Island, west of the main Samoan islands but well north of Fiji, had been cancelled at the last minute, with all of the IJN’s troops now directed to land near the village of Fagasa on Tutuila island, before crossing the mountains to attack the base at Pago Pago from the west. The location had been visited once before by the Japanese in January, when a submarine had surfaced there to shell the nearby US naval station (and ironically hitting the only Japanese structure on the island instead). One of only very few beaches on Tutuila, the site was an obvious choice.

American codebreakers were aware of Yamaguchi’s plan to split the fleet between Fiji and Samoa within hours of it leaving his headquarters, and an opportunity was quickly sensed. Because the Japanese were determined to fight the decisive battle near Fiji, it was obvious that they would keep their best forces in that sector. Near Fiji, the Japanese would have as much of an advantage as they could anywhere in the South Pacific, able to keep the fleet active for several days before needing to return to base, while their armies on Viti Levu could potentially warn of approaching Allied ships. Furthermore, the Americans knew that a defeat in a decisive battle, exactly as the Japanese planned, would have disastrous consequences for them. At the very least, major carrier operations would be impossible until the arrival of the Essex-class in mid-1943, while the IJN would have the better part of a year to interfere with communications between Australia and the United States with little risk of serious loss.
Instead, a smaller battle near Samoa was proposed. If both Wasp and Saratoga were dedicated to the battle, the Americans would be fighting on roughly even terms with the Japanese, while the Japanese would also be attempting to cover an invasion force. Furthermore, the Americans had a good idea of where the Japanese carriers were likely to be, while the Japanese were still expecting a fight near Fiji or assuming that no carriers were in the area at all. While the Americans did not know exactly how long the Japanese could stay in near Samoa, the rushed nature of the invasions of Efate and Viti Levu indicated that they would not want to stay any longer than necessary. Fletcher was given the order to send the bulk of his navy, including both carriers and the North Carolina, to intercept the Japanese invasion force. Nimitz had hoped that Enterprise would also be available for the fight, but the carrier was still refueling in Pappete when the Japanese were located.

West of the international date line, the calendar read the 24th when the Battle of Samoa began roughly 350 kilometres southwest of its namesake islands. In many ways, it was a rematch for Coral Sea: with Yamaguchi still in Fiji, Admiral Inoue was leading the Japanese, again with Shokaku and Zuikaku under his command. Fletcher too had seen Coral Sea, and was determined not to be surprised again. When the Catalinas reported back to Tutuila locating the Japanese fleet, Fletcher’s bombers were ready to be launched.
Inoue knew from reading the after action reports of the Espiritu Santo landings that the Americans were likely to attack his fleet as soon as it was located, and believed that Fletcher would try to do to him what he had done so successfully three and a half months earlier. Orders were given to put as many Zeroes into the air as possible: the troopships had to be protected. Inoue believed that he would be attacked by bombers based on Tutuila and Upolu, both to the northeast of his position. Instead, Fletcher’s Wildcats and SBDs came from the southeast.

The decision to direct the Zeroes to the north was to prove fatal for the Zuikaku, positioned further south than most of the Japanese fleet. Although an Aichi E13A (‘Jake’) seaplane spotted Fletcher’s bombers approaching from the south, the time it took for many of Inoue’s Zeroes to fly south and meet them gave the Americans the chance to attack the carrier. Several SBDs scored hits while close to 100 fighters of both sides clashed above the ruined carrier, the Japanese being joined by another wave of Zeroes launched from Shokaku. This extra wave of fighters, made up of Inoue’s reserves, has been widely considered the reason that the Japanese fleet survived the battle at all.
With most of their bombs expended on Zuikaku and some nearby destroyers and cargo ships, the American aircraft returned to their carriers. Inoue briefly considered a counterstrike, but believed that his limited fuel would not permit him to fight a major battle with the Americans, especially now that he was down to just one carrier. After receiving approval from Yamaguchi, the Samoan offensive was postponed and the fleet ordered to retreat. Neither Fletcher nor the code breakers ever intercepted the message of Inoue’s retreat, and the admiral decided that his fleet would be best used to cover Samoa. The carriers were sent north, with strike waves prepared to destroy an invasion that the Japanese would never attempt.

Inoue’s defeat in the Battle of Samoa proved ruinous to the overall FS plan. Instead of quickly taking the Samoan islands and limiting the Allies’ ability to strike at their position on Viti Levu, the Japanese could only interdict some of the naval traffic passing through the ocean between Fiji and Samoa, while their important base in Fiji was vulnerable. In addition to Zuikaku, they had also lost five destroyers and three cargo ships, taking with them a quarter of the IJN’s SNLF infantry. The carriers’ air groups had also taken heavy losses, with all of Zuikaku’s bombers going down with the ship, although fighters that survived the battle were able to land on Shokaku instead. Yamaguchi ordered Inoue to return to Fiji so that the entire fleet could return to base as one large group, while a use for the SNLF was decided upon.
Coming just two days after the fall of Suva, the Battle of Samoa gave the Allies some much needed good news, filling newspapers and being championed as the first true victory in the Pacific to improve morale on the home front. Japan’s aura of invincibility was shaken, and support for Roosevelt’s government increased in the vital months before congressional elections. Within the US high command however, the story was very different: Samoa, although a victory, would not radically alter the balance of power in the South Pacific, while the loss of Suva was a complete disaster that many had believed impossible. For those in the top positions, Samoa signaled that changes would be needed if Japan’s rampage through the Pacific was to be stopped for good.

- BNC
 
This is a stinging defeat for Japan, but it's not yet a Midway-level haha-get-shreked crushing ass-kicking. It will be a while yet before Japan is crippled.

For those in the top positions, Samoa signaled that changes would be needed if Japan’s rampage through the Pacific was to be stopped for good.
What sort of changes might this be, and will they be different from OTL?

You know, with how important the breaking of the Japanese codes was for both OTL Midway and TTL FS, I wonder how big the impact would be in a TL where the breaking was delayed a year?
 
This is a stinging defeat for Japan, but it's not yet a Midway-level haha-get-shreked crushing ass-kicking. It will be a while yet before Japan is crippled.
If I kill the entire IJN too quickly there's much less TL to post ;)

What sort of changes might this be, and will they be different from OTL?
I've got an entire chapter in the works devoted to these changes (and more are sure to come up past that too - this is the first true USN victory in the whole war, so it's going to be important)... don't want to say too much just yet.

But I will remind you that right at the start of the TL the Americans decided that the answer to getting smashed at Coral Sea was to focus even more on Germany... perhaps needing to fight as far away as Samoa in order to gain a victory may make them reconsider that line of thinking.

You know, with how important the breaking of the Japanese codes was for both OTL Midway and TTL FS, I wonder how big the impact would be in a TL where the breaking was delayed a year?
Broadly looking at it, my first thought is "Japan wastes a hell of a lot of fuel attacking Midway when there's no US carriers there and their landing force dies attempting an invasion", followed by some carrier encounter taking place somewhere that gets considered important sometime in 42 or 43. Probably looks more like this scenario than OTL though, with six IJN CVs posing an active threat instead of just two.

In this scenario, Japan would still lose at Samoa even if they didn't have to worry about US carriers: their landing force was well outnumbered and Tutuila is a pretty small island with few possible landing sites. Unlike Viti Levu, here landing where the enemy isn't likely to be simply isn't an option.

- BNC
 
XIV: Tightening the Noose (8/42)
XIV: Tightening the Noose, August 1942

Admiral Inoue returned to the seas of Fiji disgraced but with a substantial part of his fleet still intact. While the loss of Zuikaku did weaken Japan’s capabilities, it was the loss of three cargo ships that were the most troubling: as things were the transport fleet was well overstretched even without the US Navy interfering, and any losses suffered by those ships were losses Japan could not afford. Imperial Headquarters had committed every ship that could be spared, straining the Empire’s resources to do so, and Allied submarines were already causing damage to Japan’s merchant shipping, particularly between the East Indies and the Home Islands.
As Inoue turned west, Yamaguchi was desperate to find a new use for the surviving Navy infantry. From the very beginning of planning for FS, it had been clear that the IJN would not allow itself to be limited to being a supply service for the Army, and sending the SNLFs back to Rabaul after two weeks at sea would be wasted time that the operation had no room for. All of Viti Levu was supposed to be subjugated by now, not merely the southern half, while reconnaissance and intelligence efforts painted an increasingly bleak picture of the planned invasion of New Caledonia: instead of a few brigades, it now looked like an entire US division was on the island, if not more. Samoa, always an afterthought in the operation, could be spared, but New Caledonia was deemed important.

The need to complete the campaign in Fiji was ultimately the deciding factor in Yamaguchi’s order to send the SNLF to invade Vanua Levu. Less than a hundred kilometres to the north of Viti Levu, Fiji’s second largest island had a commanding position over the sea lanes that would be vital for any Allied efforts to resupply the defenders of Nandi and Lautoka. Yamaguchi believed that if he took Vanua Levu, not only would it kill any Allied momentum after their victory off Samoa, but it would also shatter the morale of Nandi’s garrison, allowing the Fiji campaign to be ended without another bloody fight. Every day saved in Fiji would prove invaluable in New Caledonia.
Unlike its southern neighbour, Vanua Levu was only lightly defended, with just one American battalion drawn from the 37th Infantry Division. As no major military facilities existed on the island, Ghormley and other commanders believed even that was more than the island really deserved, especially considering that it wasn’t a known Japanese target. When the Americans did intercept Yamaguchi’s orders to invade it, it was too late for reinforcements: the only troops close enough to get there before the Japanese would have to come from Nandi, while the Imperial Fleet was maintaining a menacing presence around Fiji.
The hastily-planned invasion of Vanua Levu began around 1300 on August 26th. Fuel concerns and high tides effectively ruled out a dawn attack, so the Japanese infantry were ordered onto the beaches as soon as the ships were ready, while Yamaguchi’s entire task force, now rejoined by Inoue’s detachment, covered the invasion. Destroyers and carriers bombarded the beaches and nearby installations, while the battleships stood by, ready to fight should Fletcher’s force return.
Vanua Levu hosted only one target of any consequence: the town of Savusavu, and so it was little surprise that the landing took place near there. The American commander in charge of the operation had decided that a defence of the beaches was the only possible way to win the battle: allowing the Japanese to land without interruption had already cost half of Viti Levu, as well as innumerable other locations across the Pacific. A beach battle meant that the fighting would be short and bloody, but in the end the result was not in doubt. The American battalion was outnumbered more than 3:1, facing hardened veterans with relatively fresh troops. Savusavu fell the next day, as the Japanese fleet retired for much needed refuelling and resupply. Vanua Levu’s fate was sealed. Many believed that it was the end for Fiji as well.

But the Japanese could not maintain a presence around Nandi forever. Forced to return to Rabaul and Truk to refuel, the Imperial Navy could maintain only a few submarines in the seas around Fiji, and it would be a minimum of two weeks before they could return in strength. Land forces on Viti Levu were still hunting guerillas along the south coast, while the long march around the island ensured it would be a while before General Yi could threaten Nandi on land. The newly-captured airbase at Suva was still damaged from Allied sabotage and Japanese bombs, and while a small stockpile of aviation fuel had been surrendered, no Japanese aircraft were operating from the base.
The Allies sensed that this was possibly their last good opportunity to support the defenders of Nandi, and a hard decision between evacuation and reinforcement had to be made. Estimates from the battles of Suva suggested that the Japanese had at least 20,000 men on Viti Levu, outnumbering General Beightler’s force by approximately 2:1, a ratio that could be made worse if a third invasion wave was landed. A defence would be difficult, even with the prepared fortifications left behind by the New Zealanders, and the landings at Savusavu provided yet another reminder that the best Japanese troops were being committed to the operation.
The alternative, evacuation, did not look especially promising either. Additional transport ships had been sent from the US West Coast shortly after the battle for Fiji began, and they were beginning to arrive in the theatre, but there was still not enough transport available for moving half a division in one load (nor were further deliveries likely for the immediate future, as planning for Operation ‘Torch’ reached its final stages). Abandoning a notable objective to the Japanese would have bad effects on morale both among the armed forces and the civilians at home, and an incomplete evacuation effort before the IJN returned would mean the certain loss of anyone left behind. Fletcher had enough escorts to provide an evacuation convoy with a reasonable degree of protection, but submarines would remain an ever-present threat even so.
Within forty-eight hours of the IJN’s withdrawal, it was decided that the risks of evacuation were too great, and instead an emergency convoy was assembled in Noumea. While supplying any more troops at Nandi would be impractical owing to the less developed port there and likely Japanese interdiction, Beightler could be supplied with more food and weapons that would prove valuable in what was effectively a siege. Above all, large artillery pieces and M3 ‘Stuart’ tanks would greatly improve the strength of the US position, while the Japanese would be relying on much lighter equipment. Leaving port as the month changed, the convoy was not detected by the Japanese.

- BNC
 
XV: Isolation (9/42)
XV: Isolation, September 1942

The beginning of Autumn 1942 would eventually prove to be both the mid-point of the war, and the high-tide mark of the Axis advances across the world. Rommel’s final offensive in North Africa was about to be checked at the Alam el Halfa Ridge just eighty kilometres west of Alexandria. On the Eastern Front, the German Sixth Army had pushed to the banks of the Volga River and Stalingrad, where the war’s bloodiest battle was unfolding. In the Pacific, Japan had control of more than half of Fiji with the other half on the edge of collapse, while IJN submarines had been sent to bombard the airfield and other installations on Midway island near Hawaii. Samoa had been a small victory, albeit important for morale, and so far it did not appear to have even slightly reduced Japan’s momentum. Tilting the balance had never been more important for the Allies, and it was clear that the efforts made so far would not be enough.
The first to act had been New Zealand’s Prime Minister Peter Fraser, who had asked Churchill to transfer New Zealand troops from Egypt mere hours after the first wave stormed ashore on Viti Levu. Churchill had been hesitant then, believing that protecting Egypt and the Middle East was of vital importance while Rommel continued to march relentlessly eastward. Now that Suva had fallen, Fiji was useless to the Allies as a major base and a direct threat of invasion was apparent in New Zealand: Fraser was adamant that the troops immediately be brought home. Montgomery was furious, wishing to expand his available forces in preparation for the next battle with Rommel, but Churchill reluctantly allowed the transfer. Alam el Halfa would be the last time German and New Zealand troops clashed on land.

Australia’s John Curtin had even less patience with his allies than Fraser did. Shortly after the Japanese onslaught began, he had pulled troops from Europe destined for Australia, only to see them instead sent to Singapore before being promptly taken prisoner by the Japanese. While New Zealand had only seen attacks on its soil from the rare Japanese submarine bombardments of Auckland and once Wellington, in Australia Darwin had been the target of numerous air raids from February, and various points along the Queensland coast had been attacked following the Battle of the Coral Sea. Strong enemy forces in Timor and New Guinea made the threat of imminent invasion real, and although the Brisbane Line was by now a formidable obstacle, no Australian wished to gamble with the Japanese.
Curtin’s criticisms with the war’s conduct were not directed so much towards Churchill, who sent the Australians out of North Africa shortly after the New Zealanders, but with Roosevelt. General MacArthur had been in command in Australia since the fall of the Philippines, where he had quickly annoyed both Curtin and Australian General Thomas Blamey. While Curtin had effectively resigned himself to MacArthur’s presence, he had also tired of Admiral Ghormley’s handling of the battles in the New Hebrides and Fiji, and the loss of Vanua Levu prompted him to make a now-famous phone call. “I won’t stand for my country being invaded because your commanders don’t know what they’re doing,” he said to Roosevelt, “Get rid of the bloody idiot!”
It is not clear whether Curtin’s loss of confidence in Ghormley had any impact on Roosevelt and Nimitz’ decision to relieve the admiral in early September, instead giving him a desk job in Washington. Nimitz’ first suggestion for his replacement was William “Bull” Halsey, however he was still recovering from poor health, and it was soon decided that the best replacement would be Admiral Fletcher, who had already fought two major fleet actions with the Japanese and was as familiar with the South Pacific region as anyone in the US Navy could be.
The decision to appoint Fletcher was nonetheless a curious one. Not only would Halsey be ready for duty again in just a few weeks, but Fletcher’s approach to the war was the complete opposite of Halsey’s: while Halsey supported aggressively attacking the Japanese with whatever was available, Fletcher had been advocating for preservation of existing forces above all else – a policy that had cost him the chance to destroy the entire Japanese force at Samoa, most importantly the second carrier. That missed opportunity would hang in Fletcher’s mind for a long time, and he was determined to ensure that the next battle he fought with Japan would be decisive. But with the shipping needed for offensive action still unavailable, a strong defensive fight looked like the best way to prevent the crisis from getting any worse than it already had.

What the Allies did not know was that the crisis already had gotten worse. As the second wave landed in Fiji, the Japanese had decided to finally send the enormous battleship Yamato, flagship of the Combined Fleet, to Truk and make it available for use in the South Pacific. Although the Americans had been aware of new battleship construction in Japan as early as 1936, their estimates of this effort believed that the class would weigh in between 40,000 and 50,000 tons, comparable to the German Bismarck-class. Yamato was instead closer to 70,000 tons, much larger than any possible opponent, and was so far unnoticed by the Americans. A US submarine had spotted the battleship and its escorts, but mistakenly identified it as a heavy cruiser after rain made visibility difficult.
Yamato would carry the Imperial Navy’s greatest officer, Isoroku Yamamoto, to the centre of the action in the South Pacific. The architect of the final drafts of the FS plan, who had until recently been monitoring the situation in Tokyo while ensuring that the proper resources were being sent south, would now take direct command of the operation. Success at Efate had finally convinced Tokyo that the plan was worth committing every available resource to, and Yamamoto’s first order was the immediate transfer of even more cargo ships, not only to make up for losses suffered around Samoa but also enough to land the entire 17th Army on New Caledonia in a single attack, aimed at overwhelming the Allied defences which were by now known to be much stronger than initially thought. Yamamoto faced a problem: the ships he needed simply did not exist. A few operating nearby were briefly pulled from other sectors to transfer construction units from Guadalcanal to Efate, allowing the airstrip there to finally be repaired in preparation for the New Caledonia offensive. Anything more however, was simply impossible: the dream of 30,000 men landing on New Caledonia simultaneously could never become reality.

The shipyards in the Home Islands were directed to begin the construction of as many new cargo and transport ships as possible. The fighting in New Guinea and Fiji had demonstrated that operations on the ground would dictate the behaviour of the fleets, and while more cargo ships could be produced in a matter of months, large warships would take at least two or three years. With materials scarce, the decision was made to cancel many planned warships, as losses had been less severe than planned. While work on the Yamato’s sister ship Shinano would continue until that ship’s completion in the middle of 1943, several other capital ships were cancelled, leaving only two aircraft carriers to be built after Pearl Harbour: the Taiho which would be completed in 1943 and commissioned in 1944, and her sister Unryu which would be ready for service only months before the end of the war. Unryu had originally been planned along another lightly-built design similar to the Hiryu, but the lack of an urgent need for replacements convinced the Japanese high command that the more resilient Taiho design would be more valuable than a quicker construction job.
Some readers may be interested to know of the existence of Japanese plans to convert several warships into aircraft carriers, most notably the half-built Shinano and the old battleship Ise. None of these plans were carried out, but they remain a subject of interest among historians, who have often discussed what such a “battle-carrier” might have been able to accomplish. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in discussions of the mighty Shinano, which would have been heavier than any carrier preceding the Fletcher-class of the 1960s, and able to carry several squadrons of bombers in addition to its 18-inch gun batteries: truly a ship to fear if ever there was one!

- BNC
 
Hmmm, so Japan is shoring up its logistics train now. Can't think this is going to be good for the Allies, that was their biggest single weakness IOTL.
 
And so Yamamoto himself goes all-in. Japan may advance a few inches further.

The shipyards in the Home Islands were directed to begin the construction of as many new cargo and transport ships as possible. The fighting in New Guinea and Fiji had demonstrated that operations on the ground would dictate the behaviour of the fleets, and while more cargo ships could be produced in a matter of months, large warships would take at least two or three years. With materials scarce, the decision was made to cancel many planned warships, as losses had been less severe than planned. While work on the Yamato’s sister ship Shinano would continue until that ship’s completion in the middle of 1943, several other capital ships were cancelled, leaving only two aircraft carriers to be built after Pearl Harbour: the Taiho which would be completed in 1943 and commissioned in 1944, and her sister Unryu which would be ready for service only months before the end of the war. Unryu had originally been planned along another lightly-built design similar to the Hiryu, but the lack of an urgent need for replacements convinced the Japanese high command that the more resilient Taiho design would be more valuable than a quicker construction job.
Heh, I was just about to ask how Japanese shipbuilding might be butterflied! QUITE interesting to see Japan start focusing more on logistics. In OTL Yamamoto thought he was basically boned if Japan couldn't crush the USA in six months. Here the war has already gone on for almost nine and he's asking the government for ships that will take at least another three to make any impact. He's boned any way once the Essex class comes on line, but he might do better than OTL until then. (I wonder when he'll realize the naval codes are broken...)

Very big question is, are they also ramping up production of Destroyers and Kaibókan, or are these new transports just going to become fodder for American submarines?

Speaking of questions: What if any are major warships built in OTL that are canceled in TTL? (Aside from Unryuu, which sounds like a completely different vessel than OTL's.)

they remain a subject of interest among historians, who have often discussed what such a “battle-carrier” might have been able to accomplish. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in discussions of the mighty Shinano, which would have been heavier than any carrier preceding the Fletcher-class of the 1960s, and able to carry several squadrons of bombers in addition to its 18-inch gun batteries: truly a ship to fear if ever there was one!
He he he he.

There's stuff to parse here though. Such conversions would not have really been active until late '43 at least, probably later. That any significant amount of people expect that these frankensteins would have accomplished anything of note suggests that the Japanese battleships and carriers still each posed something of a threat in TTL - Unlike OTL 1944, where the Japanese carriers were a glorified Turkey shoot and outside a few minor engagements the battleships just got bombed to shreds before accomplishing much of note.

A world where the aviation battleships have a chance of getting into gun range of anything important is rather different from OTL.
 
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