Operation Foxley Succesful

We've had plenty of "Valkyrie Successful" threads and the like, but I don't recall any discussing the implications of a successful Operation Foxley - that is the SOE plan to assassinate Hitler at the Berghof in July of 1944.

Essentially, the plan called for a British sniper and a polish born SOE agent (the fluent German speaker of the pair) to infiltrate the Berghof disguised as german soldiers, and shoot Hitler on his morning exercise. What historical analysis of the plan I've seen gives it perhaps a 20% chance of success.

But, I don't want a discussion of the plan itself. Lets assume that the SOe is successful and does manage to assassinate the Fuhrer (and that he dies instantly from the sniper's bullet). Now, the dates given as most likely for the operation were July 13 or 14 of 1944 during what was ultimately Hitler's last visit to his alpine home. Now, this just so happens to be a week prior to the date planned for the July twentieth plot.

So, basically what would be the long and short term consequences of the success of this plot. Would the Valkyrie conspirators try to put some form of their plan into action? Would Nazi Germany disintegrate into a bunch of different fiefdoms, each ruled by a powerful official? Would thi prolong the war, or bring it to a more timely conclusion?
 
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My guess: the Germans pull together under a coalition of leaders--military and Nazi. The opposition dithers again. They were good at that. The German war effort gets somewhat more rational--slightly lower tank production and more spare parts equals more working tanks on the front lines. Manpower use becomes more rational, with divisions being rebuilt rather than used to exhaustion while more green divisions are built.

One possible outcome: Ultra becomes less valuable because decision-making becomes less centralized, and that impacts the Soviets too because they were getting summaries of the Ultra stuff.

All that being said, I can't see any amount of rationalization making much difference in the general course of the war by that late date. By that time, the destruction of Army Group Centre was pretty much carved in stone, as was the success of the Normandy landings. The Germans might extract more men from the fiascos on the west and in Army Group Centre, which would help make things a little easier later on. The biggest difference might be the willingness of German leadership to try to find some way out of the war. The Allies wouldn't accept anything short of unconditional surrender, but the Germans might be willing to accept the idea of surrendering to the western Allies under a different leadership.

In the long-terms that would probably be a bad thing. Germany needed to be thoroughly defeated and divided so they didn't try again. That might actually be rather dismal outcome: the Germans say "Okay, we're beaten." They surrender to the western Allies. The Polish government in exile flies in, starts rebuilding an army. Romania sues for peace, and we end up with the western Allies trying to police the whole area the Axis held at time of surrender--kind of a restoration of the world as it was between the wars, with a very angry bunch of Soviets sitting somewhere between their 1939 and 1941 borders, having done most of the heavy lifting in the war, but getting very little from it. Of course there is some question as to whether the Soviets would put up with that. Interesting situation. They would have a card to play: entry into the war against Japan.
 
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