Operation Eagle Claw

Is there any way that the U.S. attempt to rescue the hostages from Tehran could have succeeded? I think the plan that went ahead was doomed to fail, but could any alternative military operation have any chance of succeeding? What would need to change for this to happen?
 
Its possible that they may have managed to rescue some of the hostages but the chances of doing even that are pretty slim. Eagle Claw had very fine margins to begin with even before you start looking at the planning flaws such as the Desert One site being right beside a busy road where it was inevitable that they'd attract attention. IIRC the planners expected that when they reached the embassy some of the hostages would be able to overpower their captors and help in the breakout, they were then to be driven in buses through Tehran with close air support to the evacuation planes. It has been discussed on here before and the consensus is that had it progressed further some of the hostages would have died in the attempt or it would have been an even worse failure.
 
Eagle claw is for wimps. The real intresting WI, is if they had carried out Operation Credible Sport.

It was absolutely bonkers of course, but if it had been pulled of Carter would probably have gone down as one of the all time great Presidents.
What could be more american than rocket boosting a C-130 out of a stadium in the middle of Tehran whilst under fire, and then landing it on an aircraft carrier?
 
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Is there any way that the U.S. attempt to rescue the hostages from Tehran could have succeeded? I think the plan that went ahead was doomed to fail, but could any alternative military operation have any chance of succeeding? What would need to change for this to happen?

A proper planning process with less departmental infighting between Army, Navy and Air Force. Choose a mission commander who has special operations experience and not some mild-mannered AF general who has been flying desks for years.

For reference, read the account of the operation in Richard Marcinko's Rogue Warrior book.
 
A proper planning process with less departmental infighting between Army, Navy and Air Force. Choose a mission commander who has special operations experience and not some mild-mannered AF general who has been flying desks for years.

For reference, read the account of the operation in Richard Marcinko's Rogue Warrior book.

I agree, there is no lack of physical capability within the US Military in terms of planes, helicopters and the like, nor is there any shortage of well trained units available to undertake the mission. What was missing was the snake-eating, chicken-strangling mindset when approaching the mission. What should have been a sneak in mission conducted by specialists using specialist gear became a conventional military operation where everyone got to have a play so the credit could be shared.

That said, I certainly don't believe that all the hostages would have made it home safely, there would have been casualties for sure but I think the great majority could have been rescued which makes it worthwhile.
 

EMTSATX

Banned
I think the flaw of the idea, was plenty of other Americans walking around. If Eagle Claw was successful they had ready made hostages. As much as I dislike Carter I'm not sure what he could have done short of escalating the situation.

What if we could have involved Iraq and have tacit approval from the USA and invade Iran and overthrow the new Islamic Republic (it's ASB, but Cheney would do it.)
 
A proper planning process with less departmental infighting between Army, Navy and Air Force. Choose a mission commander who has special operations experience and not some mild-mannered AF general who has been flying desks for years.

For reference, read the account of the operation in Richard Marcinko's Rogue Warrior book.

I question whether any amount of planning could have saved the mission concept. The plan called for a rendezvous in enemy territory, a stop at a second staging point, then assaults on the embassy and an Iranian airbase -a very complex operation with ample potential for friction. Even if the Desert One refueling had gone without a hitch, disaster could have struck in any subsequent phase.
 
I question whether any amount of planning could have saved the mission concept. The plan called for a rendezvous in enemy territory, a stop at a second staging point, then assaults on the embassy and an Iranian airbase -a very complex operation with ample potential for friction. Even if the Desert One refueling had gone without a hitch, disaster could have struck in any subsequent phase.

You seem to assume (mind the connotations ;) ) that the plan would have stayed the same if the clusterfuck of a planning phase had been straightened out and the number of moving parts reduced to a minimum. The KISS principle was spindled, folded, mutilated and boinked up the butt in order to stroke the egos of the military service brass instead of doing the obvious thing: Concentrating on the hostages and how to get them out.
There was a lot of input by the snake eaters, read: Those who knew how to go about such a mission. Most of it was ignored by the idiot who headed the mission.
With less of political infighting and plain old asshattery taking the driving seat, the mission would have looked a lot different.
 
Thanks for the replies. What would a rescue attempt that is more likely to succeed look like? I would imagine it would involve a more covert and less conventional operation.
 
You seem to assume (mind the connotations ;) ) that the plan would have stayed the same if the clusterfuck of a planning phase had been straightened out and the number of moving parts reduced to a minimum. The KISS principle was spindled, folded, mutilated and boinked up the butt in order to stroke the egos of the military service brass instead of doing the obvious thing: Concentrating on the hostages and how to get them out.
There was a lot of input by the snake eaters, read: Those who knew how to go about such a mission. Most of it was ignored by the idiot who headed the mission.
With less of political infighting and plain old asshattery taking the driving seat, the mission would have looked a lot different.

I see. How could the mission be streamlined?
 
Just to throw it out, the mission still goes ahead but some to most of the hostages die. Either by being executed before rescue of do to one of the helicopters or planes being shot down? Could Carter survive the fall out?

The idea of getting iraq involved as a diversion/payback has occured to me. I am not sure if it could succeed on the time schedule.
 
Indeed. What would a streamlined mission look like?

I once read that the British said that if they had to do the job it would have looked much like Eagle Claw, the geographical and equipment capability realities limit the array of options.

As for streamlining, fuck the Marines and their helicopters off, they were involved because the USN demanded any helicopters be able to be stowed in the Nimitz's hangar so had to be RH53s and to given the Marines a piece of the pie. The helicopters should have been USAF CSAR machines and flown by these pilots used to flying behind the lines at low level at night and conducting IFR.

Command was another problem, I don't know what in particular was wrong but it could have been sorted with a bit of thought and planning.
 
As for streamlining, fuck the Marines and their helicopters off,

They werent 'Marine' choppers. They were from the USN minesweeping fleet. The argument for those revolved around their range, load capacity, and the ability to withstand sea transit (salt air). Maybe the USAF helos met those two qualifications, I dont know.

... The helicopters should have been USAF CSAR machines and flown by these pilots used to flying behind the lines at low level at night and conducting IFR.

The Marines had plenty of pilots qualified for that. Unfortunatly the air crew used were included relatively late in the preparation & had little mission specific training. One of Beckworths criticism was the late provision of pilots, which crippled mission training for any selected.

Command was another problem, I don't know what in particular was wrong but it could have been sorted with a bit of thought and planning.[/QUOTE]

Another of Beckwiths criticisms. Although his description sounds to me there was a excess of thought and planning.
 
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Just to throw it out, the mission still goes ahead but some to most of the hostages die. Either by being executed before rescue of do to one of the helicopters or planes being shot down?

Most likely is the helos fail further along the way. The malfunctions that occured had to do with the dust or sand in the air, but there were plenty of other high risk failures that could have occured.

The idea of getting iraq involved as a diversion/payback has occured to me. I am not sure if it could succeed on the time schedule.

What would Iraq be "paying back" for? I'm not up on the details of Iraqi Iranian relations at the time?

The Iranian generals responsible for Terhans defense had been contacted & they favored doing nothing to interfere with the hostage rescue. They did not like the new Iranian government or the group that controlled the hostages & hoped a sucessfull rescue would cause the government to collapse & leave their position more secure.
 
They werent 'Marine' choppers. They were from the USN minesweeping fleet. The argument for those revolved around their range, load capacity, and the ability to withstand sea transit (salt air). Maybe the USAF helos met those two qualifications, I dont know.



The Marines had plenty of pilots qualified for that. Unfortunatly the air crew used were included relatively late in the preparation & had little mission specific training. One of Beckworths criticism was the late provision of pilots, which crippled mission training for any selected.

Command was another problem, I don't know what in particular was wrong but it could have been sorted with a bit of thought and planning.

Another of Beckwiths criticisms. Although his description sounds to me there was a excess of thought and planning.[/QUOTE]

The requirements of carrier stowage in transit came first and after that was settled they looked around for what in that category met the mission requirements. That is the wrong way to do it, especially when you can wash down a non naval helicopter on an important but one off mission. Using late arriving marine line pilots on somewhat unfamiliar minesweeper helicopters isn't the recipe for success that using experienced CSAR helicopters and pilots with in flight refuelling is.

I think people other than Beckwith criticised the command arrangements but again I'm not sure of the specifics.
 
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The requirements of carrier stowage in transit came first and after that was settled they looked around for what in that category met the mission requirements. That is the wrong way to do it, especially when you can wash down a non naval helicopter on an important but one off mission. Using late arriving marine line pilots on somewhat unfamiliar minesweeper helicopters isn't the recipe for success that using experienced CSAR helicopters and pilots with in flight refuelling is.

I think people other than Beckwith criticised the command arrangements but again I'm not sure of the specifics.

If you pick through the professional journals of the 1980s & more so in the 1990s you will find bits of that are not uncommon. Naval institute Proceedings is the one I am most familar with.

What USAF CSAR helocopters had the range and capacity to accomplish the mission? & how many were on hand that year?
 
If the Marine aircrew had gotten involved at an early stage, the issues with training would have been resolved. OPSEC concerns got in the way of that, along with only eight helos aboard Nimitz: the AAR mentioned that the plan should have allowed for possible aborts, and thus have 12-16 helos. OPSEC again: there were worries that if the Soviets saw a dozen or more RH-53 on the carrier-which didn't normally embark them, the GRU would start adding things up, and possibly warn the Iranians.

The actual raid on the Embassy would've gone off without much of a problem: the raiders had accurate intelligence as to where all the hostages were being kept (in the chancery), and could ignore any other buildings on the compound. Throw in at least one AC-130 orbiting over the Embassy, ready to give fire support on call (one more was headed to Meherabad AB to kill the F-4s sitting strip alert, with an airborne spare), and Navy tac air from CVW-8 (Nimitz) and CVW-15 (Coral Sea), and the raid might very well have gone off. Casualties were expected, up to fifteen hostages, and it was this possibility that led SECSTATE Vance to resign.

Carter was a bit naïve: he asked Charlie Beckwith if they could use some kind of knock-out gas to incapacitate the guards, and when Beckwith said no, sir, there's no such agent, Carter asked if the guards would just be shot in the leg. Beckwith thought it was a joke, then replied, "No, sir. Anyone armed gets two in the chest and one in the head. No exceptions." One gets the impression from reading both Beckwith's book and Jim Kyle's The Guts to Try (USAF Col. Jim Kyle was the senior USAF officer on the mission, leading a Combat Control Team), that Carter wanted the hostages rescued, but no Iranian casualties.

EAGLE CLAW was like going into Hanoi and busting POWs out of the Hanoi Hilton. (and yes, there was a plan in 1972 to try just that, but it was rejected)

Edit: the only USAF helos that could have flown the mission were HH-53Cs, and they did it before: the Son Tay raid in 1970. The helos were capable of air refueling from HC-130s, and they did just that on the Son Tay mission. IF the AF gets the helo mission, they refuel in the air and no Desert One fiasco. However, you may not get around the need for a hide location, as aircrew fatigue would have become a factor-which leads to mistakes, which leads to accidents and mission compromise.

Egress would have been via Manziyareh, an Iranian AF field used for weapons demos during the Shah's reign, and a Ranger Company was tasked with securing that field. C-141s were to fly in and embark the raiders, freed hostages, and the Rangers, then any remaining helos were to be blown up (thermite bombs are good for that), then the C-141s, with Navy fighter cover, were to fly to Oman.
 
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The USAF would have the survivors of 58 HH3E built in the mid to late 60s, the survivors of 44 HH53C which 1 was converted to Pave Low II in 1975 and 8 to Pave Low III in 1979-80. All of these helicopters had in flight refuelling capability.

HH 3 E

Screen-Shot-2014-04-11-at-10.12.23-PM.png


HH 53 C
HC-130P_refueling_HH-53C_off_Greenland_1978.JPEG
 
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