Operation Downfall 1945:US invasion of Japan

[Catspoke]

Downfall is realistically unlikely to happen. Japan was already bombed to rubble and risked an internal upheaval that would overthrow Hirohito if it kept on trucking with the war.

I had never heard that line of thinking before, I think your saying that Japan would surrender in the next couple of months even without the A Bomb. That would make the most sense with anybody but the Japanese.

Certainly the Soviet August attack would remove any hope of a political settlement (due to loss of any hope of a Allies - Soviet falling out). The loss of China, Korea the Kuriles and the forces stationed there, etc.. should have a profound impact on Japanese leadership.

Allies Battleships continuing to range up and down the coast bombarding anything and everything should of had an impact on Japanese leadership.

The total loss of shipping (military of otherwise) which would continue down to the smallest of vessels making even inter home island supply difficult should have had a impact on Japanese leadership.

A continuing conventional bombing campaign killing tens of thousands of civilians almost daily should cause the Japanese leadership to think about surrendering.

But these were the Japanese of that generation, people who would willingly crash their airplanes into ships, even if the odds of even making it to the ships were small, Is there really anybody in the Japanese leadership that would make the correct decision and do the right thing????

 

[Julian]

Losing Manchuria would not cause the Japanese to surrender - by this point in the war the Home Islands received essentially nothing useful from Manchuria, functionally it was as good as gone A bad thing, yes, but the cause of Japanese surrender - no. IMHO the Soviets would not have been able to invade Hokkaido. During WW2 all Soviet amphibious operations were relatively small, and took place over distances way less than that from Vladivostok to Hokkaido. Furthermore such "expertise" as there was in amphibious operations was in the west of the USSR, not in the east/Siberia/Vladivostok. To cap it off, it is unclear whether the Soviet Pacific Fleet had any amphibious related shipping that could make the trip from Vladivostok to Hokkaido, and the waters between the two - especially in the late fall/winter are very nasty indeed.

Actually the last supplies of vital raw materials were still trickling into Japan from Manchuria and Korea in 1945. Cutting those off would have made even the idea of long term resistance impossible even for the most fanatical high level commanders. The very idea of Soviet invasion and the possible establishment of communism on even part of the Home Islands (Not that this was particularly feasible, but the Japanese believed it was) was terrifying enough that it would cause Japan to surrender.

 

[maestro876]

I read a book a while back called The Invasion of Japan by John Ray Skates published in 2000. His argument was basically that the casualty estimates often bandied about in public discourse are woefully inaccurate, and in reality the "millions dead" talk has no basis in reality. In another thread a long time ago, I summarized his arguments:

His main arguments are these:

The Japanese placed immense faith in their kamikazes. They hopes to fling thousands of kamikaze planes at the invasion fleet en masse, in hopes of overwhelming the US anti-air network and causing massive damage to the invasion fleet. Sounds great in theory, but would not have worked in practice. In order to continue to protect those thousands of planes, they had to disperse them all across the home islands and almost literally bury them in camoflage to prevent them from being destroyed on the ground. First, the virtual absence of radios and breakdown of communications on the home islands would have made it impossible to effectively coordinate and mass the planes before the strike. Also, as soon as the planes began to mass, they would be destroyed. There would likely have been piecemeal commitment of kamikaze aircraft in groups easily handled by what would have been a massive air-defense network.

There were two operations planned: Operation OLYMPIC, which was to seize the southern third of Kyushu and turn it into a massive air and naval base, to be used in support of the next operation, CORONET. CORONET's objective would be to invade the Tokyo Bay area, and seize the Kanto plain, the industrial and political heart of modern Japan.

The Japanese decided their best hope was to meet the invaders at the beach, hold them there with Okinawa-style fixed defenses, and drive them back into the sea with a massive counterattack. The idea was to create a bloody free-for-all melee on the beaches so American air and sea power would be unable to intervene. They really did not expect to succeed, but hoped to make the affair so bloody as to force the Americans to seek a negotiated peace.

But, while this attritional strategy had worked on Luzon, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, it would have been much harder to carry out on the home islands. While the previous battles had been fought with veteran troops, the homeland defense units were extrememly poorly trained, and in most cases their equipment was woefully inadequate. Also, by the time the invasion was to occur, the Okinawa-style fixed defenses would have been nowhere near ready.

Their massive counterattack would also be near-impossible to effectively carry off. Allied air power would make strategic movement impossible, and would make tactical movement extremely difficult. As a result, their counterattack forces in all locations would have been committed piecemeal and easily defeated.

Claims that the Japanese planned to mobilize the entire civilian population and use them as a last suicidal defense are totally unfounded. In reality, the civilian mobilizations were designed to let them handle rear-area work so more soldiers could be freed up for combat. In fact, they even made plans to evacuate civilians from combat areas. One Japanese commander remarked that the idea of using civilians as cannon-fodder drastically hurt morale in his unit. Besides, even if it had been done, it is doubtful they would have had much effect. Untrained women, children, and old men wielding sticks would not be of much use on a seasoned enemy armed with armor, artillery, rifles, submachine guns, and flamethrowers.

The Japanese staked everything on defending against OLYMPIC. Once it had succeeded, it is likely they would have surrendered and CORONET would not have been necessary. Even if it had, the Japanese had never seriously thought much beyond defending Kyushu, and thus would have been horribly unprepared. Also, the terrain of the Kanto Plain decisively favors American mobility and totally cancels out the Japanese fixed-defense strategy. With the seizure of the political and industrial heart of Japan, as well as Tokyo itself, the war would have certainly ended.

The claims of "one million casualties" have no basis in reality. The actual estimates were closer to Okinawa and Normandy. It is likely that these were accurate.

Interesting to think about, at least.

 

[King Augeas]

My impression of what passed for Japanese "strategy" in the last months of the war is that they were hoping to be able to gain some sort of victory that would allow then to negotiate from a position of relative strength.

If this is actually correct, then Japan would have looked at Downfall as an opportunity to win such a victory, and it might have even been feasible with that typhoon spinning around. But of course, the Japanese being willing to negotiate is not the same as the US being willing to agree a deal. If the US just decides to burn Japanese cities and starve the survivors after a failed Olympic, then there's not much Japan can really do...

 

[Erwin the German]

If memory serves, they were planning on using atomic bombs during Downfall if the Japanese failed to surrender after Hiroshima/Nagasaki, so just imagine thousands of American troops wandering into the irradiated husks of Japanese cities... Also consider that we knew next to nothing about radiation at the time, and what information there was was vigorously suppressed by Leslie Groves and the Manhattan Project. Not a pretty picture, if you wanna throw atomic bombs into your hypothetical scenario anyway

 

[burmafrd]

Skates discounts everything that would prove him wrong. You do not have to coordinate the Kamizazes- they know where the attack is coming and I do not care what he claims 10,000 aircraft flying in from several different directions not grouped but basically a mob- how do you stop that?

You don't.

You cannot stop thousands determined to die.

And the people would have fought despite what he claimed.

Downfall would have been horrendous.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

On a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido, I already posted an extensive description of such here: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=5230474&postcount=12

Suffice to say, a successful Soviet invasion of Hokkaido is not just possible, but likely. Trying toclaim distance as an issue is a non-starter... the Soviet invasion force that took the Kuriles actually had to sail an even longer distance and on a route that took them right past Hokkaido to boot.

 

[Aelita]

Skates discounts everything that would prove him wrong. You do not have to coordinate the Kamizazes- they know where the attack is coming and I do not care what he claims 10,000 aircraft flying in from several different directions not grouped but basically a mob- how do you stop that?

You don't.

You cannot stop thousands determined to die.

And the people would have fought despite what he claimed.

Downfall would have been horrendous.

Yes, discounting the kind of "Yellow Horde" racism that the traditional casuality figures rely upon is surely an academic crime.

And that's exactly what it is. Hordes of hundreds of thousands of yellow skinned fanatics, totally discounting the actual morale situation of the Japanese Army, and how woefully equipped they'd be. That's what the traditional view of Downfall relies upon. It's a very inaccurate picture.

No one is arguing that it would be a cake walk. But hundreds of thousands of dead GIs? Get real.

 

[basileus]

Realistically, Olympic (Kyushu) would probably be very bloody, say 25-30,000 dead GIs and sailors and say four-five time that number in Japanese military dead; plus a not very dissimilar number of civilians strafed-bombed-starved to death.
Coronet, the great armada invasion to take out Tokyo, would be likely less difficult, with the main Japanese forcs already spent in the southern invasion. It can be reasonably assumed that Allied (for non-Americans, mainly from Britain and Commonwealth, would play a relevant role *here) losses would average half those incurred at Kyushu, with a loss ratio more heavily slanted (pardon the pun) in disfavor of the Japanese, for obstinate they may prove, for how many minisubs and kamikaze planes they could still muster and launch against the invader.

 

[MerryPrankster]

Yes, discounting the kind of "Yellow Horde" racism that the traditional casuality figures rely upon is surely an academic crime.

And that's exactly what it is. Hordes of hundreds of thousands of yellow skinned fanatics, totally discounting the actual morale situation of the Japanese Army, and how woefully equipped they'd be. That's what the traditional view of Downfall relies upon. It's a very inaccurate picture.

No one is arguing that it would be a cake walk. But hundreds of thousands of dead GIs? Get real.

Is that the best you can do? Cover your ears and scream "racism"?

Just because the thesis appears racist to you doesn't mean that it is.

And the Japanese had stripped the country bare to equip the army to fight the invasion. You could make the "woefully-equipped" argument for Coronet maybe, but not Olympic.

And considering you flat-out called the traditional view racist, I would be justified in playing some very nasty guess-the-motive games with you. But I won't. For now.

 

[Matt]

There's a pretty good AH book called Death is Lighter Than a Feather that I read a few years ago. I recommend it.

 

[Athelstane]

Downfall is realistically unlikely to happen. Japan was already bombed to rubble and risked an internal upheaval that would overthrow Hirohito if it kept on trucking with the war. It was a starving hell-hole of shattered cities, gutted armies, and facing a war that it very much knew was lost before it ever started.

However *if* Downfall happens, it'd be one of the bloodiest operations in human history, the biggest and bloodiest in US military history (ensuring as a cultural byproduct that the USA would focus WWII on the Pacific, not Europe) and for Japan a catastrophe never to be equaled. And while my father and I would not exist, my aunt and mom would, though my grandmother probably remarries and my mother's life would probably have been very different.

It's not often I agree with Snake, but in this case - you have a point.

And it's not just how bad a shape the Japanese economy and society was at that point. It's that, at least on the projected invasion areas and at least in the short term, Japan still had the ability to mobilize enough assets to make an invasion obscenely costly.

And Chester Nimitz knew it, which is why in early August he was in the process of withdrawing his support for Olympic/Majestic (the first phase of Downfall aimed at securing southern Kyushu), setting the stage for a terrible showdown with the Army over the direction of U.S. strategy against Japan.

Does this mean that Downfall would not have happened? Reply hazy; try again. The likely service battle that would have erupted in the absence of the atomic bombings would have made clear to all, especially Truman, what military intelligence was telling us about Japanese strength on southern Kyushu, and what it portended for U.S. casualties. It would have forced, I think, a real rethinking of the entire Downfall strategy. At a bare minimum I think it would have redirected the first phase of the invasion to an entirely new location, one which the Japanese would be less likely to anticipate, or have the logistics to relocate its troops and weapons to (thanks to the severe shortage of fuel, and the destruction of inter-island ferries and rail networks). At most, it might have won the day for the starvation/bombing route favored by the Army Air Forces and much of the Navy, which would have probably resulted in a Japanese capitulation by spring, as massive starvation and all its attendant ills set in, triggering widespread civil unrest.

But even that would have been far more costly in Japanese lives - as Calbear's timeline illustrates.

 

[Aelita]

Is that the best you can do? Cover your ears and scream "racism"?

Just because the thesis appears racist to you doesn't mean that it is.

And the Japanese had stripped the country bare to equip the army to fight the invasion. You could make the "woefully-equipped" argument for Coronet maybe, but not Olympic.

And considering you flat-out called the traditional view racist, I would be justified in playing some very nasty guess-the-motive games with you. But I won't. For now.

No, I'm afraid the only ear covering is being done by the crowd who feel the continual need to justify the moral "rightness" of incinerating civilian population centers with atomic weapons.

It's simply undeniable that the traditional narrative relied upon racism, and the notion of single-minded hordes of Asian fanatics, all willing to die for the Emperor, ignoring the very real fact that in spite of all their efforts, Japanese morale was at the breaking point, and there was scarcely enough weapons and munitions to put up a decent fight at all.

These are the simple facts of the matter. And blindly repeating the old myths over sixty years later makes a person complicit in it. Go ahead, please guess my motive. Quite frankly, I'd love to hear what you come up with.

 

[Living in Exile]

The Japanese were on the verge of collapse. I don't think Downfall and Coronet would ever happen. Soviet entry was guaranteed, and the Japanese position on mainland Asia would disappear. There's no point in continuing to fight when *both* superpowers are waging war on you. IOTL, it was doubly pointless because both superpowers were waging war AND dropping nukes. But one cannot criticize the Japanese leadership too much for holding out to see if US-Soviet relations collapse. It didn't, and they threw in the towel. But surely there's many timelines where Patton starts shooting up T-34s and consequently things get better for Japan.

 

[DCC]

Go ahead, please guess my motive. Quite frankly, I'd love to hear what you come up with.

To deny there was any justification for the use of atomic weaponry in WWII, obviously.

 

[Athelstane]

There's no point in continuing to fight when *both* superpowers are waging war on you.

Well, Japan had deliberately provoked war with two superpowers in the first place - the United States and the British Empire. Which proved fatal, ultimately, but had the flimsy excuse at least of Nazi Germany and Italy diverting much of those great powers' strength.

But after May, 1945, that wasn't true any longer. The Anglo-American combination was already much more than Japan had the strength to resist. Soviet neutrality was useful to Japan mainly because it seemed to present them with a great power that might be an honest broker to a peace deal.

I do agree with those who say Japan would have surrendered even without an invasion. But it would have taken several months (of blockade, bombing and starvation) at a minimum, even with a Soviet conquest of Manchuria. As Richard Franks has pointed out, no one has ever really made a credible case, given the evidence we now have, that the Japanese leadership would have surrendered in August, 1945 (or any date remotely close to it) without the combined shock of the Soviet entry into the war and the two atomic bombings.

Just to make it clear: I'm not necessarily arguing that the atomic bombings (or indeed, the fire bombings) of major Japanese cities were morally justifiable. Just pointing to cause and effect, based on the evidence we do have.

 

[Red Arturoist]

That's what I developed when I put North Japan into both of my mapgames (For Better, for Worse mainly). Operation Downfall, more specifically Operation Coronet, turns into the first proxy war of the Cold War...

 

[RMcD94]

So what happens after the war with Soviet controlled Manchuria and Hokkadio and a US puppet of southern Japan?

Does the death toll reach enough that Japan ends up as a USA territory? What about for the Soviets?

 

[fscott]

Yes, discounting the kind of "Yellow Horde" racism that the traditional casuality figures rely upon is surely an academic crime.

And that's exactly what it is. Hordes of hundreds of thousands of yellow skinned fanatics, totally discounting the actual morale situation of the Japanese Army, and how woefully equipped they'd be. That's what the traditional view of Downfall relies upon. It's a very inaccurate picture.

No one is arguing that it would be a cake walk. But hundreds of thousands of dead GIs? Get real.

Remember individual soldiers held out on islands until the 70's.

 

[Kongzilla]

That's what I developed when I put North Japan into both of my mapgames (For Better, for Worse mainly). Operation Downfall, more specifically Operation Coronet, turns into the first proxy war of the Cold War...

What is this map game you speak of. It sounds fun.




Also what happens if the soviet Union is defeated and the West makes peace with Nazi Germany. Would the WAllies be able to reach the home islands by 1944 and would they be forced to act with Operation Downfall.