Operation Cerberus aka "Channel Dash" Fails in 1942

Background

Now after reading some more reputable documents (neat little things stacks of paper bound on one side, with hard covers, I believe some people call them "books" :D ) I've found that my initial suspicions that the Dash was the product of incredible luck were confirmed. Indeed, the RN did in a sense know that the KM would try to run their ships through the Channel and had developed a plan to counter it (Operation Fuller).

However they assumed that the ships would attempt to make it past the guns at Dover at night and not in the middle of the day as they did in OTL. Vice Admiral Ciliax, however, rightly assumed that the element of surprise would be far more valuable and left Brest at night slipping the trap set for him by the RAF and the RN and making it well into the channel before the RAF belatedly responded.

However Ciliax's Channel Dash was as much the product of luck as it was the product of audacity and planning. In OTL the British had at least 3 chances to detect the KM units as they were leaving Brest...

1) An RAF raid on the port earlier on February 11th did little damage and furthermore failed to see the taskforce forming up to leave the port. However this raid did serve to delay the taskforce by a few hours which caused...

2)...the taskforce to slip by the HMS Sealion (ironic...) a submarine tasked with watching Brest for any sign of the ships leaving. The delay meant that the ships barely missed the Sealion which had been temporarily ordered off her station (can't remember exactly why...)

3) Furthermore the KM also got really lucky when a member of the French resistance who had discerned the taskforce's actual course failed to slip by the security cordon and make it to his transmitter in time to inform the British.

Now for the POD let's say that 1 or all of these factors go the other way. Britain knows about the Channel Dash right from the get go and moves to take advantage of this golden opportunity. For the sake of the scenario, within the next 24 hours the KM taskforce is swamped with a combined air and naval attack that succeeds in sinking most if not all of the ships involved including sinking all 3 heavy units (The Schnarnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen.

Would a naval disaster such as this be enough for Hitler to sack Raeder as head of the KM? I've been torn over this question as Operation Cerberus was basically a last ditch maneuver, Hitler's alternative was to scrap the ships so I have a nagging feeling he wouldn't be overly livid with their loss as it was expected.

Also would this be enough to have the RN keep the size of the Far Eastern Fleet the same or only slightly reduce it's size?
 
There was active German radar jamming causing aircraft charged with watching the port to assume their radar was inoperable. A visual sighting by two Spitfires of Fighter Command was not reported because they were operating under radio silence reg's and their report upon landing at base was not treated with priority. British air and sea assets were not on station. Was it purely luck that the KM picked the right day that the British didn't own the Channel, or a mixture of German subterfuge and British incompetance?
 
There was active German radar jamming causing aircraft charged with watching the port to assume their radar was inoperable. A visual sighting by two Spitfires of Fighter Command was not reported because they were operating under radio silence reg's and their report upon landing at base was not treated with priority. British air and sea assets were not on station. Was it purely luck that the KM picked the right day that the British didn't own the Channel, or a mixture of German subterfuge and British incompetance?

I never meant to imply that the Channel Dash's success was solely a product of blind luck. In many ways it illustrates the saying "you make your own luck" as both German planning/subterfuge and British incompetence played a role in the operations success. What I was trying to point out is that the Dash's success was a very near run thing and that the ships could have easily been spotted on February 11th 1942 giving the British enough time to put Operation Fuller into motion...fully and probably stop the German ships.
 
Going only by the Wiki page you linked us to, Operation Fuller seems to be the after-the-fact name for the disjointed British attacks made during the Dash.

Uncoordinated attacks by motor boats and six Fleet Air Arm Fairey Swordfish torpedo biplanes launched from Manston (in an operation formally referred to as "Operation Fuller")[3] failed to inflict any damage.
The real plan is said to have involved heavy naval and air attacks, but the Wiki page only mentions six destroyers which were supposed to be on stand by, but weren't, and the hundreds of RAF aircraft that weren't even able to find the ships, let alone attack them. Can you provide any more details about the real plan?

Anyway, the loss of Schnarnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen isn't going to change that much as none of them amounted to much after returning to Germany. Schnarnhorst had the best post-Dash career acting as a surface raiding threat in Norway. Gneisenau was nothing but a yard queen for the rest of her career. Before getting nuked, Prinz Eugen spent a little time in Norway, more time in the yards, and a brief period in the Baltic transporting refugees.

No Scharnhorst might make the Murmansk run slightly easier and make the Home Fleet's job slightly easier too, but Tirpitz is still floating. As for the other two, they didn't even manage what little Scharnhorst did.

There would the usual boost to UK morale, a hit to German morale, the KM will lose a lot of NCOs who would later serve aboard u-boats and/or train others who served aboard u-boats, Hitler may also abandon the KM's surface arm sooner, and fewer Baltic refugees will escape the advancing Red Army.

I don't see a lot of big changes.
 
I don't see huge changes coming from this, but there might be some impact. From old and possibly fallible memory, the British home fleet was maintained at either 5 or 8 battleships until fairly late in the war. Cut the German surface fleet as much as this battle probably would and you might see a couple of those battleships heading to the Mediterranean. That could be useful in Torch or in supplying Malta, though air power would probably be more important in terms of Malta.

The extra battleships might come in handy in interdicting Italian/German sea lanes to Tunisia in early 1943, but at best the impact would probably be rather marginal.
 
I've read that the British had virtually nothing on hand which could kill these ships anyway. They'd need either a big AP or SAP bomb, a 2000lb'er, delivered from high level or in a fast dive, or a torpedo get get significant damage. The Brits had very little on hand, let alone the large numbers needed to deliver powerful cordinated attacks, and didn't have units trained to attack heavy ships at sea, so there isn't too much which could have been done.

However Britain does have to plan for the worst, and the worst is the S & G, PE meeting up with Tirpitz and breaking out into the Atlantic. This is why the RN kept such powerful battleship and carrier forces in home waters, despite the feeble performance of the German ships when we look back. If these 3 ships are sunk in the Channel the worst case scenario is the Tirpitz, which only needs 2 BBs, freeing up powerful naval units for service elsewhere which could have a significant impact on the war.
 

Hyperion

Banned
I don't see huge changes coming from this, but there might be some impact. From old and possibly fallible memory, the British home fleet was maintained at either 5 or 8 battleships until fairly late in the war. Cut the German surface fleet as much as this battle probably would and you might see a couple of those battleships heading to the Mediterranean. That could be useful in Torch or in supplying Malta, though air power would probably be more important in terms of Malta.

The extra battleships might come in handy in interdicting Italian/German sea lanes to Tunisia in early 1943, but at best the impact would probably be rather marginal.

Politically, if any or all three ships are lost, I could well see Hitler ordering other ships scrapped, and likely any ships under construction or on order to be canceled. I could well see other surface units, mainly Tirpitz and various destroyers being consolidated closer to home, likely southern Norway or in the Baltic.

Sending a couple of battleships to the Med would be helpful, how much I don't know.

I think it wouldn't be impossible to send another battleship or maybe two to the Indian Ocean. Not enough to go on the attack, but the help the British build or maintain a noticable fleet in being.
 
This is why the RN kept such powerful battleship and carrier forces in home waters, despite the feeble performance of the German ships when we look back.


The RN kept fewer assets than we'd like suppose at Scapa to counter the KM presence in Norway. I've posted the information in earlier threads. While I don't quite remember the battleship numbers, I do remember that the fleet in Scapa more usually had no carriers and, when they were available, made do with one.

I'll pull the information out again this evening (EST).

If these 3 ships are sunk in the Channel the worst case scenario is the Tirpitz, which only needs 2 BBs, freeing up powerful naval units for service elsewhere which could have a significant impact on the war.

When I post the actual numbers, you'll see that, while the benefits do exist, they won't be as great as we normally presume.
 

Markus

Banned
Also would this be enough to have the RN keep the size of the Far Eastern Fleet the same or only slightly reduce it's size?

Why reduce the size of the EF? Increase it!

With The Sisters gone, Tirpitz is the only fast capital ship Germany has. Once she´s gone -Battle of North Cape?- all KGV´s, Renown, Furious and the four Illustriouses could go to the IO and that´s enough to invade Burma by sea. IOTL the japanese fleet in the DEI and the weakness of the EF prevented that. This fleet could defeat any thing the IJN had left after their carriers had been gelded at the Marianas.

How about launching the invasions of Burma and the Marianas at the same time? That ABSOLUTELY ensures the Japanese suffer a defeat in one critical operation, probably in both. The Marianas were a part of the defensive perimeter around Japan and Burma was shielding the "southern resource area"(Malaya+DEI).
 
Why reduce the size of the EF? Increase it!

With The Sisters gone, Tirpitz is the only fast capital ship Germany has. Once she´s gone -Battle of North Cape?- all KGV´s, Renown, Furious and the four Illustriouses could go to the IO and that´s enough to invade Burma by sea. IOTL the japanese fleet in the DEI and the weakness of the EF prevented that. This fleet could defeat any thing the IJN had left after their carriers had been gelded at the Marianas.

How about launching the invasions of Burma and the Marianas at the same time? That ABSOLUTELY ensures the Japanese suffer a defeat in one critical operation, probably in both. The Marianas were a part of the defensive perimeter around Japan and Burma was shielding the "southern resource area"(Malaya+DEI).

IIRC in OTL the Eastern Fleet was reduced in size to have it's vessels participate in ongoing operations in the Mediterranean. In TTL however, more vessels are going to be around therefore IMO leading to the Eastern Fleet remaining the same size, or worst case scenario having only a few units being sent over to fight in the Mediterranean.

Here's another related question: How would the loss of the Schnarnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen affect the Royal Navy's attempt to sink/damage the rest of the Kriegsmarine? Would there/could there be a more aggressive campaign to go after the remaining surface elements stationed in Norway than in OTL? Given that the ships involved in the Channel Dash were basically writeoffs otherwise in Hitler's mind I doubt he'd scrap the battlefleet when he still has the Tirpitz, Hipper, Lutzow, and the Admiral Scheer at his disposal.
 

Markus

Banned
Here's another related question: How would the loss of the Schnarnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen affect the Royal Navy's attempt to sink/damage the rest of the Kriegsmarine? Would there/could there be a more aggressive campaign to go after the remaining surface elements stationed in Norway than in OTL?

I can see that happening for the reason I stated. Once Tirpitz is gone all of the RN´s fast BB and CV would no longer be needed in home waters. The Nelrods, QE´s and CA could take care of what´s left.


Given that the ships involved in the Channel Dash were basically writeoffs otherwise in Hitler's mind I doubt he'd scrap the battlefleet when he still has the Tirpitz, Hipper, Lutzow, and the Admiral Scheer at his disposal.
I´d not scrap them under any circumstances as they at least tie down enemy ships.
 
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