Operation Beleaguer leads to more American involvement in the Chinese Civil War

Operation Beleaguer was a U.S. military operation in post-World War II China that oversaw the repatriation of Japanese and Korean nationals and the protection of American citizens and interests in the mainland. Since this was during the time of the resumption of the Chinese Civil War, the U.S. Army and the Marines inevitably clashed with Mao's communist armies. In our timeline, the U.S. under President Truman basically withdrew support to the KMT due to rampant corruption and government incompetence to the point that China was declared a lost cause. The last U.S. Navy ship, the USS Dixie, left Qingdao with American citizens on board in 1949.

What if this alternate history scenario, Truman does not withdraw support for the KMT and allows the U.S. Army and Marines to fight the communists alongside the NRA? How would this play out for the U.S.? Would this butterfly the Korean War?
 
It might have prolonged the war another year, and poisoned Chinese American relations for generations. The Truman Administration was hoping to maintain normal relations with China. There was never an issue of contention between the two countries that couldn't be resolved, ideology aside, and there was much that both sides could benefit from by have good relations.
 
It might have prolonged the war another year, and poisoned Chinese American relations for generations. The Truman Administration was hoping to maintain normal relations with China. There was never an issue of contention between the two countries that couldn't be resolved, ideology aside, and there was much that both sides could benefit from by have good relations.
Wouldn't it be like a Vietnam War-style but 20 years earlier? Except this time the U.S. wasn't ready to fight another major ground war?
 
An old post of mine with some slight changes (sorry for any links that may no longer work):

***

The question is, just what all-out aid means. If it means US troops, there is practically no chance of this. As dedicated an anti-Communist as General MacArthur repeatedly said, "anyone in favor of sending American ground troops to fight on Chinese soil should have his head examined." https://books.google.com/books?id=462-ocjLNtAC&pg=PA76

Would anything short of this be enough? I doubt it. Chiang got plenty of aid from the US. Derk Bodde (an American professor who was a witness to the Communist takeover), describing the PLA victory parade in Beijing in 1949 said "what made it especially memorable to Americans was the fact that it was primarily a display of *American* military equipment, virtually all of it captured or obtained by bribe from Kuomintang forces in the short space of two and one half years." https://archive.org/stream/pekingdiaryayear009614mbp#page/n133/mode/2up

Here let me anticipate two arguments: (1) The notion that Chiang was on the verge of a decisive victory in Manchuria in 1946 and was prevented from winning only by a cease-fire imposed by Marshall is not supported by the evidence. See Harold M. Tanner, *The Battle for Manchuria and the Fate of China: Siping, 1946* the concluson of which is summarized by one reviewer as follows: "The major question concerns the decisiveness of the battle of Siping. In retrospect, many Nationalists have looked on this battle as a lost chance to win the war. According to this view, the Nationalists had the Communists in full retreat until the Americans interfered with the cease-fire that halted pursuit of Mao’s armies. The pause allowed the Communists to rebuild their forces and eventually win control of Manchuria. Without a cease-fire, supporters of this argument believe that Nationalists would have secured control of Manchuria and eventually defeated the Communists across China. In response, Tanner argues that Siping did not set the stage for a possible Nationalist victory in Manchuria. Chiang’s armies faced logistical and manpower problems and that further advance might have fatally exposed Nationalist forces to Communist hit-and-run attacks." http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=39472 Another review (not available in full to non-subscribers): "Tanner systematically refutes such charges against Marshall...Using a variety of recently available archival materials, he demonstrates that leadership on both sides had military reasons for accepting the ceasefire at that time. In reality, Marshall's maneuvers were peripheral to their strategic decision making. The latter was shaped by perceptions of the changing facts on the battlefield. *Chiang had no intention at the time of pursuing the communists beyond the Songhua River.* [emphasis added]. Although Western and Taiwan-based historians have argued in hindsight that pursuing and annihilating the communists is what he should have done, Chiang was focused on consolidating his hold on southern Manchuria by moving north to capture Changchun. Tanner quotes Chiang's diary to make this point. As for Marshall, both the communist and nationalist leaders considered him a nuisance...to be humored and outmanuevered at the negotiating table... "
http://ahr.oxfordjournals.org/content/118/5/1500.extract The notion that Marshall prevented Chiang from gaining a decisive victory by taking Harbin is also false: see my post at https://soc.history.what-if.narkive...i-marshall-lets-chiang-take-harbin-1946#post1 where I point out that "In short, the significance of this particular event seems to have been overblown. Marshall did not coerce a reluctant Chiang into losing a golden opportunity to wipe out Lin Biao's troops; rather, Chiang as well as Marshall was worried that going too far north could be provocative to Stalin, and anyway capturing Harbin would not have made that much of a difference, militarily speaking, for the KMT."

(2) 'What about the arms embargo imposed for eight months in connection with the Marshall mission?" Answer: "In military terms, however, the embargo's effect was limited, since the Nationalist forces had already been well equipped with surplus materiel from U.S. bases in the Pacific." Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950* (Stanford University Press 2003), p. 49.https://books.google.com/books?id=JBCOecRg5nEC&pg=PA49

"Overall, however, the KMT had ample supplies of weapons and probably lost more to capture, defection, and poor planning than to maintenance failure. A 1950 classified evaluation by the Nationalist Ministry of National Defense accurately assessed the issue: 'We have never heard it said that our military defeat in recent years resulted from a lack of ammunition or an insufficiency of other supplies. Rather, we inadequately understood bandit-suppression and anticommunism; we had insufficient morale; and our government, economy and programs completely failed to provide close support for the bandit-suppression military effort.' Jonathan M. House, *A Military History of the Cold War, 1944–1962* (University of Oklahoma Press 2012). https://books.google.com/books?id=T5lxAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT144

BTW, as House notes, even during the arms embargo, the US "gave or sold China another $200 million worth of 'nonmilitary' wartime surplus trucks and other equipment, often at advantageous rates." Those who argue that the US didn't do enough to Chiang sometimes discount all aid that wasn't strictly "military" but this is absurd. The more such aid the KMT got--*if it was effective* (and the *effectiveness* of US aid, both military and economic is a different matter from its extent) the more it could devote to the war. Money, after all, is fungible. There may have been some spare parts the KMT could only get from the US but as noted they were hardly decisive.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...n-for-nationalist-china.388943/#post-12423321
 
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US involvement in China means that Soviet Union can push his influence over an another Cold War hotspot such as Iran (the 1946 Iran Crisis) or Italy (Trieste and Tito's ambitions).
 
Wouldn't it be like a Vietnam War-style but 20 years earlier? Except this time the U.S. wasn't ready to fight another major ground war?

In many ways yes, but on a much bigger scale. Your also right that the U.S. wasn't ready for another major ground war. The U.S., and UN ground forces were able to contain, and push back the Communist Army in Korea, because Korea is a narrow front, and the Chinese were deploying from their Manchurian bases, this would be fighting in the middle of China. The Chinese Civil War involved millions of men, on each side, the U.S. didn't have an army big enough to make a difference in that scale, and scope of fighting. American Public Opinion would never have excepted the casualties involved, or the drafting of millions of men needed for the fight. Korea was a defensive war thrust on the American People, and was limited in scale, and scope. The only winner in such a Chinese mess would be Stalin.
 
An old post of mine. with some slight changes (sorry for any links that may no longer work):

***

The question is, just what all-out aid means. If it means US troops, there is practically no chance of this. As dedicated an anti-Communist as General MacArthur repeatedly said, "anyone in favor of sending American ground troops to fight on Chinese soil should have his head examined." https://books.google.com/books?id=462-ocjLNtAC&pg=PA76

Would anything short of this be enough? I doubt it. Chiang got plenty of aid from the US. Derk Bodde (an American professor who was a witness to the Communist takeover), describing the PLA victory parade in Beijing in 1949 said "what made it especially memorable to Americans was the fact that it was primarily a display of *American* military equipment, virtually all of it captured or obtained by bribe from Kuomintang forces in the short space of two and one half years." https://archive.org/stream/pekingdiaryayear009614mbp#page/n133/mode/2up

Here let me anticipate two arguments: (1) The notion that Chiang was on the verge of a decisive victory in Manchuria in 1946 and was prevented from winning only by a cease-fire imposed by Marshall is not supported by the evidence. See Harold M. Tanner, *The Battle for Manchuria and the Fate of China: Siping, 1946* the concluson of which is summarized by one reviewer as follows: "The major question concerns the decisiveness of the battle of Siping. In retrospect, many Nationalists have looked on this battle as a lost chance to win the war. According to this view, the Nationalists had the Communists in full retreat until the Americans interfered with the cease-fire that halted pursuit of Mao’s armies. The pause allowed the Communists to rebuild their forces and eventually win control of Manchuria. Without a cease-fire, supporters of this argument believe that Nationalists would have secured control of Manchuria and eventually defeated the Communists across China. In response, Tanner argues that Siping did not set the stage for a possible Nationalist victory in Manchuria. Chiang’s armies faced logistical and manpower problems and that further advance might have fatally exposed Nationalist forces to Communist hit-and-run attacks." http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=39472 Another review (not available in full to non-subscribers): "Tanner systematically refutes such charges against Marshall...Using a variety of recently available archival materials, he demonstrates that leadership on both sides had military reasons for accepting the ceasefire at that time. In reality, Marshall's maneuvers were peripheral to their strategic decision making. The latter was shaped by perceptions of the changing facts on the battlefield. *Chiang had no intention at the time of pursuing the communists beyond the Songhua River.* [emphasis added]. Although Western and Taiwan-based historians have argued in hindsight that pursuing and annihilating the communists is what he should have done, Chiang was focused on consolidating his hold on southern Manchuria by moving north to capture Changchun. Tanner quotes Chiang's diary to make this point. As for Marshall, both the communist and nationalist leaders considered him a nuisance...to be humored and outmanuevered at the negotiating table... "
http://ahr.oxfordjournals.org/content/118/5/1500.extract The notion that Marshall prevented Chiang from gaining a decisive victory by taking Harbin is also false: see my post at https://soc.history.what-if.narkive...i-marshall-lets-chiang-take-harbin-1946#post1 where I point out that "In short, the significance of this particular event seems to have been overblown. Marshall did not coerce a reluctant Chiang into losing a golden opportunity to wipe out Lin Biao's troops; rather, Chiang as well as Marshall was worried that going too far north could be provocative to Stalin, and anyway capturing Harbin would not have made that much of a difference, militarily speaking, for the KMT."

(2) 'What about the arms embargo imposed for eight months in connection with the Marshall mission?" Answer: "In military terms, however, the embargo's effect was limited, since the Nationalist forces had already been well equipped with surplus materiel from U.S. bases in the Pacific." Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950* (Stanford University Press 2003), p. 49.https://books.google.com/books?id=JBCOecRg5nEC&pg=PA49

"Overall, however, the KMT had ample supplies of weapons and probably lost more to capture, defection, and poor planning than to maintenance failure. A 1950 classified evaluation by the Nationalist Ministry of National Defense accurately assessed the issue: 'We have never heard it said that our military defeat in recent years resulted from a lack of ammunition or an insufficiency of other supplies. Rather, we inadequately understood bandit-suppression and anticommunism; we had insufficient morale; and our government, economy and programs completely failed to provide close support for the bandit-suppression military effort.' Jonathan M. House, *A Military History of the Cold War, 1944–1962* (University of Oklahoma Press 2012). https://books.google.com/books?id=T5lxAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT144

BTW, as House notes, even during the arms embargo, the US "gave or sold China another $200 million worth of 'nonmilitary' wartime surplus trucks and other equipment, often at advantageous rates." Those who argue that the US didn't do enough to Chiang sometimes discount all aid that wasn't strictly "military" but this is absurd. The more such aid the KMT got--*if it was effective* (and the *effectiveness* of US aid, both military and economic is a different matter from its extent) the more it could devote to the war. Money, after all, is fungible. There may have been some spare parts the KMT could only get from the US but as noted they were hardly decisive.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...n-for-nationalist-china.388943/#post-12423321
So in short, KMT incompetence and corruption was what made the communists look like saints to the Chinese who were tired of seeing foreigners in their land?
In many ways yes, but on a much bigger scale. Your also right that the U.S. wasn't ready for another major ground war. The U.S., and UN ground forces were able to contain, and push back the Communist Army in Korea, because Korea is a narrow front, and the Chinese were deploying from their Manchurian bases, this would be fighting in the middle of China. The Chinese Civil War involved millions of men, on each side, the U.S. didn't have an army big enough to make a difference in that scale, and scope of fighting. American Public Opinion would never have excepted the casualties involved, or the drafting of millions of men needed for the fight. Korea was a defensive war thrust on the American People, and was limited in scale, and scope. The only winner in such a Chinese mess would be Stalin.
Stalin preferred Chiang over Mao because the latter did not want to follow Stalin's Soviet bloc.
 
I think if Operation Beleaguer was committed to destroying the CCP, the U.S. would find itself in an earlier Vietnam War-like scenario. Except this time, the Chinese would be tired of foreigners coming into their country.
 
The American presence in China did little to help the Nationalists, in particular the raping of Chinese women. These women weren't some country bumbkin nobodies, instead they were the daughters of the KMT base of support like the Shen Chong case. This led to protest student protest and anger against America and the KMT due to their attempts at covering up incidents.
An American intervention might also split the party, since some KMT members didn't like America or the west like Bai Chongxi or Dai Li. Maybe something similar to the assassination of Park Chung-hee could happen as well.
 
The American presence in China did little to help the Nationalists, in particular the raping of Chinese women. These women weren't some country bumbkin nobodies, instead they were the daughters of the KMT base of support like the Shen Chong case. This led to protest student protest and anger against America and the KMT due to their attempts at covering up incidents.
An American intervention might also split the party, since some KMT members didn't like America or the west like Bai Chongxi or Dai Li. Maybe something similar to the assassination of Park Chung-hee could happen as well.
So it is basically an early Vietnam War wherein this time American hasn't recovered from WWII.
 
Rather than the million casualties during the Korean War?
I'd see it as deadlier than Korea. Since there would be millions of small arms donated from Lend Lease, the Soviet Union, and leftover Japanese weapons. Plus, the Chinese at this point were tired of foreigners in their country. Most likely the Korean War is butterflied away here.
 
I'd see it as deadlier than Korea. Since there would be millions of small arms donated from Lend Lease, the Soviet Union, and leftover Japanese weapons. Plus, the Chinese at this point were tired of foreigners in their country. Most likely the Korean War is butterflied away here.

I don't think the Korean War would be butterflied away, maybe delayed. If the Chinese Civil War lasts till 1950, or 51 the Chinese won't release the Korean Communist Troops severing in PLA till it's over. The NKPA was Soviet trained, and equipped, but they needed the hardcore troops from the 8th Route Army, that fought in Northern China, for the invasion of the South. Stalin Green Lite the NK Invasion of the South in the hope of entangling China in a conflict with the U.S., to keep China dependent on Soviet Military aid. I don't see any reason he wouldn't do the same thing a year later. As long as Stalin could keep Soviet Forces out of the war, he'd want to keep the pot boiling. Stalin's Death in March 1953 was a major factor in ending the Korean War.
 
You'd need a PoD that changes the American popular attitude towards China to get large scale intervention. No one in America wanted to hop into war so close to WWII. Especially when the enemies were not a foreign empire attacking the US, but rather a distant land's civil war. The political elite of the country had up until that point avoided getting into messy colonial wars, they were not chomping at the bit to start now.

But if we ignore that and Truman does go through with it, the 1950 midterms will be a Republican blowout. Then they will force the recalling of American soldiers, ending the conflict only a year in. This might butterfly into a weaker executive branch when comes to foreign policy, and certainly taints Truman's image in the long run, but I can't imagine much else in the way of political changes.

Militarily, I'm not knowledgeable enough to speak on it, but as far as I know by 1949 the KMT were doomed. Though this setback may butterfly away intervention in Korea or weaken it, resulting in a more pro-south peace.
 
In my view the best way to prevent the CCP resurgence after World War II would have been to evict the Soviet Red Army from Manchuria as soon as possible. On 14 August 1945 the USSR and KMT China signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance against Japan. The exchange of notes attached to this treaty had, among other things, the following two obligations:

(1) 'In accordance with the spirit of the above mentioned Treaty - that is, the Treaty of Friendship 'and Alliance between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - and to implement its general idea and purposes, the Soviet Government agrees to render China moral support and assist her with military supplies and other material resources, it being understood that this support and assistance will go exclusively to the National Government as the Central Government of China.'​
(2) 'During the negotiations on the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur and on the joint operation of the Chinese Changchun Railway, the Soviet Government regarded the Three Eastern Provinces - that is, Manchuria - as part of China and again affirmed its respect for the complete sovereignty of China over the Three Eastern Provinces and recognition of their territorial and administrative integrity.'​

Prior to the treaty Stalin also went on record stating that Soviet forces would withdraw from Manchuria beginning three weeks after the surrender of Japan, to be completed within three months. However, the Soviets violated their promise to leave immediately and furthermore blocked KMT troops from entering into Manchuria either through seaports or by the single railway leading there from China proper. Rather than providing 'military and moral aid' to Chiang Kai Shek as stipulated under the above, the Soviets supported the Chinese communists. At the 1068th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations on 1 December 1961, representative Tsiang (ROC) declared:

"Shortly after V-J Day, the Chinese communist forces under the command of Lin Piao infiltrated into Manchuria in large numbers, amounting to about 200,000 men. Let me remind the Assembly that this commander, Lin Piao, was the same man who led the so-called Chinese volunteers into Korea [Bob note: actually Peng Teh-Huai]. All these 200,000 Chinese communist soldiers were then unarmed. A short time afterwards, these 200,000 men were all fully, armed with Japanese equipment and supplied with Japanese munitions. Since all the equipment and supplies of the Japanese forces in Manchuria were either captured by or surrendered to the Soviet forces, the Chinese communist forces at that time could have only one source of supply-namely, the Soviet Army. "

According to Tseng: "In the first month of the occupation of Manchuria, from 9 August to 9 September 1945, the Soviet Army captured from the Japanese army 594,000 prisoners of war, 925 aircraft, 369 tanks, 35 armoured cars, 1,226 pieces of field artillery, 4,836 machine guns, 300,000 rifles, 133 radio sets, 2,300 motor vehicles, 125 tractors, 17,497 horses and mules, and 742 depots with munitions and supplies included. In addition, at the time of its surrender, the Japanese Kwantung army had in storage in various parts of Manchuria 1,436 pieces of field artillery, 8,989 machine guns, 11,052 grenade-throwers, 3,078 trucks, 104,777 horses, 21,084 supply cars, 815 special vehicles, and 287 command cars. These captured supplies and equipment were not transferred to the Chinese Government. Neither were the surrendered items."

According to page 186 of "The China Handbook, 1950," Chinese forces under the central government collected the following weapons and equipment from Japanese troops in China, Taiwan, and northern FIC by mid-April 1946: 685,897 rifles, 60,377 pistols, 29,822 light and heavy machine guns, 12,446 artillery pieces "of various kinds and calibers," 383 tanks, 151 armored trucks, 15,785 trucks, 74,159 horses, 1,068 aircraft, and 1,400 naval vessels with total tonnage 54,600 (most of these were useless). Fuel and munitions captured amounted to 3,101,927 gallons of avgas, 6,000 tons of aerial bombs, ~180,994,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, ~2,035,000 rounds of pistol ammunition, and over 2,070,000 shells "of various kinds." Chinese communist troops occupied Chengteh, Chihfeng, Tulun, Kalgan, and Kupeikow, which were not handed over to the national army. (I do not know what became of this materiel, perhaps it was destroyed after being collected)

Therefore, the answer seems to apply pressure on the USSR to get out of Manchuria ASAP under the terms of the treaty rather than allow them to further foment civil war and communist revolution. Considering the threat, if all else failed the KMT may have been justified in issuing an ultimatum for the Soviets to either leave in accordance with the agreement or be treated as a hostile occupation force.
 
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Stalin preferred Chiang over Mao because the latter did not want to follow Stalin's Soviet bloc.

It is simply not true that Stalin preferred Chiang to Mao. Soviet support for the CCP was substantial, though both the USSR and CCP tried to conceal it. See for example my posts at https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...munist-without-the-ussr.473591/#post-19365108 and https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...munist-without-the-ussr.473591/#post-19365616

The notion that Stalin tried to stop Mao from crossing the Yangtze in 1949 also seems false: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...munist-without-the-ussr.473591/#post-19365616

True, Stalin did veto some of Mao's wilder ideas. For example at the time of the Xi'an incident, Mao wanted Chiang to be put on trial and executed. In August 1945 Mao wanted to restart the Chinese Civil War prematurely by attempting to seize Shanghai and other cities. In both cases, it was a good thing for the CCP that Mao felt obliged to yield to Stalin's advice. Executing Chiang would simply have enough to power the most pro-Japanese elements of the GMD, who would be determined to liquidate the CCP. As for trying to seize the major cities in August 1945, Michael Sheng writes, "Had Mao's orders been carried out, the CCP would have suffered a disaster more. severe than that of the Li Lisan 'left-deviationist adventurism' in the l930s." https://books.google.com/books?id=HZJcxq1DIOYC&pg=PA103

Far from not wanting to "follow Stalin's Soviet bloc" Mao completely supported Stalin over Tito. To quote Sheng again:

Clipboard01.jpg


"In numerous occasions after Stalin's death Mao purposely discredited Stalin's contribution to the CCP cause, thereby creating a myth that Stalin was always wrong in his China policy, and Mao was always correct and he resisted Stalin and saved the CCP revolution single-handedly. The myth of Mao's own making has been influential in the western scholarship in the field..." https://books.google.com/books?id=HZJcxq1DIOYC&pg=PA15
 
In my view the best way to prevent the CCP resurgence after World War II would have been to evict the Soviet Red Army from Manchuria as soon as possible. On 14 August 1945 the USSR and KMT China signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance against Japan. The exchange of notes attached to this treaty had, among other things, the following two obligations:

(1) 'In accordance with the spirit of the above mentioned Treaty - that is, the Treaty of Friendship 'and Alliance between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - and to implement its general idea and purposes, the Soviet Government agrees to render China moral support and assist her with military supplies and other material resources, it being understood that this support and assistance will go exclusively to the National Government as the Central Government of China.'​
(2) 'During the negotiations on the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur and on the joint operation of the Chinese Changchun Railway, the Soviet Government regarded the Three Eastern Provinces - that is, Manchuria - as part of China and again affirmed its respect for the complete sovereignty of China over the Three Eastern Provinces and recognition of their territorial and administrative integrity.'​

Prior to the treaty Stalin also went on record stating that Soviet forces would withdraw from Manchuria beginning three weeks after the surrender of Japan, to be completed within three months. However, the Soviets violated their promise to leave immediately and furthermore blocked KMT troops from entering into Manchuria either through seaports or by the single railway leading there from China proper. Rather than providing 'military and moral aid' to Chiang Kai Shek as stipulated under the above, the Soviets supported the Chinese communists. At the 1068th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations on 1 December 1961, representative Tsiang (ROC) declared:

"Shortly after V-J Day, the Chinese communist forces under the command of Lin Piao infiltrated into Manchuria in large numbers, amounting to about 200,000 men. Let me remind the Assembly that this commander, Lin Piao, was the same man who led the so-called Chinese volunteers into Korea [Bob note: actually Peng Teh-Huai]. All these 200,000 Chinese communist soldiers were then unarmed. A short time afterwards, these 200,000 men were all fully, armed with Japanese equipment and supplied with Japanese munitions. Since all the equipment and supplies of the Japanese forces in Manchuria were either captured by or surrendered to the Soviet forces, the Chinese communist forces at that time could have only one source of supply-namely, the Soviet Army. "

According to Tseng: "In the first month of the occupation of Manchuria, from 9 August to 9 September 1945, the Soviet Army captured from the Japanese army 594,000 prisoners of war, 925 aircraft, 369 tanks, 35 armoured cars, 1,226 pieces of field artillery, 4,836 machine guns, 300,000 rifles, 133 radio sets, 2,300 motor vehicles, 125 tractors, 17,497 horses and mules, and 742 depots with munitions and supplies included. In addition, at the time of its surrender, the Japanese Kwantung army had in storage in various parts of Manchuria 1,436 pieces of field artillery, 8,989 machine guns, 11,052 grenade-throwers, 3,078 trucks, 104,777 horses, 21,084 supply cars, 815 special vehicles, and 287 command cars. These captured supplies and equipment were not transferred to the Chinese Government. Neither were the surrendered items."

According to page 186 of "The China Handbook, 1950," Chinese forces under the central government collected the following weapons and equipment from Japanese troops in China, Taiwan, and northern FIC by mid-April 1946: 685,897 rifles, 60,377 pistols, 29,822 light and heavy machine guns, 12,446 artillery pieces "of various kinds and calibers," 383 tanks, 151 armored trucks, 15,785 trucks, 74,159 horses, 1,068 aircraft, and 1,400 naval vessels with total tonnage 54,600 (most of these were useless). Fuel and munitions captured amounted to 3,101,927 gallons of avgas, 6,000 tons of aerial bombs, ~180,994,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, ~2,035,000 rounds of pistol ammunition, and over 2,070,000 shells "of various kinds." Chinese communist troops occupied Chengteh, Chihfeng, Tulun, Kalgan, and Kupeikow, which were not handed over to the national army. (I do not know what became of this materiel, perhaps it was destroyed after being collected)

Therefore, the answer seems to apply pressure on the USSR to get out of Manchuria ASAP under the terms of the treaty rather than allow them to further foment civil war and communist revolution. Considering the threat, if all else failed the KMT may have been justified in issuing an ultimatum for the Soviets to either leave in accordance with the agreement or be treated as a hostile occupation force.

Respectfully just how would the KMT force the Soviets to leave? The only way to prevent this from happening would be to have prevented the Soviets from joining the war against Japan, and I can't see how to do that. Stalin was going to get his pound of flesh no matter what. At first Stalin wanted to reestablish the status quo of 1904, but then wisely deferred to Chinese Nationalism, and accepted Chinese Sovereignty over Manchuria.
 
Respectfully just how would the KMT force the Soviets to leave? The only way to prevent this from happening would be to have prevented the Soviets from joining the war against Japan, and I can't see how to do that. Stalin was going to get his pound of flesh no matter what. At first Stalin wanted to reestablish the status quo of 1904, but then wisely deferred to Chinese Nationalism, and accepted Chinese Sovereignty over Manchuria.

They can denounce Stalin's government as an aggressor and declare its presence an illegal occupation. This wouldn't be Mussolini vs Ethiopia or Japan in Manchuria: China was one of the founding members of the UN, which, unlike the League of Nations the United States had an expressed interest in as a means of preventing a future war. A test of this magnitude would basically compel them (and the British and possibly French too) to take strong actions quickly if they wanted this 'experiment' to be anything more than a sham. If the Soviet regime is isolated at the UN security council, basically it will be them against the entire world. If they walk out Matsuoka-style, they will have further destroyed all credibility and established themselves as the successor to Hitler and the Japanese militarists. Additionally a confrontation with the USSR in the interests of self defense would also offer an opportunity to repair frayed US-KMT ties and possibly secure more military and economic aid to Chiang Kai Shek. Maybe there would be a 'Chinese Marshall Plan' or NATO equivalent on the USSR's eastern border.

Continuing in that vein, although an actual declaration of war and subsequent attacks on Soviet forces in Manchuria would have been risky from a military and humanitarian standpoint, an ultimatum backed by a credible will to fight would have forced an ageing Stalin into the uncomfortable position of either backing down or having to face another war on the extreme periphery of the USSR after his regime just survived its 'death struggle' with Nazi Germany. This, combined with the simmering Cold War in Central Europe, the prospect of global isolation, and the gathering of a worldwide anti-Soviet front, might have forced him to fold.

Even if the Chinese declared war as a last resort, the opportunity for strengthening ties with the US (which had suffered toward the end of WWII) and the chance for a quick UN mediation meant that the KMT might have reasonably expected to succeed, as long as it limited its goals to getting the Soviets out of Manchuria and suppressing communism in China.
 
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They can denounce Stalin's government as an aggressor and declare its presence an illegal occupation. This wouldn't be Mussolini vs Ethiopia or Japan in Manchuria: China was one of the founding members of the UN, which, unlike the League of Nations the United States had an expressed interest in as a means of preventing a future war. A test of this magnitude would basically compel them (and the British and possibly French too) to take strong actions quickly if they wanted this 'experiment' to be anything more than a sham. If the Soviet regime is isolated at the UN security council, basically it will be them against the entire world. If they walk out Matsuoka-style, they will have further destroyed all credibility and established themselves as the successor to Hitler and the Japanese militarists. Additionally a confrontation with the USSR in the interests of self defense would also offer an opportunity to repair frayed US-KMT ties and possibly secure more military and economic aid to Chiang Kai Shek. Maybe there would be a 'Chinese Marshall Plan' or NATO equivalent on the USSR's eastern border.

Continuing in that vein, although an actual declaration of war and subsequent attacks on Soviet forces in Manchuria would have been risky from a military and humanitarian standpoint, an ultimatum backed by a credible will to fight would have forced an ageing Stalin into the uncomfortable position of either backing down or having to face another war on the extreme periphery of the USSR after his regime just survived its 'death struggle' with Nazi Germany. This, combined with the simmering Cold War in Central Europe, the prospect of global isolation, and the gathering of a worldwide anti-Soviet front, might have forced him to fold.

Even if the Chinese declared war as a last resort, the opportunity for strengthening ties with the US (which had suffered toward the end of WWII) and the chance for a quick UN mediation meant that the KMT might have reasonably expected to succeed, as long as it limited its goals to getting the Soviets out of Manchuria and suppressing communism in China.

Sorry to say the scenario you paint is completely unrealistic. The Western Allies didn't care much about Manchuria, and North China. They did care about Eastern Europe, and it took 45 years of Cold War to get the Soviets to leave. The USA did get the Soviets to leave Northern Iran in 1946, because it wasn't that important to them, compared to the Far East. In 1945 Nationalist China was a fragile State, devastated by war, militarily, and economically weak. The Chinese Nationalists were hoping to get what aid they could get from West, and East, and hang on for deer life. The Soviets for their part were striping out the industrial plant in Manchuria, and shipping it back home, they weren't about to stop, and put it back.

As for an aging Stalin backing down from a threat of war from Chiang the idea isn't serious. The only danger to Stalin would be an early stroke from fits of laughter. Like Churchill Stalin regarded Chiang, and Chinese Power with contempt. Stalin was a ruthless, and evil cynic, only power entered into his calculations, and Nationalist China had almost none.
 
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