Op. Torch worst case scenario


So I guess that's it then...

No chance for a great big naval battle, and even if the allies pulled back, there would be no way for the Axis to reinforce that region in the long run.

It would seriously delay the Allied timetable though, so there's that.

Moving on to the realm of ASB, if the Italian fleet confronted Eastern Task Force + Force H, how would that fight go?
 
Magnum
I think with a few changes you can get closer to your battle. First have the Allies choose the higher risk option & send the Eastern TF to capture Bone. Second look at the possibilities in terms of all the naval and air forces that can be deployed. Again, take a look at the battle that developed around the Pedestal operation.
 
Again the Brits changed their deception story. Now the massive naval force entering the Mediterranian was destined for Sardinia. For the third time Hitler & Co at OKW bought off on the fairy tale and were sending messages hither & yon concerning redeploying German and Italian forces in the Med to counter a Sardinian invasion.

Did a small story a while back, about this very idea.

Allied landings in Tunisia, Sardinia & Corsica + the Vichy fleet setting sail.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/a-different-torch.297273/

A sort of "best case scenario" for *Torch.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
It's been pointed out that the infrastructure in North Africa was pitiful and that the Germans wouldn't be able to hold a line in the Atlas Mountains, since the American superiority in logistics (endless supplies of reliable trucks, in other words) would allow them to maintain a much larger force. But it's a pretty enormous distance from Casablanca to Oran by land and the Germans would be the ones on the defensive. It seems to me at least possible that the Germans could put up a pretty stout resistance for awhile. Thoughts?
 
I haven't read the thread so forgive me if this has been stated before, but how have the Italians got the fuel to use all 7 of their battleships at the same time? IIRC at the time of Operation Pedestal the Italians only had enough fuel to use one of their battleships and decided to only cruisers and destroyers.

If they did have the fuel to keep the whole fleet operational I suggest that rather than a direct attack on the invasion task force it might be better to use the fleet for "battleship convoys" like the ones the Italians sent to Libya in the early part of 1942 so that a greater proportion of the supplies dispatched to Tunisia got through.
 
No Siege of Stalingrad might help because the Luftwaffe's transport force could be concentrated on supplying Tunisia for about 2½ months. Plus AFAIK the Luftwaffe transport units supplying Tunisia while Stalingrad was going on had lower loss rates to the Luftwaffe might have more transport aircraft from 2nd February 1943.

The Luftwaffe had 85 transport staffeln at the end of October 1942 rising to 96 at the end of November, which was still 96 at the end of December and 109 at the end of January.

Perhaps it could be that the Caucasus offensive was more successful, which might also be how the Regia Navale had enough fuel to use all its ships at once.
 
It's been pointed out that the infrastructure in North Africa was pitiful and that the Germans wouldn't be able to hold a line in the Atlas Mountains, since the American superiority in logistics (endless supplies of reliable trucks, in other words) would allow them to maintain a much larger force. But it's a pretty enormous distance from Casablanca to Oran by land and the Germans would be the ones on the defensive. It seems to me at least possible that the Germans could put up a pretty stout resistance for awhile. Thoughts?

the thread wasn't really about the land battle though.

But yeah, you could have significant resistance, if you are able to stay well supplied.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
If the Allies do not occupy Algiers, perhaps after turning back in the face of a surface threat, can the Germans occupy it as they did Tunis IOTL? How would the French react?
 
It's been pointed out that the infrastructure in North Africa was pitiful and that the Germans wouldn't be able to hold a line in the Atlas Mountains, since the American superiority in logistics (endless supplies of reliable trucks, in other words) would allow them to maintain a much larger force. But it's a pretty enormous distance from Casablanca to Oran by land and the Germans would be the ones on the defensive. It seems to me at least possible that the Germans could put up a pretty stout resistance for awhile. Thoughts?

How long OTL did it take the Allies to build their airbase & airforce suffcient to isolate Tunisia? It was about five months. Work started in mid November, the Axis supply flow started failing in late March. In Sicilly the Allied AF was not trying very hard, still the supply flow was shakey before Op Husky started. Op Strangle had the desired effect in April 1944 when Keselring looked at the effect of Allied air attacks & how close his armies south of Rome had before fuel and ammo ran out. The Transportation Plan against western France pretty well trashed supply deliver to 7th & 15th Armies in less than six months.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
IIRC, the Germans assumed that the Torch convoys were heading towards Malta or perhaps intended to land behind Rommel's lines in Libya. Therefore, they positioned their U-boats and bombers to attack the ships as they passed south of Sicily. Had they correctly guessed the actual destination, they could have positioned them much farther to the west and been in place to inflict terrible damage.
 
IIRC, the Germans assumed that the Torch convoys were heading towards Malta or perhaps intended to land behind Rommel's lines in Libya. ....

That was one thought. Ultimately Hitler & his staff went with the disinformation fed them via the Double Cross system & concluded the target was Sardinia. That was late on the 4th or early on the 5th Nov when the Eastern & Center TF passed Gibraltar & the German observers on the Spanish coast. However the Germans did not control naval operations in the Med. Those were the Italians baliwick. While the Germans could influence strategy & operations the Italians held the weight in naval and air power. Commando Supremo did judge correctly the target was French north Africa, but were reluctant to deploy significant force west wards beyond fighter cover.

There was also a problem of reaction time. The reports of the fleets passing into the Med came a bit late for redeploying submarines to the Algerian coast and air wings to western Sicily and Sardinia. As it was Axis bombers later based in Sardinia could raid the eastern Algerian ports. They did sink & damage a few cargo ships and a French cruiser. They also took losses from the Allied interceptors based to cover the ports.

Unlike with the Pedestal operation the Axis got caught pants down with Torch. Perhaps, had the Italians been a bit more on the ball, or the French betrayed the operation the Italian subs & torpedo boats could have been redeployed in time. As I understand there were 130 Axis aircraft operational on Sardinia on 6th November. A weeks notice might have allowed that to be doubled or tripled. The Axis bombers would still have been operating beyond the limits of fighter escort, but 200+ bombers would have their effect.
 
Lets assume the Italians figure out Algeria is to be invaded, & figure it out when the Eastern & Central TF depart he UK approx 26-28 October. That gives over a week to prepare. So:

1. How many bombers can be deployed to Sardinia & Sicilly that have the range to reach the Eastern TF landing sites near Algiers?

2. How many submarines could be deployed to this area on a weeks notice?

2b How powerful were the Allied ASW defenses for both the Eastern and Center TF?

3. a look at the map makes it clear the Eastern TF target is entirely out of fighter range from Sardinia. Would the Italians risk any cruisers or destroyers vs the Eastern TF without CAP? I am assuming they would try for night attacks.

4. Would the Axis contemplate a preemptive occupation of the Tunisian and Algerian ports/airfields before the Allies enter the Med?

4b Would tis preemptive move by the Axis cause more French leaders to oppose them and opt for the Allies?
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
1. How many bombers can be deployed to Sardinia & Sicilly that have the range to reach the Eastern TF landing sites near Algiers?

Not sure exactly. But heavy Luftwaffe reinforcements were sent after the landings themselves.

2. How many submarines could be deployed to this area on a weeks notice?

IIRC, twenty or so were waiting around Sicily in the expectation that the Allies would pass that way.

2b How powerful were the Allied ASW defenses for both the Eastern and Center TF?

Not nearly as strong as they would be in 1943.

3. a look at the map makes it clear the Eastern TF target is entirely out of fighter range from Sardinia. Would the Italians risk any cruisers or destroyers vs the Eastern TF without CAP? I am assuming they would try for night attacks.

Probably not. As far as the surface fleet was concerned, the Italians were understandably scaredy cats. But then, what if they used airfields in Tunisia?

4. Would the Axis contemplate a preemptive occupation of the Tunisian and Algerian ports/airfields before the Allies enter the Med?

4b Would tis preemptive move by the Axis cause more French leaders to oppose them and opt for the Allies?

They still have the stick of threatening unoccupied France at this point. So they could say to Darlan, "Listen up. The limeys and Yankees are about to land in Algeria. You had better make damn sure that your men resist them stoutly, like you promised, otherwise we will occupy southern France. Oh, and by the way, we're sending the 1st Parachute Division to help you out and keep an eye on things."
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Here's a question. The French Navy resisted the Allied landings pretty forcefully at first. If Darlan, for whatever reason, had ordered the Toulon fleet to sortie and attack the Allied forces, would they have done so?
 
Depends on their actual fuel state. The German armistice commission was concerned about a unauthorized sortie of the French fleet & the ships were allowed to take on only small quantities of fuel. Just sufficient for housekeeping. Naturally the French tried to cheat, but I have no idea how thurough the armistice inspections were. Neither do I know what fuel lay in the depot ashore. The stuff was 'valuable' & the Germans may have been sending trainloads north for naval ops in the Baltic & North Sea. As it was the French had some 12+ hours to get the fleet to sea . That would have saved it from German capture or scuttling. Instead the commanders choose scuttling. Why?

This fuel problem affects the Italians as well. The naval stores were thin on bunker fuel & deploying the fuel hogs was becoming a all or nothing decision
 
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... They still have the stick of threatening unoccupied France at this point. So they could say to Darlan, "Listen up. The limeys and Yankees are about to land in Algeria. You had better make damn sure that your men resist them stoutly, like you promised, otherwise we will occupy southern France. Oh, and by the way, we're sending the 1st Parachute Division to help you out and keep an eye on things."

Some of the French commanders choose to resist the Germans contrary to orders. Barre choose to disobey orders to confine his men to the barracks & instead deployed some around the airfields the Germans were flying into. The rest he marched off into the hills and broke out the hidden supply dumps he stashed there. When confronted by a Axis mixed group at Medjeb his soldiers disobeyed orders again and defended the town and critical bridge. Barres counterpart in Bizerte more or less dropped his trousers and rolled over for the Germans. Not only confining his command to camp but disarming them as well. Conversely Nougues the governor general of Morroco offered all the resitance he could to the Allies, and dragged his feet when Darlan ordered a cease fire. When the Allied intel started making contact with French officers of possible pro Allied sympathy they found Nougues was busy locking them up in a military prison. It took a direct order from Darlan to reverse this. Allied counter intel services also claimed Nougues had aided German armistice commission reps to depart to Spain, and had his own intel section sending key bits of info to German agents. In France one of the generals had his command marching off to Bourdeux & preparing to attack the German garrison there. Apparently under the belief a Allied invasion fleet was just over the horizon. He was relieved of command before this attack was executed.

What this hints at is the divided opinions of the French leaders & how any effort to take militiary action would be a cat herding exercise.
 
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