Onward to Defeat!

TFSmith121

Banned
Sorry, how did that advantage in firepower work out

...there is a big gap between "anything less than infallible and invincible" and what usually happens. It's often treated as "US promptly takes Canada and the Brits have to like it or lump it". Harrison is just the most ridiculous manifestation. I mean, even in TFSmith's discussions, Canada is sufficiently forested that the undeniable (and huge) advantage in British effective fire range (about a factor of eight, AIUI) is useless since all combat takes place at smoothbore range...
...and at the same time Canada is sufficiently open that guerillas can't expect to hide out against US forces.

Sorry, how did that advantage in firepower work out against troops with rifled small arms and artillery, in the field or in entrenchments, in Russia in 1854-56 or in South Africa in 1880-81?

The Maoris barely had rifled small arms, and yet they managed to keep British regulars and colonial militia at a disadvantage, off and on, for much of the 1860s...and there were some irregulars without modern firearms who bested a British infantry battalion armed with rifles (and not muzzle loaders) and with artillery support, on the veld in 1879...

You are more than welcome to critique any given chapter, part, or section of BROS - I welcome it, and have from day one. I would appreciate that, rather than blanket statements. Thanks

Best,
 
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...there is a big gap between "anything less than infallible and invincible" and what usually happens. It's often treated as "US promptly takes Canada and the Brits have to like it or lump it".
Harrison is just the most ridiculous manifestation. I mean, even in TFSmith's discussions, Canada is sufficiently forested that the undeniable (and huge) advantage in British effective fire range (about a factor of eight, AIUI) is useless since all combat takes place at smoothbore range...
...and at the same time Canada is sufficiently open that guerillas can't expect to hide out against US forces.

I'm not disagreeing with your points regarding the hypothetical war, but:

1. This still understates the vitriol and condescension in Grenadier's posts, which was my main point.

2. I don't read every ACW discussion here (god, but there's way too many...it's the Pre-1900 WW2), but I feel like you're overestimating the Ameriwank sentiment in them, as well. If anything, I feel like the board consensus would be: likely but not certain British victory if war breaks out in 1862, certain victory in 1861, but intervention itself is highly unlikely, and post-1862 intervention becomes progressively less likely as well as less successful. And again, comparing pro-American posts in such threads to Harrison is like comparing a Star Wars Prequel to Plan 9 From Outer Space. The latter's in a whole other league in incompetence, and conflating the two betrays a severe lack of perspective.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
If anything, I feel like the board consensus would be: likely but not certain British victory if war breaks out in 1862, certain victory in 1861, but intervention itself is highly unlikely, and post-1862 intervention becomes progressively less likely as well as less successful.

I will be honest, if that is the board consensus then what I've personally seen indicates it is a highly fractious one. My usual perception is that most people view the British as unlikely to win due to inbuilt Union advantages no matter the time the war kicks off...
 
I will be honest, if that is the board consensus then what I've personally seen indicates it is a highly fractious one. My usual perception is that most people view the British as unlikely to win due to inbuilt Union advantages no matter the time the war kicks off...

Well, to say there is a consensus at all is probably being generous. Nothing gets quite so heated on this board as competition between the US and the UK. At any rate, I doubt either of us have done careful and systematic analysis of the issue, and we see what we want to see...it would probably be for the best to say that a broad spectrum of opinion gets presented regardless, so getting too worked up about the exact balance is probably a waste.
 
Thanks for the kind words... I note our OP has an interesting posting history, but will leave it at that.

One thing about the "Americans have no access to powder and/or nitrates after the British impose a blockade" meme. One may wish to consider:

a) the efficacy of a blockade 3,000 miles across the North Atlantic (beginning in the middle of winter, mind) and in an age of wooden cruising vessels with the need for auxiliary steam propulsion in opposition to steam coast defense vessels without the need for auxiliary sail propulsion, much less how porous the British blockade was in 1775-83 (including before the French intervened) and again in 1812-15, and for that matter, the USN's blockade of the rebel states in 1861-65, especially in the first 12-24 months;

b) the stockpiles of both finished powder and nitrates/saltpeter on hand in April, 1861 with the Army Ordnance Department, the Navy Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, and the amount of finished powder with troops and the fleet (including the Revenue Marine and the Marine Corps) in the same period;

c) the amount of both finished powder and nitrates/saltpeter imported between April of '61 and (pick your potential cut-off date) but presumably anywhere from seven to 12 months later (hint: for Army Ordnance, it is in the Official Records; you have to go to the National Archives for the Navy, including the Revenue Marine and Marine Corps - it's not on-line. Sorry;)), and by and for the state Adjutant General's offices (remembering that the US states had their own procurement arms, which means you have to go to Albany, Harrisburg, Trenton, etc.), much less that imported (or smuggled) by civilian interests, for sale, civil use, or simple speculation;

d) the size, speed, and general capacity of the US merchant marine in 1861-62, especially those fast (including Blue Riband holders) trans-atlantic steamers, and the European sources of arms and munitions available to the US in 1861-62, and their various regard or otherwise for 1) Britain, 2) rebellious slaveholders, and 3) hard currency (i.e., all that specie the US did not pay domestic vendors with between 1862 and 1875, when the Specie Payment Resumption Act was passed by Congress;

e) the available US sources, including both cave niter, surface deposits, and nitre-bed production possibilities; worth noting in this context are the cave and surface deposits of Kentucky alone (which yielded 100 to 150 tons of finished powder annually as early as 1810; imagine what could be done with free labor and steam; it would have been a gold rush that would make the Comstock look penny-ante); historically, the cost of production and shipping was prohibitive after 1815 (and DuPont's attempt to fix the price of saltpeter did not help) but the saltpetre/nitrate resources of Kentucky, West Virginia, and the other states of the Ohio Valley region were well-understood by the US leadership in the Nineteenth Century. And DuPont, of course, was far from the only source of finished powder for the War Department;

There's also the minor reality, of course, that chemistry was hardly an unknown discipline in the United States in 1861-62; there are these minor institutions known as Harvard, Yale, Princeton, etc.

Now, if someone actually has done the above, and produced a professionally-sourced and academically-vetted work on the issue, I'd be interested in reading it, as I am sure many of us would ...

But until or unless someone can offer such a title or titles up (and if so I'm sure the friendly campus library at Random Adjectival State U. does, or can get it interlibrary loan), I'd suggest the "Americans are reduced to bow and arrow on M Day+1" concept may be slightly flawed.

Tell, you what - I have to go into the office today, but this weekend I can wander the shelves at my local version of RAS U. and see what I can find. Umpteen million volumes, I'm sure there's a dissertation or two that examines the issue.

Best,

a) Well of course the problem is (as the superb article "Dupont, Dahlgren, and the Civil War Nitre Shortage" which for those interested is easily found through Google) that Britain simply cutting off nitre shipments is a massive problem since agents both in Britain and British India were the primary supplier for the entire US armed forces and no alternative had been found. Hence why they attempted to both purchase supplies from intermediaries (such as Japan) or from a secondary source, Chile. Now the reasons for this were difficult OTL both due to distance and expense versus British supplies, but that probably becomes a tad irrelevant with a British blockade since they now don't have freedom of movement.

b) was something along the lines of a capacity upwards of 4.5 million pounds IIRC

c) Well considering there's explicit mention of domestic and pre-existing stocks being eroded during the winter of 61-62 in the aforementioned article I would imagine the stocks on hand weren't exactly overwhelming, if they were the Navy wouldn't be casting around for an alternative source now would it? Mind you I wouldn't bet good money on the supply from sources suggested exceeding 1 million pounds.

Smuggling of course is a different bird, but no single ship is going to be able to carry in excess of a few hundred tons at most.

d) none of whom could even come close in dealing the simply vast tons of the stuff Britain could supply. They had their own domestic sources, but those were all supplemented by British nitre. Britain had a very clear monopoly in this time period. I don't think anyone disputes that.

e) Chemistry is of course understood, but there is very little reference to any sort of nitre beds being used in domestic US production versus imported products on a mass scale. The estimates for how long setting up a very large domestic industry can be extrapolated in part by comparing the time it would take the German method to properly be adjusted to the climate of the Northern states (and for those not interested in doing all the math look up the work of Joseph LeConte who did much of the work in setting up the Confederate industry). Now while Dupont was not the only supplier, his company was the largest in the Union, which of course makes his concern on the matter just a bit justified.

As I've said though, there are sources online which can be read (and have of course been quoted by historians of far more pedigree than myself) which tend to show its not a rosy picture in the case of a British embargo.

As a start I would suggest the "Dupont and the Nitre Shortage" article since it is well researched with tons of foot notes for the researchers pleasure.

Until then the claim that the Union would have absolutely zero problem in overcoming a problem it was not historically prepared for is somewhat unsubstantiated.
 
Sorry, how did that advantage in firepower work out against troops with rifled small arms and artillery, in the field or in entrenchments, in Russia in 1854-56 or in South Africa in 1880-81?

Pretty well at Alma and Inkerman, and considering the final outcome of the siege of Sevastopol, again pretty well. Sure there was the failure at Great Redan but you can't honestly say any of the list of disasters in the attempts to storm Vicksburg, Atlanta, or Petersburg were any somehow superior examples of arms.

The Maoris barely had rifled small arms, and yet they managed to keep British regulars and colonial militia at a disadvantage, off and on, for much of the 1860s...and there were some irregulars without modern firearms who bested a British infantry battalion armed with rifles (and not muzzle loaders) and with artillery support, on the veld in 1879...

Through a frankly ingenious use of fortifications, terrain and, guerrilla tactics. Something no army in history has yet found a way of decisively beating save through attrition. Which is exactly what happened, how many of the Maori Wars ended in favor of the Maori though?

As to the first Boer War, I'm not sure what point there is to be made against a three month war which saw the British garrison defeated in the field due to both poor leadership and guerrilla tactics by the Boers? I don't think the Americans would suddenly dawn khakis and begin to melt into the countryside to fire from over 500 yards away (which they are incapable of doing anyways) versus give battle in the field like the Russians.
 
Um... wow. I really have to wonder how long some of you have been around here. The 'Trent War' subject has come up on here a lot. The Union problem with gunpowder has been mentioned a lot. The comparison of British vs. Union manpower/naval power has been discussed a lot. And.. it's a given on here that everyone thinks the Union would win? Since when? From what I remember, it was pretty much the opposite for a long time. I always find that the discussion of British vs. Union manpower/logistics/shipping troops overseas to be rather irrelevant, since the Union can do next to nothing to stop the British navy from blockading the Union coastline and ruining the US economy, stopping gunpowder imports, etc. A blockade is a sure fire 'the British win' strategy, regardless of what happens on land...
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Except that there is no evidence the RN could

Um... wow. I really have to wonder how long some of you have been around here. The 'Trent War' subject has come up on here a lot. The Union problem with gunpowder has been mentioned a lot. The comparison of British vs. Union manpower/naval power has been discussed a lot. And.. it's a given on here that everyone thinks the Union would win? Since when? From what I remember, it was pretty much the opposite for a long time. I always find that the discussion of British vs. Union manpower/logistics/shipping troops overseas to be rather irrelevant, since the Union can do next to nothing to stop the British navy from blockading the Union coastline and ruining the US economy, stopping gunpowder imports, etc. A blockade is a sure fire 'the British win' strategy, regardless of what happens on land...

Except there is no evidence an RN blockade, as mooted in 1862, would actually suffice to limit imports of powder and precursors sufficiently that a combination of running, smuggling, use of the Army stockpile of powder AND nitrates (note that Dahlgren and company are Navy; there were multiple procurement arms in 1862), and, of course, domestic US sources - which were essentially untouched in 1862 - would cover the initial year of an Anglo-American conflict that began in 1861, quite comfortably.

The actual US Army Ordnance stockpile numbers (entirely separate from the Navy and/or state procurement) are in the OR; if one looks for them, one will discover they are vastly more significant than the numbers quoted in the 1949 9-page article by a graduate student cited above.

Finally, there is the question of what motivation the DuPont interests may have had in 1862-63 regarding gunpowder production ... There is a reason they were among the trusts busted in the later half of the century.

Not to suggest a skeptical read of a single source, much less the motivations behind the facts reported may be in order, but still.

There is also the undeniable reality the rebels imported almost umpteen million pounds of powder and precursors in 1861-65; as well as mined cave and surface niter (at least until the US overran the sources in Western Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas) at which point they fell back on urine and manure and surface deposits in Texas.

It comes down to the reality that in a pre-oil age economy, panacea targets are just that; economic warfare against a continental autarky in the 1860s is not going to have a significant impact, especially at transtlantic distances, for years (if ever), and the reality of European warfare in the 1850s and 1860s is the conflicts ended quickly. Again, if our friend the OP has a specific criticism, perhaps they would be better served by making it as such - of a specific passage in a specific piece of writing.

If not, it says something.;)


Best
 
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Except there is no evidence an RN blockade, as mooted in 1862, would actually suffice to limit imports of powder and precursors sufficiently that a combination of running, smuggling, use of the Army stockpile of powder AND nitrates (note that Dahlgren and company are Navy; there were multiple procurement arms in 1862), and, of course, domestic US sources - which were essentially untouched in 1862 - would cover the initial year of an Anglo-American conflict that began in 1861, quite comfortably.

Except for the fact that the British did have a monopoly on nitre and were the largest net exporters of the stuff in the era. That might have something to do with it. I'm curious as to where this second massive cheap exporter of the stuff is.

Though I can certainly imagine certain domestic sources would object quite strenuously to the removal of their powder supplies (mining interests most certainly) since it would quite noticeably cut back on productivity.

Also, using the numbers which might have been on hand based on uninterrupted shipping in 1862 can't possibly be considered accurate in this situation.

The actual US Army Ordnance stockpile numbers (entirely separate from the Navy and/or state procurement) are in the OR; if one looks for them, one will discover they are vastly more significant than the numbers quoted in the 1949 9-page article by a graduate student cited above.

That's true only if you include powder and nitre, which the article doesn't, explicitly referencing nitre. They aren't exactly wildly inaccurate.

Finally, there is the question of what motivation the DuPont interests may have had in 1862-63 regarding gunpowder production ... There is a reason they were among the trusts busted in the later half of the century.

So, that his virtual monopoly on the supply was busted in 1912 after having expanded into purchasing smaller competing companies and coming under scrutiny is reason to doubt the word of a man (who was dead when his companies trust was busted) whose company runs on providing the lions share of the stuff in 1862?

Curious criteria that.

Not to suggest a skeptical read of a single source, much less the motivations behind the facts reported may be in order, but still.

Little difficult with the whole death thing before trust busting became a thing post-war.

There is also the undeniable reality the rebels imported almost umpteen million pounds of powder and precursors in 1861-65; as well as mined cave and surface niter (at least until the US overran the sources in Western Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas) at which point they fell back on urine and manure and surface deposits in Texas.

Oh indeed they did, from Great Britain. Who still had a monopoly on the stuff, which the Confederacy continued to do until all foreign shipping was cut off to them.

Interesting how neither side was ever quite able to have a 100% domestic supply isn't it?

It comes down to the reality that in a pre-oil age economy, panacea targets are just that; economic warfare against a continental autarky in the 1860s is not going to have a significant impact, especially at transtlantic distances, for years (if ever), and the reality of European warfare in the 1850s and 1860s is the conflicts ended quickly.

Curious to say the US is a continental autarky when it lacked the means of mass producing steel at this time or to totally produce their own nitre supplies. Mind you economics had lots to do with that, but its blatantly dishonest to say the US was a complete autarky.

Though what is your criteria for conflicts ending quickly precisely? You seem to be stretching criteria out a bit to make these arguments fit.
 
I'm not disagreeing with your points regarding the hypothetical war, but:

1. This still understates the vitriol and condescension in Grenadier's posts, which was my main point.

2. I don't read every ACW discussion here (god, but there's way too many...it's the Pre-1900 WW2), but I feel like you're overestimating the Ameriwank sentiment in them, as well. If anything, I feel like the board consensus would be: likely but not certain British victory if war breaks out in 1862, certain victory in 1861, but intervention itself is highly unlikely, and post-1862 intervention becomes progressively less likely as well as less successful. And again, comparing pro-American posts in such threads to Harrison is like comparing a Star Wars Prequel to Plan 9 From Outer Space. The latter's in a whole other league in incompetence, and conflating the two betrays a severe lack of perspective.

There is a chance that there may be a touch of tongue in cheek over exaggeration on my part in my posts that you may have missed, unless you think I am seriously comparing the ACW/Brit intervention stories on these boards to the drivel that has been actually published on the subject.

I have never said that Victorian Britain is and should be portrayed as invincible and infallible as it was no such thing but neither would it would it be quite the punching bag that it tends to be more often than not.

But enough from me I will take my Vitriol and condescension and head into the sunset
(it did get a discussion going though)
 
There is a chance that there may be a touch of tongue in cheek over exaggeration on my part in my posts that you may have missed, unless you think I am seriously comparing the ACW/Brit intervention stories on these boards to the drivel that has been actually published on the subject.

I have never said that Victorian Britain is and should be portrayed as invincible and infallible as it was no such thing but neither would it would it be quite the punching bag that it tends to be more often than not.

But enough from me I will take my Vitriol and condescension and head into the sunset
(it did get a discussion going though)

In my defense, you've had so few posts here, I can't say that I know you at all. Worse comparisons have certainly been made on this board over the years. If you were deliberately exaggerating your sentiments, that I can more readily understand, and I apologize for my misinterpretation. That said, if I could persuade you to stay just a while longer, there is one last thing I was hoping you could clear up for me.

Name one timeline, not a WI discussion, but an actual timeline, where the sort of unremitting British incompetence you bemoan takes place in the context of their entering the American Civil War. I cannot fairly name a single such timeline, but you've technically been on the board a bit longer than me, so I assume you have some examples in mind. For the sake of the discussion, I'd be interested in seeing them.
 
But it was ALL BORING; why care? No city or army ever fell, pretty much. And All trench warfare and digging ALL the time. That, I guess is why EVERYBODY made up lies, especially the losers and THESE threads, and some authors, globally, whom want to sell well.

We DID have the biggest fleet there was of our geeky ironclad monitors, meaning you could about invading or bringing anything close. And nothing to keep it from dominating and helping take Canada once we were sufficiently done with the CSA.And we would go building deepwater ironclads if you went to war with us.

But boringly, wouldn't you be likelier to go on the antislave side? Especially they had Rumsfeld as their diplomats. Told ya - the whole was all BORING all the time.

* The French were first, by Gloire.
 
I'm not disagreeing with your points regarding the hypothetical war, but:

1. This still understates the vitriol and condescension in Grenadier's posts, which was my main point.

2. I don't read every ACW discussion here (god, but there's way too many...it's the Pre-1900 WW2), but I feel like you're overestimating the Ameriwank sentiment in them, as well. If anything, I feel like the board consensus would be: likely but not certain British victory if war breaks out in 1862, certain victory in 1861, but intervention itself is highly unlikely, and post-1862 intervention becomes progressively less likely as well as less successful. And again, comparing pro-American posts in such threads to Harrison is like comparing a Star Wars Prequel to Plan 9 From Outer Space. The latter's in a whole other league in incompetence, and conflating the two betrays a severe lack of perspective.

Actually its quite insignificant in global terms - its a big thing in the US history, but without the US civil war the world of the 19 th century would not be THAT different ;)
 
Okay I may be slightly exaggerating (Except when it comes to Harrison where I expected a steam powered Death Star to appear any second) but like a fool time and time again I have hoped for something even slightly different to the British being bested with ease. Is their some kind rule written into the Universe that means when this subject comes up the British must always lose and lose badly?

That may be the way it goes in published AHs, but I've seen more Britwanks than Ameriwanks on this. One former poster on this site was counting every ship in the Royal Navy (including storeships, target hulks, and ships due to be scrapped) as fully armed, provisioned and crewed; ready to sail at an instant; and capable of going anywhere there was water (including up rapids faster than their top speed, across shoals shallower than their daft, and through canals shorter than their length and narrower than their beam).
 
Then add a force that can be raised from British India

The British Empire did have a manpower advantage, but between the Indian Rebellion of 1857 and the Great War, the only significant forces they sent out of India were to help secure areas that bordered India. The British forces in India were there to ensure India remained British, the same was true of many of their colonies. Few would be sent halfway around the world for a war where Britain's survival was not at stake.
 
In addition the UK can both base troops within the CSA and Canada.

The Confederacy had trouble supplying it's own troops with food, boots and clothing. There's no slack for also supplying British troops. Canada only had a population of 3 million and would be trying to equip their own troops first.
 
The British Empire did have a manpower advantage, but between the Indian Rebellion of 1857 and the Great War, the only significant forces they sent out of India were to help secure areas that bordered India. The British forces in India were there to ensure India remained British, the same was true of many of their colonies. Few would be sent halfway around the world for a war where Britain's survival was not at stake.

The Confederacy had trouble supplying it's own troops with food, boots and clothing. There's no slack for also supplying British troops. Canada only had a population of 3 million and would be trying to equip their own troops first.

They sent troops to africa when their interest was endangered, why wouldN't they send troops to America - The Confederacy has trouble because it is blockaded and brit assistance butterflies that away. The "basing" in means also that the Brits don't have to conduct landing operations - tehy can base their troops in friendly territory and stockpile food and other things in a "save" environment.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
I think Fiver's reference was to the "Indian" element of

They sent troops to africa when their interest was endangered, why wouldN't they send troops to America - The Confederacy has trouble because it is blockaded and brit assistance butterflies that away. The "basing" in means also that the Brits don't have to conduct landing operations - tehy can base their troops in friendly territory and stockpile food and other things in a "save" environment.

I think Fiver's reference was to the "Indian" element of the "Army of India" which was different than the "Army in India" much less the Indian Army.

Which was not the same as the "(Indian) Imperial Service Force" or the armies of the EIC's Bengal, Bombay, and Madras presidencies, at an earlier point.

Confused yet?

Best,
 
Actually its quite insignificant in global terms - its a big thing in the US history, but without the US civil war the world of the 19 th century would not be THAT different ;)

If this is in answer to my WW2 comparison, I was referring to how many TL's and how much discussion it draws, not global significance. I was basically just complaining about how overexposed it is.
 
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