In February 1971, with the NFSD study set to conclude in less than two months, D. J. Osias, an analyst with Bellcomm, NASA’s Apollo planning contractor, summarized and critiqued reports prepared by the three contractors. He began by examining the ways that the contractors had approached the problem of radiation shielding. “Nuclear propulsion,” he wrote, “complicates in-space operations by introducing a radioactive environment.”
All the RNS designs included a 3000-pound radiation shield on top of the NERVA I to create a conical radiation “shadow” for crew protection, but also relied on the vehicle’s propellants and structure for supplemental shielding. Osias asserted that “in regard to radiation shielding. . .the most optimistic results are being accepted and attention to the problem is diminishing.”
He also noted that, as liquid hydrogen was expended as propellant, it would cease to be available to serve as radiation shielding. As the RNS tank or tanks emptied, crew radiation dose would thus steadily increase. To solve this problem, NAR had developed a “stand-pipe” single-tank RNS concept, in which a cylindrical “central column” running the length of the main tank stood between the crew and the NERVA I engine. The central column would remain filled with hydrogen until the surrounding main tank was emptied. MDAC, for its part, had developed a “hybrid” RNS shielding design that included a small hydrogen tank between the bottom of the main tank and the top of the NERVA I engine.
Osias postulated a maximum allowable radiation dose for an astronaut from sources other than cosmic rays of between 10 and 25 Roentgen Equivalent Man (REM) per year. Astronauts riding an RNS would, however, receive 10 REM each time its NERVA I engine operated. An astronaut 10 miles behind or to the side of an RNS operating at full power would receive a radiation dose of between 25 and 30 REM per hour. Osias noted that the NFSD contractors had recommended that no piloted spacecraft approach to within 100 miles of an operating NERVA I engine.
Radiation created other operational problems, Osias added. Spacecraft could dock with an RNS by approaching through the cone-shaped radiation shadow that protected its crew. Docking an RNS to a large vehicle that protruded beyond the shadow – for example, a space station or a liquid hydrogen propellant depot – would, however, generate obvious problems. The large vehicle’s crew might be exposed to radiation from the NERVA I; more insidiously, the large vehicle’s structure would reflect radiation back at the RNS, endangering its crew.
The NERVA I engine would emit radiation not only while it was in operation; it would also generate spent nuclear fuel that would emit harmful levels of radiation for decades or centuries. Osias noted that NAR had “repeatedly emphasized [that] maintainability is essential to economic operation of the RNS.” A spacewalking repairman who approached to within 400 feet of the side of an RNS 10 days after its tenth (and, going by MSFC’s traffic model, final) Earth-moon roundtrip would, however, receive one REM per hour from the spent fuel it contained. Maintenance robots might replace the servicing capabilities of astronauts, Osias noted, but such systems would need expensive development.
Osias also reported that the “NFSD contractors. . .devoted little effort to [studying] emergency operations and malfunctions,” adding that “[n]uclear systems, more than chemical propulsion vehicles, have the ability to involve the general population of the [E]arth in a space accident.” A NERVA I explosion in LEO, for example, could lead to “random reentry of large pieces of radioactive material” that would probably survive reentry heating and strike Earth’s surface. He urged that prevention of “return of the NERVA engine to the [E]arth’s surface. . .be a basic rule of nuclear propulsion planning.”