Both sides had general plans that could roughly be drawn into two groups, offensive and defensive. Entire books could be written covering these various plans (and several have, especially the excellent Plan 9 by John Smith) but the one most crucial to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the early days is known today as “Seven Days to the River Rhine.” Much like the infamous Schlieffen plan of the first world war, the Seven Days focused on achieving a quick victory through overrunning the initial defensive lines, surrounding troop concentrations, and seizing important political, industrial, and strategic assets that would force a capitulation of NATO. The specifics of the original plan involved what basically amounted to a counterstrike against NATO after a nuclear attack against Poland, with the Soviets responding as such with nuclear strikes as they advance across Europe. It was a modified version of this plan that would end up being employed in the early days of the Third World War, informed by intelligence from inside West Germany and other NATO nations. Warsaw Pact planning counted heavily on several factors – surprise, overwhelming force, and speed. It was very much an attitude informed by the balance of power within Europe, where the majority of NATO’s manpower was overseas at any given time, and away from where the initial strikes would take place. A quick, decisive strike was required to eliminate influence from the areas where the Soviets and their puppet states were lacking, namely control of the seas.
NATO went through several doctrines and war plans leading up to the war, but crucial towards the conduct of the war and possibly the survival of the human species was the shift away from nuclear retaliation on an operational and tactical level, towards a trust that the conventional forces could conduct an effective defense of Western Europe. While most NATO defensive plans were simple in nature and had more to do with the distribution of forces in response to attack, along with counterattacks back to the border and perhaps beyond. To NATO, doctrine would be what made the difference in the end, not some grand strategic plan for quick victory. The focus had by 1986 shifted away from the idea of an active defense, to more of an elastic one. Called ‘AirLand Battle’ by its’ proponents in the US military and NATO command structures, it was intended to counter the lack of direct ability of NATO fight a war of attrition in the crucial opening stages of the war, and allow the outnumbered initial defenders to hopefully defeat larger forces without sustaining unacceptably large amounts of casualties. NATO forces would not stand toe to toe for long periods of time, instead using the recent advances in technology like ‘Smart Bombs’ along with maneuver warfare to take out enemy command and supply assets, hopefully allowing them to regain the tactical advantage as the Warsaw Pact offensive was slowed down. Buying time was crucial to NATO planners. The US and Canada would need to ship forces across the Atlantic, along with supplies for not only their own forces, but also for allies as well. Time was the crucial aspect for everyone’s plans, and whoever made the first move set the time schedule.
The Soviets were the first to blink. The young and new Gorbachev, never very well liked among the proponents of the Brezhnev doctrine or among party hardliners, attempted to put feelers out towards the United States to try and ease the tension caused by the Black Sea Incident, along with another arms restriction conference. This was a show of conciliation and weakness his enemies could not tolerate. On March 24th, 1986 Gorbachev was hustled into a car by KGB agents loyal to his political enemies, and took to a location outside the capital. There, a quick trial was held, the allegations falsified and no defense allowed. He was convicted for crimes against the people and party, and sentenced to death by firing squad. His apocryphal last words were apparently delivered with a cold calm to the KGB agent who blindfolded him. “I hope you enjoy midnight. I won’t get to see it.” Gorbachev was right. He was executed at 11:59 PM, in secret. His final resting place is still unknown.
At the head of this coup was a triumvirate consisting of three fellow politburo members: Sergey Sokolov, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, and Heydar Aliyev. All three were members of the political old guard, and had seized the opportunity to not only take power, but prevent Gorbachev’s potential reforms from eroding their own power bases. They also moved quickly to consolidate their own power over the next several days, focusing on potential enemies among the other members of the politburo. Viktor Chebrikov, head of the KGB, was killed attempting to flee to the west. Yegor Ligachyov, one of Gorbachev’s political prodigies died in a similar manner to his mentor, though his show trial was more public, the triumvirate accusing of being the ring leader of the conspiracy that killed Gorbachev. Boris Yeltsin, another politburo supporter of Gorbachev’s, escaped into Finland but was cornered by KGB agents a few days later, committing suicide rather than being captured alive. A few others were luckier. Andrei Gromyko, one of Gorbachev’s primary supporters and former foreign minister, slipped out of the country to Sweden, and from there fled to Switzerland, barely escaping there before the outbreak of war. By the end of March, the triumvirate had unquestioned control over the government, and had decided what course to take.
The military preparations began soon after, Soviet submarines receiving orders to move out into the Atlantic, reserve units being called up, and prestaging of supplies and men starting in Eastern Germany, the Finnish and Norwegian borders and Czechoslovakia. This build up was matched on the other side as well, intelligence reports and satellite imagery telling the west that the Cold War was likely to go hot. Operation Reforger was initiated, and the largest deployment of US forces to Europe since the end of the second world war began, spearheaded by five divisions who armed themselves with prepositioned equipment, along with the storied 101st Airborne, and NATO’s Standing Force Atlantic was reinforced in anticipation of Soviet convoy raiders. Over the ten days between the official take over and the start of the war, everything was on a knifes edge, both sides staring each other down as diplomatic relations broke down. Early morning, April 12th, 1986, the order came as the Soviet Union’s 3rd Shock Army crossed the border between East and West Germany.
The clock had ticked a second closer to midnight.