One Nation Indivisible: An American Civil War TL

"...and having thus chosen our course, without guile, and with pure purpose, let us renew our trust in God, and go forward without fear, and with manly hearts."
--President Abraham Lincoln of the United States of America

July 21, 1861
Manassas, Virginia

Major General Irvin McDowell, Commander of the Army of Northeastern Virginia, stared out at the battlefield of Manassas with increasing horror; in the center of the line, a brigade of Confederates were stopping his army's main push, led by an aged colonel. Group after group of green, untried Union infantrymen were decimated by the hardy Confederates and their damned accurate rifles. Behind Beauregard's troops, more rested and fed Confederate soldiers were pouring in from Manassas Railway Junction, which McDowell had earlier failed to take. Suddenly, the entire Confederate line surged forward, to McDowell's horror. Beauregard was charging. The General immediately leapt upon his horse, realizing it was a lost cause, and screamed, "Retreat! Retreat!" to his erstwhile men. The terrified Federals were only too happy to oblige.

. . .

Three Months Later--September 18, 1861

"...He [Garibaldi] said that the only way in which he could render service, as he ardently desired to do, to the cause of the United States, was as Commander-in-chief of its forces, that he would only go as such, and with the additional contingent power—to be governed by events—of declaring the abolition of slavery; that he would be of little use without the first, and without the second it would appear like a civil war in which the world at large could have little interest or sympathy."

---Letter from U.S. Sanford, U.S. Ambassador in Brussels, to American Foreign Secretary William H. Steward

Giuseppe Garibaldi, bandit, warrior, prospective Italian unifier, and advocate of civil rights worldwide, was a rude little fellow. Or so thought Abraham Lincoln, American President. However, what other man could command the Federal army? George McLellan was one of the weakest men Lincoln had ever met; his appointment to commander was only temporary. Ulysses S. Grant was a possible choice; but he was a drunk, and worse, a nobody. Henry Halleck was only a placeholder. Suffice it to say, he was no Washington. No American was capable of commanding the army. After all, most of the greatest U.S. generals had defected to the Confederacy! Only an Italian could do the job no American could. And yet he could not become general-in-chief. The job of general-in-chief was for men like Halleck, men skilled in bureaucracy. No, he deserved a field posting, an active command.

And thus did Giuseppe Garibaldi become Commander of Army of the Potomac, on October 14th, 1861.

---

Okay, so this is a TL I've had in my mind for a while. What if Garibaldi become commander of the Federal troops? I decided he couldn't become general-in-chief. Any fool could see that that was too much of a bureaucratic position for him. That's why I chose the Army of the Potomac. Anyway....thoughts?
 

Art

Monthly Donor
Beautiful!

Hurrah! Someone finally has done a Garibaldi in command story. And Lincoln, at the time, did not know of Grant. He was only in command of one regiment, at the time of Bull Run. What do I think? I'm enthusiastic about this tale. But Garibaldi was never a bandit, that I know of. and Lincoln was, at the time, in favor of Garvey's plan, the "ship them back to Africa, or South America" plan. Garibaldi would never have been for it. He had used revolvers in the campaign for Sicily, and had commanded irregular cavalry. And he had never had the best soldiers, except the Thousand, when he broke the Neapolitans in Sicily and Campania. He had never commanded so many men as the Army of the Potomac, but then, neither had anyone else. He was not a McClellan, a Pope,or a Burnside. That's the crucial advantage that the Union's armies in the East lacked. They never, until Grant, had a man who was willing to attack no matter what, and batter the enemy into submission. Half-hearted commanders payed the price for their timidity in the lives of their soldiers, because decisive victory saves lives, though it takes a higher cost.
 
The Army of the Potomac already had problems. Jumping in a foreigner is going to cause a good deal of discontent within the officer corps. Removing McClellan before he's had a chance to prove him weaknesses is going to cause morale problems and a major backlash among war Democrats. Assuming Garbaldi doesn't back down on being allowed to declare abolition, Lincoln is undermining his own authority, risking disaffection among the crucial border states, and inviting attacks from Radical Republican supporters of Fremont, who has recently been removed.
 
Thanks for the support, guys! This idea has been bouncing around in my head for a while, but I haven't really expanded on it beyond "Garibaldi becomes Potomac's leader". So, stay with me, guys. I'll have the next update as soon as I can figure it out.

Oh, and I'll try to address all of your concerns next time.
 

Art

Monthly Donor
Fremont had not been removed before Bull Run, for gods sake!

Fremont is a favorite of mine actually. It's not his fault he was going up against Stonewall Jackson and his so-called "Foot Cavalry".
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Group after group of green, untried Union infantrymen were decimated by the hardy Confederates and their damned accurate rifles.

Very minor nitpick. As best I know of the 44 CS units on the field only 5 had rifle-muskets, 9 had old fashioned rifles and the bulk (30) had smoothbores (of which 4 were still flintlock).

Of the 50 Union units 12 had rifle-muskets, 3 had old fashioned rifles, 2 had flintlocks and 33 had percussion smoothbores.

George McLellan was one of the weakest men Lincoln had ever met; his appointment to commander was only temporary. Ulysses S. Grant was a possible choice; but he was a drunk, and worse, a nobody. Henry Halleck was only a placeholder. Suffice it to say, he was no Washington. No American was capable of commanding the army. After all, most of the greatest U.S. generals had defected to the Confederacy!

McClellan impressed Lincoln deeply and was the only successful Union General at this point.

Grant is the newly appointed Colonel of the 21st Illinois, he is a nobody at this point.

Halleck is not a Federal officer. He is a California Militia officer trying to wangle a Generals commission. OTL he succeeded.

Getting Garibaldi to command the AoP is easy, leave McClellan in command of the Army of the Ohio and appoint Garibaldi.....
 
Enjoy! Just so you're warned, there's some bloody fighting in this update!

A General Goes to War

“As our case is new, we must think and act anew.”

--Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America

Lincoln had gone through several hurdles to secure his new general's appointment. Sometimes he had wondered why he was doing this; and then he remembered Garibaldi's energy, fame, and relentlessness. The Union needed those kinds of generals to crush the unlawful rebellion to the south. He had even promised to emancipate the slaves when the war was over, a promise he never intended to keep. He had argued with the Senate over Garibaldi's appointment; while most Northern Senators supported his choice, the senators from the so-called “border states”, slave states that had joined the Union, were furious about it. Thomas H. Hicks, governor of Maryland, had burst into a rage upon hearing of the Italian's appointment and had threatened secession. Lincoln had, in turn, coolly threatened to have him arrested for such treason. This had put down most of these treasonous statements, but resentment still smoldered among the border states. Indeed, some secret militias were, even now, being formed in Maryland to fight against the Federals, but no concrete steps had been taken as of yet.

Meanwhile, the great Italian himself was having significant troubles with his new army. When he had arrived in the U.S., he had discovered, to his great dismay, that his army was the size of a corps, much, much larger than anything he had ever commanded. As well, the army was ill-equipped, ill-supplied, and was filled with temperamental, undisciplined soldiers. If nothing else could prove that the man was destined for greatness, it was the speed with which he re-created the Army of the Potomac. Each day, he personally went out among the soldiers and spoke to each of them, attempting to redress as many of their concerns as possible. Of course, some of their concerns were that he was a foreigner, but he ignored those. As well, he instituted a strict exercise regimen among his troops to keep them fit and disciplined. And finally, he begged and wheedled General-in-Chief Winfield Scott to prioritize the Army of the Potomac, arguing that the Eastern Theater would be the one that decided the outcome of the entire war. Scott, however, would not relent. Garibaldi's ideas did not fit in with his Anaconda Plan, which involved the blockading of Southern ports and the capture of the Mississippi. Instead, he ordered the Army of the Potomac to defend Washington, and not launch an offensive into Virginia. Garibaldi quietly ignored him and began preparing his army for a spring offensive.

Garibaldi's plan, soon to become famous as the so-called Race to Richmond, involved racing to the Rappahannock River and attempting to take Fredricksburg, a strategic point between the capitals of the two nations. The capture and holding of Fredricksburg, Garibaldi predicted, would knock the notoriously indecisive Joseph E. Johnston off his feet and enable a quick strike towards Richmond; not one to completely decapitate the Confederacy, but one that would certainly frighten them out of their wits and flex Garibaldi's new army's muscles. The Maj. General could obviously not hide the preparation of his army from the government in Washington, but Lincoln gave his private approval to Garibaldi's endeavor, remarking to William Seward that “...this is why we hired the man, after all.” General-in-Chief Scott was too busy micromanaging events in the Western Theater to see what was happening. As final preparations, Garibaldi asked for recently-promoted Major General Joseph Hooker to command a division in his Army. He had heard good things about the man, and was glad when it was reluctantly granted by Scott. Also, he organized the army into two separate corps; I Corps, commanded by himself, and II Corps, commanded by Hooker. And on March 10, 1862, the Army of the Potomac quietly packed their gear, picked up their guns, and surged towards Fredricksburg.

Garibaldi's plan would have a been a solid one-- however, he did not have access to maps of the fortifications of the city, and couldn't have known that the Confederate Army of North Virginia, under Joseph E. Johnston, was arriving to defend the city that day. The great general had foreseen a Union attack on Fredricksburg, and was taking necessary precautions to defend it. Taking these setbacks into consideration, it is astounding that he accomplished what he did and kept the Army of the Potomac together as a coherent fighting force. On March 15, 1862, the Army of the Potomac reached the hills across the river from Fredricksburg. There, Garibaldi saw a sight that surprised and terrified him; the city was filled with Confederate troops, the Army of North Virginia. However, he decided to carry out the plan anyway; a decision that would have major consequences for both his future and the war's future. Johnston, meanwhile, was stunned to see a huge Federal force tearing out of the hills towards the ferry. II Corps, led by Hooker, swept away the few Confederates guarding the ferries and had already begun crossing when Johnston finally got his wits together and ordered his soldiers to prepare to defend the city.

The resulting battle is famous for being one of the bloodiest in the Civil War. Though Johnston had been surprised, he managed to rally his troops and fight a never-relenting defense in the city. It has been said every inch of ground gained by Garibaldi was soaked in the blood of Federals. The Confederates attempted to repulse II Corps landing; however, Joe Hooker managed to establish a foothold on the shore, to which a steady trickle of Union troops were sent. It was here that Hooker would prove his nickname “Fightin' Joe”, as he hardily defended the foothold and fought the Confederates back into the city, forcing them to fight house-to-house. Garibaldi watched with unease as these things happened; though II Corps was slowly managing to push the Southerners back into the city, they were exacting a heavy toll. Thus, he quickly decided to order a infantry brigade, led by one Colonel Ambrose Clay*, to take the second ferry and land on the eastern side of the city, where there were relatively few soldiers, and there to establish a beachhead, to surround the Confederates. Clay led his troops surprisingly well, and slaughtered the few Confederates still guarding the eastern side of the city, capturing it quickly. However, when they reached, roughly, the location of the Mary Washington house, Clay and his men encountered heavy Southern resistance, and there began to fortify and trade shots with Johnston's men. I Corps, led by Garibaldi himself, quickly poured into the eastern side of the city and filled it to bursting point. There, they simply traded shots with the Confederates, while Joe Hooker fought a brilliant offensive against Johnston to the west. Then, at 3:33 PM, they struck. I Corps pushed, hard, into Johnston's left flank. Though this flank was filled with hardy Virginians, veterans of the Battle of Bull Run, they were surprised and decimated by the sheer ferocity of Garibaldi's assault. The Southerners gave as good as they got, and fought a bloody defense against Garibaldi's offensive. Nonetheless, they were slowly pushed back.

As the sun set on blood-drenched Fredricksburg, the battle ended as well. The city was firmly in the grip of the Army of the Potomac, and the Union now held the linchpin of Virginia's defenses. Joseph E. Johnston and his remaining 30,000 men retreated to Richmond, where they began pulling together a hasty defense, in case Garibaldi struck south. However, the Army of the Potomac had been bloodied as well. At least 12,000 men had been killed, captured, or seriously wounded, nearly a third of the army's strength. At the same time, Garibaldi was now receiving furious orders from General-in-Chief Scott, demanding that he return Washington to face a court-martial for disobeying orders. However, Garibaldi refused, and was supported by Lincoln, who approved of the capture of a major Confederate city. Indeed, he even agreed to send him more troops from Banks' Department of the Shenandoah so he could prepare a summer offensive to Richmond.

Things were looking up for the Union.

*The first fictional character I've put in.
 
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I knew I wasn't going to like this timeline when you attributed the victory at Manassas to Beauregard instead of Johnston - in reality Joe Johnston did more to win that battle than any other Confederate General and had the single biggest impact on the Manassas Campaign of any general of either side - and now I've seen you label Johnston "notoriously indecisive" without establishing why in the context of the timeline and replace him with Lee and an Army of Northern Virginia without creating that army and the reasons for Lee getting command of it.

Johnston commanded the main eastern army from the aftermath of the 1st Battle of Manassas 1861 until his wounding on May 31 1862. His command was interfered with heavilly by the Confederate War Office under Judah P. Benjamin and the Adjutant's department under Samuel Cooper which made his job almost impossible. In 1861 the majority of troops were only short-term draftees and voluntiers and many of them were leaving the Confederate army altogether or being reassigned with the blessing of Benjamin to posts closer to their homes so the Confederate army was understrenght and it lacked many handheld weapons or heavy artillery - no other general of the war had to organize an army under such adverse conditions as did Johnston in 1861, in fact the feat is only challenged by his own work with the Army of Tennessee in 1864 and the Army that he build for Bentonville in 1865.

Johnston was forced to sit at the Manassas/Centerville line for weeks while Davis worked out that he couldn't at that time supply enough manpower for an attack towards Washington and once that was finally worked out Johnston decided to pull back to Fredericksburg and the Rappahannock line. It was Johnston who was prodding Davis to get him either the manpower to advance or let him withdraw and it was Davis who was being indecisive.

If Johnston appeared indecisive in Virginia during 1861 and 1862 it was in a large part down to circumstance.

In OTL McClellan wanted to land at Aquia Creek and get between Johnston and Richmond at Fredericksburg and advance quickly to take the lightly held capital but Johnston foresaw this movement and redeployed his own army to block it before McClellan could begin his move. It was in fact because Johnston pre-empted McClellan's move and blocked him that McClellan turned his attention to the James Peninsula in the first place. This happened before the winter of 1861 so would surely block Garibaldi's plans in this timeline as well because you have him moving the spring of 1862.

Further Lee has a dismal record as an independent commander come 1862 because he's only overseen the failure of the West Virginia Campaign and was in exile in South Carolina. He was brought back to Virginia in the early months of 1862 to deal with strategic troop deployment between the different departments of Virginia because Johnston's couldn't do it while he was with the AotP(CS), the war office had no one who could do it and Davis thought it would reflect poorly on him if he did it. Lee got command of the main Eastern Army after Johnston's wounding and G.W. Smith's breakdown but was far from the first choice to take over so some explaination is due over him getting command in this timeline.

Also the Army of Northern Virginia cannot exist when you have them invovled. The troops had not been trained let alone concentrated in Virginia by March 1862 and the weapons for the Army were still to be manufactured or were yet arrived from Europe. The Army of Northern Virginia didn't exist until Lee had manage to get them concentrated in June/July of 1862 and they were only beginning to arrive around Richmond during the final days of May and early days of June.

And, in 1861 and 1862, there was as much dead weight and excess baggage in the Union Armies as there was in the Confederate ones and simply putting Garibaldi in charge will not magically remove the bad generals and turn the Union Army into an experianced and effective deadly force overnight. There has to be a period where the flaws of the army are worked out, where the good and bad generals can be sorted from each other and promoted or sacked accordingly. Without battle this cannot be sorted and because there are still bad generals in the Union Army and Garibaldi cannot know who's good and bad when he takes over because he has no experiance with the American Army so he's bound to make mistakes and pick some bad ones, not to mention that some of them have political power that forces professional soldiers to employ them in the field so he'll be stuck with some even if he doesn't want them. Garibaldi will not be able to sort these things out without seeing his army in action.

And why would the main army of the Confederacy suddenly abandon the whole of Virginia after being driven from Frederickburg? It didn't happen in reality and it couldn't happen here. The Confederate Armies always fell back towards Richmond and defended the capital. Any Confederate Army Commander who abandonned the capital would get sacked unless they had a damned good reason for it and the loss of Fredericksburg in 1862 is not a damned good reason - in OTL Fredericksburg was in Federal hands in 1862 before McDowell was sent to the Valley!

Perhaps I should have just said I dind't like it and left it at that, or not commented at all but my ire was raised. Dont let this discourage you if you want to continue the timeline, I'm sure there are more people interested in it and enjoying it than people like me. Just take my points under advisement
 
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Okay. *cracks fingers* Let's do this.

I knew I wasn't going to like this timeline when you attributed the victory at Manassas to Beauregard instead of Johnston - in reality Joe Johnston did more to win that battle than any other Confederate General and had the single biggest impact on the Manassas Campaign of any general of either side....

First of all, P.G.T. Beauregard -was- the main reason the South won the battle. While Johnston may have been the most senior general, Beauregard did create the battle plan that won the battle, though it must be said that he did not contribute much to battlefield tactics during the battle itself. Yes, Johnston did do most of that.

...and now I've seen you label Johnston "notoriously indecisive" without establishing why in the context of the timeline and replace him with Lee and an Army of Northern Virginia without creating that army and the reasons for Lee getting command of it....Johnston was forced to sit at the Manassas/Centerville line for weeks while Davis worked out that he couldn't at that time supply enough manpower for an attack towards Washington and once that was finally worked out Johnston decided to pull back to Fredericksburg and the Rappahannock line. It was Johnston who was prodding Davis to get him either the manpower to advance or let him withdraw and it was Davis who was being indecisive.

I'm writing it from the Union's point of view, for chrissakes. They'd be seeing Johnston as indecisive because of all the reasons you listed above. I'm not saying he WAS indecisive. I'm saying he SEEMED indecisive.

As to Lee and an Army of North Virginia, you're right about the improbability of him being in command of it. I've just reread my sources and realized that you're right about that part. However, the Army of North Virginia was most certainly existent in early 1862, though it was much smaller than it would become and didn't have the greatest of supply lines.

In OTL McClellan wanted to land at Aquia Creek and get between Johnston and Richmond at Fredericksburg and advance quickly to take the lightly held capital but Johnston foresaw this movement and redeployed his own army to block it before McClellan could begin his move. It was in fact because Johnston pre-empted McClellan's move and blocked him that McClellan turned his attention to the James Peninsula in the first place. This happened before the winter of 1861 so would surely block Garibaldi's plans in this timeline as well because you have him moving the spring of 1862.

Is McClellan in command here? No. Could Johnston still foresee the nonexistent McClellan's moves? No. Is he defending Fredricksburg, in preparation for a Union attack he thinks is coming? Yes. Maybe I didn't make that clear. Lemme go make that clear.

Also the Army of Northern Virginia cannot exist when you have them invovled. The troops had not been trained let alone concentrated in Virginia by March 1862 and the weapons for the Army were still to be manufactured or were yet arrived from Europe. The Army of Northern Virginia didn't exist until Lee had manage to get them concentrated in June/July of 1862 and they were only beginning to arrive around Richmond during the final days of May and early days of June.

Yes, it can and did. However, I will admit that in early March, it was still named the (Confederate) Army of the Potomac. However, in that same month, on March 14, it was renamed the Army of North Virginia. But you're still right about the Lee thing; Johnston was in command by then.

And, in 1861 and 1862, there was as much dead weight and excess baggage in the Union Armies as there was in the Confederate ones and simply putting Garibaldi in charge will not magically remove the bad generals and turn the Union Army into an experianced and effective deadly force overnight. There has to be a period where the flaws of the army are worked out, where the good and bad generals can be sorted from each other and promoted or sacked accordingly. Without battle this cannot be sorted and because there are still bad generals in the Union Army and Garibaldi cannot know who's good and bad when he takes over because he has no experiance with the American Army so he's bound to make mistakes and pick some bad ones, not to mention that some of them have political power that forces professional soldiers to employ them in the field so he'll be stuck with some even if he doesn't want them. Garibaldi will not be able to sort these things out without seeing his army in action.

Well, he's seen his army in action now, hasn't he?

And why would the main army of the Confederacy suddenly abandon the whole of Virginia after being driven from Frederickburg? It didn't happen in reality and it couldn't happen here. The Confederate Armies always fell back towards Richmond and defended the capital. Any Confederate Army Commander who abandonned the capital would get sacked unless they had a damned good reason for it and the loss of Fredericksburg in 1862 is not a damned good reason - in OTL Fredericksburg was in Federal hands in 1862 before McDowell was sent to the Valley!

Mmm, yes, I see your point. They should retreat to Richmond, rather than to Charlottesville.

About Fredricksburg being in Federal hands, no. It wasn't. The First Battle of Fredricksburg (fought around the same time as I have this one happening, coincidentally) was the Union ATTACKING Fredricksburg and ended in a bloody Union defeat and led to the sacking of Ambrose Burnside as commander of the Army of the Potomac.

Perhaps I should have just said I dind't like it and left it at that, or not commented at all but my ire was raised. Dont let this discourage you if you want to continue the timeline, I'm sure there are more people interested in it and enjoying it than people like me. Just take my points under advisement

Will do. You did help me, so thanks for that.
 
First of all, P.G.T. Beauregard -was- the main reason the South won the battle. While Johnston may have been the most senior general, Beauregard did create the battle plan that won the battle, though it must be said that he did not contribute much to battlefield tactics during the battle itself. Yes, Johnston did do most of that.

Beauregard's plan for the battle of 1st Manassas was to converge all his green, ill-disciplined brigades on Centerville over a series of complicated roads to strike at McDowell's left flank and by the time his orders for his plans had reached the only subordinate who got them - Longstreet - they were already obsolete because McDowell had gotten the drop on Beauregard.

Johnston had given Patterson the slip in the Valley and was transferring his army to Manassas. He personally arrived the day before the battle and permitted Beauregard to plan the offensive while he got some rest having been up for 48 hours overseeing the transfer of his army and he consented to allow Beauregard to control the battle because he didn't know the area that well and he assumed Beauregard would.

When Johnston woke the next day the battle had already begun and Johnston found Beauregard stood with all his staff on Lookout Hill gazing towards Centerville, ignoring the sounds of fighting on his left flank. Beauregard refused to give up his own offensive but equally didn't do anything to deal with the fighting on his left flank.

After a while Thomas J. Jackson and Bernard Bee's brigades arrived from the Valley and Jackson and Bee went to their commander Johnston for orders. Johnston sent them immediately to the left flank to secure the line and convinced Beauregard to send Wade Hampton (recently arrived from Richmond) as well.

Eventually, after hours on Lookout Hill, Johnston could stand staying static no long and finally decreed that the battle was happening on the left flank and he was going there to take command. Beauregard had no choice but to follow in Johnston's wake because it was clear by then that his plan would never be put into effect.

Once they reached Henry House Hill Beauregard and Johnston rallied the troops until the line was somewhat secured then Beauregard - knowing that being at the front got the headlines - suggested Johnston go to the rear and Johnston - more concerned with winning the battle at the time than getting the headlines - agreed. While Beauregard played cheerleader at the front Johnston found more troops to bring forward and strengthen the line, Johnston took Edmund Kirby Smith's Brigade personally to the Federal Flank and he sent Jubal Early's brigade in support to launch the flank attack that broke the Federal position.

Beauregard concocted a plan that was likely impossible to succeed even if it had gone ahead because it called for a complex and confusing movement of many green, ill-discipline and inexperianced brigades onto one position and once it was clear his plan wasn't going to be able to go forward he refused to accept it and stood for hours on Lookout Hill doing nothing about the fighting on his left flank while still looking to launch his own offensive. If Johnston hadn't taken control of the battle when he did Beauregard would have still been stood on Lookout Hill as the Federals marched past Henry House Hill and rolled up the Confederate Army.

Johnston bringing the Army of the Shenandoah to Manassas in a matter of days, taking command of the battle as Beauregard remained inactive, sending Jackson, Bee and Hampton to the left flank, finding more troops to sent to Henry House Hill to secure the line, personally leading Kirby Smith's Brigade to the Federal flank and sending Early's brigade in support were all the major factors that won this battle.

I'm writing it from the Union's point of view, for chrissakes. They'd be seeing Johnston as indecisive because of all the reasons you listed above. I'm not saying he WAS indecisive. I'm saying he SEEMED indecisive.

Well still it was not established why in the context of the timeline you labled Johnston indecisive. A short parargraph about staying at the Manassas/Centerville line too long without advancing or withdrawing or something would have established the reasons for the label in the timeline.

As to Lee and an Army of North Virginia, you're right about the improbability of him being in command of it. I've just reread my sources and realized that you're right about that part. However, the Army of North Virginia was most certainly existent in early 1862, though it was much smaller than it would become and didn't have the greatest of supply lines.

The Army of Northern Virginia was created from Johnston's Army of the Potomac (CS), John B. Magruder's Army of the Peninsula, Benjamin Huger's division from Norfolk, Jackson and Ewell's divisions from the Valley, Lawrence O'Bryan Branch's brigade, J.R. Anderson's divison from Fredericksburg, Thoephilus H. Holmes' command from the Carolina's and forces coming from Pemberton's department of Georgia. In early 1862 these forces were scattered throughout the eastern theater employed in coastal defense and frontier defence and only half of that force, at most, was together in May of 1862.

One of the things Lee did while he was in Richmond in early 1862 coordinating the strategic troops deployment in Virginia was to lead a recruitment drive and oversee training of new troop and the manufacture and procurement of weapons. He put newly trained troops in positions that experianced troops were in before so those experianced troops could come to Virginia for the main eastern Army and he armed them as best he could. Without Lee doing this the Army of Northern Virginia as we knew it would never have come into being.

Is McClellan in command here? No. Could Johnston still foresee the nonexistent McClellan's moves? No. Is he defending Fredricksburg, in preparation for a Union attack he thinks is coming? Yes. Maybe I didn't make that clear. Lemme go make that clear.

Yeah. The point was that McClellan in OTL planned to do - if not exactly the same but something very similar to - what you have Garibaldi doing in thie timeline and was prevented from doing so by Johnston taking up positions on the Rappahannock Line. It wan't that McClellan was not aggressive enough to land at that position and fight Johnston for it, it was that Johnston controled the landing ground. Under these circumstances, if you want to attack Fredricksburg, then there is more logic in travelling over land from Washington to this position than there is to land there.

Yes, it can and did. However, I will admit that in early March, it was still named the (Confederate) Army of the Potomac. However, in that same month, on March 14, it was renamed the Army of North Virginia. But you're still right about the Lee thing; Johnston was in command by then.

I may have gotten a bit confused when I saw you attribute the ANV to Lee and thought you were sticking the Army as we know it into the timeline. If its just an army called that then I have no complaint about it but if it had been the ANV as we knew it in OTL then I would.

Well, he's seen his army in action now, hasn't he?

And I expect there to be some sackings in the near future following bad performances. I was kind of running on emotion when I went into that bit and I'm not really sure what my point was.

Mmm, yes, I see your point. They should retreat to Richmond, rather than to Charlottesville.

About Fredricksburg being in Federal hands, no. It wasn't. The First Battle of Fredricksburg (fought around the same time as I have this one happening, coincidentally) was the Union ATTACKING Fredricksburg and ended in a bloody Union defeat and led to the sacking of Ambrose Burnside as commander of the Army of the Potomac.

You're thinking about the Battle of Fredericksburg between Burnsides AotP and Lee's ANV, I was thinking of the situation during McClellan's/Johnston's Peninsula Campaign. While the Peninsula Campaign was happening Charles Field - who Johnston had left in command of the defence of Fredericksburg - abandonned it and fell back. Lee placed J.R. Anderson above Field in a new division (that Anderson classed as the Army of the Rappahannock) and sent him back to Fredericksburg but Anderson too abandonned it.

Irvin McDowell took Fredericksburg as he was marching south to link up with McClellan but he stopped there for a while and was eventually transfered to the Shenandoah Valley as Stonewall Jackson's campaign there drew more attention from Washington once Nathaniel Bank was expelled from it.
 
Beauregard's plan for the battle of 1st Manassas was to converge all his green, ill-disciplined brigades on Centerville over a series of complicated roads to strike at McDowell's left flank and by the time his orders for his plans had reached the only subordinate who got them - Longstreet - they were already obsolete because McDowell had gotten the drop on Beauregard.

Johnston had given Patterson the slip in the Valley and was transferring his army to Manassas. He personally arrived the day before the battle and permitted Beauregard to plan the offensive while he got some rest having been up for 48 hours overseeing the transfer of his army and he consented to allow Beauregard to control the battle because he didn't know the area that well and he assumed Beauregard would.

When Johnston woke the next day the battle had already begun and Johnston found Beauregard stood with all his staff on Lookout Hill gazing towards Centerville, ignoring the sounds of fighting on his left flank. Beauregard refused to give up his own offensive but equally didn't do anything to deal with the fighting on his left flank.

After a while Thomas J. Jackson and Bernard Bee's brigades arrived from the Valley and Jackson and Bee went to their commander Johnston for orders. Johnston sent them immediately to the left flank to secure the line and convinced Beauregard to send Wade Hampton (recently arrived from Richmond) as well.

Eventually, after hours on Lookout Hill, Johnston could stand staying static no long and finally decreed that the battle was happening on the left flank and he was going there to take command. Beauregard had no choice but to follow in Johnston's wake because it was clear by then that his plan would never be put into effect.

Once they reached Henry House Hill Beauregard and Johnston rallied the troops until the line was somewhat secured then Beauregard - knowing that being at the front got the headlines - suggested Johnston go to the rear and Johnston - more concerned with winning the battle at the time than getting the headlines - agreed. While Beauregard played cheerleader at the front Johnston found more troops to bring forward and strengthen the line, Johnston took Edmund Kirby Smith's Brigade personally to the Federal Flank and he sent Jubal Early's brigade in support to launch the flank attack that broke the Federal position.

Beauregard concocted a plan that was likely impossible to succeed even if it had gone ahead because it called for a complex and confusing movement of many green, ill-discipline and inexperianced brigades onto one position and once it was clear his plan wasn't going to be able to go forward he refused to accept it and stood for hours on Lookout Hill doing nothing about the fighting on his left flank while still looking to launch his own offensive. If Johnston hadn't taken control of the battle when he did Beauregard would have still been stood on Lookout Hill as the Federals marched past Henry House Hill and rolled up the Confederate Army.

Johnston bringing the Army of the Shenandoah to Manassas in a matter of days, taking command of the battle as Beauregard remained inactive, sending Jackson, Bee and Hampton to the left flank, finding more troops to sent to Henry House Hill to secure the line, personally leading Kirby Smith's Brigade to the Federal flank and sending Early's brigade in support were all the major factors that won this battle.

Hmm, I suppose you have a point there. I concede. :)

Well still it was not established why in the context of the timeline you labled Johnston indecisive. A short parargraph about staying at the Manassas/Centerville line too long without advancing or withdrawing or something would have established the reasons for the label in the timeline.

I probably should have written a paragraph about that. Might edit to include something along those lines, might not. Still, thanks for pointing this out.

The Army of Northern Virginia was created from Johnston's Army of the Potomac (CS), John B. Magruder's Army of the Peninsula, Benjamin Huger's division from Norfolk, Jackson and Ewell's divisions from the Valley, Lawrence O'Bryan Branch's brigade, J.R. Anderson's divison from Fredericksburg, Thoephilus H. Holmes' command from the Carolina's and forces coming from Pemberton's department of Georgia. In early 1862 these forces were scattered throughout the eastern theater employed in coastal defense and frontier defence and only half of that force, at most, was together in May of 1862.

One of the things Lee did while he was in Richmond in early 1862 coordinating the strategic troops deployment in Virginia was to lead a recruitment drive and oversee training of new troop and the manufacture and procurement of weapons. He put newly trained troops in positions that experianced troops were in before so those experianced troops could come to Virginia for the main eastern Army and he armed them as best he could. Without Lee doing this the Army of Northern Virginia as we knew it would never have come into being.

Might as well go back and change the name to the Confederate Army of the Potomac, just to distinguish it.

Yeah. The point was that McClellan in OTL planned to do - if not exactly the same but something very similar to - what you have Garibaldi doing in thie timeline and was prevented from doing so by Johnston taking up positions on the Rappahannock Line. It wan't that McClellan was not aggressive enough to land at that position and fight Johnston for it, it was that Johnston controled the landing ground. Under these circumstances, if you want to attack Fredricksburg, then there is more logic in travelling over land from Washington to this position than there is to land there.

Garibaldi, ATM, doesn't really have much ability to scout out the land, but he's still chomping at the bit to move forward. Thus, Fredricksburg.



I may have gotten a bit confused when I saw you attribute the ANV to Lee and thought you were sticking the Army as we know it into the timeline. If its just an army called that then I have no complaint about it but if it had been the ANV as we knew it in OTL then I would.

Of course.



And I expect there to be some sackings in the near future following bad performances. I was kind of running on emotion when I went into that bit and I'm not really sure what my point was.

Most definitely. Would a McClellan serving under Garibaldi in the Army of the Potomac (later on) be illogical?

You're thinking about the Battle of Fredericksburg between Burnsides AotP and Lee's ANV, I was thinking of the situation during McClellan's/Johnston's Peninsula Campaign. While the Peninsula Campaign was happening Charles Field - who Johnston had left in command of the defence of Fredericksburg - abandonned it and fell back. Lee placed J.R. Anderson above Field in a new division (that Anderson classed as the Army of the Rappahannock) and sent him back to Fredericksburg but Anderson too abandonned it.

Irvin McDowell took Fredericksburg as he was marching south to link up with McClellan but he stopped there for a while and was eventually transfered to the Shenandoah Valley as Stonewall Jackson's campaign there drew more attention from Washington once Nathaniel Bank was expelled from it.

Yeah, but since there's been no Peninsula Campaign, I was thinking that the Confederates should still hold Fredricksburg.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Most definitely. Would a McClellan serving under Garibaldi in the Army of the Potomac (later on) be illogical?

Not just illogical, impossible. McClellan ranks fourth on the army list (third when Scott retires) and is extremely well thought of. ITTL he doesn't even gain the ire of the JCCW. Should McClellan and Garibaldi's forces be united then McClellan will be the commander.

In fact this seniority proved problematic, OTL Halleck (as General in Chief) refused to give orders to McClellan as McClellan was senior, so instead made "suggestions". He wasn't alone in this however, as Stoker has pointed out, even Lincoln never gave "orders" to McClellan, only vague suggestions.
 
Most definitely. Would a McClellan serving under Garibaldi in the Army of the Potomac (later on) be illogical?

Well, if McClellan's come east after 1st Manassas he might serve under Garibaldi for a while but chances are, if Garibaldi got command of the Aotp (US) very soon after that battle then McClellan will remain with the Department of the Ohio and command that instead of Buell. Considering that you have Garibaldi training the AotP (US) from scratch it's safe to say that McClellan will have remained in command of the Department of the Ohio.

As to "later on", McClellan's not the type to willingly subordinate himself to another so it would have to be an order from Scott or whoever replaces Scott as General-in-Chief for him to come under Garibaldi's command. And even the he's going to be a difficult subordinate to handle because of his ego.

Yeah, but since there's been no Peninsula Campaign, I was thinking that the Confederates should still hold Fredricksburg.

Well, yes, with Johnston at Fredericksburg in this timeline they'll still hold it until driven from it but we were talking about what happened in OTL and in that McDowell did take Fredericksburg for a while so the original point I made about it remains - that the taking the taking of Fredericksburg in early 1862 doesn't force the Confederate to withdraw out of Virginia.

Though that's been ratified in your timeline already anyway so is kind of a moot point now.
 
Mmm, all right then. I was thinking that McClellan should stay in command of the Ohio, but I was entertaining the possibility that he would join the AotP as well. Fair enough.

Update either later tonight or tomorrow!
 
The Humiliation of George B. McClellan

“I offer neither pay, nor quarters, nor food; I offer only hunger, thirst, forced marches, battles and death. Let him who loves his country with his heart, and not merely with his lips, follow me.”

--Giuseppe Garibaldi


Before we continue on our story to the east, let us first move to the west for a moment.

When Garibaldi first became commander in the East, Beriah Magoffin, governor of Kentucky, was infuriated by the Federal government's choice of general and immediately went to the Kentucky Legislature, arguing passionately for secession. However, most of the County Representatives staunchly remained pro-Union. Further angered by this, Magoffin gathered those pro-Confederate representatives and stormed out of the building. There, he asked them if they were “...truly dedicated to the just and right cause of a state's rights against its oppressive central government...” They said they were, eagerly. Then, he commanded them to go to their counties and begin organizing militias, to seize control of Kentucky for the South. They went and began preparing.

Meanwhile, George B. McClellan, commander of the Department of the Ohio, smarting from the recent snub from Washington and from the Army of the Potomac's recent victory at Fredricksburg, attempted to prove himself a more capable general than Garibaldi. From his base in West Virginia, he launched a typically-slow offensive into the center of Virginia, through the Shenandoah Valley towards Harrisonburg. However, there was a large obstacle in his path; specifically, a Stonewall.

Thomas Jackson, commander of the Valley District, was a formidable man. He was most famous one of those who had fought at Manassas, gaining the nickname “Stonewall” from his excellent defensive posture during the battle. And here, he was to demonstrate that same excellent defensive strategy against McClellan. In late 1861, Stonewall Jackson had, foreseeing an invasion into the Shenandoah, built an intricate set of trenches throughout the already-heavily-wooded Shenandoah. This had made the Valley nigh-impenetrable and easily defended. McClellan had no idea what he was in for. Jackson was already forewarned and well-prepared of McClellan's approach, and the fortifications were fully prepared. When McClellan's army arrived in early April, they were utterly surprised to find the lines of trenches well-stocked with Confederates. McClellan began the famous Battle of the Valley by shelling the trenches using the few cannon he had managed to bring with him. This was largely ineffective because of the forest surrounding the trenches. He then had his subordinate, George A. Custer, lead a cavalry charge on the trenches, backed up by infantry fire from behind. He expected this to easily succeed, having expected less from the Confederacy after the Battle of Fredricksburg. He was wrong.

The cavalry charge was perhaps the biggest miscalculation McClellan would ever make. The rows of Confederate infantry decimated Custer's cavalry with their fire, Custer himself falling. They broke after only a few minutes, and were easily routed. Only a few made it back. McClellan then realized he would have to fight it out with the Confederates, and ordered his men to dig trenches as well, just far away from the Confederates to not be shot at. Then, the troops of the Department of the Ohio settled down to a long, long battle. The next few days were marked by a distinct stalemate, in which both sides pummeled the other's lines with cannon. Jackson held a vastly superior position in this; he had several tens of cannon that had been brought from Richmond, while McClellan had only around six. McClellan attempted to make up for this using his superior numbers; the first few days were marked by bloody massacres as he ordered his men to charge across what was rapidly beginning to be called No Man's Land. Finally, as April ended and more and more Federals from McClellan's army were quietly defecting to the Confederacy, McClellan was forced to withdraw in shame. The Confederates had won the day. Jackson, infused with confidence by this victory, began preparing his forces for an offensive into West Virginia.

Intrigued by the methods which Jackson had used to defeat McClellan, Robert E. Lee, military advisor to Jefferson Davis, advised him to build a network of trenches around Richmond, with which to defend it when Garibaldi moved south. The proposed line of trenches would stretch from Charlottesville to Richmond, and from there to the northern tip of Hampton Roads. While approving of the plan, Davis made some slight changes to it; rather than stretching all the way to Charlottesville, the so-called “Richmond Line” would go from the northern tip of Hampton Roads to just west of Richmond, at the Chickahominy River. Many historians believe that this change directly led to the fall of Charlottesville just a month later, and to the bombarding of Richmond.

After the Battle of Fredricksburg, Garibaldi quickly began reorganizing his army. He gave a stern talking to Joe Hooker after finding him drunk and with a Fredricksburg prostitute after the battle, but ultimately decided not to demote him. Hooker was a good commander. Instead, Garibaldi split the Army of the Potomac a second time, this time into four corps. I Corps would be commanded by him, II Corps by Hooker, III Corps by the recently-promoted Ambrose Clay, and IV by Irvin McDowell, who had spent the past year in effective exile from the Army's leadership. Garibaldi was willing to give the man a chance rather than simply abandon him to his fate, and McDowell was appropriately grateful.

Hearing of McClellan's defeat, Garibaldi hurried his preparations for the summer offensive into Virginia. By now, he had decided to strike first for Winchester, taking Jackson by surprise, then march down through the valley until reaching Harrisonburg. Then, he would turn his army east, to Charlottesville, encircling Richmond. And finally, he would march south to the Chickahominy, which he would have one of his generals blockade in an attempt to dry up the flow of supplies going to Richmond, while he himself besieged the city. If all went well, the war would be over by September.

How very wrong his estimations would turn out to be.
 
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