On 1944

Yes, there may be some truth to that, certainly.

Also, there's going to be a political price to pay if the W. Allies have to retreat too far from ground they've taken.

Also, remember that the division of Europe was an ongoing process; it was talked about at Yalta, for example, six months after the Falaise Pocket. For that matter, it was a week after the OTL Battle of the Bulge.
 
Also, there's going to be a political price to pay if the W. Allies have to retreat too far from ground they've taken.

Also, remember that the division of Europe was an ongoing process; it was talked about at Yalta, for example, six months after the Falaise Pocket. For that matter, it was a week after the OTL Battle of the Bulge.

Losing that Uranium oxide would handicap the Soviet nuke project considerably, because they where not able to exploit the mines in Kazakstahn until the war had been over a while (I would venture this sets them back at least 18 to 24 months; if not more due to not being able to strip so much industrial and brain power out of Germany) Might butterfly away Korea (Stalin wouldn't try something like that without having his own bomb)
 
The problem is that by September 1944 the Red Army is practically in every country it would occupy anyway. It's hard to see the Western Allies doing so much better that by that time they are in Eastern Europe as well.

Yugoslavia is going to be dominated by Tito.

Bulgaria and Romania are going to have the Red Army all over it.

Hungary and Poland are likely to be occupied before the Western Allies can do anything.

That leaves Czechoslovakia, and the Czechs are in a very strange situation. First, almost alone of the Eastern European countries, it is not anti-Soviet. Second, given the history up to Munich, the Czechs know they can't count on Western Europe to help them because of the geography. That means they must rely on the goodwill of the Soviet Union. People tend to read too much of the initial postwar politics through Cold War lenses. In 1945-1946, the main issue was not the US vs USSR, but "how they hell can I guarantee Germany won't invade my country for the third time?" I believe the Red Army had already left Czechoslovakia by the time the government walked away from the Marshall Plan, and the Prague coup was done internally by Czech Communists and not through the Soviets. None of these dynamics change with a greater Western Allied advance in 1944.

The only way I see non-Communist governments in Eastern Europe is if the Allies have a more successful Torch in 1942 or invasion of Italy in 1943 that allows some troops to be diverted into the Balkans by 1943 (probably because Churchill insists on it). If so, then Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and perhaps Romania come into play. Bulgaria and Romania may come into some sort of workable democracy, but Yugoslavia probably descends into a terrible civil war afterwards. But the level of competence, experience, and intitiative for that are probably beyond the Western Allies at that point.
 
If the plot against Hitler had succeeded, the German generals might have tried to negotiate a deal with the Western Allies, but they'd come up against the firm Allied unconditional surrender policy. Maybe the Western Allies could have persuaded Stalin to agree to let a larger portion of the German forces come west to surrender. There's no way he would have tolerated not being able to occupy a large chunk of Germany, including Berlin, and he had the tanks on the ground and the warplanes to enforce this. All the stuff about Patton racing to Berlin and thus winning a Cold War that had not even begun is Bircher type nonsense.

As to the idea that a quicker Torch victory--with the Allies taking Tunisia really fast--would have redounded to a quicker victory after D-Day, I'm not so sure. First the delay in North Africa meant that 250,000 Axis troops got sucked into a trap and were all captured; many of those troops would have otherwise made Sicily and southern Italy a much harder slog and some would have ended up in northern France facing us. Second, the extended fighting gave the U.S. troops and commanders vital experience that would be put to use in Normandy.

The only way to push the borders of the Cold War eastward was by Churchill's Balkan strategy but that would have been a diversion that would have taken urgently needed forces away from Normandy and would have prohibited Operation Dragoon, thus screwing up U.S. logistics in a big, big way. It would have delayed victory in Normandy and the crossing of the Rhine by possibly a month or more. The Western Allies simply didn't have the resources to do both.
 
Last edited:
The carve up was agreed as I understand it between Churchill and Stalin it the autumn of 1944 and later simply confirmed at Yalta.

I can imagine with better luck the allies could have been well into Germany at that time.

However Poland would still be beyond the West's capacity and that was the key cause of the Cold War
 
You are probably right (barring some kind of serious political changes in the western allies)

BUT it gives the allies a good chance to get all persons of interest OUT of eastern Germany and to keep a lot of gear out of their hands as well (uranium oxide especially)... there would certainly be a solid period of time before these areas where handed over to the Russians (and who knows the coalition could break down in between if the Russians are bitter about not getting the prize) during that time (6 months maybe a year) A LOT of people would flee to western Germany

Slower soviet jet and rocket development without those persons of interest.

Fewer soviet casualties, potentially a more intact Germany both east and west with less fighting and bombing by the end of the war.

Faster Japanese collapse with an earlier Manchurian offensive? Not sure how much of an effective strategic bomber force could be diverted from europe to the pacific earlier. How likely would a Japanese surrender be prior to the use of nuclear weapons or a longer blockade?

What might the effects be on airborne employment and doctrine without Market Garden?
 
Alpine Fortress or Alpenfestung

What forces will SHAEF send south to deal with the fabled (and mythic) Alpenfestung? I understand that reports only surfaced early '45 but if the Allies are progressing faster the rumour may well surface earlier too. Just been reading various sources on "The race to Berlin" and the Western Allies would have gone for it if the Russians hadn't been that close at the time.
 
Slower soviet jet and rocket development without those persons of interest.

Fewer soviet casualties, potentially a more intact Germany both east and west with less fighting and bombing by the end of the war.

Faster Japanese collapse with an earlier Manchurian offensive? Not sure how much of an effective strategic bomber force could be diverted from europe to the pacific earlier. How likely would a Japanese surrender be prior to the use of nuclear weapons or a longer blockade?

What might the effects be on airborne employment and doctrine without Market Garden?

Thats true about Soviet development of Jets and Rockets, especially if the US takes down the FW plants that the Soviets captured semi intact... but the first priority of course would be to dismantle and take away everything at the kaiser wilhelm institute... again Korean war butterflies I suppose

I don't know much about the Pacific war, and would yield to other's comment's

One would hope that someone does an honest review of parachute ops during the war and figures out that they universally lead to massive dispersion and casualties and where not worth the expense and effort that went into fielding them
 
invasion of Italy in 1943 that allows some troops to be diverted into the Balkans by 1943
That was Winston's nutty scheme. The better option was not invade Italy in the 1st place.:rolleyes: Send the troops & supplies to Britain for invasion of France in July or Aug '43. Do this.:p
As to the idea that a quicker Torch victory--with the Allies taking Tunisia really fast--would have redounded to a quicker victory after D-Day, I'm not so sure. First the delay in North Africa meant that 250,000 Axis troops got sucked into a trap and were all captured; many of those troops would have otherwise made Sicily and southern Italy a much harder slog and some would have ended up in northern France facing us.
Not if Tunisia was bottled up tight, rather than cleared: there'd be no delay. And the Allies were pretty good at cutting Axis sea transport in the Med by this time, so the numbers escaping wouldn't be huge. Then see above on the stupidity of Avalanche...
The only way to push the borders of the Cold War eastward was by Churchill's Balkan strategy
That can't be dignigied as "strategy". It was suicidal & stupid.
Faster Japanese collapse with an earlier Manchurian offensive? Not sure how much of an effective strategic bomber force could be diverted from europe to the pacific earlier. How likely would a Japanese surrender be prior to the use of nuclear weapons or a longer blockade?
Japan's economy was at a virtual standstill by January 1945. Imports were down more than half, & oil down well below needs. Given German surrender a bit earlier, the U.S. could accept Japan's surrender as early as April '45, when the first feelers went out (& the U.S. knew it, via Purple). Nukes, contrary to popular U.S. belief, weren't the decider: the Sov DoW did it.
 
Last edited:
Top