Okinawa WW2 WI

Upon realizing that the japanese had fortified the southern end of Okinawa and the casualities needed to take them out, why not just have a few divisions as a screening forces down south and build airfields etc in the north and let the japanese on the southern end die from starvation.

Is this possible? What does experts like @CalBear say?
 

CalBear

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The difficulty with this sort of a strategy is actually multifold.

1. It violates one of the basic principals of warfare in that it leaves a strong enemy in your rear areas. An enemy who can be reinforced and resupplied, admittedly with difficulty,
by submarine (and the Japanese had considerable experience in this thanks to outpost going back to Guadalcanal).

2. It leaves an observation force with good to excellent communications in place to report on the build-up of forces planned for Okinawa as part of Downfall. Keep in mind that a single IJA soldier could infiltrate through U.S. line, even swim around them, and blend in easily with the civilian population. The Intel may not be real-time, but it would be close, and far more likely to be transmitted than any of the attempts to fly recon aircraft over the Island.

3. It sends exactly the wrong message. At the time, no one knew if the Bomb would work, when it would be available, and in what numbers. Operational planners absolutely did not have an inkling that Manhattan even existed. Leaving the IJA formations in place on the Shuri Line tells Tokyo the U.S. will not push through if the defenses are strong enough. It is a guess on my part, but allowing the Shuri Line to survive might have been enough to keep the IJA from blinking, even after the two Bombs and the Soviet entry into the war.
 
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