Oi! Adolph! NO! - Earliest plausible intervention?

When I was growing up in the Sixties and Seventies the common opinion was that Neville Chamberlain was almost as much to blame for WWII as Hitler - because of Appeasement.

With the benefit of greater hindsight, how could Britain and France have done better, given a POD after Hitler's rise to power?

Could they conceivably have stopped him in Czechoslovakia? How could they have guaranteed its security? Austria? The Ruhr? Will of the people innit? Spain? The Condor Legion were volunteers (so it could be argued) and on the side of the "good guys", or at least the not-so-bad guys. And if you object to them, what are you going to do about Italy, which was even more heavily involved?

The whole sorry mess seems to start with Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. Britain and France more or less turned a blind eye to that (apparently) because they wanted Mussolini's continued opposition to Nazi designs on Austria. Which of course they did not get, and I don't see a way to change that.

So maybe the problem is not so much stopping Hitler as stopping Benny from setting a bad example. IT seems he had planned a surprise attack on France and Yugoslavia in August 1933, only to call it off when it became clear that the French had broken his military codes. So at that time France considered Italy to be a military threat, but an insignificant one, and even less so by the start of the Spanish Civil War. Germany at that time would have seemed an even lesser one, though increasing. I'm finding it hard, even with hindsight, do see a point before Poland when they could, would, and should have said "Oi! Adolph! NO!"

WI the French had not broken the Italian codes, and Mussolini had carried out his plans? Presumably he gets beaten eventually, Abyssinia is safe, and French are more ready for the wee man with the moustache to try the same trick. But what happens to Spain, and what lessons does Germany learn?
 
Hindsight is such a funny thing because while it views past history from a sort of 50 ft macro point of view, it sometimes forget all the intrecate realities that guide men like Chamberlain at the time of say appeasement.

As far as I know, most French and likewise British citizens wanted appeasement, because to them the alternative (trench warfare) wasnt worth stopping Germany from violating an unfair Versailles Treaty.

So while while we love to point and laugh at Neville for waving that white piece of paper in the air after Munich, we forget to notice the throngs of British people cheering him as the hero of peace.

That being said, if I had to guess the best time for the allies to launch an attack to stop Hitler would probably be Remilitarization of the Rhineland. Though neither France nor Britain were ready for war at the time, Hitler had apparently told his generals that if the French even looked like they were mobilizing, to immediately pull back to the Versailles Treaty borders.

That alone would probably make Hitler second guess any future Anschulles or Sudentenland gamble and likely lead to coup later in the 30s
 
I think possibly the Anschluss could have been stopped if Britain and France had worked with Italy (who was far from happy with these events) and other regional powers as well as possible support from The USSR.

Without the additional Steel and Money gained from Austria - Germany is in trouble and will be hard pressed to expand its military further and even harder pressed regarding further adventurism

Having been forced to back down once. the 'Entente' would be far more willing to call Hitler's bluff again
 
Stopping Germany from taking back the industries and damns in the Ruhr and Rhineland would go a long way to slow up/stop Hitler. Getting Benny to work against him and stop the Anschluss should really get him taken out by the Prussian Generals and Friends.
 

jahenders

Banned
A few possible points for them to do something. Direct intervention seems unlikely, but trade sanctions or embargoes were possible, along with things like international sanctions, cancelling the olympics, etc.

1) The first option would be to include some level of Entente occupation/oversight to guarantee fulfilment of the terms of Versailles
2) In 1932, Britain and France could have refused to suspend reparation payments or made that suspension conditional on certain things (remaining a 'democracy', complying with other Versailles terms, etc.)
3) In either 1935 (when Germany introduced conscription) or 1936 (when Germany remilitarized the Rhineland), Britain, France, etc could have imposed trade sanctions or an embargo on Germany and fought to get the 1936 olympics moved from Berlin
4) Likewise, after the Anschluss (Austria) in 1938, they could have imposed sanctions
5) And, certainly, Britain/France could have rejected the idea of appeasement and refused any German claims on Czechoslovakia at the Munich conference. They couldn't have physically prevented the German takeover, but they didn't have to be complicit.
6) Finally, in 1939 when Britain/France guaranteed Polish borders, they could have likewise guaranteed the borders of Lithuania and the Free City of Danzig, perhaps even openly stationing some troops there
 
IIRC Chamberlain had been advised by the military that even with the beginnings of rearmament they weren't strong enough to defend the nation or win a war against Germany which puts him in a bit of a fix. He can't use, or threaten to use, military force, sanctions are complicated in that they need to be punitive but if they're too punishing then they might force Germany to move militarily, which they don't want, but at the same time if they're too lenient they're useless.
 
IIRC Chamberlain had been advised by the military that even with the beginnings of rearmament they weren't strong enough to defend the nation or win a war against Germany which puts him in a bit of a fix. He can't use, or threaten to use, military force, sanctions are complicated in that they need to be punitive but if they're too punishing then they might force Germany to move militarily, which they don't want, but at the same time if they're too lenient they're useless.

And we have a winner....

Neville Chamberlain has the defense that his potentially UK ending decision (as opposed to other persons...) was made with a very realistic assessment of the British Empire's military capabilities. In 1938, the British are in the process of re-armament, but in the part of the process that has yet to provide a great deal of actual weapons. The RAF has some very keen things in the pipeline, but doesn't have a lot of it operational. In order to reduce Stukas and He-111's and such to mincemeat, the Spitfire and the Hurricane have to exist in significant numbers. In 1938, they do not. The Royal Navy is still short in some key categories as well. Chamberlain bought a critical year with Munich, and in that year the RAF and the RN got enough of their plans into actual weapons and formations to be able to make the difference.

To paraphrase Garak, what's the self-respect and honor of one UK MP versus entering the war with the weapons to fight it?
 

CalBear

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March 7, 1936. Day the Wehrmacht crossed troops back into the Rhineland the French should have advanced to contact and destroyed the Heer forces. Once that was complete, drive through into Germany, destroy any armed German formations encountered. Keep it up until you are in Berlin or until the General Staff hand over Hitler's cooling corpse.

Second best is March 1, 1935. Day the Luftwaffe is announced, advance to contact, destroy any and all forces encountered until Germany surrenders.
 
March 7, 1936. Day the Wehrmacht crossed troops back into the Rhineland the French should have advanced to contact and destroyed the Heer forces. Once that was complete, drive through into Germany, destroy any armed German formations encountered. Keep it up until you are in Berlin or until the General Staff hand over Hitler's cooling corpse.

Second best is March 1, 1935. Day the Luftwaffe is announced, advance to contact, destroy any and all forces encountered until Germany surrenders.
Of course, Hitler had basically ordered not to engage French troops if they even so much as looked funny at the Heer.
 
Hindsight is such a funny thing because while it views past history from a sort of 50 ft macro point of view, it sometimes forget all the intrecate realities that guide men like Chamberlain at the time of say appeasement.

As far as I know, most French and likewise British citizens wanted appeasement, because to them the alternative (trench warfare) wasnt worth stopping Germany from violating an unfair Versailles Treaty.

So while while we love to point and laugh at Neville for waving that white piece of paper in the air after Munich, we forget to notice the throngs of British people cheering him as the hero of peace.

That being said, if I had to guess the best time for the allies to launch an attack to stop Hitler would probably be Remilitarization of the Rhineland. Though neither France nor Britain were ready for war at the time, Hitler had apparently told his generals that if the French even looked like they were mobilizing, to immediately pull back to the Versailles Treaty borders.

That alone would probably make Hitler second guess any future Anschulles or Sudentenland gamble and likely lead to coup later in the 30s

I tend to agree with this. The First World War was such a horror that the prevailing opinion in Britain and France was that another major war was simply unthinkable. Perhaps it would have been wise in hindsight to attempt intervention in 1935 or 1936, but at the time, nobody knew that Hitler might well have folded nor that such an action would have led to another trench war. There is such a thing as democratically elected leaders getting too far ahead of their voters and there's an argument to be made that few in France or Britain would have supported a war in 1935/36. There's another factor to consider in this and that is demographics. A 1936 war would have been waged by forces woefully short of young men of fighting age. There weren't a lot of births in Europe around 1918. By 1939, things were a bit different.
 
When the French cabinet discussed sending the Army into the Rhineland, here is what Gamelin told the minister of war:

“The idea of rapidly sending a French expeditionary corps into the Rhineland, even in a more or less symbolic form, is unrealistic. The immediate launching of such an operation is able to be realized only by troops in the condition of acting at any moment and constituting some sort of an expeditionary corps… always ready to fulfill, outside the frontiers, its eventual mission. But our military system does not give us this possibility. Our active army is only the nucleus of the mobilized national army…. None of our units are capable of being placed instantly on a complete war footing."

Even occupying occupy a narrow strip of the Saar from Saarbrücken to Merzig, twenty-five miles long and eight miles deep, would require establishing the covering forces along the frontier, mobilizing at least 1,200,000 men, expending twenty million francs each day, beginning the manufacture of war goods, and preparing to launch complete mobilization. (from Doughty, Seeds of Disaster, ch.2).

France had decided that, in any future war, she would rely upon a "nation in arms" concept, based around the reservist, full economic mobilization, and the Methodical Battle.
Each of her active duty divisions was to split up, effectively creating three new divisions. Any division sent into the Rhineland (against a German force that the French seriously overestimated) represented two more divisions that could not be formed, if a full-scale conflict resulted.
Further, the active army lacked the scale of equipment considered necessary for the Methodical Battle offensives that French leaders thought would be essential; this scale of gear could only be provided once the economy was on a full war footing.

Basically, in 1928 the French adopted a military system that mandated essentially a "full scale Total War, or nothing" approach.

To be honest, if an intervention is to be launched in 1936, Britain will be merely the tail of the dog; France will have to do the "heavy lifting". But France was (in the eyes of her leaders) utterly unable to do any less than launch a full, Total War effort. And this they were simply not prepared to do.

If you want an intervention in 1936, your POD almost certainly needs to include France adopting a different military system in 1928, or heavily modifying it between 1928 and about 1934. This will require very heavy politicking in the French cabinet, because many were seriously opposed to doing anything else than implement the system described.

Read Doughty. Our ideas of what a standing army can do, simply do not fit the French system at all.





Edit: the best way to grasp this, I think, is to look at the French Army of 1936 as a bunch of Army Reserve cadres, lumped together and referred to administratively as "divisions".
 
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jahenders

Banned
March 7, 1936. Day the Wehrmacht crossed troops back into the Rhineland the French should have advanced to contact and destroyed the Heer forces. Once that was complete, drive through into Germany, destroy any armed German formations encountered. Keep it up until you are in Berlin or until the General Staff hand over Hitler's cooling corpse.

In 20/20 hindsight, that would have been the best plan. However, as you know, historical events always take place in degrees of confusion and uncertainty. I suspect the French thought the Germans were much stronger than they were and would fight more staunchly than they had been ordered to, leading to a general war.
 

CalBear

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In 20/20 hindsight, that would have been the best plan. However, as you know, historical events always take place in degrees of confusion and uncertainty. I suspect the French thought the Germans were much stronger than they were and would fight more staunchly than they had been ordered to, leading to a general war.
Oh, absolutely hindsight helps.

Still, you have someone who is already showing he's pretty aggressive making a move that effectively dares you to react while he is still pitifully weak and you are, by comparison, extremely powerful. Add in that this lead is in charge of the same country that has invaded and, at least initially, defeated your forces twice in the last 60 years. Said leader is now in vast and open vilation of the treaties put in place to prevent further aggression by his country.

If there was ever a time to go to war, that was it.
Of course, Hitler had basically ordered not to engage French troops if they even so much as looked funny at the Heer.
Excellent. Fewer dead on both sides.
 

jahenders

Banned
Oh, absolutely hindsight helps.

Still, you have someone who is already showing he's pretty aggressive making a move that effectively dares you to react while he is still pitifully weak and you are, by comparison, extremely powerful. Add in that this lead is in charge of the same country that has invaded and, at least initially, defeated your forces twice in the last 60 years. Said leader is now in vast and open vilation of the treaties put in place to prevent further aggression by his country.

If there was ever a time to go to war, that was it.
.

Oh, I certainly agree that the French SHOULD have pushed the Germans out and such. I'm just suggesting the likely reason why they DIDN'T do so.
 
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