Anaxagoras
Banned
How does copying and pasting a dictionary definition of the word "campaign", which every person that posts here obviously already knows, advance your contention that Jubal Early's Raid on Washington was somehow a failure?
Official "Did the Confederacy Have a Chance to Win the American Civil War?" Thread
- Thread starter Anaxagoras
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How does copying and pasting a dictionary definition of the word "campaign", which every person that posts here obviously already knows, advance your contention that Jubal Early's Raid on Washington was somehow a failure?
to be fair regarding Hood's march on Tennessee...
in previous campaigns, the Rebs had hit Union communications (rail) very hard with frequent and highly effective cavalry raids. To the point where it tied down significant Union forces and delayed seriously Union advances.
http://www.amazon.com/Civil-War-Command-And-Strategy/dp/0029166357
this book basically considers the deep penetration raid the principal effective strategic move during the war by both sides, and seen in that light, Hood moving on Nashville makes a certain amount of sense as he couldn't stop Sherman's army any other way (after the pounding at Atlanta)
Of course Sherman himself was conducting a deep penetration on an epic scale. The Union Army when it left Atlanta did not leave any garrisons between Atlanta and Savannah (and didn't need to). The problem Hood had though is that Thomas was a better general than him, and more troops, better supplies, and understood that a frontal attack was suicidal (as it turned out to be at Franklin and Nashville). The other problem Hood had was that his concept of operations was completely outdated, because Sherman was moving too a new base and didn't need to keep communications with the railway to Nashville any more.
As to Early... his raid was designed to draw off troops away from Lee as well as clear the Valley. He did one, but he failed to significantly affect Grant's Overland Campaign.
So both of these great deep penetration raids by the South failed in their mission. They were supposed to force the Union to react to them, and stop the Union penetration of vital CSA territory. They failed because the Union had plenty of reserves to deal with them and continue their own efforts.
As to Sheridan... he was rash but highly aggressive. Grant gives him credit for the aggression and motivating force that outdistanced Lee in his retreat from Richmond and in getting in behind him and preventing Lee from continuing his retreat. So whatever faults he demonstrated in the Valley he more than made up for at Appomattox.
Jackson never demonstrated that kind of understanding of the vital elements of the war... finding, fixing and making it possible to destroy the enemy. He did a great job in driving the enemy into flight and away, but never successfully sealed the deal and won the decisive battle. Sheridan did.. at least according to Grant.
As to Sherman... he understood, better than anyone else including Grant that to win the war and break the Southern ability and will to resist required demonstrating Union power by marching through their heartland and destroying those things. He also outmaneuvered Johnston and drove him back, and demolished Hood, and ultimately was in position to trap and destroy Johnson again. Sources I have seen rank him as the General who best understood what it took to win.
While I admire Lee (he is a personal hero), he was the only one who really seemed to understand the strategic position of the South. It had to win a battlefield victory equal to Saratoga. It never could, but he understood the campaign objectives in his two moves North. I don't recall any other Southern General demonstrating understanding of that. Sure Gordan was a good corps commander (which by definition requires being able to handle limited independent operations). Early did a good job with what he had, and Hardee and Taylor both had a lot of potential.
But I don't think you will ever see them listed as Great Captains. I have seen Grant, Sherman and Lee listed as such
in previous campaigns, the Rebs had hit Union communications (rail) very hard with frequent and highly effective cavalry raids. To the point where it tied down significant Union forces and delayed seriously Union advances.
http://www.amazon.com/Civil-War-Command-And-Strategy/dp/0029166357
this book basically considers the deep penetration raid the principal effective strategic move during the war by both sides, and seen in that light, Hood moving on Nashville makes a certain amount of sense as he couldn't stop Sherman's army any other way (after the pounding at Atlanta)
Of course Sherman himself was conducting a deep penetration on an epic scale. The Union Army when it left Atlanta did not leave any garrisons between Atlanta and Savannah (and didn't need to). The problem Hood had though is that Thomas was a better general than him, and more troops, better supplies, and understood that a frontal attack was suicidal (as it turned out to be at Franklin and Nashville). The other problem Hood had was that his concept of operations was completely outdated, because Sherman was moving too a new base and didn't need to keep communications with the railway to Nashville any more.
As to Early... his raid was designed to draw off troops away from Lee as well as clear the Valley. He did one, but he failed to significantly affect Grant's Overland Campaign.
So both of these great deep penetration raids by the South failed in their mission. They were supposed to force the Union to react to them, and stop the Union penetration of vital CSA territory. They failed because the Union had plenty of reserves to deal with them and continue their own efforts.
As to Sheridan... he was rash but highly aggressive. Grant gives him credit for the aggression and motivating force that outdistanced Lee in his retreat from Richmond and in getting in behind him and preventing Lee from continuing his retreat. So whatever faults he demonstrated in the Valley he more than made up for at Appomattox.
Jackson never demonstrated that kind of understanding of the vital elements of the war... finding, fixing and making it possible to destroy the enemy. He did a great job in driving the enemy into flight and away, but never successfully sealed the deal and won the decisive battle. Sheridan did.. at least according to Grant.
As to Sherman... he understood, better than anyone else including Grant that to win the war and break the Southern ability and will to resist required demonstrating Union power by marching through their heartland and destroying those things. He also outmaneuvered Johnston and drove him back, and demolished Hood, and ultimately was in position to trap and destroy Johnson again. Sources I have seen rank him as the General who best understood what it took to win.
While I admire Lee (he is a personal hero), he was the only one who really seemed to understand the strategic position of the South. It had to win a battlefield victory equal to Saratoga. It never could, but he understood the campaign objectives in his two moves North. I don't recall any other Southern General demonstrating understanding of that. Sure Gordan was a good corps commander (which by definition requires being able to handle limited independent operations). Early did a good job with what he had, and Hardee and Taylor both had a lot of potential.
But I don't think you will ever see them listed as Great Captains. I have seen Grant, Sherman and Lee listed as such
did it force Grant to significantly alter his Overland Campaign? ... no
did it take Washington DC or ever have a serious possibility of doing so... no
did it clear the Valley briefly... yes
did that have a permanent effect... no
was his little army ultimately destroyed... yes
not the definition of a successful raid.... as he was supposed to make Grant react to him (that was the whole point) and that did not happen sufficiently to affect Grant's campaign that ultimately bled the Army of Northern Virginia to the point where it was finished as an offensive force
Anaxagoras
Banned
The Overland Campaign was over by this point and the Siege of Petersburg had begun. Did it force Grant to significantly alter the Siege of Petersburg? Absolutely, it did. It forced Grant to divert two corps of infantry and two divisions of cavalry away from where he wanted them to be in order to react to Early's effort. Had those forces been available for the fighting around Petersburg, the offensives of that summer and fall might have been successful and Richmond might have fallen before the end of 1864.
Lee's orders never raised the suggestion that Early capture Washington, which he recognized as impregnable, only to present the appearance of a threat to it. In this, Early succeeded. In fact, Lincoln appeared more frightened by Early's raid than he was by Lee's invasion of Maryland in 1862 or Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania in 1863. He even came close to ordering Grant to return to the vicinity of Washington with most of his troops to deal with Early. Only at one point did Early seem to think that Washington might fall, as Grant had foolishly denuded the capital of defenders, but it was a fleeting moment.
Taking this thinking to its logical conclusion, one would have to say that the Confederacy never had a single success during the war since it eventually lost the war. It simply makes no sense.
did those two corps make a difference in the siege.... no, because the Union Army was content at that point to hold Lee in place (which it did just fine). Did Union strategic mobility allow for rapid (and timely) reinforcement of the threat? Yes it did. Naval mobility made all the difference, and the Union could move quicker than Early ever could. Besides, although severely reduced in numbers, the fortress that was DC was more than capable enough to hold off Early from anything beyond minor penetrations.
Bottom line, Early made a good effort but there was never a hope that his army would ever seriously impact the direction the war was going. The War was decided when Lincoln got reelected, Atlanta fell, Savannah fell, and the Army of Northern Virginia was broken as an offensive force (note no successful attack by Lee after he got locked into Petersburg).
It was all over but the final bloodletting at that point.
So there is no reason to call Early's raid a success. It failed to do anything that materially impacted the chance of Rebel Victory. The only way DC was going to fall would have been if it wasn't a fortress, and as it was, that wasn't going to happen from the little 15,000 man force Early had with him (a corps).
winning battles only matters if it results in winning the war... otherwise it is just blood shed to prolong the result.
So yes, the logical conclusion is that any blood shed after the reelection of Lincoln (which showed that Union willpower was unbroken and now implacable) was a waste of American lives.
Note that I am specifically addressing campaigns that occurred after that... Early and Hood. Neither had a prayer. Of course we know that NOW, in 2020 hindsight, but Grant and Sherman figured it out then, and that is the difference between a Great Captain and a competent one.
TFSmith121
Banned
"could" is one of those words that covers a multitude of sins
"could" is one of those words that covers a multitude of sins ...
As in, the Republicans retained the majority in both the House and the Senate (85 to 72 in the House, 31 to 10 in the Senate). In addition, the 1862 elections did not, of course, allow absentee ballots or voting in the field.
And in addition, the same population you suggest was ready to throw in the towel in 1862 or 1864 or whenever, accepted 359,528 fatal casaulties from a force of (roughly) 2.8 million (enlistments). Source is Dyer.
I'm not thinking that country is going to throw in the towel.
Obviously, given that 1862-65 predates Gallup et al, no one has any idea how the 1864 election would have gone "otherwise", but the only poll that matters is the one conducted on Election Day, and we know how that turned out.
Best,
"could" is one of those words that covers a multitude of sins ...
As in, the Republicans retained the majority in both the House and the Senate (85 to 72 in the House, 31 to 10 in the Senate). In addition, the 1862 elections did not, of course, allow absentee ballots or voting in the field.
And in addition, the same population you suggest was ready to throw in the towel in 1862 or 1864 or whenever, accepted 359,528 fatal casaulties from a force of (roughly) 2.8 million (enlistments). Source is Dyer.
I'm not thinking that country is going to throw in the towel.
Obviously, given that 1862-65 predates Gallup et al, no one has any idea how the 1864 election would have gone "otherwise", but the only poll that matters is the one conducted on Election Day, and we know how that turned out.
Best,
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TFSmith121
Banned
Actually, it's not a dictionary definition;
Actually, it's not a dictionary definition; it's from Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning:
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf
Little bit more than a dictionary; its doctrine, which - basically - spells out what the point of military operations is, which is to win battles that lead to winning campaigns for a given objective ... which, quite obviously, Early's raid did not do (military or otherwise).
It was a stunt; very gallant, very romantic, perhaps even very southern.
Also very pointless.
Best,
Actually, it's not a dictionary definition; it's from Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning:
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf
Little bit more than a dictionary; its doctrine, which - basically - spells out what the point of military operations is, which is to win battles that lead to winning campaigns for a given objective ... which, quite obviously, Early's raid did not do (military or otherwise).
It was a stunt; very gallant, very romantic, perhaps even very southern.
Also very pointless.
Best,
Anaxagoras
Banned
On the contrary, Grant wanted very much to capture Petersburg and Richmond and there was heavy fighting throughout the summer and fall. The absence of the two infantry corps and two cavalry divisions was a severe hindrance to these operations, demonstrating that Early was quite successful in diverting forces away from Grant.
Capturing Washington was never part of the operational plan for Early.
Anaxagoras
Banned
It is also one of those words used rather often around here, given that this is a website focused on the discussion of alternate history.
TFSmith121
Banned
Which is, to be anything beyond fantasy, supposed to
Which is, to be anything beyond fantasy, supposed to based on something resembling historical reality.
Otherwise, cripes, write a parable and bring in the dragons, orcs, and elf maidens.
Worked for Tolkien, after all.
Best,
Which is, to be anything beyond fantasy, supposed to based on something resembling historical reality.
Otherwise, cripes, write a parable and bring in the dragons, orcs, and elf maidens.
Worked for Tolkien, after all.
Best,
redlightning
Banned
The only way the southern states could get independence is if Britain and France intervene on their behalf. That is unlikely because the cause isn't interesting enough.
Let's say France does it. They break the Union blockade of Southern ports and begin one of their own on northeastern cities.
The North is forced to cede the right of session for those states as part of peace terms with France. France is able to continue any activities it likes in colonizing Mexico as well.
Let's say France does it. They break the Union blockade of Southern ports and begin one of their own on northeastern cities.
The North is forced to cede the right of session for those states as part of peace terms with France. France is able to continue any activities it likes in colonizing Mexico as well.
TFSmith121
Banned
What is it do you think the French Navy was built for?
What is it do you think the French Navy was built for?
Best,
What is it do you think the French Navy was built for?
Best,
I voted for the third option - that it was unlikely though not impossible. The key for the South was to hang in there until the next presidential election, at which point Lincoln might be defeated, and his successor might be open to peace negotiations. This had a chance of happening; Lincoln himself was doubtful of his re-election chances for awhile. But then the Union scored major victories in the final months preceding the election, and that was that.
Launching the insurrection so soon after Lincoln's election looks like a serious error on the part of South. They put themselves in a situation in which they'd need to survive nearly four years before that pivotal election could happen. Perhaps in a timeline in which the attack on Fort Sumter is delayed by 6-12 months, for whatever reason, the CSA can still be fighting pretty well up to the time of the 1864 election - like, say, have the Red River campaign end right beforehand - so that perhaps the Democratic candidate wins.
Launching the insurrection so soon after Lincoln's election looks like a serious error on the part of South. They put themselves in a situation in which they'd need to survive nearly four years before that pivotal election could happen. Perhaps in a timeline in which the attack on Fort Sumter is delayed by 6-12 months, for whatever reason, the CSA can still be fighting pretty well up to the time of the 1864 election - like, say, have the Red River campaign end right beforehand - so that perhaps the Democratic candidate wins.
Technically? Yes. However, it was very highly unlikely and within a generation or two, most of the CSA would've been reincorporated into the Union in one way or another.
Saphroneth
Banned
The funny thing is, the British actually thought that the US sans the CSA would have been a great partner - in such things as diplomatically browbeating the CSA.
Anaxagoras
Banned
I agree about Hood (if you're referring specifically to the Tennessee adventure), but Early's campaigns occurred BEFORE Lincoln's reelection.
yes regarding Hoods adventures...plus I am pissed at him for getting Cleburne killed, who would have been nice to have in Arkansas post Civil War
True, Early was before the election. If his raid had affected that enough to result in Lincoln getting defeated it might have been worth it. He didn't have the numbers and power to take DC or even seriously threaten it. If he had killed Lincoln (thanks to Oliver Wendell Holmes for telling him to get down), that might have been a 'success' from the Confederate view point, although there is considerable argument on that topic.
Anaxagoras
Banned
That's the point I'm making. Early's raid was a success for three primary reasons. First, it diverted very large Union forces away from Richmond/Petersburg, where they otherwise would have been employed against Lee. Second, it secured the Confederacy an enormous haul of food and other supplies. And third, it was politically humiliating to the Lincoln administration exactly at the time when Confederate hopes for victory depended upon Lincoln's defeat at the polls. He did so with a relatively small number of casualties and escaped the botched pursuit without any difficulty. I honestly have a difficult time understanding why anyone could call it a failure.
Had the Confederacy gone on to win with the in the peace-through-exhaustion scenario later in 1864, Early's Raid would have gone down in history as a major factor in the defeat of Lincoln.
Lee never envisioned that Early would be able to capture Washington; his orders certainly didn't suggest it. At one point, Lee instructed Early to see whether he might effect the release of the prisoners held at Point Lookout Prison Camp, though. The fact that Lee thought this was possible, yet not the capture of Washington, clearly suggests that Lee never had the capture of Washington in mind. Only at one moment, during the approach march after the Battle of Monocacy, did Early actually seem to think he might be able to take the city, but it was a fleeting moment and he called off the attack when he realized that the VI Corps had arrived.
Whether or not Early could seriously threaten the capital, however, was not nearly so important as the fact that many people in the Union high command, including Stanton and Halleck, thought that it was a very real possibility. Again, it was the political angle that was important here. In 1864, the Northern public had expected Grant to defeat Lee and the war to be won. Instead, Lee remained undefeated, Grant's army had suffered unspeakable casualties, and here was a rebel army (we know it was about 15,000 men, yet press reports of the time suggested 40,000 or even more) throwing shells into Washington City itself!
Needless to say, the whole episode was a severe blow to Lincoln's reelection chances. That, by itself, meant that it was a substantial Confederate victory.
I tend to think not. Lincoln's popularity was at a low ebb in the summer of 1864, but getting himself killed by a Confederate bullet would have instantly turned him into a martyr figure. Hamlin was no Lincoln, but the sympathy factor would have ensured he would have had enough support to keep the ship sailing for at least a couple of months. It's impossible to say, of course, who the Republicans would have ended up putting forward as their candidate and how the end result of the election would have been affected.