Official "Did the Confederacy Have a Chance to Win the American Civil War?" Thread

[Johnrankins]

Sheridan is terribly overrated. He was not a good general. His tenure in command of the Army of the Potomac's cavalry was basically a trail of failure. The perception is that he was successful only stems from the fact that Jeb Stuart was killed in the Battle of Yellow Tavern. The raid towards Richmond accomplished nothing substantial and deprived the army of its cavalry, leaving it blind in the face of Lee's army at Spotsylvania. Later, when Sheridan was sent off to the west to cooperate with Hunter's army in the Shenandoah, he was trounced by Hampton at the Battle of Trevilian Station.

In the Valley, Sheridan had at least 40,000 men against Early's 15,000 (granted, Early's men were possibly the finest infantry on the planet). Yet Early nearly defeated Sheridan at Third Winchester because Sheridan foolishly decided to funnel almost his entire army through a single defile, allowing Early to concentrate the bulk of his force on only a portion of the Union army. His carelessness and overconfidence later allowed Early to surprise the Union army at Cedar Creek, nearly turning the tide of the whole campaign. And after all three of the major Union victories of the campaign - Third Winchester, Fisher's Hill, and Cedar Creek - Sheridan failed to vigorously pursue the beaten enemy when he might have completely destroyed them. With such odds in the Union's favor, a more competent general would have defeated Early more more easily and at less cost than Sheridan did.

I agree with most of this but I think it is more his trouncing of Early than killing Jeb Stuart that made his reputation. However when you outnumber your enemy by nearly 3:1 you should be able to trounce them!

 

[TFSmith121]

There's something else being demonstrated here, however:

I agree with most of this but I think it is more his trouncing of Early than killing Jeb Stuart that made his reputation. However when you outnumber your enemy by nearly 3:1 you should be able to trounce them!

There's something else being demonstrated here, however; by the end of the war (1864-65) the US had roughly a half dozen senior generals trusted to command independently, at the army/army group/theater level, who had a track record of defeating whatever the rebels threw at them, namely:

Grant
Sherman
Meade
Thomas
Sheridan
Ord, and, possibly,
Canby;

The rebels had:
Lee

And possibly Kirby-Smith...

In addition, the US had a number of men "on the shelf," so to speak, who nonetheless had demonstrated their abilities at the army level against the rebels - if not Lee, then Bragg, Beauregard, Longstreet, and the like, on similar "independent" commands.

McClellan
Rosecrans
Hooker
Buell
Burnside

Their equivalents for the rebels don't even really compare. Maybe Hardee.

So, the point is that having a (roughly) 4-1 advantage in terms of population has an impact, even beyond the bigger battalions necessary for an offensive war - which is what the US fought, from 1861 onwards, as the constantly shrinking amount of territory held by the rebels makes clear...

It also means the talent pool is larger, as witness Grant, Sherman, Meade, Thomas, Sheridan et al vs. Lee and Hood/JE Johnston et al.

Best,

 

[Johnrankins]

There's something else being demonstrated here, however; by the end of the war (1864-65) the US had roughly a half dozen senior generals trusted to command independently, at the army/army group/theater level, who had a track record of defeating whatever the rebels threw at them, namely:

Grant
Sherman
Meade
Thomas
Sheridan
Ord, and, possibly,
Canby;

The rebels had:
Lee

And possibly Kirby-Smith...

In addition, the US had a number of men "on the shelf," so to speak, who nonetheless had demonstrated their abilities at the army level against the rebels - if not Lee, then Bragg, Beauregard, Longstreet, and the like, on similar "independent" commands.

McClellan
Rosecrans
Hooker
Buell
Burnside

Their equivalents for the rebels don't even really compare. Maybe Hardee.

So, the point is that having a (roughly) 4-1 advantage in terms of population has an impact, even beyond the bigger battalions necessary for an offensive war - which is what the US fought, from 1861 onwards, as the constantly shrinking amount of territory held by the rebels makes clear...

It also means the talent pool is larger, as witness Grant, Sherman, Meade, Thomas, Sheridan et al vs. Lee and Hood/JE Johnston et al.

Best,

Also the Union had at least two commanders that demonstrated they could handle Lee, as both Grant and Meade did so. I would argue Thomas and probably Sherman could have done so as well.

 

[Anaxagoras]

Also the Union had at least two commanders that demonstrated they could handle Lee, as both Grant and Meade did so. I would argue Thomas and probably Sherman could have done so as well.

Meade respected Lee's abilities and recognized that Lee was tactically the superior general. That was why Meade was always very cautious with Lee, not charging after him after Gettysburg and playing it safe around Bristoe Station and Mine Creek. At the same time, Meade was not afraid of Lee and refused to be intimidated by him. That was what set him apart from the previous commanders of the Army of the Potomac.

Thomas against Lee? That's a tough one. Lee knew Thomas very well from their prewar days. He would have recognized that Thomas rarely put a foot wrong. Sherman would have been beaten up by Lee rather badly, methinks. Sherman was a poor tactical commander, as was demonstrated in pretty much every battle he fought. Brilliant at logistics, to be sure, but not the guy you want in command when the shooting starts.

An interesting thought experiment: what if the 1864 campaign had featured Sherman vs. Lee and Grant vs. Johnston?

 

[TFSmith121]

Very true...

Also the Union had at least two commanders that demonstrated they could handle Lee, as both Grant and Meade did so. I would argue Thomas and probably Sherman could have done so as well.

Very true...

and, FWIW, Sheridan and Ord both showed in 1864-65 they could handle detachments from Lee's army fairly capably, as (for example) Burnside had shown with regards to Longstreet at Knoxville.

Sherman handled both JE Johnston and Hood pretty capably, and Thomas had dealt with Hood with great finality. Thomas had also demonstrated he could handle Bragg at the flood, even when Rosecrans could not...

McClellan had held off JE Johnston and Lee in full flood as well, back in 1862; and one can question the capacities of Rosecrans, Hooker, and Buell, but presumably all of them - along with Newton, Hancock, Humphreys, Wood, Stanley, Warren, Griffin, Wright, Getty, Steele, JJ Reynolds, Parke, Willcox, Terry, Howard, Slocum, Granger, Davis, Logan, AJ Smith, Blair, Weitzel, Emory, Mower, Augur, Schofield, Ruger, Gibbon, and Wilson - could have commanded capably at the corps level...

Which again, considering the rebel corps commanders in 1864-65, points out the differentials.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Sherman commanded capably at the army/army group level

Sherman would have been beaten up by Lee rather badly, methinks. Sherman was a poor tactical commander, as was demonstrated in pretty much every battle he fought. Brilliant at logistics, to be sure, but not the guy you want in command when the shooting starts.

Sherman commanded capably at the army/army group level against JE Johnston (arguably, the best the rebels had after Lee in 1864-65) and Hood (who commanded the AoT a lot like Lee had led the ANV in 1862-63) and got the best of them both...

Best,

 

[Johnrankins]

Meade respected Lee's abilities and recognized that Lee was tactically the superior general. That was why Meade was always very cautious with Lee, not charging after him after Gettysburg and playing it safe around Bristoe Station and Mine Creek. At the same time, Meade was not afraid of Lee and refused to be intimidated by him. That was what set him apart from the previous commanders of the Army of the Potomac.

Yet he consistently lost to Meade when the chips were down. In the end that is all that matters.

 

[Anaxagoras]

Sherman commanded capably at the army/army group level against JE Johnston (arguably, the best the rebels had after Lee in 1864-65) and Hood (who commanded the AoT a lot like Lee had led the ANV in 1862-63) and got the best of them both...

Sherman versus Johnston is a complicated question and both commanders deserve praise and criticism for varying aspects of the campaign. Against Hood, though, Sherman performed poorly. In the last phase of the Atlanta Campaign, the Confederates lost much more than the Union won, because Hood was a walking disaster as an army commander and did pretty much everything wrong. Had Sherman been a more competent commander, Atlanta would not only have fallen but the Army of Tennessee would have been destroyed.

During the approach to Atlanta, Sherman split his army group (which is what we would call it today) to approach the city from two different directions. In doing so, he gave the Confederates the opportunity to concentrate the bulk of the Army of Tennessee against only a portion of his own forces, thus allowing them to achieve numerical parity at the point of contact at the Battle of Peachtree Creek and the Battle of Atlanta. The former battle was lost by the Confederates rather than won by the Union, in that the attack was hopelessly mismanaged. The same is true, though to a lesser degree, for the battle on the July 22. But the fact that the Southerners had a decent chance to defeat a sizable portion of the Union force on both July 20 and July 22 is Sherman's fault.

At the Battle of Atlanta itself, once the Confederate offensive had been beaten back, Sherman had the golden opportunity to throw Schofield's army against Hood's left flank. The Southerners were reeling from the day's fighting and such an attack might have had devastating results. But Sherman refused to order it and the excuse he gave is inexcusable. In his memoirs, he said that the Army of the Tennessee (the force which had been doing the fighting) would have its feelings hurt if it felt that another army had to come to its assistance! In other words, because the Army of the Tennessee was his favorite army and he wanted it to get full credit for the victory, he refused to order an assault that might have wrecked Hood's army and brought the war to the West to an end many months before it actually did.

And then, in the last days of August and the first days of September, Sherman's performance was again inexcusably awful. Once the Southern attack at Jonesboro had been beaten off, the Army of Tennessee was divided and scattered across a wide stretch of territory for many miles south of Atlanta. Sherman's by contrast, was concentrated in and around Jonesboro, with the exception of XX Corps holding the bridgehead over the Chattahoochee near Atlanta. All Sherman had to do was march his army forward and the disunited, demoralized Confederates could have simply been gobbled up. Inexplicably, he did not. Once again, an opportunity beckoned the shatter Confederate military power in the Western Theater and Sherman was just not the commander to do it.

That's Sherman against the incompetent commander Hood. Lee would have run circles around Sherman and had him for lunch.

 

[Anaxagoras]

Grant
Sherman
Meade
Thomas
Sheridan
Ord, and, possibly,
Canby

Sheridan and Sherman were both overrated for reasons I have already described. Neither Canby or Ord had seen all that much combat; Canby had in New Mexico and Ord had at the Battle of Hatchie's Bridge, but both had otherwise been mostly on the sidelines. There was not really anything to suggest that they had "potentially great army commander" stamped on them. I'm rather bemused that you would include them on this list.

When the 1864 campaign opened, critical commands were given to Benjamin Butler, Nathaniel Banks, Ambrose Burnside, Franz Sigel, and David Hunter. Why did these recognized incompetents receive such commands if the Union army command was by then so outstanding, as you allege?

The rebels had:
Lee

And possibly Kirby-Smith...

And Jubal Early, Richard Taylor, and John C. Breckinridge, all of whom really came into their own in 1864 and demonstrated high effectiveness in independent commands. Hardee demonstrated an untapped potential for independent command around Savannah in late 1864. John B. Gordon was just then coming into his own as well. You're oft-repeated contention that Lee was the only solid independent Confederate commander is simply wrong.

 

[GohanLSSJ2]

To my understanding... There was also the case that many capable low-ranked Confederate officers that had great potential ended up killed in the early battles by 1861-1862.

So it may still be possible for the Confederates to have a better chance if these guys had made it out alive on the first battles.

Though if you ask me, the best POD to ensure a confederate victory is start earlier. A trend I'm seeing, for example, is Mexico doing considerably better in the US-Mexican war, leaving the South empty-handed, but the North devoid of resources such as Californian Gold.

 

[TFSmith121]

And yet...

Sherman versus Johnston is a complicated question and both commanders deserve praise and criticism for varying aspects of the campaign. Against Hood, though, Sherman performed poorly. In the last phase of the Atlanta Campaign, the Confederates lost much more than the Union won, because Hood was a walking disaster as an army commander and did pretty much everything wrong. Had Sherman been a more competent commander, Atlanta would not only have fallen but the Army of Tennessee would have been destroyed.

- snip -

Sheridan and Sherman were both overrated for reasons I have already described. Neither Canby or Ord had seen all that much combat; Canby had in New Mexico and Ord had at the Battle of Hatchie's Bridge, but both had otherwise been mostly on the sidelines. There was not really anything to suggest that they had "potentially great army commander" stamped on them. I'm rather bemused that you would include them on this list.

When the 1864 campaign opened, critical commands were given to Benjamin Butler, Nathaniel Banks, Ambrose Burnside, Franz Sigel, and David Hunter. Why did these recognized incompetents receive such commands if the Union army command was by then so outstanding, as you allege?

And Jubal Early, Richard Taylor, and John C. Breckinridge, all of whom really came into their own in 1864 and demonstrated high effectiveness in independent commands. Hardee demonstrated an untapped potential for independent command around Savannah in late 1864. John B. Gordon was just then coming into his own as well. You're oft-repeated contention that Lee was the only solid independent Confederate commander is simply wrong.

And yet, Sherman beat Johnston and Hood (the best the rebels had, apparently, for the Georgia front, at least in the eyes of Jeff Davis) from one end of the state to the other, captured and destroyed Atlanta, and cast off for Savannah, and the rebs' best response was to send Hood into Tennessee...

So yeah, Sherman was a horrible army commander.

Canby and Ord both had something damn few rebel generals managed to demonstrate: the confidence of their superiors, and the ability to manuever and sustain a field army in an offensive war of movement and in the enemy's country in 1864-65. In comparison, Early's efforts were a) a raid, or b) a failed defensive campaign.

The 1864 campaign opened before the election; political generals were still important. Compared with Polk and some of their rebel equivalents, they certainly don't look terrible; hell, Banks' beat Jackson, of all people, at Kernstown in 1862 pretty handily.

• Early led a raid that failed and fought a defensive campaign that failed in 1864-65;
• Taylor managed to beat Banks on the Red River;
• Breckinridge fought a couple of minor defensive actions in East Tennessee/West Virginia in 1864 and then was named secretary of war; his most significant contribution to the war was getting Northrop removed;

Throw Hardee (who had been relieved, essentially, along with JE Johnston, of course) and Gibbon into the mix; it still comes down to - maybe - three army commanders that met Davis' standards in 1864-65: Lee, Hood, and Kirby-Smith, and we all know how things worked out with them...

The US had - at least - three times as many able general officers capable of commanding independently at the (roughly) army level.

Put it this way, if you wish: the rebellion began the big war in 1861-62 with - maybe - four army-level commanders: Lee, JE Johnston, AS Johnston, and PGT Beauregard. When it ended, four years later, the only two forces that mattered in terms of rebel armies east of the Mississippi were commanded by Lee and JE Johnston.

In the same period in 1861-62, the US army-level commanders included McDowell, McClellan, Pope, Buell, Rosecrans, Halleck, and Grant. Four years later, the only one of them in active combat command was Grant. In 1861-62, other than Sherman's short assignment to relieve Anderson in Kentucky, all of the other US army group/independent army-level field commanders - Sherman, Meade, Thomas, Sheridan, Ord, and Canby - were men who had been brigade or, at most, division commanders in 1861-62.

Which speaks to the richness of the US' bench, and acknowledgement of the very real military advantages the demographic differential (4 to 1, after all) gave the US war effort.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Anyone in particular you have in mind?

1) To my understanding... There was also the case that many capable low-ranked Confederate officers that had great potential ended up killed in the early battles by 1861-1862. So it may still be possible for the Confederates to have a better chance if these guys had made it out alive on the first battles.

2) Though if you ask me, the best POD to ensure a confederate victory is start earlier. A trend I'm seeing, for example, is Mexico doing considerably better in the US-Mexican war, leaving the South empty-handed, but the North devoid of resources such as Californian Gold.

Anyone in particular you have in mind?

Because 1) after all, simply suggest that granting the same boon to the US brings in a host of professionals who were casualties in 1861-62, ranging from Lyons to Richardson to Stevens to Kearny to etc...

As far as 2) goes, considering the four decades difference between US independence and Mexican independence, and the advantages that gace the US in terms of economic and demographic development and internal stability by 1846, good luck.

Best,

 

[Anaxagoras]

Early led a raid that failed

Failed? Jubal Early's raid on Washington was a spectacular success. With less than 15,000 men, he managed to clear the Shenandoah Valley of Federal forces, inflict three sharp defeats on the Union army (Monocacy, Cool Spring, and Second Kernstown), penetrate into the outskirts of Washington City itself, divert several infantry and cavalry divisions away from Richmond/Petersburg, collect vast amounts of supplies, forage and livestock from enemy sources, make the Lincoln administration appear incompetent and foolish when Confederate hopes depended on defeating Lincoln at the polls, and raise military and civilian morale across the Confederacy. It was one of the great achievements by any commander on either side during the entire war.

 

[TFSmith121]

It was a raid in a war that turned on battles...

Failed? Jubal Early's raid on Washington was a spectacular success. With less than 15,000 men, he managed to clear the Shenandoah Valley of Federal forces, inflict three sharp defeats on the Union army (Monocacy, Cool Spring, and Second Kernstown), penetrate into the outskirts of Washington City itself, divert several infantry and cavalry divisions away from Richmond/Petersburg, collect vast amounts of supplies, forage and livestock from enemy sources, make the Lincoln administration appear incompetent and foolish when Confederate hopes depended on defeating Lincoln at the polls, and raise military and civilian morale across the Confederacy. It was one of the great achievements by any commander on either side during the entire war.

It was a raid in a war that turned on battles as elements of campaigns in theaters the size of most European nations.

Essentially, Early's operation was a stunt.

By your measure, Morgan's raid into Ohio in 1863 should have won the rebels their independence.

Best,

 

[Anaxagoras]

It was a raid in a war that turned on battles as elements of campaigns in theaters the size of most European nations.

Which is a long-winded way of saying nothing in particular.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

The only serious chance it had was political. There's no way they could possibly win militarily if the Union (much larger, richer and more industrialized) kept at it.

Since the poll suggests to me a military victory, I'd have to say essentially no chance. But they DID have some reasonable chance to pull off independence if they can get the North to give up (or not start).

 

[Anaxagoras]

The only serious chance it had was political. There's no way they could possibly win militarily if the Union (much larger, richer and more industrialized) kept at it.

Since the poll suggests to me a military victory, I'd have to say essentially no chance. But they DID have some reasonable chance to pull off independence if they can get the North to give up (or not start).

By "win" I mean "secure independence". I don't suggest the conquest of the North by the South, which was effectively impossible.

 

[TFSmith121]

No, it's making the point that a single operation -

Which is a long-winded way of saying nothing in particular.

No, it's making the point that a single operation - pitched battle or hit and run raid - doesn't mean anything unless it is part of a larger plan of campaign. As in:

A [FONT=Calibri,Calibri][FONT=Calibri,Calibri]campaign [/FONT][/FONT]is defined as "a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space."1 (1 being JP 5-0, page II-21.)

See below for Dr./Col./Prof. Jack Kem's textbook - well worth reading:

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/Planning-for-Action-Kem-August-2012.pdf

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Sure -which raises the question:

The only serious chance it had was political. There's no way they could possibly win militarily if the Union (much larger, richer and more industrialized) kept at it.

Since the poll suggests to me a military victory, I'd have to say essentially no chance. But they DID have some reasonable chance to pull off independence if they can get the North to give up (or not start).

Sure -which raises the question:

WHY would the US give up?

Best,

 

[Anaxagoras]

Sure -which raises the question:

WHY would the US give up?

Because the Northern people could have lost the will to continue the war effort, having concluded that the goal of restoring the Union and ending slavery was not worth the price being paid in blood and treasure to achieve it. Since the United States was a republic, the people could express their will at the ballot box. IOTL, this could be seen in the fall elections of 1862, where the Democrats made major gains due to a general disaffection with the way the Lincoln administration was running the war. Had it not been for the trio of victories in the summer of 1864 at Mobile Bay, Atlanta, and the Shenandoah Valley, the people could have kicked Lincoln out of office and put in an administration willing to seek a negotiated settlement.