Official "Did the Confederacy Have a Chance to Win the American Civil War?" Thread

[htgriffin]

I find myself wondering how much talking past one-another is going on here. On one hand proclaiming that the Confederate Cause was only defeated by an improbable run of bad luck and only a mild setback would have sent the Union Men scrambling back north is insulting on a few levels.

However legitimate war-gamer sorts asking "Okay, presume the CSA rolled multiple natural-20s and the US rolled at least as many natural-1s, now what?" is a different matter.

 

[galveston bay]

I find myself wondering how much talking past one-another is going on here. On one hand proclaiming that the Confederate Cause was only defeated by an improbable run of bad luck and only a mild setback would have sent the Union Men scrambling back north is insulting on a few levels.

However legitimate war-gamer sorts asking "Okay, presume the CSA rolled multiple natural-20s and the US rolled at least as many natural-1s, now what?" is a different matter.

I tend to fall into the wargamer category myself and generally feel that is about what it would have taken. A lot of Union missteps and a number of better Confederate decisions.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

Not quite sure what you mean by the destruction of the Green Banner Army. By the 19th Century it’s a constabulary of 600k total. Its beaten in the Opium wars which are the definition of a colonial war, and the Taiping rebellion but the rebellion fails so any defeat by Government forces is by definition indecisive.

Hakodate. Well apart from the scale – 3,000 vs 7,000 putting this in the skirmish category its less a battle than a series of actions over a month resulting in the side with 2:1 superiority taking the last fortified position of a rebel movement

Pavon well the winners ( and its confused in English sources) benefit from having British trained and manned artillery. While politically important, tactically its completely indecisive.

Tuyiti – 1866 and the war goes on til 1870.

Solferino – end result is the intact Austrian armies retreat to its fortresses and Napoleon to seek a peace well short of decisive.

The problem with the early 19th century is the battles are not decisive in terms of the overall war. Ulm, the fall of Vienna and then Austerlitz combined settles the 3rd coalition not Austerlitz alone but the war then merges into the 4th coalition because the Russian army is intact then the peninsular war, fifth coalition, 1812, 6th coalition. For France there is no Battle without tomorrow until Waterloo.

The ACW confederate issue is that they need a battle without tomorrow a military victory has to be of such a scale that it forces the Union to seek a peace in which achieves its objectives that is to say a victory of such a scale as it forces the US government to agree to the dissolution of its own country.

That means something like Sadowa or it means a combination of actions that culminate in one, against a numerically superior enemy able to shift very large forces between theatres and raise new forces.

 

[dandan_noodles]

The problem with the early 19th century is the battles are not decisive in terms of the overall war. Ulm, the fall of Vienna and then Austerlitz combined settles the 3rd coalition not Austerlitz alone but the war then merges into the 4th coalition because the Russian army is intact then the peninsular war, fifth coalition, 1812, 6th coalition. For France there is no Battle without tomorrow until Waterloo.

The ACW confederate issue is that they need a battle without tomorrow a military victory has to be of such a scale that it forces the Union to seek a peace in which achieves its objectives that is to say a victory of such a scale as it forces the US government to agree to the dissolution of its own country.

That means something like Sadowa or it means a combination of actions that culminate in one, against a numerically superior enemy able to shift very large forces between theatres and raise new forces.

I don't think the Confederates would [theoretically] need a battle-without-tomorrow victory; they banked their hopes on foreign recognition and electoral defeat of the Republicans, not on defeating the whole Union in a Clausewitzian theoretical Absolute War. For that, they just need to consistently defeat Union invasions between elections and inflict stinging defeats immediately before. Easier said than done, but still easier than trying to win the war in one battle.

 

[Anaxagoras]

Just thought I'd reboot my old thread here to see if anyone has any new thoughts to add.

 

[Saphroneth]

I think the Confederacy most certainly had a chance. It's a chance which varies depending on the situation, but I can see some paths to victory out there.

Perhaps the easiest is some kind of Trent War because this instantly changes the preponderance of capability, but it's not the only one - one I've been thinking about recently is the idea of the Virginia being unmolested by the Monitor (for example, if the Monitor took another week or two to get her rudder problems sorted out). Specifically, it's the idea of the Virginia sailing up the Potomac. (The limiting draft on the Potomac below Washington is 19.5 feet low tide - Mattawoman Shoal - and the Virginia is 21 feet while the tide is three feet, so it's possible.) Fort Washington is not able to stop an ironclad - not my opinion, it was the view of the Union generals who'd know - and having a Confederate ironclad shelling Washington would at the least seriously interfere with public morale. Worse is if the Virginia supports a crossing of the Potomac... or if this all develops after the Peninsular Campaign has started, thus meaning McClellan surrenders his entire army once cut off from supply.

So yes, the Confederacy had a chance. It's in the position of the underdog - the nation which has a lot to do in order to be able to win, and which has to gamble because it can't win without changing the rules in some way - but it's not completely one sided, largely because the US is also in the position of very quickly making a military from nothing.

 

[Indigo]

I will offer a (hopefully moderate) defense of the Union's prospects.

Are the Confederacy's chances zero? No. Yes, the Union has an advantage in men and munitions but that merely makes it implausible for the Confederacy to win, not impossible. Lincoln and Hamlin could get typhoid, a meteor could hit D.C. and the Confederates could even rustle up better battle commanders in the West that Braxton Bragg and Leonidas Polk.

On the other hand, Confederate victories as usually spelled out fall into three main categories, all of which ring somewhat false to me.

1- Lee wins at Antietam, or Gettysburg, or somewhere else, and then goes North and the jig is up. Quite simply - it's really hard for Lee to make the Army of the Potomac simply evaporate at any point in his career. Beat it (with proportionately almost as bad casualties?) sure. Completely smash it to bits, when he has less men and the opposing general isn't John Bell Hood? That seems of doubtful probability. (I think there are a few times where a Cannae could be achieved but the timing needs to be better than just picking Antietam or Gettysburg).
And at this point in time, Lee just waltzes into Washington? Even if he takes it, what then? Lee's Army camps there and the North is like "gee, can't possibly think of what we could do to Lee's army sitting here, guess he achieved a win condition?" This outcome seems to be based on a series of improbable events.


2- Trent Affair intervention. This isn't a knock on the people writing Trent Affair timelines right now, far from it (Please keep writing, actually ). Three of the four I've seen are well researched and, with some variance in speculation, put a lot of effort in thinking how things are going to pan out when the U.S. and Britain get involved in total war. (The fourth one gives Kansas to the Confederates but I digress.)
My opinion is that if it comes to total war, yes, Britain and the C.S.A are together going to beat the United States on sea and on land. I simply think that scenario is vanishingly unlikely. Yes, there was a crisis in OTL, but it was averted for a reason.
Britain and the U.S. each have nothing to gain from going to war. Lincoln is not an idiot; he's not going to insult Britain and he's going to make any concession short of war if he has too (sure Seward had strange ideas but the rest of U.S. policymakers are not as blindly hawkish as he is. Hawkish, yes, but not enough so to take on two enemies at once). And from Britain's perspective, what real reason do they have to go to war over the South? Innate sympathy with slaveowners was not the sentiment of the time, and if Britain really wanted to go to war over balance of power than they would be best suited to look at Bismarck in Europe and not the U.S. an ocean away. Britain's advantage over the U.S. is (I don't want to stretch analogies too far) like that of France over Mexico in the same time period. If they really put in the effort of course they are going to beat the United States; but there is no logic to them doing this, so barring Palmerston being very stubborn on points of pride they have no reason to stay in the war.

3- Peace of exhaustion. Aka, Hood or Johnston prevents Sherman from taking Atlanta and George Pendleton (or some other go-to peace Democrat) wins in 1864. (Britain could swoop in to force a peace treaty here, but again, why would they care enough to put boots on the ground?) Firstly, the south is going to get carved up like a ham if they are lucky enough to actually get a treaty recognizing their independence from the Peace Democrats. Secondly, a slow high-casualty advance is still an advance. This outcome requires the northern leadership either being willfully blind to the fact that they are still winning the war, or just deciding "yes, we could win back half of our country in a few years. But we'd rather not suffer the casualties from that." The Confederacy in 1864 and 1865 is still going to be losing men at a greater rate - the Union being bled dry is just not a realistic outcome and the 1800s U.S. isn't exactly known for it's concern for humanitarianism in war. So unless the Confederates actually reverse the tide of war (not merely create more Overland Campaign-like bloodshed), they can't win.

So of course the South has a shot at winning the Civil War (and if Britain really cares enough then the South will win), but I think we need to remember that the Union is not going to make willfully stupid decisions to reach that end. A southern victory will require the South not collapsing in the west, probably a Union army being captured wholesale in the east, and Britain and France gently reminding the U.S. how fucked it's economy will be. A combination of factors, in other words.

Sorry for the word-dump. At the end of the day it's all just discussion and I don't think anyone has malicious motives behind their arguments.

 

[Saphroneth]

And from Britain's perspective, what real reason do they have to go to war over the South?

I know this is singling out a single sentence from your entire piece, but - and this should really be clear - the Trent affair is not about the South. It is about the Trent.

The British were not willing to go to war for the South, but they were willing to go to war over the rights of neutrals (which were unambiguously being infringed in the event of Trent, and in quite a big way). There's a reason my PoD is "Lincoln's cabinet rejects the ultimatum", though I could have had the PoD be a bit further back and be "Palmerston does not tone down the ultimatum" - rejection of that ultimatum means war, it was that close.
It's true that I think it unlikely that the cabinet would reject the ultimatum, but as I understand it Lincoln was actually more hawkish than Seward over the Trent ultimatum discussions - it took him some time to persuade Lincoln to accept the ultimatum.

 

[Indigo]

I know this is singling out a single sentence from your entire piece, but - and this should really be clear - the Trent affair is not about the South. It is about the Trent.

The British were not willing to go to war for the South, but they were willing to go to war over the rights of neutrals (which were unambiguously being infringed in the event of Trent, and in quite a big way). There's a reason my PoD is "Lincoln's cabinet rejects the ultimatum", though I could have had the PoD be a bit further back and be "Palmerston does not tone down the ultimatum" - rejection of that ultimatum means war, it was that close.
It's true that I think it unlikely that the cabinet would reject the ultimatum, but as I understand it Lincoln was actually more hawkish than Seward over the Trent ultimatum discussions - it took him some time to persuade Lincoln to accept the ultimatum.

Fair points Saphroneth (discussion makes the world go round after all ). I think it's rather telling that it only came to a crisis because Wilkes blundered so badly and Lincoln was slow to make amends. And certainly you are right; Britain does care about rights of neutrals. And sure Britain will probably be willing to menace the United States until it gets concessions. But when I look at Palmerston's record I see plenty of war scares, few catastrophic conflicts. Was there a arduous war over Don Pacifico? Or Germany threatening Denmark? Or the Fenians later in the decade? What is so different about the Trent Affair that Britain, briefly frustrated over concessions, goes into military overdrive to take down the United States? I don't think it's ASB at all for it to come to force (and your TL is one possible chain of events from that). But it seems far more likely for such a conflict to peter out rather than escalate, because Britain has no reason to stay in the war, because even if the immediate crisis is about the Trent, the long conflict is clearly about helping the south get independence. And is Britain really dedicated to that goal?

W/ regards to the point about Lincoln being more hawkish - my bad then. I defer to your judgement since you are, after all, the one putting the work into writing a TL about this.

In the end, the conflict fizzling is certainly less use writing about than escalation, but it seems the more likely of the two in my opinion, if that makes sense?

 

[galveston bay]

I know this is singling out a single sentence from your entire piece, but - and this should really be clear - the Trent affair is not about the South. It is about the Trent.

The British were not willing to go to war for the South, but they were willing to go to war over the rights of neutrals (which were unambiguously being infringed in the event of Trent, and in quite a big way). There's a reason my PoD is "Lincoln's cabinet rejects the ultimatum", though I could have had the PoD be a bit further back and be "Palmerston does not tone down the ultimatum" - rejection of that ultimatum means war, it was that close.
It's true that I think it unlikely that the cabinet would reject the ultimatum, but as I understand it Lincoln was actually more hawkish than Seward over the Trent ultimatum discussions - it took him some time to persuade Lincoln to accept the ultimatum.

source on Lincoln? I have seen sources claim that Seward wanted a war prior to secession to unite the country (and he wasn't alone in that), but I have seen several sources state clearly that Lincoln said "one war at a time"

 

[Fabius Maximus]

Secondly, a slow high-casualty advance is still an advance. This outcome requires the northern leadership either being willfully blind to the fact that they are still winning the war, or just deciding "yes, we could win back half of our country in a few years. But we'd rather not suffer the casualties from that." The Confederacy in 1864 and 1865 is still going to be losing men at a greater rate - the Union being bled dry is just not a realistic outcome and the 1800s U.S. isn't exactly known for it's concern for humanitarianism in war. So unless the Confederates actually reverse the tide of war (not merely create more Overland Campaign-like bloodshed), they can't win.

It's not the Union high command that would be exhausted, it's public opinion. And there are plenty of well-known real-life examples of public opinion turning against a war even though, if they stuck at it long enough, they could grind the enemy down with superior resources -- Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan all spring to mind.

 

[Indigo]

Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan all spring to mind.

If it were a modern day war against the Confederacy, with tv and war crime tribunals and left-wing peace movements, sure. I said 1800s for a reason though - from Madison through Jackson, Polk, Lincoln and in all probability McClellan we don't exactly have presidents bowing to public opinion and ending wars, do we? And also how does morale being sapped by a hidden unbeatable enemy occur when the Confederates-unlike the three cases you listed- aren't mainly using guerrilla warfare? Winning at a slower rate doesn't seem enough for the U.S. to throw in the towel? (Combined w/ effective use of guerrillas and economic collapse it could)

 

[ben0628]

It's not the Union high command that would be exhausted, it's public opinion. And there are plenty of well-known real-life examples of public opinion turning against a war even though, if they stuck at it long enough, they could grind the enemy down with superior resources -- Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan all spring to mind.

I would make the argument that your examples are all modern and include a modern media that is better able to portray the violence via television.

 

[ben0628]

And although I am by no means the most qualified expert on this subject (haven't read any civil war tls), I feel that the best most realistic way the South wins without any pods long before the war is if Democrats win the 1864 elections, but this would require in my opinion Confederate victories on all fronts in both 1864 AND 1863, which means the south needs to win at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Port Hudson, and Chattanooga.

 

[htgriffin]

It's not the Union high command that would be exhausted, it's public opinion. And there are plenty of well-known real-life examples of public opinion turning against a war even though, if they stuck at it long enough, they could grind the enemy down with superior resources -- Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan all spring to mind.

Those examples matter vastly less to the american public than a large swath of the country breaking off because they did not like the result of the elections. It is going to take far longer for serious War Weariness to kick in over that... to be blunt longer than the CSA can manage without a slew of proverbial Natural 20s and even then they are going to lose a lot of territory.

 

[Saphroneth]

With regard to the Trent thing, one of the reasons Trent can lead to the CSA winning is that in OTL early 1862 the Union was really under strain. It's in the following six months (Jan-Jun 1862) that they receive at least 500,000 small arms from Europe; they get large amounts of powder; the blockade really starts to be an extant thing; the ironclad navy starts to be built; faith in the currency is restored.

In early 1862, the limiting factor on the armies of both sides is not manpower (and if it were manpower the US would have a real advantage). It's weapons. Small arms, in short. And due to the efforts of various people in the army in Buchanan's term, the number of muskets south and north of the border is not too far off equal, so the CSA can raise about as many troops as the USA. It takes at least a year for the Union to really get weapons production going domestically, and they end up importing 436,000 Enfield rifles alone and over 1 million small arms from Europe in total - most of them to cover that industry mobilization time.

As such, with Trent (and the resultant British blockade and lack of British Enfield sales) the Union can find itself with only about the same number of troops as the Confederacy... and with the need to garrison North, East and South instead of just fighting the South. One reason I did the June 30 comparison in my TL.
(It does not help that, yes, OTL the threat of war caused a run on the banks.)

What all this means is that, if Trent eventuated, the Union very rapidly finds itself in a worse military situation than the Confederacy with far less bayonets (ie troops with guns) available for the front line than OTL. The Union's ability to win the Civil War following a Trent affair basically boils down to the political will of the Union to negotiate a peace with Britain very quickly indeed - for example, if the war lasts about two months, then most of the Union fleet has likely been lost and the Confederacy gets to buy many more modern rifles than OTL (while the Union hence gets less), again making deploying forces easier.


Could the Union nevertheless come back from a heavy hammering and still win the ACW? Yes, but not necessarily. They're vulnerable to fairly major military defeat, and if that doesn't happen it still means it takes longer than OTL to get the OTL successes rolling.

Those examples matter vastly less to the american public than a large swath of the country breaking off because they did not like the result of the elections. It is going to take far longer for serious War Weariness to kick in over that... to be blunt longer than the CSA can manage without a slew of proverbial Natural 20s and even then they are going to lose a lot of territory.

I was under the impression that it was fairly clear in 1864 that voting Democrat meant voting for a negotiated peace. Since the D vote was not overly far short of the R vote, then it suggests that there was a substantial minority in favour of a negotiated peace - add a bit more of the Confederacy doing well and there's the possibility for a D president being elected.

 

[Indigo]

Your first point is very true Saphroneth; early 1862 is probably the Union's weakest moment ; even without British intervention the South could maybe have turned the tide then at Ft.'s Henry and Donelson. If Britain does truly commit to economic disruption then the U.S. is in a pinch. (The threat of real war with Britain economically could make the U.S. back down before we have troop landings anywhere).

With regards to the second point on the 1864 election - the Democrats nominated a War Democrat (i.e. McClellan) who was pretty clearly going to ignore the peace wing. Secondly, the goal of the Peace Democrats was overwhelming negotiating a southern return to the country with slavery allowed, not splitting the U.S. up. Negotiations are going to fail in short order, and then it's probably back to war? In other words only a very small amount of the 45% that voted for McClellan wanted to just unconditionally let the South go.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

I know this is singling out a single sentence from your entire piece, but - and this should really be clear - the Trent affair is not about the South. It is about the Trent.

The British were not willing to go to war for the South, but they were willing to go to war over the rights of neutrals (which were unambiguously being infringed in the event of Trent, and in quite a big way). There's a reason my PoD is "Lincoln's cabinet rejects the ultimatum", though I could have had the PoD be a bit further back and be "Palmerston does not tone down the ultimatum" - rejection of that ultimatum means war, it was that close.
It's true that I think it unlikely that the cabinet would reject the ultimatum, but as I understand it Lincoln was actually more hawkish than Seward over the Trent ultimatum discussions - it took him some time to persuade Lincoln to accept the ultimatum.

With regards to Lincoln being hawkish; Lincoln himself was not hawkish towards the British, he was elated by news of the seizure of the commissioners, but that was because it was the seizure of two Southern envoys, not because they were scooped off a British ship.

In truth from what I have read, Lincoln at first did not completely comprehend the nature of the diplomatic incident with Trent simply because he was not fully aware of the realities of Maritime law. He also got bad advice on the British mood from Charles Sumner in the first weeks after the seizure, and in fairness Sumner was probably being optimistic while at the same time trying to stick it to his old rival Seward.

Once the scope of British dissatisfaction became apparent Lincoln immediately began looking for a face saving way out. He found one, and since neither side sincerely wanted to escalate the incident, the matter was dropped.

 

[Anaxagoras]

With regards to the second point on the 1864 election - the Democrats nominated a War Democrat (i.e. McClellan) who was pretty clearly going to ignore the peace wing.

This isn't necessarily true, as I've pointed out elsewhere. McClellan had been building bridges to the Peace Democrats as early as 1863, when he supported the Copperhead George Woodward in the Pennsylvania gubernatorial election. He also formed close relationships with Copperhead newspaper editors like Manton Marble of the New York World, telling them that he was open to a ceasefire with the Confederacy and the opening of peace negotiations. Finally, it's important to point out that McClellan only repudiated the idea of a ceasefire after news of Atlanta's fall. He could have done so at any time before then, but choose not to. It seems to me that McClellan was clearly hedging his bets. Had he taken office with the Confederates still full of fight and capable of sustained resistance as a result of a better campaigning season in 1864, I think it's entirely possible that he would have gone along with the ceasefire idea.

 

[Indigo]

It seems to me that McClellan was clearly hedging his bets. Had he taken office with the Confederates still full of fight and capable of sustained resistance as a result of a better campaigning season in 1864, I think it's entirely possible that he would have gone along with the ceasefire idea.

If the Confederates are legitimately resurgent sure, but in a situation where the only difference is Atlanta not being taken or something of the like, McClellan's not exactly going to follow through on his platform now is he? A POD earlier than mid 1864 at least?