At most, I could see Constantinople being a Vienna-sized city of a million or two million people, on that note.
Of lost monkeys and broken vehicles
- Thread starter Lascaris
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tbf I think a potential merger of the Alawite and Syrian states spearheaded by the French would be the most likely option that causes the Alawites to war, since France wants to deal with a single entity and proposes a federation while Damascus and the Ba'ath party wants national unity.
I think we'd see the party become more and more islamist in addition to being arabic due to it due to their biggest enemies being Arabs that don't see themselves as Arabic (and one thing I could see happen is Alawite/Lebanese Arabic getting more English/Greek loanwords than the Arabic other Arabians speak).
hmm so there'd still be more Turks than greeks in Constantinople despite it being an international city for so long?
the old city is still huge though, its certainly more dense than the Asiatic parts of the city...
Not really huge. Up to.the 1940s it largely was the Old City within the walls and Oera-Galata
So, to add to the Syrian question...
If the Alawite state remains independent and the Syrian state remain landlocked, then their only outlet are either Aqaba or Basrah, both under Abdullah's rule; Aqaba could use a railway connection to Ma'an and the Ottoman era Hejaz railway (if still operated) though, to make that outlet for Syria a reality.
In that perspective, Syrians offering the crown to Abdullah makes much economic sense.
Of course, if there is even an hint the pro British Abdullah would get Syria, you can be sure the French would do everything to ensure the Alawite independence becomes a sure thing, and that of Assyria as well (if the British are to walk out of their promises, as it is too likely to happen given their interests in Iraq, the petty Franco-British games in Syria will make it sure the French will step in as Assyria's patrons, just to piss the British and Hashemites off).
If the Alawite state remains independent and the Syrian state remain landlocked, then their only outlet are either Aqaba or Basrah, both under Abdullah's rule; Aqaba could use a railway connection to Ma'an and the Ottoman era Hejaz railway (if still operated) though, to make that outlet for Syria a reality.
In that perspective, Syrians offering the crown to Abdullah makes much economic sense.
Of course, if there is even an hint the pro British Abdullah would get Syria, you can be sure the French would do everything to ensure the Alawite independence becomes a sure thing, and that of Assyria as well (if the British are to walk out of their promises, as it is too likely to happen given their interests in Iraq, the petty Franco-British games in Syria will make it sure the French will step in as Assyria's patrons, just to piss the British and Hashemites off).
Hence why I think it would still be quite big, though on the scale of Vienna (the other former Imperial Capital stripped of its empire and hinterlands).
I think in this scenario you’re right that the French are going to do everything they can to maintain Alawite and Lebanese Independence, wether they be separate nations or some kind of federation. That being said, realistically can the French really do much in this situation to patronize the Assyrians? They could make sure they exist on paper for the peace deal, but they’d be land locked and surrounded by Abdullah and the Kurds who want them dead. The French can do a lot to help those countries on the Mediterranean coast but I don’t see “The Mosul Airlift” happening, or accomplishing much if it does. Maybe the fear of French intervention buys Assyria a few years, but once France starts getting dragged into conflicts in Africa for decolonization those fears disappear.
Unless Iran gets on board. Geopolitically, the Iranians are not going to like much an Hashemite Kingdom spanning Iraq and Syria on their doorstep. As much as they, along the Saudi, are going to drift towards Americans to counterbalance the British, they have a common interest with the French to undermine such a united Arab Hashemite kingdom. So looking elsewhere while the French help Assyrians from within their borders... Why not?
Assyria getting created is tough, as some the factors that could make it, Iranian support also make it equally likely to be incorporated in Iran. Perhaps they end up in the International Zone.
A thing to remember ATL the USSR is closer to the ME (vua Turkey ) than OTL. This is bound to impact movements and insurrections, wars.
A thing to remember ATL the USSR is closer to the ME (vua Turkey ) than OTL. This is bound to impact movements and insurrections, wars.
I'm aware, however, the reality is that ITTL Greece would be more accepting of other faiths than OTL, thanks to the far larger population of Muslim Greek citizens, such as Circassians, that actively participated in the fighting against the Turkish, and thus are considered to be true patriots, despite their faith, unlike OTL Pomaks which are largely thought to be of ambivalent loyalties and the only reason they are not outright called out for that is the attempt to avoid ethnic tensions, out of a hope to keep them on Greece's side or at least neutral...
Now add the far larger industrial capacity of ITTL Greece and you can see how limited immigration of Palestinians could occur, especially in order to relief Lebanon. And even then, because it's quite early for Greece, intergratonalist policies would be heavily pursed to assimilate them, in order to gain even the begrudging acceptance of these recent arrivals from the Greek populace at large.
First off, ehmmm, ITTL Greece would 100 % block that, because it would alter the demographics of the European side of Constantinople, that ITTL Greece still aspires to annex eventually.
Furthermore it would disrupt the internal balances in favor of the Turkish Muslim population within the International city even further that it already is...
So in reality, I can see ITTL Greece assisting Bulgaria with ships etc, to assist in the deportation of these Muslims towards Turkey, in order to prevent their expulsion to the international city...
Should the Bulgarians not accept for whatever reason, ITTL Greece has a black sea coastline and a very powerful fleet that would fully mobilize to prevent any and all movement between Bulgaria and the international city, as simple as that!
What are the Bulgarians going to do?
Fly their Muslim population that they want to deport over Eastern Thrace?
(Hint ITTL Greece would redirect or even shoot the airplanes!)
Nobody is fucking with the city and especially not the Bulgars!
About that, in all reality, depending on the time period that the city is annexed, assuming it is in fact the early 50s, like I've seen somewhere earlier being said, I could see Constantinople being right there with Smyrna, Athens & Thessaloniki, all having a 30 %+- difference in terms of population between one another.
That is also true and didn't Iraq and Jordan both had Hashemite cousins to ruler over them respectively?
That briefly united as a counterweight to Nasser's Pan-Arabist United Arab Republic between Egypt & Syria?
What if maybe this time the Hashemite relative ruling over Jordan is forced to admit fealty to the Iraqi Hashemite branch? And have him as overlord, uniting the two realms?
Because the unbalance of power would be really really big here, with a united Iraq & interior Syria, unlike OTL, as Iraq didn't had a proper connection with Jordan, like Syria had from the levant, other than the one through the middle of the desert.
Well Greece is not the only power controlling the internationalized zone. So it might not be a Greek decision to make. Also people can be moved to the Asian side.
On Constantinople being as big as Athens? Why? Industry on both sides is located elsewhere ( the triangle fir Greece Sivas and Gebze for Turkey), Greek Asia Minor products are going to be exported through the triangle. The Western Balkans are served via Thessaloniki. Turkish produce will mainly be exported via Mersin and Sinop.
Pretty much the only trade to go through the city is going to be Bulgarian and coastal Romanian plus Soviet. But the Soviets will just use the port of Hydarpasa.
Absent a decision to build industry, control of both coasts, pretty much the city's only economic role is as a waystation for Black Sea trade, and a export/import port for Bulgaria.
Not enough to compare with the industrial triangle and the Med ports.
I think if we get population booms it'd be due to it being post WWII and people having more children in general. Other than that I think post cold war constantinople could be a place where goods going to the former ussr will increase in volume.
Regarding Israel:
It seems likely that with much greater Zionist participation in the Allied war effort, there will be a quid pro quo of much greater Jewish immigration into Palestine. Also, Britain may give the "Hebrew Legion" the peacekeeping/police role that OTL went to the Arab Legion. This could neutralize the anti-British sentiment among extreme Zionists (e.g. the Stern Gang and Irgun).
Thus, by the end of the war or soon after, there could be a solid Zionist majority in Palestine which has de facto control of the the territory.
This will offend many Arabs, but there is little they can do about it. Abdullah has much bigger fish to fry and needs to stay friends with Britain; picking a fight over Palestine would endanger that. Alawite "Syria" doesn't border Palestine and is busy trying to survive. Lebanon is minimally interested. The Arabs in Palestine are disorganized and outnumbered.
Most likely, the Zionists oppose partition, and nearly all of the Arabs submit. The new state of Israel will include an Arab minority, as OTL, with citizenship and voting rights, as OTL, though substantially larger. There will be no "Nakba" as such, and no mass of aggrieved refugees to inflame Arab opinion. Most Palestinian Arabs will see participation in the new state as the most promising course. The Nashashibi clan may have a comeback. There will be friction, of course, but the animosity will be trivial compared to OTL.
There may still be mass migration of mizrachim from Arab states to Israel, but the demography of Israel will be more European.
Also, Israel's national culture will be very different, without the heroic narrative of 1948 as its founding. The deeds of the "Palestine Division" may serve as a feeble substitute. One also has to wonder how OTL Israelis dealt with the fact that after 1948, a great many of them occupied abandoned Arab houses. ITTL, that doesn't happen; instead Israel has a huge housing crisis as they seek to provide for the influx of wartime and post-war refugees. (I believe there was such a crisis OTL, but it will be much worse ITTL.)
It seems likely that with much greater Zionist participation in the Allied war effort, there will be a quid pro quo of much greater Jewish immigration into Palestine. Also, Britain may give the "Hebrew Legion" the peacekeeping/police role that OTL went to the Arab Legion. This could neutralize the anti-British sentiment among extreme Zionists (e.g. the Stern Gang and Irgun).
Thus, by the end of the war or soon after, there could be a solid Zionist majority in Palestine which has de facto control of the the territory.
This will offend many Arabs, but there is little they can do about it. Abdullah has much bigger fish to fry and needs to stay friends with Britain; picking a fight over Palestine would endanger that. Alawite "Syria" doesn't border Palestine and is busy trying to survive. Lebanon is minimally interested. The Arabs in Palestine are disorganized and outnumbered.
Most likely, the Zionists oppose partition, and nearly all of the Arabs submit. The new state of Israel will include an Arab minority, as OTL, with citizenship and voting rights, as OTL, though substantially larger. There will be no "Nakba" as such, and no mass of aggrieved refugees to inflame Arab opinion. Most Palestinian Arabs will see participation in the new state as the most promising course. The Nashashibi clan may have a comeback. There will be friction, of course, but the animosity will be trivial compared to OTL.
There may still be mass migration of mizrachim from Arab states to Israel, but the demography of Israel will be more European.
Also, Israel's national culture will be very different, without the heroic narrative of 1948 as its founding. The deeds of the "Palestine Division" may serve as a feeble substitute. One also has to wonder how OTL Israelis dealt with the fact that after 1948, a great many of them occupied abandoned Arab houses. ITTL, that doesn't happen; instead Israel has a huge housing crisis as they seek to provide for the influx of wartime and post-war refugees. (I believe there was such a crisis OTL, but it will be much worse ITTL.)
Where are these additional Jews coming from? And why are they coming because of some Jewish divisions? I mean I’m hopeful that the war ends earlier and more Jews avoid death because of it, and they may very well head to Israel, but I don’t see how that has anything to do with more Jewish veterans post war.
I don’t see why this would change honestly. The Muslim world is likely to still be pissed about this, even if there wasn’t a shot fired. I could see a few particularly well imbedded groups like the Jews of Djerba staying put/not being persecuted, but I don’t think most will be that lucky.
I can definitely still see that narrative happening still. Even if the Hashemites, Lebanon, and the Alawites stay out I think that Egypt is going to get involved. If it wants to have any claim of being a pan Arabic unifier they’d need to do something in the face of the Hashemites gains.
As an aside do we have any idea what an Alawite state mite be called? The only thing that comes to mind is Phoenicia but that would be more appropriate as a name of a union of the Alawites and Lebanon.
And also it would serve the purpose of getting western goods in to the Soviet block
Probably, Greece probably would be hotbed since they control how gods enter and leave the black sea. I think the Greek government will be trying to crush such movement of goods, and sometimes it works, but a lot of times it just goes badly and it doesn't work.