Of lost monkeys and broken vehicles

@Lascaris has been vague on the future of Poland and I am curious to see where it goes. Here are some of my thoughts and a map or two..

The preliminary border is the Curzon Line B in the East and the Oder-Neisse line in the west. (It is worth noting that in OTL the Poland's Eastern border was shifted slightly from Curzon A.)

The first implication of the use of Curzon line B and the inclusion of Lwow in Poland, is that it changes which Oder-Neisse line is being used in the west. There are two Neisse rivers that flow into the Oder river, the Western Lusatian Neisse (W) & the Eastern Glatzer Neisse (E). In OTL the link connecting the loss of Lwow in exchange for Breslau/Wrocław was an explicit part of negotiations and determined the use of the Western instead of Eastern Neisse. ITTL I would assume the Eastern Neisse is the assumed border - see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wroc%C5%82aw#Second_World_War final paragraph for a quick summary.

This has a knock on effect over the fate of Stettin, as Polish control over all of Silesia meant full control of the Oder river mouth was pushed for. Split control puts the Stettin question up in the air.

All else being equal Poland would look roughly like the below map.

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However there are a number of butterflies that make the final fate of Poland much more in the air than in OTL:

- There are Polish armies in the field on continental Europe, who have the possibility of liberating pre-war Polish territory directly from German occupation.
- Churchill's list of influenced countries didn't include Poland (I'm sure the ambiguity wasn't intentional...)
- Control over the straight's and Anatolia.

The first of these points is the most significant. If any polish troops liberate any pre-war polish territory that area acquires totemic significance to the Polish state. Polish control of any territory east of the Curzon line B by the end of the war would in effect tear up the 'preliminary borders', as facts on the ground are far more powerful deciders. Any restoration of a Polish voice over their own borders has huge ramifications for the final territorial outcome.

In OTL the USSR used it's influence to push it's borders as far westwards as possible. ITTL that influence is spread westwards, but also southwards. Any territorial shifts in either area will be linked by how much the USSR is able to exert it's influence. I would therefore assume that the fate of Konigsberg and the straights are directly linked.

Initially in OTL it was assumed all of East Prussia would go to Poland, but the USSR annexed Konigsberg for three broad reasons: 1) compensation for the Russian people's losses in the war; 2) the acquisition of another warm water port in Europe; 3) to threaten Poland from it's northern flank. ITTL however, I think the USSR is more unlikely to push for an East Prussian concession but an Anatolian concession instead. This is mainly as I think it will be an easier win for the Soviets. The Soviet's can still easily threaten Poland, Konigsberg or no Konigsberg, while land and warm water ports with more value can be gained around the straights. Either Asiatic Constantinople of neighbouring ports/land is of far more strategic and historic value, when you already control the rest of the Baltic states.

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With all that in mind, I think we will see a very different Poland to the 'preliminary borders'. I think it is likely to retain more of it's eastern lands that in OTL, and consequently will not gain as much land in compensation in the west. None of this is to consider the possibility of a Poland divided between East and West, which would have it's own ramifications.

Whether Poland's borders stretch far enough to the east that they prevent the USSR from bordering Czechoslovakia has also got implications for the annexation of the Ruthenia and the Sudeten Germans. In OTL the Soviet's allowed the expulsion of all Sudeten Germans in return for the annexation of Ruthenia. Without that you may still see some significant expulsions of some German's (Nazi party members etc...) from Czechoslovakia, but by no means that entire community.
Poland Curzon-Neisse.png
 
I still do not see the Greeks can defy the Soviets point. Why is it hard for a half million Soviet and half million Red Turkish army in occupied Anatolia to attack Anatolian Greece? What do they need a navy for? The whole security of Soviet commerce relies on the Straits being open. Every other Soviet goal noted by supporters of the renegade Greece option goes through security of the Straits. This is the first time since 1833 were the country whose trade relies on the straits has a chance to control that chokepoint , with the blessing of the maritime powers this time , and it us going to sit aside and let Greece take it? This is problematic thinking. I am afraid I have to disagree. The UK made sure Cyprus was a poisoned chalice. The Soviets will be much worse.
 
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With all the talk of a Greek Constantinople and all that, what would happen to the Blue Mosque in such a scenario? Converted to a church? Turned into a museum?
 
With all the talk of a Greek Constantinople and all that, what would happen to the Blue Mosque in such a scenario? Converted to a church? Turned into a museum?
This is the easiet. Same status as the mosques of Adrianople which OTL were coverrd by the Sevres Treaty. Operating Mosques under control of the treaty Muslim minority in Greece. So essentially control of the state. The Blue Mosque is not even the most important. The mosgue tombs of Mehmet the Conqueror and Suleimam the Lawgiver are in the European side as well as the tomb-mosque of Mahmud II. All the "imperial" mosques are in the Old City. Purpose built mosques are not easily turned to churches. I am not aware of one done so in Greece after 1821. Used for other things? Yes. But if it was not built as a church it usually us not turned to a church.
 
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I also want to note something. There is a persistent belief that if you do ethnic cleansing it cannot be undone. The Kosovo case should had laid this to rest. If the major powers tell Greece you need to accept an ×% proportion of turks in the City they can enforce it.

Anyway enough bickering, my fault as well. @Lascaris is the god here and unknown is the will of the lord.
 
Whether Poland's borders stretch far enough to the east that they prevent the USSR from bordering Czechoslovakia has also got implications for the annexation of the Ruthenia and the Sudeten Germans. In OTL the Soviet's allowed the expulsion of all Sudeten Germans in return for the annexation of Ruthenia. Without that you may still see some significant expulsions of some German's (Nazi party members etc...) from Czechoslovakia, but by no means that entire community.

I think the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans is a done deal, a lot of people including all of the governments in exile wanted to end the "Germans outside of Germany" problem once and for all.
 
I very much agree with @Khan Doomy.

The status of the Straits is the most important security issue of Moscow. I would argue that it is more in TTL than in OTL. After all, Germany used the Straits/Black Sea underbelly to attack twice Russia in the spand of two generations. When the Red Army was fighting a desperate battle at the gates of Moscow, a lot of divisions were tied down at the Caucasus Front, because a foreign power controlled the Straits.

Having said that, Stalin knows that Biga and Asiatic Constantinople is for DC and London to deliver and not of the Red Fleet to take. The Western Powers will first have boots on the ground at the Dardanelles no matter what. Of course the capitalist leaders have already verbally agreed, but what is a verbal commitment to Stalin with his Stalin-level of paranoia? In my view, the Americans and British hold the biggest, juiciest carrot they can dangle in front of the USSR. I take it for granted that they will extract concessions elsewhere, especially if due to the different circumstances the Western Armies liberate more of Europe.
 
Because this is not a video game!


To close my arguments, I expect Lascaris to have a hidden card to show us, as I doubt things can plausibly develop as they seem, at least without a big damage to the Greek political stability and the Western prestige (Churchill, especially) in the last stages of the war and after.
So the argument here is the Western Allies would not be making concessions to the Soviet Union over the straits, at a time the Soviets are holding down 176 German divisions in the Eastern front and the Americans want to get them in the war against the Japanese and Roosevelt has fantasies of working closely with the Soviets post-war even at the cost of British imperialist ambitions on grounds of...

1. Britain wanting to keep absolute control of the straits for itself directly or through its Greek ally and refusing uncle Joe's "reasonable demands" on grounds of... playing the great game in the middle of the war? Sure the Americans are going to be impressed by being told the Soviets need to be bottled up in the Black Sea. "Sorry about Ivan refusing to join the war against the Japs old chap. But being able to park battleships to threaten our ally in the Golden Horn matters more to us than winning."

2. Greece getting both sides of the straits. Only there's the slight problem about whether Greece wants the Asiatic side of the straits in the first place. So... Greece should want to annex roughly everything along the southern coast of the sea of Marmara up to the Sakarya river estuary? Plus Channakkale? At a minimum, while for military reasons to defend it it should likely have to take Eskisehir, which in turn means it should take Kutahya which in turn means extending the border to Banaz in not Afyon? That's what, well over 100,000 square km? With the population that runs off the top of my head in the order of 2-4 millions including Biga and Uskudar being 95% Turkish? Why Greece would want a Turkish minority running in the millions? Even if Greece DID want the territory which is questionable, why the big three would by willing to accommodate it? And if Greece does not want it what becomes of the British argument?
 
So the argument here is the Western Allies would not be making concessions to the Soviet Union over the straits, at a time the Soviets are holding down 176 German divisions in the Eastern front and the Americans want to get them in the war against the Japanese and Roosevelt has fantasies of working closely with the Soviets post-war even at the cost of British imperialist ambitions on grounds of...

1. Britain wanting to keep absolute control of the straits for itself directly or through its Greek ally and refusing uncle Joe's "reasonable demands" on grounds of... playing the great game in the middle of the war? Sure the Americans are going to be impressed by being told the Soviets need to be bottled up in the Black Sea. "Sorry about Ivan refusing to join the war against the Japs old chap. But being able to park battleships to threaten our ally in the Golden Horn matters more to us than winning."

2. Greece getting both sides of the straits. Only there's the slight problem about whether Greece wants the Asiatic side of the straits in the first place. So... Greece should want to annex roughly everything along the southern coast of the sea of Marmara up to the Sakarya river estuary? Plus Channakkale? At a minimum, while for military reasons to defend it it should likely have to take Eskisehir, which in turn means it should take Kutahya which in turn means extending the border to Banaz in not Afyon? That's what, well over 100,000 square km? With the population that runs off the top of my head in the order of 2-4 millions including Biga and Uskudar being 95% Turkish? Why Greece would want a Turkish minority running in the millions? Even if Greece DID want the territory which is questionable, why the big three would by willing to accommodate it? And if Greece does not want it what becomes of the British argument?
Thank you for your reply Lascaris!

However I think you didn't understand what I was saying, or I failed to make my point clear.

To start with, no, I don't think Greece can nor wants to get everything around the Straits, especially the Asian side. Greece has been very reasonable so far ITTL, and there's no reason to change its attitude.

Actually, Greece would (and should) even agree to an internationalised Constantinople (European side) if there weren't two issues:
1. The referendum in 1940 and the proclamation of the union in 1941. The Patriarch had become a martyr exactly because of that proclamation!! After the performance of the Greek Army all through the war, the prestige the country gained all over the western world and the sacrifices of the Greek people, everyone would expect that the union would be recognised eventually.
2. If the union is not recognised, it would be expected that Greece would get more political control over the European part of the City. But what has been proposed here is actually worse than before the war for the Greeks, as the Allies want them to accept the current demographics which favour the Turks, exactly because of the Turkish actions during the war!!

I wasn't aware that the US got assurances that the Soviets would attack Japan if they get bases at the Straits. Maybe I missed it. I also think taht thisnis not a good bargain for the Wallies, and I'd expect Churchill going bersek on this, but then this is your choice for TTL and perfectly respected.

That doesn't mean though that the Greek politicians have to bow their head without a fight! Especially as this would ve a disaster for the Greek political class IMHO.
So what I proposed is that Greece could occupy the City (possibly both sides), and play hard in order to renegotiate the deal. This would give the Wallies to re-evaluate their stance.
Maybe I wasn't clear: I wasn't talking about direct annexation, but I still find it problematic on the Greek side to simply accept everything, and for the Wallies to simply ignore the Greek people's and political class' sensitivity on the matter. Because, although the deal was designed to accommodate the Soviet interests, it actually favours the Turkish...
Therefore, under these circumstances, I would expect the Greeks going for the referendum option provided by the Allies, ehithout accepting the current demographics as proposed, but ensuring the Turks in the European side won't have the advantage, one way or the other. Then the ball will be on the Allies' side, but in the meantime the relations within the Big Three might ve altered...
 
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Well it is stated in the last update that the Greek Army can't take Constantinople on its own without massive casualties. So the option to take the city without Allied help is out. Next the Greek army can't supply itself on the current level so it needs help there as well. Also when the City is liberated, and it will be , the Greek army and remaining Greek and Armenia residents could maybe do by mistake a pogrom of reprisals on the Turks which more than likely would lead to a lot of Turks leaving the City. It would be a small one more than likely due to the presence on the rest of the Allies there but still the fear would be enough as most of the allied forces move towards Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

The Greek political class understands its inferior position compared to the big 3, or better the big 2 really. It knows that without the WAllies it can't rebuild. Also if they play the long game they can indeed play their cards better when the Soviets become the enemy #1. Then a new discussion may take place although having Allied guarantees on the City will at least make it safe.

The problem here is the Turkish population growth. If I am not mistaken at this point it's close to the Greek one or within 2-3 million. Removing the Kurds from that sum and the population of Soviet annexations the Greek population would be bigger. If we factor here that Greece is on the verge of industrialization with the consequent impact on its population then the Greeks will have more population to send to Constantinople in the short term.
 
The Greek political class understands its inferior position compared to the big 3, or better the big 2 really. It knows that without the WAllies it can't rebuild. Also if they play the long game they can indeed play their cards better when the Soviets become the enemy #1. Then a new discussion may take place although having Allied guarantees on the City will at least make it safe.
Of course the Greek political class understands its inferior position compared to the Big Three, but one would expect them to understand that giving up (European) Constantinople without a (diplomatic or political) fight would jeopardize their very existence or at least the political stability of the country at a very sensitive period.

They also have no clue that in the immediate future the USSR will become the enemy #1. There's not even a strong KKE to generate this feeling.

Concerning the capability of the Greek army to occupy the City, yes, it was stated that the Greek army will get a lot of casualties, but frankly this too soon for such an estimation. In a few months Bulgaria is likely to collapse and Turkey might capitulate. That must have been obvious to the TTL politicians and military leaders, especially after what happened with Italy. So, one would expect Pangalos to say exactly that he will know better in spring 1944.
 
Of course the Greek political class understands its inferior position compared to the Big Three, but one would expect them to understand that giving up (European) Constantinople without a (diplomatic or political) fight would jeopardize their very existence or at least the political stability of the country at a very sensitive period.

They also have no clue that in the immediate future the USSR will become the enemy #1. There's not even a strong KKE to generate this feeling.

Concerning the capability of the Greek army to occupy the City, yes, it was stated that the Greek army will get a lot of casualties, but frankly this too soon for such an estimation. In a few months Bulgaria is likely to collapse and Turkey might capitulate. That must have been obvious to the TTL politicians and military leaders, especially after what happened with Italy. So, one would expect Pangalos to say exactly that he will know better in spring 1944.

I think they are aware of how it is going to end careers considering the Dragoumis took the deal and immediately resigned as a result of it in the last update. Sometimes though statecraft requires looking at the big picture. The Greeks were given 2 bad options; take the city and immediately have a referendum that frankly they were likely to lose given current demographics or accept an international city; and personally I think they took by far the better option. Forcing the issue of Constantinople now would more or less guarantee that Greece would not get any other gains from the war because ALL of the political capital would need to be used to take the city. By agreeing to an international zone they have the opportunity now to make border adjustments more or less at will; even Stalin has accepted that they make make whatever border they desire. I mentioned earlier that there is likely an undercurrent of permanently breaking Turkey in Greek political circles and I expect that motivation to now come to the forefront. Greece has a single final chance to take the borders they want in Anatolia with the blessing of the Big 3 and through forced expulsions make those territories if not Greek at least Christian. It is the sort of thing that will lead to considerable Turkish suffering and likely make any rapprochement with Turkey impossible up to the present but it will give Greece the potential to be the pre-eminent Balkan power up to the modern day.

As for the City itself; a lot can change over the next decade or two as the Cold War comes into being. Greece in 1922 was one of many powers in the city while Greece in 1941 was able to (briefly) annex it. Who is to say that Greece in the 1960's isn't able to pull something similar on the European side at the very least during a period of détente with a Soviet leader trying to put some cracks into NATO.
 
There is also the matter of reparations. With Greece being compliant in the matter of the City and Straits, I doubt the Big Three will have any issue with Greece getting reparations from Turkey in addition to border adjustments. I wonder if Greece can receive frozen turkish FX accounts. Other than that there is always gold alongside with industrial equipment: locomotives, machine tools etc.

But let's go beyond Greece and Turkey. I very much wonder about the position of Italy. With the butterflies so far, Garibaldi included, Italiy might come out of the war with a somewhat better PR than OTL. It also seems that the Italian Co-belligerent Army might be bigger in TTL and a bit more useful to the Allied war effort. The Allies also seem to have a slightly less tough time in Italy in TTL.

Therefore, I look forward to see if Trieste will stay italian from the very start in TTL. Also what will be the fate of Slovenia especially since there will be a yugoslav civil war and the different path of the Chetniks. How will Karl Novak fare under these circumstances?
 
Guys, I don't argue that the Greek politicians didn't make the most rational decision concerning the international situation, but it's the Greeks we are talking about and THE CITY.
Everything would have been fine if Greece hadn't hold the referendum and proclaimed the union in 1941. Now the politicians are totally exposed and taking into account the Greek mentality and national pride, I don't see that ending well, without a major political turmoil and the rise of a massive anti-western sentiment.
And this will be a major setback with a great cost, which can burn much of the potential gains after the war.
IMHO
 
I also want to note something. There is a persistent belief that if you do ethnic cleansing it cannot be undone. The Kosovo case should had laid this to rest. If the major powers tell Greece you need to accept an ×% proportion of turks in the City they can enforce it.

Anyway enough bickering, my fault as well. @Lascaris is the god here and unknown is the will of the lord.
I mean, look at Calais.
It was ethnically cleansed from the French when it fell in the 1340s, and then from the English in the 1550s, and after that it went back to being French.
Ethnic cleansing sadly goes both ways, and if the Greek army "happens" to push the Turkish citizens to Scutari, I doubt that Athens will complain.
 
I still do not see the Greeks can defy the Soviets point. Why is it hard for a half million Soviet and half million Red Turkish army in occupied Anatolia to attack Anatolian Greece? What do they need a navy for? The whole security of Soviet commerce relies on the Straits being open. Every other Soviet goal noted by supporters of the renegade Greece option goes through security of the Straits. This is the first time since 1833 were the country whose trade relies on the straits has a chance to control that chokepoint , with the blessing of the maritime powers this time , and it us going to sit aside and let Greece take it? This is problematic thinking. I am afraid I have to disagree. The UK made sure Cyprus was a poisoned chalice. The Soviets will be much worse.
I think the soviets defo could get to Asiatic Constantinople by beelining through the black sea, but if Turkey capitulates early I defo see borders like what you've drawn up, with Anglo-American and Soviet occupation zones which develops into two Turkic states, and Stalin at the very least getting basing rights on Asiatic Constantinople and Izmit.
Therefore, I look forward to see if Trieste will stay italian from the very start in TTL. Also what will be the fate of Slovenia especially since there will be a yugoslav civil war and the different path of the Chetniks. How will Karl Novak fare under these circumstances?
I could see Italy retaining more of Istria ittl instead of just Trieste considering that they have an intact army that can fight and the occupation of Istria by the Yugoslav Partisans probably means that they'd get Wallies support when the Italians go for a counteroffensive even if Yugoslavia was promised Istria at the start. I could see it as a Italian autonomous region with mostly anti partisan Croats and Slovenes (I think the partisans would take over Slovenia). Or maybe Italy still gets the same border as otl and Istria is part of Chetnik-controlled Yugoslavia instead, and Italian armies would still be de facto occupying the region because the chetniks would be in the back foot against the Partisans.
I also want to note something. There is a persistent belief that if you do ethnic cleansing it cannot be undone. The Kosovo case should had laid this to rest. If the major powers tell Greece you need to accept an ×% proportion of turks in the City they can enforce it.
Tbf reverse ethnic cleansing is just more ethnic cleansing, which I think is unpalatable to a lot of ppl too due to the nature of what it entails. There's no good way to resolve things after ethnic cleansing.
Guys, I don't argue that the Greek politicians didn't make the most rational decision concerning the international situation, but it's the Greeks we are talking about and THE CITY.
Everything would have been fine if Greece hadn't hold the referendum and proclaimed the union in 1941. Now the politicians are totally exposed and taking into account the Greek mentality and national pride, I don't see that ending well, without a major political turmoil and the rise of a massive anti-western sentiment.
And this will be a major setback with a great cost, which can burn much of the potential gains after the war.
IMHO
Thing is Greece cares about European Constantinople and the history surrounding the area a hell of a lot more than Asiatic Constantinople. If they take Asiatic Constantinople and more of the Marmara region it's for geopolitics, which means they're much more likely to trade Asiatic Constantinople for something else like Caria as having to occupy more of the Marmara is just not worth it. A defensive line around Bursa makes a the most sense imo.
 
Ι was not talking reverse ethnic cleansing but repatriation. In the Kosovo war the Serbs attained their goal the Albanosn population largely left. Pape notes this as one of the reasons Milo agreed to evacuate. What they did not expect was the repatriation of the expelled population.
 
But let's go beyond Greece and Turkey. I very much wonder about the position of Italy. With the butterflies so far, Garibaldi included, Italiy might come out of the war with a somewhat better PR than OTL. It also seems that the Italian Co-belligerent Army might be bigger in TTL and a bit more useful to the Allied war effort. The Allies also seem to have a slightly less tough time in Italy in TTL.

Therefore, I look forward to see if Trieste will stay italian from the very start in TTL.
Honestly I wouldn’t be surprised if Italy lost hardly anything at all. Since they’ve avoided being destroyed by the Germans ITTL there’s going to be plenty of Italian veterans on the Allies side. I expect it’s conquests under Mussolini to be returned to their rightful owners but I can see them keeping the rest. I wouldn’t be surprised if after the war there’s a big push of an “innocent Italy” myth where it was all Mussolini and Italy was just led astray. Plus Yugoslavia is likely going to be to busy fighting it’s civil war to push for and/or secure border changes
Thing is Greece cares about European Constantinople and the history surrounding the area a hell of a lot more than Asiatic Constantinople. If they take Asiatic Constantinople and more of the Marmara region it's for geopolitics, which means they're much more likely to trade Asiatic Constantinople for something else like Caria as having to occupy more of the Marmara is just not worth it. A defensive line around Bursa makes a the most sense imo.
I’m kind of side stepping the Constantinople argument since I feel both sides have points. That being said if Greece has to give anything up for getting Caria they’re getting screwed by the allies. Even if it wasn’t directly stated, in my mind the Dodecanese and Caria were the “Price of Admission” if you will. Those were alway going to be Greek when this whole thing was over. It’s their reward for being the only Western Ally to maintain its hold on European soil and being probably the fifth most important ally in the war. So if they have to sacrifice something for either one they’re getting the short end of the stick.
 
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