@Lascaris has been vague on the future of Poland and I am curious to see where it goes. Here are some of my thoughts and a map or two..
The preliminary border is the Curzon Line B in the East and the Oder-Neisse line in the west. (It is worth noting that in OTL the Poland's Eastern border was shifted slightly from Curzon A.)
The first implication of the use of Curzon line B and the inclusion of Lwow in Poland, is that it changes which Oder-Neisse line is being used in the west. There are two Neisse rivers that flow into the Oder river, the Western Lusatian Neisse (W) & the Eastern Glatzer Neisse (E). In OTL the link connecting the loss of Lwow in exchange for Breslau/Wrocław was an explicit part of negotiations and determined the use of the Western instead of Eastern Neisse. ITTL I would assume the Eastern Neisse is the assumed border - see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wroc%C5%82aw#Second_World_War final paragraph for a quick summary.
This has a knock on effect over the fate of Stettin, as Polish control over all of Silesia meant full control of the Oder river mouth was pushed for. Split control puts the Stettin question up in the air.
All else being equal Poland would look roughly like the below map.
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However there are a number of butterflies that make the final fate of Poland much more in the air than in OTL:
- There are Polish armies in the field on continental Europe, who have the possibility of liberating pre-war Polish territory directly from German occupation.
- Churchill's list of influenced countries didn't include Poland (I'm sure the ambiguity wasn't intentional...)
- Control over the straight's and Anatolia.
The first of these points is the most significant. If any polish troops liberate any pre-war polish territory that area acquires totemic significance to the Polish state. Polish control of any territory east of the Curzon line B by the end of the war would in effect tear up the 'preliminary borders', as facts on the ground are far more powerful deciders. Any restoration of a Polish voice over their own borders has huge ramifications for the final territorial outcome.
In OTL the USSR used it's influence to push it's borders as far westwards as possible. ITTL that influence is spread westwards, but also southwards. Any territorial shifts in either area will be linked by how much the USSR is able to exert it's influence. I would therefore assume that the fate of Konigsberg and the straights are directly linked.
Initially in OTL it was assumed all of East Prussia would go to Poland, but the USSR annexed Konigsberg for three broad reasons: 1) compensation for the Russian people's losses in the war; 2) the acquisition of another warm water port in Europe; 3) to threaten Poland from it's northern flank. ITTL however, I think the USSR is more unlikely to push for an East Prussian concession but an Anatolian concession instead. This is mainly as I think it will be an easier win for the Soviets. The Soviet's can still easily threaten Poland, Konigsberg or no Konigsberg, while land and warm water ports with more value can be gained around the straights. Either Asiatic Constantinople of neighbouring ports/land is of far more strategic and historic value, when you already control the rest of the Baltic states.
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With all that in mind, I think we will see a very different Poland to the 'preliminary borders'. I think it is likely to retain more of it's eastern lands that in OTL, and consequently will not gain as much land in compensation in the west. None of this is to consider the possibility of a Poland divided between East and West, which would have it's own ramifications.
Whether Poland's borders stretch far enough to the east that they prevent the USSR from bordering Czechoslovakia has also got implications for the annexation of the Ruthenia and the Sudeten Germans. In OTL the Soviet's allowed the expulsion of all Sudeten Germans in return for the annexation of Ruthenia. Without that you may still see some significant expulsions of some German's (Nazi party members etc...) from Czechoslovakia, but by no means that entire community.
The preliminary border is the Curzon Line B in the East and the Oder-Neisse line in the west. (It is worth noting that in OTL the Poland's Eastern border was shifted slightly from Curzon A.)
The first implication of the use of Curzon line B and the inclusion of Lwow in Poland, is that it changes which Oder-Neisse line is being used in the west. There are two Neisse rivers that flow into the Oder river, the Western Lusatian Neisse (W) & the Eastern Glatzer Neisse (E). In OTL the link connecting the loss of Lwow in exchange for Breslau/Wrocław was an explicit part of negotiations and determined the use of the Western instead of Eastern Neisse. ITTL I would assume the Eastern Neisse is the assumed border - see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wroc%C5%82aw#Second_World_War final paragraph for a quick summary.
This has a knock on effect over the fate of Stettin, as Polish control over all of Silesia meant full control of the Oder river mouth was pushed for. Split control puts the Stettin question up in the air.
All else being equal Poland would look roughly like the below map.
---
However there are a number of butterflies that make the final fate of Poland much more in the air than in OTL:
- There are Polish armies in the field on continental Europe, who have the possibility of liberating pre-war Polish territory directly from German occupation.
- Churchill's list of influenced countries didn't include Poland (I'm sure the ambiguity wasn't intentional...)
- Control over the straight's and Anatolia.
The first of these points is the most significant. If any polish troops liberate any pre-war polish territory that area acquires totemic significance to the Polish state. Polish control of any territory east of the Curzon line B by the end of the war would in effect tear up the 'preliminary borders', as facts on the ground are far more powerful deciders. Any restoration of a Polish voice over their own borders has huge ramifications for the final territorial outcome.
In OTL the USSR used it's influence to push it's borders as far westwards as possible. ITTL that influence is spread westwards, but also southwards. Any territorial shifts in either area will be linked by how much the USSR is able to exert it's influence. I would therefore assume that the fate of Konigsberg and the straights are directly linked.
Initially in OTL it was assumed all of East Prussia would go to Poland, but the USSR annexed Konigsberg for three broad reasons: 1) compensation for the Russian people's losses in the war; 2) the acquisition of another warm water port in Europe; 3) to threaten Poland from it's northern flank. ITTL however, I think the USSR is more unlikely to push for an East Prussian concession but an Anatolian concession instead. This is mainly as I think it will be an easier win for the Soviets. The Soviet's can still easily threaten Poland, Konigsberg or no Konigsberg, while land and warm water ports with more value can be gained around the straights. Either Asiatic Constantinople of neighbouring ports/land is of far more strategic and historic value, when you already control the rest of the Baltic states.
--
With all that in mind, I think we will see a very different Poland to the 'preliminary borders'. I think it is likely to retain more of it's eastern lands that in OTL, and consequently will not gain as much land in compensation in the west. None of this is to consider the possibility of a Poland divided between East and West, which would have it's own ramifications.
Whether Poland's borders stretch far enough to the east that they prevent the USSR from bordering Czechoslovakia has also got implications for the annexation of the Ruthenia and the Sudeten Germans. In OTL the Soviet's allowed the expulsion of all Sudeten Germans in return for the annexation of Ruthenia. Without that you may still see some significant expulsions of some German's (Nazi party members etc...) from Czechoslovakia, but by no means that entire community.