Not exactly!
IOTL the KKE supported tge Slav Macedonian ifentity and the Macedonian Slavs sided with it for that. But one of the reasons -perhaps the main one- was that the Metaxas' regime implemented a policy of de-"slavification" against them. This is probably butterflied here. Of course even the Greek republicans were nationalists back then, but it is more likely that they implemented a hellenization policy instead, i.e. pull forces (better education, jobs in the public sector, internat migration to industrial centers, etc) to induce the Macedonian Slavs into embracing a Greek identity, or at least to incorporate the Greek citizenship in their local identity. After all, Interwar Greece ITTL was a successful and prosperous state!
Why would the majority of Greek Macedonia Slavs prefer to get into a vague adventure for a Macedonian -possibly unstable- state instead of living within a stable and prosperous one, if their identity is not directly attacked?
Imho at this point ITL they probably are pro-Bulgarian, and thus probably collaborationists with the Bulgarian occupation authorities, rather than Communists. They were largely pro-KKE because KKE accepted the positions of the Bulgarian communists on this in the interwar years.
One of the issues is the religious issue. The main wellspring of Slavic Macedonian resentment to Hellenism in the late 19th early 20th century was the policy of the Patriachate when it came to running the local church. This has not changed as Northern Greece is still under the Patriachate's jurisdiction, indeed is probably worse due to the dominance of Greek nationalists in it.
A lot will depend on how the war and post-war situation plays out in broader geographic Macedonia.
Again though, the Slavs of Greek Macedonia did not have the numbers to support a mass party. OTL the mass power came from Asia Minor Greek refugees angry by Venizelos 1930 accords. These conditions are not present ITL.
Let us think a bit about the history of socialism in the region of Greece and the Ottoman Empire. You have four strands
1) The Local Greek Agrarian Socialist and Anarchist tradition. This is largely nationalist and drew its power mostly from the Land Reform Issue (Antypas i.e).
2) The left wing of IMRO, which was fanatically republican and hated the Bulgarian and Greek Monarchies
3) The Thesalloniki Jewish Federasyon
4) The anarchist and partly socialist tradition birthed in the Ottoman Empire with exemplars like Skleros and Glenos. This also was nationalist until 1922, when the Catastrophe led to break between the nationalist and internationalist elements (the first joined the Liberals, the second SEKKE)
My guess is that absent the Catastrophe there is no unified left wing movement with a Marxist basis. Old Greece produces agrarian anarchists, North Greece is dominated by a potential alliance of the Federasyon with leftwing IMRO (now probably destroyed by the occupation), and Asia Minor probably produces anarchist syndicalists. Again my big question is who are the workers in the Greek industries? I can see only two main groups : Pontic refugees and Anatolian Muslims.
What I am trying to say is that with the Republican issue resolved, and no Catastrophe, any mass Greek marxist movement will develop on very different paths than it did historically.
By the way, for some reason I forgot that de Lattre is the commander of the Armee D' Orient and I thought Bethouart was commanding. In OTL the modern doctrine of the French was born in 1944-1945 and the commanding philosophy of de Lattre. The man lead a paradigm shift from the methodical battle and success through material superiority to victory through maneuver. The French lacking an industrial base and being completely depended on the AngloSaxons, had to change doctrine. It didn't help that they had a limited manpower pool. What de Lattre implemented in 1944 Provence was "when in doubt, attack" and constant maneuver.
It seems to me that the Cold War french doctrine would have been developed in Syria. Despite having a huge pile of gold, most of the OTL challenges exist in TTL as well. I expect de Lattre to be very aggresive and in combination with Slim, they form a formitable duo.
Unless the Soviets find a way to march an army all the way through Anatolia, the other option was a naval assault. Or perhaps an airborne one... if they find a way to get within range for one.
%Well, given the precise time and in what context that was chosen (by Stalin) to bring it up, I'd think that it, perhaps, may be intended a way to pressure to the Greek government and their British allies...
Just because the Soviet Union is slightly inconvenienced at the moment by the Germans marching on the Volga? But the Soviets have obvious strategic imperatives in the straits being closed to others warships, lest they have to deal with British and American battleship squadrons sailing up and down their coast (and yes that IS a concern for the Soviets see the 1926 war scare in OTL) and ideally in simultaneously being open to their own warships.
That is... an interesting question here, is it not? Churchill not throwing Greece under the bus here is directly connected to it being in the British interest not to throw Greece under the bus. Although within the British establishment of the time Churchill probably is amongst the least likely to throw the Greeks under.
I think that in this timeline, Germany will end up even more stretched thin after a Kursk equivalent. In TTL, the Allies are more powerful in the Mediterranean: the Commonwealth has not suffered the OTL grievous losses in North Africa. For example, the 2nd Armoured and 2nd South African divisions have not been destroyed. So when Tunisia is finally cleared, they have two very powerful armies in reserve. I expect by summer 1943 that a third (american) army will be ready as well.
At the moment, including the French there are 14 allied divisions in Tunisia. The French numbers are likely not sustainable without mass material reinforcement which is not likely in 1942. On the other hand the Americans if OTL is any indication will have 6 divisions in the Mediterranean by the end of the year. The South Africans I expect will be planning to convert moth their infantry divisions to armoured ones to better sustain the manpower needs, they are still an all volunteer force with the war being... not very popular back at home.
As @JSC correctly says it is standard German strategic modus operandi till the days of Prussia. Sometimes it wins spectacularly. Most of the time... Russian tsarinas don't conveniently die at the wrong moment.
The WAllies won't sit idle until July 1943 and the Tunisian Campaign will be wrapped up before the end of 1942. Therefore, I expect for the Invasion of Sicily to take place a bit sooner and the Allies to try a breakout from Smyrna towards the Marmara Sea. In that case, the turkish war effort collapses in 1943, releasing the greatest part of the 28-30 Allied divisions engaged there. However, I expect that we will have an Italian Armistice in this timeline as well. That would be huge. Securing north Italy is much more important for Germany compared to the Greek Front.
The Allies have strategic constraints of their own here, namely the Mediterranean is still closed. Even with Tunisia gone the Germans and Italians will have sufficient air and naval power to make running convoys through the Mediterranean a difficult affair. Not an impossible one mind you but a difficult one. What does this mean in practice? First that most of the RAF Mediterranean strength is concentrated in Tunisia and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Then that the Allies are limited to the size of forces they can shift from the Western to the Eastern Mediterranean. Once Tunisia is gone and till the Mediterranean is opened for good the safest way will be the sail reinforcements to Algeria, take the train from there to Tripoli (the British have extended the railroad to Mareth already) and then re-embark from Tripoli for Piraeus or Beirut.
The other question is of course how soon sufficient numbers of landing craft become available. There is a pretty interesting USNI article here and while I disagree with the writer's conclusions the numbers on production and availability are pretty interesting. The 420 landing craft used at Husky had a carrying capacity ~384,000t. As of January 1943 you are short 97 LST, and have ~200,000t available enough for 3.6 divisions call it 11 brigades. The interesting part is of course that of the 97 missing LSTs, 63 must already exist since production to June 1943 was only 34 ships. So the ships for a 5-6 division assault physically exist already.
10 divisions are indeed a game changer but only when we take their composition and quality into account. A field army of 10 divisions, most of which are panzer, panzer grenadier and mountain infantry will be a game changer. But an army with just a couple armoured or mechanized divisions and the rest being regular infantry won't be a grave danger, especially not when Béthouart's and Slim's armies are available. The Heer has only a finite number of these elite formations and I believe they would prioritize Italy over Greece.
Which can have a chance to backfire in the future. The fact that Stalin mentioned the matter and possible regime change should alarm Churchill and Roosevelt over his type of behavior. Soviets post war status could possibly get weakened because of this matter.
I don't think anyone in London is exactly surprised the Soviets have their eyes in the straits, after all its standing Russian policy since the time of Peter the Great and the Soviets were asking for a military presence of their own there as early as 1939 TTL.
The Axis cannot suffer a defeat in detail in the soviet front. But the Allies can inflict a defeat in detail in the turkish theater of operations. A sensible policy would have been to abandon Cilicia as soon as Alexandretta was captured. The Taurus forms an excellent bastion that would allow them to economize forces for the Caucasus. But with choosing to fight in Cilicia they are facing a superior opponent with significantly more and better armor. Bethuart and Slim are very good generals and Slim had excellent situational awareness. They also have superior tanks compared to OTL. Therefore, I think that the Battle of Cilicia will be very costly for Turkey in terms of experienced manpower and material.
Leaving Cilicia would mean abandoning, checks, ~870,000 civilians perhaps more and one of the country's most economically productive areas to enemy occupation. Yes it may make military sense. But it is not a politically palatable option. Besides as long as the Mediterranean remain closed where are the landing ships for the Cilicia landings?
The smaller Greek shipyards are at the moment building LCTs and minesweepers. How many is a different question.
Come spring 1943, the Allies have large uncommitted reserves in North Africa and the Turks are stretched thin. They went through a meatgrinder in Cilicia and another one in the Caucasus. They have to deal with three and a half fronts: We cannot discount the guerillas lead by Lawrence of Kurdistan, not when they operate across the Caucasus Front's lines of communication and around the valuable chromite ore mines of Elazig. The Western Allies can choose where to concentrate: it could be Smyrna for a breakout or it could be a landing in Antalya to outflank Taurus.
As noted the Allies have supply constraints of their own. The Syrian front is obviously dependent upon the Syrian ports and railroads. In Smyrna the Allies have a first class port, at least 8,000t per day capacity (that was in 1911, so has likely increased in the passing generation) but the railroads to the interior will be able to support only a fraction of that.
By the way, I think that one potential butterfly of an Axis Turkey is the total destruction of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. In OTL, the soviet warships found refuge in Poti and Batum. Now the Axis have just captured these ports, while it makes sense to concentrate on eradicating the soviet naval threat to their logistics and communication with Turkey. Between a lack of bases, the Luftwaffe and the remnants of the Turkish Navy, I cannot see how the Black Sea Fleet can survive 1942. That development would be interesting since it reduces the soviet assets and power projection in the Black Sea for at least a few years. It might produce some butterflies over the Strait's Question and the soviet policy in the region.
Batum is lost, Poti threatened, Sochi is also threatened from the other direction. OTOH the Soviet Black Sea fleet was much larger than its opposition, even when taking into account the Turkish navy.
So I’ve had a thought. If Turkey falls significantly earlier than the other axis powers, does it get a lighter peace deal? It’s already in a pretty shaky position, so it isn’t hard to see in falling a year or more before the rest. Does that get it a lighter peace deal, a harsher one, or does it even matter?
Is it in a pretty shaky position when not seen in hindsight? It is winning in the Caucasus, still has Smyrna under siege and it's southern front while problematic is not a disaster so far, it is holding its own there if at a high cost. The question that will be turning more imperative with every passing month will be German aid for obvious reasons...
I will say that Stalins interaction here isn’t gonna win him any friends. I’m not sure if something similar happened OTL but it already shows his feelings for national sovereignty.
We are talking about the two people who made the percentages agreement here. Colour me unconvinced either the British or the Soviet establishment of the era took small countries entirely too seriously when it came to their own interest.
Also if word of him trying to take Constantinople for himself reaches the Greek communists, it might cause a bit of a split in the group depending on how they view the city.
"This is obviously for the good of the socialist motherland and the world revolution! Why anyone would prefer the Athens bourgeois to the Soviet Union? When the revolution reaches Greece it won't matter anyway, Constantinople and Greece will both be part of the Balkan socialist federation!"
That was IOTL, when Greece had suffered the Asia Minor Catastrophe.
ITTL the Greek labour class of Smyrna, East Thrace, Macedonia at which the KKE should gave an appeal, wouldn't appreciate much a similar stance. Furthermore IMHO the KKE doesn't seem to have any reason to support sucha a development or rhetoric.
Did it have in OTL 1924? From the memoirs of the people that signed to the decision in OTL the party effectively had no independent policy it just accepted the Comintern decision with anyone who disagreed leaving the party. We are effectively talking in the early 1920s for something that in numbers and behaviour was little more than a religious sect.
Even IOTL the KKE changed its policy twice, according to the Greek public feeling: in the Interwar it seems that the leadership only was in favour of such a development, and that only to please Stalin and get some support. Then, in WWII it abandoned this idea in the framework of the Greek National Resistance. KKE fully supported ceding Macedonia during the Civil War, in a desperate effort to get Stalin's support, in the expence on Greece, but also that of Yugoslavia: waht Zachariades implied was a Socialist Republic of Macedonia-Thrace, part of a Socialist Balkan Federation.
We do not know what the popular base for the Left in Greece is in this timeline. That is important. Not sure if in the Smyrna/Izmir region the working class is mainly Greek. Probably Pontian Greek refugees, Anatolian Muslims, and local Jews but Lascaris probably can provide the ITL facts.
I must note the left and the communist party are not synonyms. The Greek socialists and the Agrarians, where of course mostly part of the broader Venizelist coalition but were getting significantly higher returns in the ballots than KKE. In 1933, the last more or less normal election before the war the Agrarians despite being disunited got 5.01% of the vote, Papanastasiou socialists 4.16 and KKE 4.64%. In the previous 1932 election where KKE got 4.97%, Papanastasiou got 5.89% and the Agrarians 6.17%. Given that we are talking about the peak of the depression in Greece...
TTL the rifts within Venizelism are not showing to the same extend since Venizelos was continuously around since 1920, but this does not mean they are not there. If anything there should be regional variations as well, are the interests of the Venizelist voting working class districts of Smyrna and Athens the same to these of Cretan farmers voting for the party? The firs breach is seen in the TTL 1939 election, shortly after the death of Venizelos (part 52) where the Democratic Agrarian Party under George Papandreou grabs 6.39% of the vote to 5.43% of the communists.
The Asia Minor Catastrophe and its consequences was such a monumental event in the formation of the popular masses that would support the Socialist Left in Greece that absent it the sociological dynamics supporting a mass Left movement will have to be very different.
I think this was being papered over by the national schism and then random factors in the 1960s effectively perpetuated this. Normally a three way split not unlike present day Cyprus would be looking more reasonable.
Dunno about key support. Pre war KKE was getting most of its, not that many, votes from tobacco workers. The Slavs were a key support group during the civil war as given geography they resided in the core territory controlled by the Democratic Army of Greece (and a cynic would note KKE turning a blind eye to former Okhrana collaborators in its need for manpower hardly hurt...)
It's a big city that like Athens has been receiving internal migration from the rest of Greece. Pontic Greeks would be for the most part an Agrarian population and TTL Greece is not exactly short of farmland to settle tem. The ones from the cities like Trebizond would for the most part end up in Thessaloniki and Smyrna. So the Smyrniot proletariat, has likely a much higher proportion of people from Lesvos and the other East Aegean islands going over to the big city to find work...
According to "Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943" , fast troopship availability was perhaps the most important bottleneck of deploying Americans in the ETO during 1942.
Shipping in sight for July could carry only 5,000 to 5,500; British transports would not be available until August, when some 50,000 troops were tentatively scheduled to move. On both sides of the Atlantic the planning staffs began to talk of over-all reductions in the program. The Washington BOLERO Combined Committee anticipated other difficulties— competition between service troops and combat troops for transport during the summer, shortages of escorts, delays in "marrying up" troops and equipment.
By the end of July the American forces in the British Isles had reached a total of 82,000. August schedules called for 108,000 more, but actual shipments fell somewhat short of this figure.
The big difference to OTL is having the Normandie: a lift capacity for 20,000 more men per month. If the British have provided her to the Americans in March, I expect a significantly faster american deployment to Britain and FNA. Even the composition of the ferried units changes, e.g. more AAF personnel and taking the other bottlenecks into account, I think it is reasonable to expect 8 american divisions instead of 6 by the end of the year. The fact that the Allies have a bit more shipping - the beauty of compound interest, also helps.
Moreover, I would argue that the Kriegsmarine is sufficiently gutted that does not pose a major threat to Iceland. There is no reason to keep the whole US 5th Infantry Division there, just rear echelon elements as would have been the case in OTL summer 1943.
The other question is of course how soon sufficient numbers of landing craft become available. There is a pretty interesting USNI article here and while I disagree with the writer's conclusions the numbers on production and availability are pretty interesting. The 420 landing craft used at Husky had a carrying capacity ~384,000t. As of January 1943 you are short 97 LST, and have ~200,000t available enough for 3.6 divisions call it 11 brigades. The interesting part is of course that of the 97 missing LSTs, 63 must already exist since production to June 1943 was only 34 ships. So the ships for a 5-6 division assault physically exist already.
The book I mentioned above provided somewhat different figures for 1942 and 1943.
LST's had begun to emerge from U.S. yards in October; 43 were completed in December, 46 in January, and production was to reach a peak of 61 in February 1943.
In the twelve months from May 1942 through April 1943, 8,719 landing craft totaling 512,333 light displacement tons were produced, almost three-fifths of them in the November-February period. They included 214 LST's, 302 LCI (L)'s, 470 LCT's, 2,052 LCM's, 3,250 landing craft, personnel (LCP), 690 landing craft, vehicle (LCV), 1,799 LCVP's, and 998 LVT's
Moreover, in Casablanca the LST allocation was 68 units provided to Britain and another 68 kept by the Americans in the Atlantic theater of operations.
When it comes to the reduction of production to June 1943 you mentioned, I think the main reason must have been the following:
As a 1943 ROUNDUP, the original reason for the program, receded into the limbo of improbability, in mid-September 1942 Admiral King launched a move in the JCS to cut back construction of the larger landing craft. The JCS agreed to the extent of eliminating 100 LST's and 48 LCI (L)'s, reducing the total LST program from 490 to 390 and the LCI (L) program from 350 to 302. Other reductions were not practicable because construction was already so far advanced in most categories that speedy completion offered the best promise of clearing the ways for escort vessels and the other types the Navy wanted most
However, the need for escorts is less urgent compared to OTL, since the Battle of the Atlantic is going better and the Allies have Dakar and (as of recently) Casablanca as well as major ASW bases. Moreover, the need for amphibious capacity is greater since there is also the east Mediterranean to be taken into account, not just Torch and the follow-up. There is also a certain Mr Papagos lobbying for resource allocation in DC, that might -just might- be of some usefuleness.
Therefore, it seems plausible to me that King might reduce the cancellations.
Overall, I think you might have a somewhat greater sea-lift capacity.
Imho at this point ITL they probably are pro-Bulgarian, and thus probably collaborationists with the Bulgarian occupation authorities, rather than Communists. They were largely pro-KKE because KKE accepted the positions of the Bulgarian communists on this in the interwar years.
One of the issues is the religious issue. The main wellspring of Slavic Macedonian resentment to Hellenism in the late 19th early 20th century was the policy of the Patriachate when it came to running the local church. This has not changed as Northern Greece is still under the Patriachate's jurisdiction, indeed is probably worse due to the dominance of Greek nationalists in it.
Agree. Furthermore since this time round the Bulgarians are occupying all of Greek Macedonia they are likely able to get more collaboration , in OTL Ohrana got about 3,000 men recruiting from German occupied territory. TTL they quite likely just get mobilized straight into the Bulgarian army..
A lot will depend on how the war and post-war situation plays out in broader geographic Macedonia.
Again though, the Slavs of Greek Macedonia did not have the numbers to support a mass party. OTL the mass power came from Asia Minor Greek refugees angry by Venizelos 1930 accords. These conditions are not present ITL.
Even then we are calling of a minor fraction of the refugee vote IMS in places like Kaisariani the Venizelists got 90% of the vote in 1928 and 82% in 1932 with some of them going to Kondylis who got ~4% of the total vote.
Let us think a bit about the history of socialism in the region of Greece and the Ottoman Empire. You have four strands
1) The Local Greek Agrarian Socialist and Anarchist tradition. This is largely nationalist and drew its power mostly from the Land Reform Issue (Antypas i.e).
Not a factor in Greek politics, inter-war Greece may be a democracy but that would not include any toleration of IMRO activities. OTOH is is fair to guess these ended up for the most part into the Bulgarian and Yugoslav communist parties?
4) The anarchist and partly socialist tradition birthed in the Ottoman Empire with exemplars like Skleros and Glenos. This also was nationalist until 1922, when the Catastrophe led to break between the nationalist and internationalist elements (the first joined the Liberals, the second SEKKE)
No Catastrophe TTL but I don't think the internationalist wing would fit very well with the rest. So the split is likely delayed TTL but still likely happens.
My guess is that absent the Catastrophe there is no unified left wing movement with a Marxist basis. Old Greece produces agrarian anarchists, North Greece is dominated by a potential alliance of the Federasyon with leftwing IMRO (now probably destroyed by the occupation), and Asia Minor probably produces anarchist syndicalists.
I could be wrong but in terms of broader coalitions I can see 1 and the nationalist wing of 4 ending within the same party/ coalition. Or at least I envision them as the voting block behind Papandreou's Democratic Agrarian party in TTL 1939. Was the elder Papandreou a socialist? At least he claimed at several times in his career he was and from the likely leaders of a separate socialist party he's the one with the most populist appeal after the death of Papanastasiou most likely.
3 and the internationalist wing of 4 become SEKE, this predates POD. With SEKE becoming SEKKE and then KKE. Would KKE significantly differ in its TTL evolution? I may be wrong but it seems to me that its evolution depended on a small clique of perhaps a few hundred people in this era that was subject to multiple internal breakdowns and does not appear to me to have been entirely in contact with the broader realities around it. How do you manage in a country were a fifth of the population is destitute refugees and most of the rest somewhat less destitute people out of a decade of wars to be no more than a side-note all the way to 1936?
Well who ARE they? Lets try to list possibilities.
1. Not Anatolian Muslims, after the population exchange the Greek Anatolian Muslim population are the Circassians who chose the Greeks over the Turkish nationalists, they are too few in number to make an industrial proletariat and the Greek government probably been treating them with kid gloves since them.
2. Pontic refugees? Some certainly. TTL Greece was much better able to absorb its refugees but the urban refugees end up in Thessaloniki and Smyrna by default. If you count in their numbers some 150,000 Caucasus Greeks they likely are the largest single refugee group in TTL Greece. The Caucasus Greeks may be the more important influence here as the more socialist inclined. Likely there has been a trickle of more trying to leave the Soviet Union in the intervening years.
3. Other Asia Minor refugees. There were nearly ~400,000 of them overall from the parts of Anatolia east of the Greek border. Most would be farmers and as said TTL Greece has a lot of farmland to settle them compared to OTL but there are some interesting groups in the mix. Cappadocian carpet makers anyone?
4. Armenian refugees... one of the early assumptions was that TTL Greece accepted the waves of Armenian refugees it was receiving, between humanitarian, poltical and propaganda reasons there would be a strong argument to make to keep them and with a much more prosperous Greece incentinves for them not to migrate out despite Soviet encouragement later in the 1930s. TTL Greece has an Armenian population around 228,000. These are I think an obvious candidate as a working class urban population... and are also interesting in other ways IMO. Which group of Armenians would be most inclined to prefer Greece over the Soviet Union? Arguably Dashnaks. Add another socialist nationalist revolutionary tradition into the TTL Greek socialist mix...
5. Not certain why we do not take into account old Greece and TTL Smyrna itself. 1920 Athens already had 453,000 people. It received 306,000 refugees and her population reached 1,124,000 by 1940, while the rest of Attica increased from 117,000 to ~169,000 in the same time. That's an increase of 417,000. If we discount natural population growth in still means Athens must have received ~256,000 people beyond the refugee wave. IMO the numbers indicate a clear urbanization drive already in the nterwar years. Who would be these people? Largely former small/landless farmers going to Athens and Smyrna for work/ following their families there. I'd guess you'd see regional variations here. It makes much more sense IMO to see Peloponnesian currant farmers that cannot any more immigrate to America seeking their luck in Athens while their Lesbos counterparts left for whatever reason without work in the olive groves and mills taking the ship to Smyrna...
According to "Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943" , fast troopship availability was perhaps the most important bottleneck of deploying Americans in the ETO during 1942.
The big difference to OTL is having the Normandie: a lift capacity for 20,000 more men per month. If the British have provided her to the Americans in March, I expect a significantly faster american deployment to Britain and FNA. Even the composition of the ferried units changes, e.g. more AAF personnel and taking the other bottlenecks into account, I think it is reasonable to expect 8 american divisions instead of 6 by the end of the year. The fact that the Allies have a bit more shipping - the beauty of compound interest, also helps.
Moreover, I would argue that the Kriegsmarine is sufficiently gutted that does not pose a major threat to Iceland. There is no reason to keep the whole US 5th Infantry Division there, just rear echelon elements as would have been the case in OTL summer 1943.
However, the need for escorts is less urgent compared to OTL, since the Battle of the Atlantic is going better and the Allies have Dakar and (as of recently) Casablanca as well as major ASW bases. Moreover, the need for amphibious capacity is greater since there is also the east Mediterranean to be taken into account, not just Torch and the follow-up. There is also a certain Mr Papagos lobbying for resource allocation in DC, that might -just might- be of some usefuleness.
Therefore, it seems plausible to me that King might reduce the cancellations.
Overall, I think you might have a somewhat greater sea-lift capacity.
The question in not whether post Mid-1943 you have more shipping capacity. It's more how early in 1943 you have sufficient shipping capacity for a 5 to 7 division assault on Sicily. Which is not just a matter of ship deliveries but of trained crews as well. And in order to securely open the Mediterranean the Allies need to take Sicily...
Not sure if it has been directly touched upon yet though was reading about the Bristol Basin the other day and how the rubble was used as ballast by Liberty Ships returning to the United States after delivering their troop-supply cargo to Europe. Where despite excuses of ships being unavailable in OTL, it is said they had plenty of room to carry people on the return trip with efforts to put refugees on the ships (even to places outside of the US like Mexico, Dominican Republic, etc) largely being stymied by opposition from FDR (and particularly by the likes of Breckenridge Long).
Would the additional ships have created any butterflies in ATL however slight in that regard?
The question in not whether post Mid-1943 you have more shipping capacity. It's more how early in 1943 you have sufficient shipping capacity for a 5 to 7 division assault on Sicily. Which is not just a matter of ship deliveries but of trained crews as well. And in order to securely open the Mediterranean the Allies need to take Sicily...
I believe you can get you 5-6 division ton amphibious capacity in March 1943 -I take in account the needs of SWPA, so let's say a landing in April. However, I have no idea about sea conditions in Central Mediterranean.
We have to also add, the OTL losses in Torch: 6 sunken troopships, 4 of which had a tonnage of 66k grt. I know they are not landing ships, but even so, not having to fight for FNA makes 1943 logistics just a tiny bit easier.
To that we can add the RN amphibious capacity: For April 1943 there are 12,579 grt of LSTs. Another 10,800grt are ready in May. Then, its the british LSIs: 80,000 grt of shipping as of March 1943.
As I see it, I think you can have your Husky at April 1943, if we take into account avoiding Torch losses and the british shipping.
I believe you can get you 5-6 division ton amphibious capacity in March 1943 -I take in account the needs of SWPA, so let's say a landing in April. However, I have no idea about sea conditions in Central Mediterranean.
We have to also add, the OTL losses in Torch: 6 sunken troopships, 4 of which had a tonnage of 66k grt. I know they are not landing ships, but even so, not having to fight for FNA makes 1943 logistics just a tiny bit easier.
To that we can add the RN amphibious capacity: For April 1943 there are 12,579 grt of LSTs. Another 10,800grt are ready in May. Then, its the british LSIs: 80,000 grt of shipping as of March 1943.
As I see it, I think you can have your Husky at April 1943, if we take into account avoiding Torch losses and the british shipping.
The worst case scenario analysis is that out of 268 LST built up to Husky 109 had gone to other tasks. So availability is something like this:
March 43: 60
April 43: 88
May 43: 105
June 43: 132
July 43: 159
So call it 5 divisions in May, something between 4 and 5 in April, less than 4 in March. Now if you also take reinforcements after the initial landings into account Husky involved 13 US and Commonwealth divisions plus three independent brigades. Of these 46th Infantry staid out of the fighting so call it 13 divisions overall. Fewer ships means fewer second wave units as well...
The city fell to the Turkish army. Further east Ardahan had fallen the previous day and the Turkish army was advancing from the recently captured Kars towards Leninakan.
Rio De Janeiro, August 22nd, 1942
Back in June Hitler had ordered an "U-Boat blitz" in Brazilian waters. It had proved particularly successful... in turning Brazilian public opinion decisively against Germany. As hundreds of civilians aboard Brazilian ships were killed during August alone, with casualties since the start of the year reaching nearly 2,000 people, violent demonstrators demanding war and on occasion attacking local Germans had erupted. The government of Getulio Vargas, despite some of its military backers being friendly to Germany had declared war against the Axis powers.
Stalingrad, August 23rd, 1942
The city was being pounded into rubble by the Luftwaffe as the German 6th army reached its outskirts and start reducing the city street by street and building by building. Within a week general Zhukov would be placed into over command of the Soviet defences.
Tunisia, August 30th, 1942
The 7th Armoured division captured Akarit, Gabes had fallen to the South Africans three days earlier. It had taken four weeks of heavy fighting with hundreds of tanks and thousands of men lost but the enemy hold on the Mareth line had been broken. News were not any better for the German-Italian army in the west where general Juin's Armee d' Afrique reinforced by British and American units was steadily pushing the Germans and Italians eastwards. The only black spot from the Allies point of view had been the less than stellar performance of general Fredenhall the commander of the US II Corps but this had not been enough to stop the Allied advance.
Leninakan, Armenia, August 30th, 1942
Westerners mostly knew the small city as Alexandropol. The Soviets had renamed it to Leninakan back in 1924. No few Armenians still privately used their native name for the city, Gyumri, instead of either of the two Russian names. But at the moment it was not the name that mattered. What mattered was that finally after two months of fighting the Turkish offensive in Eastern Anatolia had been brought to a halt after heavy fighting in front of the city. In these two months Fahrettin's army had advanced nearly 300 km in a wide area over Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus. In Georgia its advance had been halted just short of the Abhazian border on the coast and to the west of Kutaisi. In Northern Iran a Turkish thrust out of Van despite being pretty small in numbers had crossed the Armenian border at Nakhchivan instigating an insurrection of the Azeri population there while MAH operatives and arms had been parachuted into Chechenia to support the insurrection there. But Fahrettin was also facing an insurrection of his own in the parts of Armenia and Georgia he had managed to capture exacerbating his supply problems, nearly 70,000 men were tied down by now on occupation duty. It would take some time before sufficient supplies and reinforcements could be brought forward for the offensive to resume.
Belfast, September 4th, 1942
Tensions were rising in Northern Ireland since the Irish entry in the war and the first tentative steps supposedly towards reunification of Ireland. For the more extreme of the Catholics they did not look to be quite enough. For the more extreme of the Protestants they did look to be too much. Under the circumstances riots erupting between the two communities was perhaps unsurprising. Both the Belfast and the Dublin governments had to be thankful that they were brought under control in relatively short order without much damage.
Russian SSR, September 6th, 1942
Novorossysk fell to the Wehrmacht. The German and Turkish advances along the coast were still separated by over 400 km on a straight line, even more on the ground, the the Soviet Black sea fleet was starting to run perilously close of naval bases with only the ports of Sochi and Sokhumi remaining in Soviet hands. The Soviets still had operational a single battleship, 4 cruisers, 9 destroyers and about two dozen submarines but so far they had failed to seriously challenge the Turkish convoys moving supplies to Poti and Batum.
Ciampino airport, Rome, September 7th, 1942
An SM.84 transport plane coming from Tunis landed in the airport, shortly followed by the dozen Macchi C205s escorting it. Italo Balbo walked out from the the aircraft to the car waiting for him. His time as governor general of Italian North Africa was over. Three days earlier field marshall Erwin Rommel had been recalled to Germany ostensibly for health reasons...
Oh this is very interesting. Turkey is feeling the attrition soon same with Germany and North Africa is practically WAllies so hopefully the battle for Italy and Greece will commence soon. Things will get interesting...
@Lascaris, the following question might be a bit stupid but I will ask it regardless: why is the number of LSTs that important? Strictly for supply over the beach? Because the lift capacity exists already (troopships), the assault capacity exists already (LCTs etc). So is it mostly an issue of supplying the invasion over beaches until suitable ports have been captured?
To be honest, in any case I think the Invasion of Sicily to be a more bloody affair compared to the OTL one. I think the main reason is not going through Torch and the valuable lessons in amphibious warfare learned there. At the same time, there are more losses that have been avoided in addition to the 6 troopships/ assault ships I mentioned in my previous post. According to the "War of Supply - WW2 Allied Logistics in the Mediterranean", 242 of the 378 landing craft used in Torch were damaged or destroyed. At least 80 of them were completely destroyed.
There is another advantage of having the Vichy joining the Allies that early: the American engineers have more than enough time to upgrade the FNA railroad network. In March 1943, the ports and railroads will be in a better condition compared to OTL.
There is also the mother of all battles: allocation of resources between the ETO and the PTO. The equivalent of the original Tunisian Campaign timeline can be seen from the progress so far: 30 August 1942 and the position of Wadi Akarit has fallen, when in OTL it was in April 7th 1943. In OTL, on February 2nd 1943, Eisenhower issued a preliminary directive for his senior commanders to begin planning for the seizure of Sicily. The Guadalcanal Campaign at this point was basic over - the last IJA remnants would last another week. Admiral King had a reasonable case of needing amphibious capacity to continue the offensive in SWP. What about now though ? The Tunisian Campaign will be over while the Marines are still bogged down protecting Henderson Airfield - months away before any new offensive can commence. As I see it, in the corridors of power in DC the Army has a better case to make when it comes to the next round of allocating amphibious assets compared to the USN.
@Lascaris, the following question might be a bit stupid but I will ask it regardless: why is the number of LSTs that important? Strictly for supply over the beach? Because the lift capacity exists already (troopships), the assault capacity exists already (LCTs etc). So is it mostly an issue of supplying the invasion over beaches until suitable ports have been captured?
Well the report on Husky helps. To quote some selected pieces:
"As a result of these well carried out investigations, ten LSTs were altered to provide for side-carrying of one complete causeway each. Another LST was converted into an auxiliary aircraft carrier for the transport and launching of the Army Cub spotting planes; still another was modified to carry the GCI equipment essential to the control of Fighter aircraft in the assault; others were provided with means for pumping fuel and water to shore tankage. Facilities were installed in some ships of this type to render them available as hospital ships for the evacuation of casualties. The most far-reaching innovation, however, was the utilization of the six-davit LST. Thirty-six LSTs were thus able to carry six LCVPs in davits, thereby permitting each craft of this type to embark one company of infantry for the initial assault in LCVPs, the ship later landing on the beaches to discharge the vehicle lift. This specially-fitted craft thus had a marked influence upon the development of the shore-to-shore technique."
"Confronting the Commanders was also the task of developing an organization, a plan, and the vast facilities needed to meet the requirements of embarking 130,000 troops and loading 30,000 vehicles and 20,000 tons of ammunition and supplies in the 250 odd craft envisaged in the joint plans. Since such an undertaking had never before been attempted, there was no past experience upon which to draw guidance. "
Now Husky used 159 LST, 68 LCI and 193 LCT... the LSTs constitute something like 90% of the vehicle carrying capacity, a similar percentage of the cargo capacity, even in the troop carrying role they can bring directly to shore as many men as an LCI. Looks to me that if you want more than mere infantry ashore the LSTs were absolutely essential for the job.
But the Soviets have obvious strategic imperatives in the straits being closed to others warships, lest they have to deal with British and American battleship squadrons sailing up and down their coast (and yes that IS a concern for the Soviets see the 1926 war scare in OTL) and ideally in simultaneously being open to their own warships.