Beginning of the sortie to the Skagerrak
Finally, it was time for the German Navy to sail from its home ports to the decisive battle sites. After the final preparations, the Kaiserliche Marine slipped from its home ports starting from the morning of 1 November to the evening of the same day and the fleets proceeded to their sectors. The Channel assault force would proceed to the Channel while the High Seas Fleet moved to intercept the Grand Fleet. Despite information regarding the Grand Fleet's imminent sailing, Admiral Hipper was to continue with his orders and attack the British. There was only one thing in question. This was the Dover-Calais mine barrage, which had the Germans in doubt as to its status. Although the barrage was swept as ordered by 31 October, several mines were still in force and safety was in question, especially for the precious battlecruisers involved.
The first squadron to sortie, as scheduled, were the raiding, submarine hunting and minesweeping destroyers and anti-submarine vessels. Next was the minelaying group of slow and minelaying cruisers plus the Siegfried class ships. Then, the Channel attack force raised its anchors and finally, the High Seas Fleet would await orders from Hotzendorff before sailing. It was recommended that if the Grand Fleet was sighted, the Germans break radio silence or drive the Grand Fleet into minefields, especially German-laid ones. After all, it was expected that the High Seas Fleet would intervene and the Entente, with poor coordination, would not be aware of these fields.
Also, Entente submarines had to be dealt with and observed to prevent attacks and reports. This was especially after the fleet was underway to the west at midnight on 2 November and about to shell Entente ports and ships. Since no Entente warnings were expected, Hipper felt that complete surprise would befall the Channel Squadron. It was expected that the attack take place earlier to exploit the speed and surprise presented to him. A plane flew over the squadron and the fleet was reported, but without an operating radio, it had to return to base. Since the plane was operating some distance off its projected route from the views of several sailors, plus didn't stop or report, Admiral Hipper's confidence that the plane was on a regular flight or returning to base damaged would increase his confidence. He didn't know that the information presented would be in British Admiralty intelligence by breakfast that day.
By 7:00 a.m., Admiral Hipper woke up from his sleep and read the information presented to him. He hoped that the Dover-Calais mine barrage was [virtually] secure, to permit sailing of his fleet. The presence of some 25 destroyers was an issue to the British, who ordered a destroyer flotilla and several scouting cruisers out of port. The French pre-dreadnoughts in the Channel and escorts of 10 destroyers and a squadron of slower protected cruisers were out to intercept the Germans. Meanwhile, the Grand Fleet was sailing southwards before the battlecruisers were detached to steam at full speed, assist the blocking and mining of the Channel, and then intercept the German Channel Squadron. As of the moment, the mine warfare squadron would rescue survivors from the 4 destroyers sunk and scuttle 2 heavily damaged vessels. However, 5 British destroyers were sunk and several others were badly damaged. Within a few hours, 10 British destroyers were sunk, aground or scuttled from the Dover Barrage. In a few hours, additional destroyers, light cruisers, minesweepers and submarines were to reinforce the Channel Fleet and intercept the German Channel and mine warfare squadrons. Then, the French ships, monitors, scouting and protected cruisers and the assigned destroyer and light cruiser escorts would engage the Germans.
With the assistance of direction finding equipment, the Admiralstab informed the mine squadron to accelerate the pace of sweeping before returning or rendevousing with Hipper starting at 10:00 a.m. and the mandatory report sent would be the first report received by the High Seas Fleet from this squadron. Hipper was confident that if he sacrificed the Siegfried class ships and minelayers, he would be capable of steaming at over 24 knots, enough to engage the battleships, cruisers, destroyers and monitors.
Finally, it was time for the German Navy to sail from its home ports to the decisive battle sites. After the final preparations, the Kaiserliche Marine slipped from its home ports starting from the morning of 1 November to the evening of the same day and the fleets proceeded to their sectors. The Channel assault force would proceed to the Channel while the High Seas Fleet moved to intercept the Grand Fleet. Despite information regarding the Grand Fleet's imminent sailing, Admiral Hipper was to continue with his orders and attack the British. There was only one thing in question. This was the Dover-Calais mine barrage, which had the Germans in doubt as to its status. Although the barrage was swept as ordered by 31 October, several mines were still in force and safety was in question, especially for the precious battlecruisers involved.
The first squadron to sortie, as scheduled, were the raiding, submarine hunting and minesweeping destroyers and anti-submarine vessels. Next was the minelaying group of slow and minelaying cruisers plus the Siegfried class ships. Then, the Channel attack force raised its anchors and finally, the High Seas Fleet would await orders from Hotzendorff before sailing. It was recommended that if the Grand Fleet was sighted, the Germans break radio silence or drive the Grand Fleet into minefields, especially German-laid ones. After all, it was expected that the High Seas Fleet would intervene and the Entente, with poor coordination, would not be aware of these fields.
Also, Entente submarines had to be dealt with and observed to prevent attacks and reports. This was especially after the fleet was underway to the west at midnight on 2 November and about to shell Entente ports and ships. Since no Entente warnings were expected, Hipper felt that complete surprise would befall the Channel Squadron. It was expected that the attack take place earlier to exploit the speed and surprise presented to him. A plane flew over the squadron and the fleet was reported, but without an operating radio, it had to return to base. Since the plane was operating some distance off its projected route from the views of several sailors, plus didn't stop or report, Admiral Hipper's confidence that the plane was on a regular flight or returning to base damaged would increase his confidence. He didn't know that the information presented would be in British Admiralty intelligence by breakfast that day.
By 7:00 a.m., Admiral Hipper woke up from his sleep and read the information presented to him. He hoped that the Dover-Calais mine barrage was [virtually] secure, to permit sailing of his fleet. The presence of some 25 destroyers was an issue to the British, who ordered a destroyer flotilla and several scouting cruisers out of port. The French pre-dreadnoughts in the Channel and escorts of 10 destroyers and a squadron of slower protected cruisers were out to intercept the Germans. Meanwhile, the Grand Fleet was sailing southwards before the battlecruisers were detached to steam at full speed, assist the blocking and mining of the Channel, and then intercept the German Channel Squadron. As of the moment, the mine warfare squadron would rescue survivors from the 4 destroyers sunk and scuttle 2 heavily damaged vessels. However, 5 British destroyers were sunk and several others were badly damaged. Within a few hours, 10 British destroyers were sunk, aground or scuttled from the Dover Barrage. In a few hours, additional destroyers, light cruisers, minesweepers and submarines were to reinforce the Channel Fleet and intercept the German Channel and mine warfare squadrons. Then, the French ships, monitors, scouting and protected cruisers and the assigned destroyer and light cruiser escorts would engage the Germans.
With the assistance of direction finding equipment, the Admiralstab informed the mine squadron to accelerate the pace of sweeping before returning or rendevousing with Hipper starting at 10:00 a.m. and the mandatory report sent would be the first report received by the High Seas Fleet from this squadron. Hipper was confident that if he sacrificed the Siegfried class ships and minelayers, he would be capable of steaming at over 24 knots, enough to engage the battleships, cruisers, destroyers and monitors.
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