October Woes of 1917

[ghappy1000]

Introduction:

These are my intentions, give Germany crushing but pyrrhic victories at Jutland and the Somme against Britain followed by slightly better conditions in 1917 with Romania staying neutral until events that year keep them from joining the Entente and a greater threat to St. Petersburg. The minor differences, however, keep unrestricted submarine warfare out of the picture or reduces it, preserving American neutrality. Germany fights the Western Front with better conditions in 1917 and Italy suffers a bigger defeat at Caporetto and is forced to rely more on foreign help, collapsing in 1918. 1918 is decision year in which the Germans win against Britain and France or suffer defeat as in reality and unrestricted submarine warfare is launched after the failures of 1918. In 1919, if the Entente survives the German offensives to fight with victory, they begin the counterattack, with American support in 1920. Germany finally surrenders that year after revolution, defeats and the collapse of Austria Hungary and the Ottoman Empire the previous year.

Despite the timeline's name, I'm actually continuing the 'Failure On The Somme' timeline after its closure [with the German decisive but pyrrhic victory at Jutland pod]. By the way, is it possible with less wikipedia usage and direct copying to continue this timeline since I have Calbear's permission? And, I'm now at October 1917, during the height of the Passchendaele battle. Also, note that the articles would be properly sourced [due to butterfly effects and source issues] and mass Wikipedia usage might stop after this scenario's Passchendaele [which is slightly worse for the British with less troops and American neutrality, along with better German performance in the east]. And, note the previous writing and posting of the articles on Microsoft Word over the two weeks. And, there's another thread under consideration about Cambrai instead of Passchendaele.
Summary Of The Overall Timeline As Of Now [If you haven't read the threads in my userpage]:
August 1915: With German naval assistance, Riga falls into German hands during the battle for the city or falls under greater threat. The Russians reinforce or recapture the city, but weaken the front slightly because of its importance. [First POD]
November 1915: The Russian Navy sorties in an attempt to save Riga, but is destroyed because of its ships' weaknesses. Riga falls to a siege over the winter.
21 February 1916: Assault on Verdun begins as in reality.
March 1916: The Riga and Lake Naroch Offensives fail, with several more casualties than reality because of butterflies.
31 May 1916: [First consequential and significant pod.] The German Navy under Admiral Hipper destroys the battlecruiser force in the first hour of engagement [save for the 5th Battle Squadron]. As a result, the German Navy decides to fight out for the night and inflict massive losses on the Grand Fleet, including the loss of every [dreadnought] battleship. German losses are too heavy for the fleet to exploit the victory, with 2 battlecruisers being the only capital ships surviving the battle.
4/5 June 1916: The Brusilov Offensive kicks off with initial success, but is stopped after logistical issues. On the northern flank, the Brusilov Offensive is defeated decisively for want of troops. This, along with the Jutland and Somme battles, keep Romania neutral.
1 July 1916: With heavy losses at Jutland, the British offensive on the Somme is slightly weaker than reality without the diversionary offensive. This enables the Germans to reinforce the Somme and inflict heavier casualties on the British. When the battle ends by late November 1916, the British are at a disadvantage of 50,000 casualties compared to reality. Verdun is slightly better for Germany as well.
19 August 1916: A naval battle destroys even more of the Royal Navy. As a result of the battle, unrestricted submarine warfare is postponed until the situation on the Eastern Front decides it with a prolonged stay of Falkenhayn.
Early September 1916: An attempt to destroy the Ottoman Navy to free up ships for the British Grand and Channel Fleets and knock out the Ottomans from the war fails in a disaster for the Russian Black Sea Fleet and several French ships. The Russian Caucasus Army goes on the defensive as a result.
March 1917: First ['February'] Russian Revolution weakens the internal situation in Russia and with postponed unrestricted submarine warfare, keeps America neutrality going throughout 1917.
9 April - 20 May 1917: Battle of Arras proceeds as in reality, but stronger German forces and weaker British forces result in the offensive doing slightly worse.
16 April - 22 May 1917: The Nivelle Offensive does worse with heavier mutinies as a result of the defeats.
7-14 June 1917: Messines Offensive proceeds as in reality, but is slightly better for the Germans.
31 July - November 1917: Passchendaele Offensive [or 'third battle of Ypres'] launched. [The timeline is still in this stage as of this moment.]

 

[ghappy1000]

German 4th Army September-October 1917

[Still part of the introduction for the timeline]
By September 1917, the German 4th Army [although strengthened by 50,000 soldiers extra compared to reality,] was weakened by the transfer of troops to the Italian Front for the Caporetto Offensive. Despite this, it held firm although the British offensive tactics were turning more into their favour. The reasons were the greater amount of surprise used, the weakened German strength, more modest and straightforward but focused aims, heavy constant bombardments and issues with moving reinforcements due to rain and mud; although the latter was good at hampering British reinforcement of the offensive and halting usage of roads for supplies. Despite this, any capitalization of German frontline weaknesses was stopped by General Hubert Gough's offensive had ceased despite being created by the Fifth Army's attacks and modifications were made to the tactical attacks based on evaluation of the offensive’s performance, however, the German offensive in the east and imminent defeat of Russia, along with better September weather and several costly defeats on the Germans. accelerated the pace of the offensive. The unusually wet weather had caused the attacks to be postponed until 10 August despite the aims of assaulting them by 5 August and the Battle of Langemarck from 16-18 August, although supposed to fulfill these aims, left several intended objectives under German Army occupation after operations during late August and early September.
Minor operations
During the silence and preparations of early September, both sides tried to improve their tactical positions for the upcoming assault. A German counter attack on 1 September at Inverness Copse took the position and got halted. Further north in the XIX Corps area, a battalion of the 61st Division attempted to occupy Hill 35, but failed before reaching the objective. Another reattempt on 3 September failed. Next day, the division attacked Aisne Farm and took the farm before withdrawing along with Spot Farm by the neighbouring 58th Division. On 5 September, the 61st Division launched a final night attempt and failed badly in achieving its capture as it was lost after a counter attack. An attack from south of Hill 35 by the 42nd Division with the 125th Brigade and a battalion of the 127th Brigade, took place on 6 September. For several days, practice barrages were conducted and a daylight reconnaissance by a small party probed to within 25 yards (23 m) of Beck House. During the night, the Germans sent up many flares and rockets, disclosed their barrage line and many undetected posts.
The timetable for artillery shelling needed an average of four rounds for each gun-during a-minute but the gunners increased the speed of shelling to ten. The 125th Brigade assaulted Iberian, Borry and Beck House farms, with two battalions forward and two in reserve and the attached battalion acting as a carrying-party. Only Beck House Farm was captured but small-arms fire from the south slope of Hill 35inflicted heavy casualties and stopped the attack after another failed counterattack on Beck House. The Germans retook Beck House at 10.45 a.m. and shelled the brigade, who withdrew from the scene. Overall, the 61st Division received approximately c. 1100 casualties for its failed and unnecessary assault. At night, the last attack on Hill 35 failed and the Germans pushed the division out of sector until reinforcements halted the counterattack.
A brigade of the 58th Division raided the Inverness Corpse on 8 September and next day the 24th Division (II Corps) lost Inverness Copse to a German attack before retaking it. On 11 September, a night attack by a battalion of the 42nd Division failed to capture The Hut and a covering party for a group of soldiers working in no man's land, discovered an Inniskilling Fusilier, who had lain out wounded since 11 August. The soldiers relied on rations taken from the pockets and surroundings of dead soldiers. Next day, a battalion of the 42nd Division edged forward 100 yards (91 m) and a battalion of the 58th Division attacked Winnipeg. In the evening a German counter-attack took ground towards Springfield. On 15 September, a battalion of the 47th Division, with intense but minor bombardment support, attacked and captured a strong point near Inverness Copse, fire from which had devastated earlier attacks in the vicinity and took 26 prisoners. The position was later lost. A battalion of the 42nd Division assaulted Sans Souci and the 51st Division launched a diversionary demonstration. A day later, a German attack on the strong point captured by the 47th Division and renamed Cryer Farm, was defeated with moderate German losses and in the XIV Corps area, another attack was halted on the 20th Division front from small-arms fire despite a lack of British defending troops. A party of the Guards Division was cut off near Ney Copse and after surrendering; a lull followed until 20 September, when the next attack of the offensive began.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Menin_Road_Ridge
German 25 September Counteroffensive
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_counter-attack,_25_September_1917
German Offensive Preparations and Introduction

The reforms in attack techniques by General Plumer attempted to weaken German defences by reducing the penetration and capture of the frontline, except for heavily weakened or very important points, and then engaging the crucial battle against counterattacking German Eingrief divisions. A careful reorganization of the reserve troops by General Plumer himself ensured that the depth of the divisions were similar to the intensity of local German counter-attack reserves and the Eingreif divisions, making both offensive and defensive operations easier. More troops were reserved and provided for the later stages of the advance, to defeat German counter-attacks by moving no more than 1,500 yards (1,400 m), before they consolidated captured territory. This would ensure after the Germans counterattacked, they would face stronger British defences with adequate artillery and receive heavy casualties for little gains, rather than defeat the small and disorganised groups of British infantry that were repulsed on the 31 July, 10 and 16 August battles by the Germans. When the German 4th Army was defeated at Menin Road Ridge on the 20 September battle, the 4th Army modified how regiments and battalions were arranged in their defensive positions. During August, each German front-line division had kept two regiments in the front position with all six of their battalions and the third regiment was held further back in reserve. It was found that replacement of frontline battalions were needed much more frequently than anticipated as a result of constant British bombardments and the wet weather. Periods in the line were grueling and battalions were scattered to ensure they were at the needed sector to face the attacks. Regiments in reserve were incapable of launching a Gegenstoss (immediate counter-attack), which had left the battalions furthest forward unsupported, until reserve Eingreif divisions arrived from the rearmost parts of the defences after hours, which would do little good if the Germans were losing, especially for their purpose. By 26 September, all three regiments of each line-holding division had been deployed the front line, each holding an area 1,000 yards (910 m) wide and 3,000 yards (2,700 m) deep, with one battalion in the front-line, one in support and the third in close reserve.
The three battalions of each regiment were to move advance one at a time and to fight British battalions which leap-frogged through those of the previous stage of an attack. The Eingreif divisions had to conduct a Gegenangriff (organised counter-attack with artillery and air support) later in the day, before the British could consolidate captured ground and maintain it for defence. The objective of the reform was to modify the neutralization of the front division reserves which occurred on 20 September from the heavy shelling and barrages of the British artillery; the reserve battalion in each regimental sector would be capable of counterattacking, before the arrival of the Eingreif divisions. On 22 September, new tactical needs were shown to the troops that increased the artillery bombardments to be fired between British attacks, with half of the artillery conducting counter-battery fire against British artillery and the other half to shell enemy infantry incessantly. More infantry raids and resistance were to be done, to compel the British to reinforce the front line and make a denser target for the German artillery. Improvements in artillery observation in the battle zone were demanded, to improve the accuracy of German artillery fire for the British attacks.
On 23 September, Crown Prince Rupprecht’s diary entry wrote that the higher ground at Zonnebeke and Gheluvelt was vulnerable to another British attack and holding the ground was crucial to the success of German defence and counter-attack system planned, as the 20 September experiences showed. Next day, Rupprecht wrote that wished any subsequent British attack would be delayed, as the 4th Army lacked adequate reserves for the whole of the active front east of Ypres. A Gegenangriff (organised counter-attack) against the British flank between the Menin Road and Polygon Wood, which had been lengthened by the attack on 20 September, was demanded by Rupprecht himself. Group Wytschaete was to assault with the 50th Reserve and Bavarian Ersatz Divisions. The commander of Reserve Infantry Regiment 229 believed that the attack might fail, unless it was most carefully prepared and assisted by a Group Ypres assault opposite Polygon Wood. However, the suggestion was disregarded The counter-attack was delayed by one day and responsibility was transferred to Major Litzmann, the commander of Reserve Infantry Regiment 230.

It was planned for the Germans to conduct a Gegenangriff on the Fifth Army front opposite the 20th (Light) Division in XIV Corps and a bigger attack against the X Corps front, in the centre of the Second Army, to the southern flank of the I Anzac Corps in Polygon Wood. The 50th Reserve Division had been the Eingreif division for Group Dixmude from 10 August – 19 September and was moved south to the Menin area for support The division then freed up the Bavarian Ersatz Division on 21 September, for an attack by a battalion in each of the three regimental sectors, on a 1,800-yard (1,600 m) front, from the Menin road north to Polygon Wood on the Gheluvelt plateau. At 5:15 a.m., the assault would begin by recapturing the Wilhelm line opposite Group Wytschaete, about 500 yards (460 m) to the west from the Menin north to the Reutel road, south of Polygon Wood. It was hoped that the attack would preempt any British offensive and wreck or delay it while fresh divisions were transferred to the Flanders front, to re-establish the defensive system which had been overrun during the attack on 20 September and the troops moved to Italy for Caporetto. The III Battalion, Reserve Infantry Regiment 229 (RIR 229) , was to assault on the northern flank by taking control of the Reutelbeek and III Battalion, Reserve Infantry Regiment 230 (RIR 230) under Colonel Litzmann, the RIR 230 commander, was to attack from the Reutelbeek north to Polygon Wood and the 4th Army‘s Storm Battalion were to assault the sector of Reserve Infantry Regiment 231 (RIR 231), on the Menin road.
[Counterattack is quite similar to reality and might be included as an addition after October 1917 in Passchendaele is finished. And, I'll be having dinner soon, so don't criticize this post severely.]

 

[ghappy1000]

Battle of Poelcappelle

source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Poelcappelle
After the victories of 20 and 26 September, the fine weather, the disorganization of the defending German soldiers and the unlikely possibility of German reinforcements from the collapsing Eastern front, Haig believed that the attack of 4 October would terminate the minimal advances as conditions for a breakthrough were underway. The next offensive would have more extensive aims to allow for exploitation of the anticipated breakthrough. Using reserve and specialist army units, the offensive was planned, but Gough and Plumer responded over the next couple of days and told Haig that they felt the field marshal's proposals were premature and that capitalization would not be possible, until Passchendaele ridge had been taken from Passchendaele northwards to Westroosebeke. The British generals thought that this would probably take two more steps with three-day intervals in between and then another four days to repair roads over the newly captured territory. Haig believed that while a breakdown of the German defence was needed to permit capitalization of the 10 October battle, which was not the certain date he desired, since the arrangements had to be made and they would also be available for a later date without delaying the offensive significantly.
At a 2 October meeting with his generals, Haig announced that operations at Ypres would continue for as long as the weather allowed, that six fresh divisions were shifted from inactive fronts to the Fifth Army and that the Canadian Corps was reallocated to the Second Army. The preparations to be made for instant exploitation in the event the 10 October attack proceed as scheduled and be as successful as anticipated, were that each assaulting division was to keep its reserve brigade lightly equipped with the support from two 60-pdr batteries, two 6-inch howitzer batteries and four field artillery brigades. If the brigades launching the morning portion of the offensive found a big success and circumstances for a breakthrough, their reserve brigades would extend the advance in the afternoon and capitalize on the success. The reserve brigades of the attacking divisions of I and II Anzac corps, were to take Drogenbroodhoek in the south, 3,000 yards (2,700 m) beyond Broodseinde, Passchendaele station on the Morslede road in the centre and obtain contact with the Fifth Army north of Passchendaele after reaching the Westroosebeke road. A reserve division from every corps participating in the offensive was to be readied behind the front, which the Director-General of Transportation Major-General Nash, undertook to have on the battlefield in 3 1⁄2 hours, if given three hours' notice. The reserve divisions would be ready by the following morning to advance with the reserve brigades and take advantage of crumbling German resistance. Each army was provided with a calvary division to co-operate with the reserve divisions and two tank battalions were attached to the Second Army, plus one tank brigade to the Fifth Army, to exploit the firmer going should the hoped for breakthrough or opportunity arrive as anticipated.
Haig, Gough and Plumer’s 2 October preparations, the 4 October triumph and the disarray of the German defenders, led to the commencing day of the offensive being planned for 10 October, however the preparations were accelerated for a 9 October offensive. Attacking a front of 13,500 yards (12,300 m), it was intended to capture Passchendaele ridge in two phrases. The first aim (red line) would be taken by a morning offensive, which, if successful and resulting in a general German retreat, would be followed-up by the reserve brigades from assaulting divisions and these would move in the afternoon to the second target (blue line) in the afternoon. On 7 October, the assault on the blue line was cancelled due to weather concerns.
X Corps, on the southern sector, was to divert German reserves around Becelaere and Gheluvelt. Meanwhile, the I Anzac Corps was to advance to the main offensive's right flank with the 1st and 2nd Australian divisions, the 4th and 5th Australian divisions being in reserve, II Anzac Corps with the New Zealand and 3rd Australian divisions in reserve, was to attack two objectives, the 66th Division advancing through the main ridge, north of the Ypres–Roulers railway to the front of Passchendaele and the 49th Division pass the Ravebeek stream, up Wallemolen spur and to the Bellevue pillboxes. After taking control of the first aims, the reserve brigades were to assault the second objective, which were 800–1,000 yards (730–910 m) ahead of the red line, beyond the village and the main ridge respectively, in the afternoon. The reserve divisions were prepared to advance forward quickly, by train from west of Ypres to continue the attack the next day.
South of the X Corps, the 5th British Division assaulted Polderhoek Château. The brigade captured the Château ruins and shelled the pill-boxes in the vicinity but supplies of ammunition were hampered and German machine-gun fire from Gheluvelt compelled the brigade to return to its starting line. A renewed attack was prepared for the night but later cancelled after negotiations. Further north, the 95th Brigade attacked astride the Reutelbeek, advanced through Cameron Covert and was then stopped by German machine-gun fire. The 21st Division, between the 5th and 7th divisions, was not participating in the offensive and kept as reserve. Two battalions of the 22nd Brigade of the 7th Division, managed to gather their units on time for the offensive despite the sodden ground and began advancing at 5:20 a.m. to the blue line, which had been the last objective of the 21st Division during the attack of 4 October. Within 35 minutes, green flares on the objective (blue line) were fired to show that it had been captured. Then, it was reported that the commanding ground around Reutel had been captured with many escaping Germans being shot while fleeing. The advance had been stalled at Juniper Cottage and German guns in a hole at Judge Copse also delayed the infantry's advance; a reserve platoon was sent up but was also unable to clear the copse. Eventually two companies captured the area after a south-east attack. The Germans bombarded the sector throughout the night and all of next day despite no counter offensive attempts being considered.

The I Anzac Corps had an assault sector north of X Corps. Its 1st Australian Division raided Celtic Wood and one battalion was almost decimated. The 2nd Australian Division was to support the 66th Division’s right flank, located southwards of the Ypres–Roulers railway, by turning to its right. The 6th Australian Brigade attacked towards Daisy and Dairy Woods on a 1,200-yard (1,100 m) front to support the right flank, but its troops were quickly stopped by German machine-gun fire and lost control. 5th Australian Brigade advanced 1,200 yards (1,100 m) to the north-western end of the Keiberg spur; the battalions were weakened and attacked by German troops that weren’t mopped up as a consequence. German troop reinforcements were able to pass behind the Australians' knowledge and control because of negligence, which threatened them with encirclement. Before troops from the 66th Division arrived on the spot, the Australian brigade retreated 800 yards (730 m) with heavy casualties; during the withdrawal, British troops were seen advancing north of the railway. When newly arrived reinforcements were ready to attempt another supporting offensive, the British troops had also returned to their original positions and the 5th Australian Brigade consolidated on the first objective.

The main attack was launched by the II Anzac Corps. The 66th and 49th Divisions prepared for the offensive behind Frezenberg and Potijze, about 2.5 miles (4.0 km) from the jumping off line. The divisions were expected to cover the distance in five hours but the dark, rain, muddy and rough ground conditions and fierce German artillery fire caused serious delays. Both divisions reported at 2:30 a.m. that some battalions would not be ready for zero hour at 5:20 a.m. and that all of the 197th Brigade on the right flank would be late for the attack, unless it had to be postponed. Staff officers were sent out to increase the pace of the divisional battalions’ advance. When the artillery barrage began, the readied troops were dispersed and followed the barrage. Following the creeping barrage was difficult because much of the field artillery was out of action, some of the rest shelled inaccurately from unstable platforms and mud smothered many high-explosive shells.

The 66th Division battalions of the 197th Brigade on the right, quickly caught up on the sandy ground despite the serious delay. German infantry from the 195th Division were caught surprised in shell holes and many were captured, as the British reached the final objective (blue line) at 10:00 a.m., a patrol finding Passchendaele village empty. Soon after reaching the final objective, the rain stopped and with increased visibility, German machine-guns and field artillery started firing from the right flank. At midday, both flanks of the brigade were swung back to locate stagglers and neighbouring units, which the troops in the centre mistook as a withdrawal and followed, all the brigade ending up at the red line. After halting a late afternoon German counter-attack, the division withdrew slightly to obtain contact with the 49th Division on the left and receive cover from machine-guns on the Bellevue spur. The 198th Brigade on the left had difficulties with mud and flooded trenches north of the Ravebeek. German machine-gun fire from the pill-boxes at Bellevue 500–800 yards (460–730 m) away, stopped the infantry half way to the red line, despite another attempt to advance by the supporting battalions.
The German pill-boxes at Bellevue were capable of shelling the 198th brigade because the attack by the 148th Brigade, to the 49th Division's right flank, was stalled in the swamp astride the Ravebeek and only a few parties managed to wade across. The creeping barrage was thin and moved at 100 yards (91 m) in six minutes, which proved too fast for the infantry. The barrage was lost on the right flank, at the marshy edges of the Stroombeek and German riflemen and machine-gunners were capable of firing through the British barrage, especially from Bellevue and the Yetta Slopes. "Peter Pan" on the left was captured by the 146th Brigade and by 6:40 a.m., the first objective (red line) had been reached. An attempt by following waves to leap-frog through the troops on the red line failed, due to heavy fire from the Bellevue pillboxes. One attack reached Bellevue before being stopped and a later attempt at a flanking attack was repulsed by machine-gun fire. The attack on the Yetta House was also disrupted by machine-guns and on the left, it stopped 100 yards (91 m) short of the objective.

The 147th Brigade was alerted and put on one hour's notice by 7:30 a.m. and during the morning, troops from the supporting battalions of the attacking brigades covered frontline holes. The final position reached was 100–200 yards (91–183 m) beyond the first objective, from which a line of posts ran from south of Wolf Farm to the eastern edge of Wolf Copse and from there to the south-east of Wolf Copse, with an advanced post 150 yards (140 m) south-east of the copse. A support line was dug along the first objective and several small counter-attacks retook the position before stopping. Troops from a reserve battalion were sent up to the vicinity of Peter Pan and the old British front line was occupied by more troops. Around 9:00 a.m., a company managed to work round Peter Pan and take the pillboxes, which enabled the advance to proceed up to a field of barbed wire, 150 yards (140 m) from Bellevue, before being repulsed with some losses. More wire had been distributed around the pill-boxes, which at this point were part of Flandern I and more German machine-guns were concealed in shell-holes. After several assaults, the troops dug in half-way up the slope.

The 146th Brigade found a bridge on the Gravenstafel road and its advance proceeded up to several hundred yards up the Wallemolen spur beyond the Ravebeek, before being stopped at 9:30 a.m. by hidden machine-guns in the Bellevue pill-boxes and a field of uncut wire 25–40 yards (23–37 m) wide in front of the pill-boxes, which blocked all of the divisional front from observation. At about 1:00 p.m., a reconnaissance report from a contact patrol aircraft crew had the 66th and 49th divisions at the final objective. Despite the brigade staff officers's doubts, both divisions were ordered to move reserves forward to hold and protect the line. Without knowledge of the actual cause for halting, the 49th Division headquarters sent the 147th Brigade forward and the rest of the supporting battalions of the attacking brigades, which were either pinned down or stuck on Gravenstafel spur, as the reason for the delay was acknowledged. In the afternoon, the 148th and 146th brigades almost reached the red line, having received 2,600 casualties. The 66th Division's troops on the right rested on the railway beyond Keerselaarhoek below the main ridge, then north past Augustus Wood to the Ravebeek. The 49th Division line stretched from the valley at Marsh Bottom, through the bottom of the Bellevue slopes above the Ravebeek, to Peter Pan and Yetta Houses, before reaching the XVIII Corps boundary of the 144th Brigade of the 48th Division at Adler Farm. Small parties were isolated piecemeal further up the Bellevue slopes, on the western edge of Wolf Copse, Wolf Farm and a cemetery on the northern boundary, which were taken earlier.
5th Army Offensive
In the XVIII Corps sector, a brigade each of the 48th and 11th Divisions required 14 1⁄2 hours on the night of 7/8 October to reach the front line in the hail of mud and rain. When the brigades attacked, they were shelled by machine-gun fire from the newly arrived German 16th Division, which had crept forward in the dark to occupy shell-hole positions very near to the British jumping-off line, that the British barrage overshot them. The British infantry lost the barrage, which was as useless as elsewhere due to shells being smothered by mud and moving too fast at 100 yards (91 m) in four minutes. The German counter-barrage arrived after a delay of seven minutes and was just as ineffective. The British destructive bombardment on German positions, on the other hand, was much more damaging and effective than the creeping bombardment and caused considerable German casualties.

Unfortunately, the German pillboxes in that sector were left intact, and heavy small-arms fire from them caused many British casualties from cross-fire and traversing fire, while positions dug into the ruins of Poelcappelle, were used to launch enfilade fire on attacking British soldiers. The British offensive there was halted 100–200 yards (91–183 m) beyond the front line on the left, at the Brewery near Polcappelle, from which the troops returned to reorganise at the starting trenches. As this retreat was observed by other soldiers, the survivors of other units on the left flank and in the centre attempted to conform it before following the retreating troops. On the right flank, the German defence was less determined and more ground could have been taken without the left flank's failure. The ground was consolidated and reinforcements were sent to the area between Pheasant Farm and Retour Crossroads. Prisoners reported many casualties in the opposite German division because of its freshness and willingness to defend its own ground. After the fighting ended, both sides took advantage of a local truce to recover wounded and corpses.
In the XIV Corps area, one brigade of the 4th Division on an 800-yard (730 m) front. The slow progress of the XVIII Corps attack to the south restricted the XIV Corps's offensive to just beyond Poelcappelle and a new line was dug up beyond the Poelcappelle–Houthoulst road. To the north, the 29th Division had a final objective 1,650 yards (1,510 m) forward on the right and 2,500 yards (2,300 m) on the left to be taken. The attacking troops advanced in torrential rain the night before, the Royal Newfoundland Battalion on the left flank taking 4 and a half hours to move 6 miles (9.7 km) to the front line. There were three phrases in the advance, with an hour to consolidate while standing behind smoke barrages, at the first and intermediate objectives. The rain stopped at midnight and the attack began at 5:20 a.m. On the right, German machine-guns at Olga Farm resulted in many casualties and a delay, but the first objective was captured within the schedule. The surviving troops advanced on Condé House by rushes from shell-holes with 150 prisoners captured after they reached it before stopping.
Then, the shelling from two German pill-boxes halted the advance and a German counter-attack started from the pill-boxes. The German infantry attacked in eight waves and rifle and were faced with machine-gun fire . At 8:55 a.m., the barrage for the advance to the third (final) objective began and shelled the remaining German infantry; German resistance stopped shortly afterwards and at 10:00 a.m., the final objective was taken. The left brigade moved to the right of Bear Copse, which was specially bombarded by Stokes mortars that forced the German garrison's surrender. The Broembeek was crossed by the Newfoundland battalion, which moved up the Ypres–Staden railway, captured German dug-outs in the embankment before being assaulted and finally reaching the first objective slightly late. The advance to the second objective found decreased German resistance and the final objective 700 yards (640 m) further on was captured before being stopped by a German counter attack. The counter-attack was defeated at noon and then a retirement of 200 yards (180 m) was made, in anticipation of another late afternoon counter-attack, but German infantry left the area emptied after inflicting heavy casualties.

The Guards Division had the Broembeek to cross over and close up to Houthoulst Forest, on a front from the Ypres–Staden railway, to the junction with the French army near Craonne Farm. Before the attack, the pioneer battalion carried forward 355 mats, 180 footbridges and enough wire to cover 3,000 yards (2,700 m) of front; and much digging was done before the rain destroyed trenches under construction and smothered a few soldiers with mud. The two attacking brigades advanced in torrential rain later on October 7, which stopped at midnight on 8/9 October, and the morning dawned fine with a drying wind. The barrage came down at exactly 5:30 a.m. and after four minutes began to creep forward at a rate of 100 yards (91 m) in eight minutes. Crossing the Broembeek was slightly easier than expected, as the German infantry nearby surrendered after a failed, but fierce counterattack.

Little German resistance was found by the right, except from several German pill-boxes at Egypt House, whence the Guards pulled their right flank back under sniper fire, as they waited for the support of the 29th Division's Newfoundland troops to arrive. The left brigade evaded a German strong-point and arrived at the final objective in the evening, after an initial failed attack on the strongpoint. Consolidation was hampered by German sniping in Houthoulst Forest and German planes flew over the new front line, which was 2,500 yards (2,300 m) forward on the Veldhoek–Vijwegen spur. No counter-attack was made until the evening, beyond the right flank on the 29th Division front, which retreated over a short distance. On the left of the Guards Division, German troops gathering at the junction with the French 2nd Division to the north for counterattacking, were dispersed by machine-gun fire from gunners, who had advanced to the final objective with the infantry and by British artillery fire, arriving at the objectives in the evening.
French 1st Army
The French First Army, between the British Fifth Army to the south and the Belgian Army further north, attacked south of the inundations earlier on 31 July, and advanced to the west of Wydendreft and Bixschoote. On 1 August, the French division on the left flank captured ground stretching from the Martjevaart and St. Jansbeek to Drie Grachten. The axis of the French advance was along the banks of the Corverbeek, towards the south and south-eastern fringes of Houthulst Forest, the villages of Koekuit and Mangelaere and blockhouses and pillboxes, which clinked the forest with the German line southwards towards Poelcappelle. On the left flank, the Belgian Army supported the French and held the ground about Knocke and the Yser inundations. On 9 October, the French 2nd Infantry Division from the I Corps was to attack towards Houthulst Forest to support the British XIV Corps attack on Poelcappelle. The French artillery placed the German defences east and south-east of Houthulst Forest under a three-day bombardment. At 5.30 a.m., a creeping-barrage started its slow movement over a "sea" of mud forwards. The artillery-fire was more effective than the British or Germans and its effectiveness was such that, despite an extremely sluggish advance by the infantry, the French targets were taken by 10:00 a.m. with minimal casualties.

After crossing the flooded Broembeek at the junction with the Steenbeek near St. Jean, just before the point where the Steenbeek becomes the St. Jansbeek, through a wide and shallow depression filled with mud, the French 2nd Division had the villages of St. Jean, Veldhoek and Mangelaere on the outskirts of the forest under its control. The Germans were driven from several fortified farms and pillboxes after some losses. On average, the penetration of the advance was 1.25-mile (2.01 km) and was managed in four hours even with poor ground conditions for an offensive, with slightly more than 600 casualties; I Corps took 200 prisoners. Even with obscuring rain, low cloud and high winds, French pilots flew at low altitudes to bomb German infantry and carried out tactical reconnaissance. On the right of the French, the British Guards Division assisted in Koekuit's capture, having been compelled to cross the mud of the Broembeek as well. German counter-attacks took several strong points at the north end of the French attack front, until a local counter-attack by the French failed and the counterattacks proceeded for an hour. Eventually, the Germans had to abandon the positions to the French after losing troops despite the heavier rate of French casualties On the left flank of the joint French-British offensive, total success was obtained and the troops were capable of maintaining their positions.
German 4th Army
German 233rd Division, facing I Anzac Corps, did not require the 220th (Eingreif) Division's assistance. To counter-attack the II Anzac Corps, the 16th and 195th Divisions in the front line were assisted by parts of the 20th Division and 45th Reserve Division. The 240th (Eingreif) Division advanced at midday to assist the 6th Bavarian Division when the latter was defending Polecappelle. The division advanced on approach routes which were under heavy shelling and managed to retake ground lost earlier. At 7:00 p.m., the British attacked again, with the battle eventually ending with minimal gains of ground by each side. After several night German counter-attacks, the final positions of the British divisions except near Reutel, opposite Passchendaele and near Houthoulst Forest, were the same as their starting positions, where heavy casualties compelled withdrawal. The writers of Der Weltkrieg, the German Official War History, believed that the battle was a costly success for the defending Germans.
[My laptop is having issues as of now and I'll stop posting until this can be edited and checked. I still attribute Wikipedia as a source.]

 

[ghappy1000]

Battles of Passchendaele and the bad news of October

Battles of Passchendaele and the bad news of October
First Battle of Passchendaele
source:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Battle_of_Passchendaele
By the time of the offensive, the Germans had suffered tactical reverses in Ypres and exploitation was sought.to permit a breakthrough. Despite this, the German Baltic Offensive after the failure of the Kerensky Offensive [which included an attack on the German Army in the Baltics] began on 1 September 1917 and after encircling the 12th Army, progressed to take Estonia and Latvia while defence was hampered by Bolshevism, demoralization and defeats. Meanwhile, reports regarding the defensive success on 9 October were delayed in reaching senior British commanders due to a collapse of communications during an attack, which was aggravated by the typical rain and mud of ‘No Man’s Land’ in Flanders. Later on the same day, Plumer informed Haig that II Anzac Corps had reached the first objective, which made a good position to initiate the attack of 12 October, albeit in error. However, many British guns were bogged down while under transfer to the frontline or sank into the mud and the remainders lacked ammunition supplies. German artillery fire increased in intensity after British counter-battery artillery fire decreased from 9–12 October due to the relocation and reloading of the guns, although the defenders still suffered from British bombardments heavily after the reloading and preparations began. A German bombardment preempted the offensive early on 11 October and later that day, the British bombarded German defences on Wallemolen spur for minimal effect in return. The construction of plank roads since the attack on 9 October was underway and a few more guns arrived at their new positions by 12 October. Adequate artillery support and accurate information regarding German defences for the offensive couldn’t be guaranteed with the lack of time, as Russia and Italy would implode before sufficient preparations could be finished.
The II Anzac Corps and the Second Army headquarters had to advance despite not achieving the expected success of 9 October. The aims of 12 October needed an advance of 2,000–2,500 yards (1,800–2,300 m) to the final objective instead of the initial 1,000–1,500 yards (910–1,370 m). The I Anzac Corps with the 4th and 5th Australian divisions, which replaced the exhausted 1st and 2nd Australian divisions, was to give the southern flank support. The I Anzac Corps was to capture Keiberg Spur and consolidate on the flank of the main assault, at the first and second objective lines only, 1,200 yards (1,100 m) and 880 yards (800 m) forward.
The British Second Army played the most important role, with the 3rd Australian Division and the New Zealand Division of the II Anzac Corps assaulting on a front of 3,000 yards (2,700 m). The 3rd Australian Division would take both Passchendaele ridge and village and the New Zealand Division was to take Bellevue Spur. The first objective (Red Line) was similar to the second objective of 9 October’s attack, 1,200 yards (1,100 m) forward, beyond the Bellevue pillboxes. The second objective (Blue Line) was 880 yards (800 m) beyond, at the junction of the Wallemolen Spur and was the starting point for the assault on Passchendaele village, with the final aim (Green Line) laying 400 yards (370 m) behind the village.
Second Army Offensive
The major offensive against Passchendaele itself was launched by the Second Army’s Anzac Corps. There was rain throughout the night of 11/12 October, with only one dry pause for the day. The Germans facing the New Zealanders were on alert throughout the night, launching many flares and bombarding artillery on the New Zealand front line at 5:00 a.m., which knocked out New Zealand trench mortar personnel after their ammunition exploded. The 12th Brigade of the 4th Australian Division attacked as planned at 5:25 a.m. but saw no infantry from the 3rd Australian Division beyond the railway. The brigade took control of the Keiberg, then cutting and consolidating it from the Germans along with the remainder of the first objective captured with many casualties. The 9th Brigade of the 3rd Australian Division arrived at the first objective with the battalion due to attack the second objective moving straight on before being halted by German troops, who pushed the brigade back to the first objective. When they began their descent from a slight rise, the Australians were shelled by German field and heavy artillery. The brigade proceeded to the second objective before returning to secure the first objective from German hands, delaying their mission. The 10th Brigade of the 3rd Australian Division suffered heavy casualties from machine-guns in pillboxes before reaching a fold in the ground near the first objective and sought refuge despite the increasing intensity of machine-gun fire from the Bellevue pillboxes that weren’t captured.
Uncut barbed wire on the Wallemolen spur delayed the New Zealanders’ advance; the supporting barrage was very thin, as some guns were stranded and others were disabled by German artillery as a consequence. The creeping barrage decreased and was replaced by howitzer shells plunging into wet ground around the Bellevue pillboxes exploded harmlessly. The German artillery launched shells at the rear of the New Zealand divisional area and machine-gun barrages from the German pillboxes were launched to disrupt the advance. The division took Wallemolen cemetery and Wolf Copse, the right of the advance stopping on the rise astride the Ravebeek creek. North of the Gravenstafel–Metcheele road, the division was stopped by belts of barbed wire 25–50 yards (23–46 m) deep and were swept by machine-gun fire, losing captured territory. The infantry attempted to break through the wire of the German Flandern I defensive line on the Wallemolen spur and none of the troops got through both belts before being killed or wounded after being stopped by more wire surrounding German pillboxes. Further south, the New Zealand Division captured two pillboxes, with the assistance of a 3rd Australian Division brigade. An advance began up the northern slope of the Ravebeek creek but stopped around Laamkeek. At 8:00 a.m. the surviving New Zealand infantry consolidated and awaited orders.
The movement of the Australians towards the second objective began at 8:35 a.m. but the 10th Brigade received too many casualties to advance and waited for reinforcements. One party from the 10th Brigade proceeded and arrived at the pillbox near Crest Farm, whose occupants counterattacked after rallying and repulsed the attack. The party then advanced into Passchendaele village after reinforcement by a battalion. Small groups from the 12th Brigade reached Keiberg spur with heavy casualties. The 12th Brigade lost ground to two German counter-attacks between 3:00 p.m. and 4.00 p.m., before retaking lost territory. An attempt was considered to use the reserve battalions from 3rd Australian Division to outflank the Bellevue pillboxes with support of the New Zealand Division at around 3:00 p.m. The attack was eventually cancelled, as the 9th Division to the north and the 3rd Australian Division to the south were repulsed by the fire of the Bellevue machine-guns and lost territory captured earlier, along with losing the needed troops. The artillery bombardment proceeded and ruined the counter-attack plans of a battalion. By 3:30 p.m., the 10th Brigade returned to its start-line, after shelling from Bellevue Spur. 9th Brigade was risked by this retirement and retreated without taking the second objective in the face of artillery, machine-gun and sniper fire with many losses. When the Anzac advance broke into the front between Passchendaele and the Keiberg Spur, I Battalion, Reserve Infantry Regiment 55 of the 220th Division was attached to the 195th Division, and II Battalion, Reserve Infantry Regiment 55 to the 233rd Division, which with the divisions on the front, reoccupied the areas vacated by the Australians and New Zealanders, capturing 56 unwounded and many injured Australians. In the evening most of the New Zealand Division withdrew to a line on the lower slopes of the Wallemolen spur.

5th Army Offensive
The British XVIII Corps’ 9th Division was delayed by rain and mud affecting supply routes, which stranded guns and reduced ammunition supply, particularly in smoke shells. At midnight on 11 October, torrential rain and a German gas and high explosive bombardment fell on the division’s gathering area. The wide front left numerous gaps in the line, as the 26th Brigade attacked behind guns moving at 100 yards (91 m) in eight minutes with the help of a machine-gun barrage from 16 Vickers machine-guns. The creeping barrage began at 5:35 a.m. and was considered "thin and ragged". Attacking troops lost direction and communication was stopped temporarily when carrier pigeons were delayed by the high wind and messenger dog handlers became casualties. The infantry maintained their advance through the right of the captured Adler Farm and reached the green line at Source Trench before stopping.
In the centre, the attackers dug in after advancing for 100-yards (91 m). Small parties reached Source Trench before German resistance stopped them. On the left of the brigade, the ground was even worse and troops were unable of catching up with the barrage, losing their sense of direction and were halted after capturing several pillboxes. Some of the troops on the left flank inadvertently crossed the Lekkerboterbeek, advanced 80 yards (73 m) and then formed a flank with troops from the 18th Division. Except on the right flank, the attack was repulsed by the Germans only 100 yards (91 m) from the start line, despite the 27th Brigade reinforcement of the attack sector and some of the British infantry drowned in shell-holes and rain. The new front line ran from the meeting with the New Zealand Division at the cemetery near Wallemolen, to Oxford Houses then back to the old front line.
For the 18th Division, the barrage began at 5:20 a.m. and infantry advanced in "snake formation". The divisional field artillery suffered the same fate as those of the divisions to the south, many guns sinking into the soft ground. A German counter-barrage began immediately after the advance and as British troops took cover, German machine-gunners fired at the crater lips of shell-holes, through which bullets pierced and wounded soldiers inside, reducing their role in the offensive. The German barrage’s consequence was worst on the right flank and added to German machine-gun fire from the Brewery and Helles House strong points; the situation at Requette Farm was unknown as all runners sent from the area were killed. Mud bugged down every weapon that required land movement and at 11:00 a.m., several British trench-mortar batteries and supporting machine-guns had to stop firing, because of wet ground and unsuitable ammunition. At noon, German counter-attacks towards the west end of Poelcappelle began and lasted throughout the afternoon, with the Germans trying to capitalize on a gap between the British 4th and 18th divisions. Defensive positions in shell-holes were held by the survivors of the British attack, but the counterattack took minimal ground before repulsion.

Fifth Army’s north was supported by the French First Army and contact was made by XIV Corps, which also attacked with a brigade of each division to capture Houthoulst Forest. After the night of 11 October, tape was laid beyond the front line in the corps area to enable troop organization beyond possible German counter-barrages. To prevent detection, scouts patrolled further forward and ambushed German patrols. The 3rd Guards Brigade of the Guards Division moved up for the attack on the night of 11 October through heavy rain and a German gas barrage (Operation Mondnacht), which caused heavy losses in this sector of the front. The artillery barrage was also launched at the scheduled 5:25 a.m. and the German counter-barrage was slow to respond, but competent, with shells falling mostly on the attacking waves. The XIV Corps divisions had much better artillery and machine-gun barrages compared to the southern divisions and the creeping barrage moved very slowly at a speed of 100 yards (91 m) in ten minutes and in two 300-yard (270 m) bounds.
The entire 12th Brigade from the 4th Division next to the XVIII Corps sector was to attack with two battalions of the 10th Brigade opposite the full brigade and another 10th Brigade battalion was held in reserve. Two battalions were to start the attack, with a battalion each in support and reserve, following to capture the first objective about 200 yards (180 m) forward and then pivot on the right to the last objective, another 300 yards (270 m) forward on the left at Water House. The ground was also soaked in water by overnight rain like the rest of theground to be captured and the advance by the right-hand battalion was stopped at Requette Farm by determined German resistance and massed machine-gun fire, during which contact with the neighbouring 18th Division battalion was lost. The left-hand battalion advance also encountered opposition and by 6:20 a.m. had crossed the Poelcappelle–le 5 Chemins road, captured Memling Farm and Senegal Farm and was incapable of meeting with the 17th Division until an hour later. After the capture of Requette Farm by the right-hand battalion, the Brewery and Helles House stopped the attack on the right flank by launching more German artillery fire. Requette Farm was lost to a German counter-attack around noon and attempts by reinforcements to re-take the farm persisted until night and heavy German resistance stopped the attempts. The brigade prepared its defensive flank on the right, to obtain contact with the 18th Division. The new front line curved back through Besace Farm to west of Helles House, south-west of Requette Farm, north of Poelcappelle after a slight German withdrawal over the night, but with considerable losses to the Australians.
The 51st Brigade of the 17th Division assaulted for 1,600 yards (1,500 m) astride the Ypres–Staden railway, to link up with the 4th Division’s left north of Poelcappelle and the right flank of the Guards Division, 400 yards (370 m) north of the railway. Beyond the railway, the advance of the 51st Brigade turned southwards and captured a German strong-point after losing many casualties. It later lost contact with the Guards Division. South of the embankment, astride the Broombeek and Watervlietbeek streams, several German farm strong-points, pillboxes and shell-hole positions were overrun by the infantry and later lost, who were able to proceed at the same pace as the very-slow-moving barrage. The brigade reached its first objective by 8:00 a.m., despite a number of German reinforcements arriving through the British artillery barrages. The final objective was reached at 12:00 p.m. and on the right, a defensive flank was thrown back from Memling Farm at the final objective, to meet troops of the 4th Division. By noon the advance was complete with the capture of 200 German prisoners and a German counter-attack followed, which took back lost territory, but resistance was constricted to a small amount of rifle fire otherwise.
Beneath the rainy weather, the 3rd Guards Brigade advanced behind a ragged barrage, took the higher ground on the edge of Houthoulst Forest and severed the rest of the spur running north-east from Veldhoek. It lost contact with the 17th Division’s right flank, after the left flank formation of the 17th Division turned south and the crew of a contact patrol aircraft observing the advance failed to see the loss of direction. Two platoons detailed to meet the attacking brigade of the 17th Division consolidated near the Angle Point pillbox while under machine-gun fire. After dark, the Guards and the 17th Division closed the gap by capturing the blockhouses at Angle Point and Aden House. Next day, conditions were so terrible that the attacking brigade was replaced by the 1st Guards Brigade. The fresh troops searched vigorously to the southern edge of Houthoulst Forest, against moderately organised German resistance, except for heavy sniping from the Colbert cross-roads and Colombo House.


Second Battle of Passchendaele
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Passchendaele
The Passchendaele offensive had to be maintained with the imminent surrender of Russia under the new Bolshevik Government and the reinforcement of the Western and Italian Fronts. If it wasn’t maintained, not only would the Central Powers exploit the opportunity given to them, but any chance of negotiations with the new government would be lost. Also, maintaining morale in this crucial period was important as otherwise, desertions and strengthening of the German Army in the west would occur significantly. Nevertheless, the mud and rain that bogged down conditions for an offensive in the area remained and had not subsided before the offensive. The Canadian Corps’ four divisions were shifted from the Lens sector to the Ypres Salient in the final attempt to capture Passchendaele. The Canadian Corps joined the II Anzac Corps on 18 October and took position along the valley between Gravenstafel Ridge and the heights at Passchendaele to initiate planning for the offensive. For the 1st Canadian Division’s soldiers, it was virtually the same front as had been occupied by their compatriots back in the 1915 battle for the same region, which interested several soldiers despite the imminent sacrifice awaiting them.
The Canadian offensive was planned in a series of three attacks, each with limited objectives, delivered at intervals of three or more days. As the Canadian Corps position was directly south of the inter-army boundary between British Fifth and Second Army, the British Fifth Army would launch minor operations on the left flank of the Canadian Corps, while the I and II Anzac Corps would attack to support the offensive’s right flank. X Corps assaulted Gheluvelt to improve the local tactical position and act as a diversion for the main attack in the north. Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie, the Canadian Corps’ commander, gave his temporary operational plan on 16 October and suggested that the offensive wait until 24 October to permit time for movement of sufficient artillery. However, Haig was worried about unnecessary delays, particularly given that the French attack on Mailmaison, which was to begin on 23 October, had to be supported and intensified. Currie and the British Second Army commander, Herbert Plumer, checked the situation and finally set the attack for the same day. The dates for the subsequent phases were tentatively given as 28 October and 2 November.
Heavy preparations were done to ensure the offensive’s success. Problems were found with the artillery and Australian positions. Of the 250 heavy howitzers that existed on paper, only 200 were found and of these, 90 were damaged. Of the 306 18 pounder field guns, less than half were capable of action. The problem of movement caused by muddy ground also resulted in the Australian artillery being separated in two main clusters, thereby furnishing the Germans with good targets to be destroyed piecemeal and it was bad to launch an offensive without adequate artillery. Furthermore, the Australians were unable to bring damaged artillery pieces for repair, because the provost demanded that no guns use the roads to prevent the bogging of traffic, troops and weather conditions. The situation was improved greatly after the Canadian divisional artillery’s arrival which placed an additional 210 18-pounder field guns, 200 howitzers and 26 heavy guns for the Canadian Corps’ usage.

By 17 October, attacking units received information on every available detail about German defences in their respective assault areas to assist early assault planning. Intelligence officers and artillery observers co-operated in observation posts and checked German fortifications that were newly constructed or undetected to ensure none escaped notice, enabling artillery bombardment before the offensive. A fast road construction program was started to permit rapid transportation of artillery and supplies. Ten field companies, seven Royal Engineer tunneling companies, four army troop companies and nine battalions were ordered to repair or extend existing plank roads for movement of supplies. From the middle of October until the end of the offensive, a total of 2 miles (3.2 km) of double plank road and more than 4,000 yards (3,700 m) of heavy tram line were laid in the Canadian Corps area. Brigadier General Edward Morrison asked for consent to use the roads to the rear for getting disabled or damaged guns repaired because, as the head of the artillery, he couldn’t afford delays and defeats caused by a lack of artillery.
Relocating troops to the battlefield in preparation of the attack was nonetheless extremely complicated, as the only methods of reaching the front line were wooden narrow boardwalks which wound between the shell-holes. Falling off the duckboards could often be fatal with unlucky troops frequently drowning in mud under the heavy mass of their own equipment. On consideration of the heavy physical demands the trip often caused, the first assault units had to reach the support line four days before the battle, to ensure soldiers would be as fresh and ready for attacking as possible without any delays.

Preparatory Operations
A hasty and surprise German attack captured several posts intended for the IX Corps on 14 October. The next day, British 9th Division patrols located Germans occupying Varlet Farm. On 20 October, a local assault was launched by parties from of three British divisions to improve their assault positions. The British 18th and 34th Divisions attacked Poelcappelle while the British 35th assaulted the Houthoulst Forest. The attack began at 5:25 a.m., after a 48-hour bombardment. Two battalions of the British 18th Division reached a German headquarters, west of Poelcappelle church. Two brigades of the 34th Division began attacking at 5:35 a.m., the right brigade taking their objectives and Requette Farm in the 18th Division sector. The left brigade of the 34th Division advanced until it approached a row of pillboxes, thought to have been captured; this was wrong however as the attacking troops were shelled and suffered casualties. British reinforcements had to stop advancing at the Broembeek creek due to flooding and a heavy German barrage. The 35th Division attacked with two brigades. Easily, the right brigade captured the first objective. The left flank of the brigade arrived at its final objective at 6:45 a.m., while German machine-gun fire halted any further advance on the right flank. The left brigade captured Marechal Farm on its right flank but the attack in the centre was also halted by machine-gun fire. The left flank of the brigade reached the final objective by 7:45 a.m. A German counterattack inflicted heavy casualties on a battalion and forced its retreat to the start line; with the counterattack being halted British artillery fire. During the operation, the British suffered 800 casualties and took 100 prisoners.
Piercing of the barbed wire started on the Fifth and Second Army fronts under cover of artillery bombardment on 21 October and 18th Division platoons advanced on the night of 21 October before digging shallow trenches, which averted heavy casualties from German –shelling after a ruined farm behind the jumping-off places caught fire and silhouetted the troops. The bombardment complicated the advance, though. On 22 October, in the British 9th Division sector to the south, the XVIII Corps Cyclist Battalion launched a diversion with dummy soldiers to support a 9th Division assault. The attack continued at 7:30 a.m. through the village, taking Noble's Farm, Meunier House and then Tracas Farm, a total advance of 1,000 yards (910 m). At 5:00 p.m. A German counterattack took Noble's Farm with several casualties before being halted at the other farms with several casualties after disorganizing the British troops.


General Currie’s Canadian Corps played the most important role in the offensive. The Canadians were assisted to the north by XVIII Corps and after an inter-army boundary shift and II Corps of the Second Army. Further north, the advance was assisted by diversionary attacks from the British XIV Corps and the French First Army’s 1st and 133rd Divisions. To the south, the advance was supported by 2 Anzac Corps, with X Corps supporting the operation by attacking Gheluvelt to secure Tower Hamlets ridge, east of the Bassevillebeek further southwards.
Passchendaele Ridge and village were held by Gruppe Ypern, which was organized under Guard Corps commander, General der Kavallere, Alfred Graf zu Dohna-Schlobitten. Defending German units counterattacked at various points of the battle and consisted of the 4th, 7th, 11th, 11th Bavarian, 27th, 39th, 44th Reserve, 185th, 199th,and 239th Divisions.

 

[Derek Pullem]

Isn't copying walls of Wiki and then making a few tiny changes still a bit dubious as a TL technique?

 

[ghappy1000]

German 25 September 1917 counteroffensive
[Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_counter-attack,_25_September_1917]
On the night of 24 September, Battalions belonging to the 50th Reserve Division organised and suffered very minimal, if there were any effective, casualties, due to support by the line-holding battalions that moved into ‘no-man's-land’ and lack of British activity. Surprisingly heavy amounts of field and heavy artillery began the bombardment at 5:15 a.m. and red flares were fired by the German infantry to signal the beginning of the offensive, but several shells fell short onto them, especially the III Battalion, RIR 230, south of the Reutelbeek. The troops retired until the bombardment began to decrease at 5:30 a.m. then the Germans attacked with the cover of the last shells. Observation aircraft flew at low altitude and fired white flares in an attempt to reveal the German troop deposition to the artillery. On the right flank, the 4th Company of I Battalion, RIR 229, attacked the 58th Australian Battalion, to secure a defensive flank linking southwards with RIR 49 of the 3rd Reserve Division in Group Ypres to the north. Major Hethey, the Kampftruppenkommandeur (KTK) of the area north of the Reutelbeek, held back 9th Company of the III Battalion, RIR 229 further back behind the northern flank as a tactical reserve for reinforcement. German contact-patrol aircrew found the position of the advancing Germans and informed Group Wytschaete headquarters in 10 minutes.
German 50th, 33rd and Bavarian Ersatz Divisions
Hethey arrived and made a re-captured pillbox for personal use along with Jerk House the KTK headquarters besides ordering the 9th Company from a n inactive division to reinforce the centre. The assault resumed at 10:00 a.m., after making tactical adjustments. By 11:00 a.m., the first objective was captured. South of the Reutelbeek, the III Battalion, RIR 230 had advanced into muddy ground and south of the stream, against the 4th King’s sector and no ground was captured due to mud. The Storm Battalion got forward along the Menin road and stopped by a local counter-attack; prisoners captured by German troops informing that the next British action would occur next day. On the right flank, Hethey organised the consolidation of the new positions under the darkness of night, as the infantry companies had become mingled and all the commanders of the III Battalion and two in the I Battalion, had been wounded. The I Battalion (Captain Fischer) with the 4th, 3rd, 5th, and 6th companies and attached storm troops, took the right flank near Polygon Wood. Hethey with the III Battalion, a company of the II Battalion, RIR 229 and half of II Battalion, RIR 230 held the left flank in the Reutelbeek valley, the 1st, 7th and 8th companies of RIR 229, being retained as reserves. The III Battalion, Fusilier Regiment 90, the most advanced battalion of the fresh 17th Division, acted as a counterattack unit in Flandern I.
At 5:15 a.m. on 25 September, just as the 33rd Division completed the relief of the 23rd Division, a heavy German bombardment was launched on the 33rd Division front and reached so far back that restricted usage of roads; the deafening sound of the bombardment and vibrations in the ground could be felt as far as Boulogne. SOS rockets were fired all along the 33rd Division front for quick response by British artillery and machine-guns. German infantry assaulted Menin road from Gheluvelt with the help of flame-thrower teams, who released burning oil 100 yards (91 m) forwards and upwards and trees which had dried out in the sunny weather were aflame The forward positions of the 1st Queen's (Royal West Surrey) (1st Queen's), on the right flank of the 100th Brigade were captured and the 2nd Worcester in reserve at Inverness Copse, lost most of its strength in the bombardment. The 1/9th Highland Light Infantry (1/9th HLI) moved quickly to cover a hole on the flank of 1st Queen's sector and the remnants of the 2nd Worcester dug in as the 4th Battalion King's Liverpool (4th King's) of the 98th Brigade extended the right flank in support. The 4th King's restored contact with 2nd Worcester after sidestepping southwards to maintain communication with the 1st HLI behind the 1st Queen's and to add to the small-arms fire being directed at the German attackers, but the Germans prevailed.
On the 98th Brigade’s left flank, the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (2nd Argyll) and the 1st Middlesex retreated and a company of each battalion was isolated and destroyed by German troops by-cutting their flanks. The 207th (Independent) Machine-gun Company was located behind the front line, with 16 Vickers machine-guns in groups, which watched as German officers led their troops forward. When the second line of German infantry was found on the forward slope as far down as their knees and too far forward to retreat, the guns began firing. German aircrews flying their aircraft low over the battlefield, soon saw the machine-guns and demanded artillery-fire for strafing, causing many casualties until the guns withdrew. The intensity of British artillery-fire decreased during the day as a consequence of heavy German counter-battery fire cutting off the guns from their ammunition stocks and destruction. Communication was severed with the front line, except for a few fortunate message-runners who completed the three hour journey from Brigade headquarters at the Tor Tops pillbox. Smoke and dust raised by German and British shelling obstructed views and many of the troops who moved forward as reinforcements vanished without any sign of return.
The Australians
When dawn broke on 25 September, it was hazy despite being suitable for attacking. Preparations for next day’s offensive continued behind the Second Army front line. Practice barrages were prepared for 6:30 a.m. by all the artillery of the Second Army for an hour and then an 18-minute bombardment at 8:30 a.m. by the I Anzac Corps artillery. German artillery started bombarding at 4:30 a.m. and an hour later, SOS rockets were launched at 33rd Division’s area on the left of X Corps and by the 5th Australian Division to the right of I Anzac Corps. The German shell-fire was heavier than typically expected and at 7:15 a.m., a messenger pigeon returned to the 33rd Division headquarters, which had just relieved the 32nd Division, with information that the part of the front line in the southern part on the Menin road was in German hands. German infantry compelled the 1st Middlesex‘s retreat and machine-guns pushed onto the Reutelbeek road, at the boundary between X Corps and the I Anzac Corps, between the Reutelbeek and Polygon Wood. Further south an attack against the 4th King's of the 100th Brigade was initially successful before repulsion.
The area behind the 5th Australian Division was hit by German aircraft bombs, with the advanced divisional ammunition dump, the top priority, blowing up and scattering bullets and hand grenades besides destroying several lorries on the Menin road. The 58th Battalion of the 15th Australian Brigade on the right flank demanded reinforcements but the only troops available were those preparing for the 26 September offensive and only a company from the 60th Battalion arrived at the scene. On the right flank, the 33rd Division sector had its communication disrupted because it was also heavily bombarded by German artillery. The commander of the 98th Brigade also called on troops intended for the attack next day to support the 15th Australian Brigade to the north. At 9:40 a.m., two companies from the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders Brigades were sent forward to participate in the 1st Middlesex’s counter-attack.

The 58th Australian Battalion, in the south-western edge of Polygon Wood, was warned of the offensive when it saw several groups of German infantry 500 yards (460 m) away marching in small "worm" columns to their objectives. The I Anzac Corps barrage was launched within 15 seconds of the SOS call, but it fell between the foremost German troops and the supporting units. Using small-arms fire, Australian infantry confronted the advancing Germans from Cameron House and sheltered behind the remains of hedges along the Reutel road before losing the position. The 1st Middlesex on the right flank retreated and at 5:55 a.m., the attackers tried to rush the Australian right flank and were repulsed four times with heavy losses to a battalion, although a German company resisted in a shell-crater and which threw grenades into the right-flank post from there, until silenced by a rifle-grenade. Most of the surviving German infantry had gone underneath about 100 yards (91 m) from the Australians. At 6:10 a.m., a soldier of the 1st Middlesex reported that the Germans entered the 1st Middlesex front line close on the right and that the Germans had placed a line of machine-guns along the Reutel road for attacks. The Australians swung their right flank further to the right, parallel to the road. Germans were then seen infiltrating towards the 1st Middlesex support line and requests for more troops were asked, but only meager numbers arrived.
The German barrage was at its most intense, but from 9:00 a.m., more troops passed through the curtain of shell-fire and stretched the Australian right flank. The British practice barrages were fired on schedule and fell behind the German infantry, after which the accuracy of the British artillery response increased to exploit the approaching targets. At 10:00 a.m., German troops were seen moving forward from Jerk House towards several pillboxes in the 1st Middlesex area, on a rise 150 yards (140 m) behind the right flank of the 58th Australian Battalion. The Australian Stokes mortar crews depleted their ammunition and the battalion was engaged from the right. From the German rear, a large number of troops advanced closely and faced small-arms fire.
The 58th Battalion was alerted to the 1st Middlesex counter-attack due at 2:00 p.m., with 60th Battalion’s support. The 58th Battalion had to retain ground and inflict casualties to enable its success and at 12:30 p.m., a company of the 60th Battalion arrived and occupied positions on the right flank. A diminished battalion of the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders arrived and extended the flank past Black Watch Corner. There was no barrage and no infantry attack was underway, but at 2:10 p.m., the Australians launched their attack, advancing through shell holes with Stokes mortar fire support, but were repulsed by the Germans. The advance was halted while contact was made with the 1st Middlesex along with the discovery of a small troop party to the right. Australian troops far out to the right rear located two companies of the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders move down the head of the valley without artillery barrage support.
The Scots advanced in two lines while under heavy return fire and the first line passed Lone House, south-west of Black Watch Corner. Together with a few men of the 1st Middlesex, the Argylls dug in with the second line 100 yards (91 m) behind, about 350 yards (320 m) behind the Australian flank, but information about the new positions didn’t reach British and Australian commanders. The main German attack began at 11:00 a.m., but German airmen saw the advance of the Australian flank and ground observers saw reserves moving towards Glencorse Wood under persistent bombardment, which inflicted many British and Australian casualties. The Australian defensive flank was bombarded and a retreat was planned because of the huge number of German troops detected at Cameron House preparing for an attack. After waiting until 5:00 p.m. for a British counter-attack’s support, the Australians dribbled back to their original positions.
The 98th Brigade prepared its offensive with a creeping barrage at 2:03 p.m., after a short bombardment with 15th Australian Brigade’s involvement listed in the orders. At 4:55 p.m., the 33rd Divisional artillery informed General Hobbs that the counter-attack wasn’t ready and the 33rd divisional headquarters that the 98th Brigade had been seen advancing at 2:45 p.m. At 5:08 p.m., the 33rd Division informed that the counter-attack had succeeded with heavy losses but information from the 58th Battalion was that many Germans had been seen assembling at Cameron House opposite the corps boundary, preparing for a counteroffensive. At 7:30 p.m., the 98th Brigade reported that it had to retreat to the area of Verbeek Farm, about 750 yards (690 m) behind the right flank of the 58th Brigade.
By nightfall, three of the four Australian battalions due for the attack on 26 September were sent to the attack. The 15th Australian Brigade in the north and the 4th King's of the 98th Brigade to the south of the German counter-attack’s rupture of the front, maintained their front line despite the slight retreat. On the Australian right, the Germans were at the Australian support line, well behind the alignment on which the attacking troops must assemble. The Germans continued attacking and the 33rd Division was uncertain as to the disposition of its troops. Tapes to mark the start-lines for tomorrow’s attack were virtually ready, but officers of the 58th Battalion, who were to guide the assembling battalions, had become casualties of the attack. The divisional dump and two forward dumps, from which the attacking troops were to replace necessary stores and ammunition, were blown up and it was believed that the Germans received intelligence regarding the offensive on 26 September. During the evening, Hobbs warned the 8th Australian Brigade (Brigadier-General Tivey) placed in reserve that it might have to carry out the attack even if understrength to disrupt German planning.
The 4th Suffolk and 5th SR took over the roles intended for the Argylls and 1st Middlesex for the attack on 26 September, with orders to pass through them while attacking and hoping the latter would catch up. Without information of their positions, a creeping barrage could not be used and tanks were substituted to support the infantry’s foremost advance. Isolated battalions were discovered around Lone Farm approximately 400 yards (370 m) south of Black Watch Corner. RIR 230 counterattacked the British near Jut Farm at about 2:00 p.m. Infantry Regiment 78 of the 19th Reserve Division moved up behind IR 231 the main counter-attack was conducted by the 17th Division, which was rushed forward from Gheuve to Gheluvelt. It was attached to IR 231 to advance through the positions of the 50th Reserve Division, with the 236th Division on the right flank and take the Wilhelm line. The I Battalion, Infantry Regiment 75 (IR 75) and II Battalion, IR 75 attacked to the from the Menin road north to the Reutelbeek, against the positions of the 100th Brigade, the first battalion in extended order and the other following in close formation. Much of the artillery-fire was directed by gunners onto the German infantry that only several parties reached the front line west of Polderhoek, where they faced combat with small-arms fire and the few Germans who persisted were separated by bayonets.
26 September
When 5th Australian Division attacked at 5:50 a.m., Hethey ordered a counter-attack from Jerk House by the II Battalion’s RIR 230. The counter-attack captured fifty prisoners but Hethey was killed at 6:30 a.m. and Lieutenants Glaubitz and Weigel took over in the chaos before being killed in turn at 7:00 a.m. Lieutenant Stolting of the machine-gun company was killed at 7:30 a.m., after which the adjutant, Lieutenant Körber, took over command and was the last man to retreat from Polygon Wood. The Germans retired from Jerk House at noon but machine-gun crews farther south gained a good view of the attack at about 11:00 a.m., when the mist on the right flank rose. The British advance was found by troops of RIR 230 on the Polderhoek spur, with the added support of a creeping barrage, pushing to the south-east. At 1,100–2,000 yards (1,000–1,800 m), every machine-gun began shelling and British artillery was unable to disable them. More than 20,000 rounds were dropped by 7 machine guns of the 1st Company. Grenadier Regiment 89 was to attack through the positions held by RIR 229 on the right of the 50th Reserve Division but ran into artillery-fire in the Holle Bosch (Hollow Wood) and was dispersed by artillery fired in defence of the Australians as they pushed over Reutel Hill towards the south end of Polygon Wood. At 7:00 p.m. ,the Germans launched their final offensive attempt from the Tower Hamlets spur in the south-west to Polygon Wood to the north-east. Several Germans made their way through the artillery before being engaged by small-arms fire and suffered moderate losses; around 8:30 p.m. the German counter-attacks ended and the rest of the night was devoid of activity.
Subsequent operations
On 27 September, the 39th Division on the right flank of the X Corps, defeated three German counter-attacks with artillery fire after temporarily taking back former objectives. On the 33rd Division front, after being informed that Cameron House had been captured, a battalion attacked past it and reached the blue line, the initial aim for 25 September’s attack. The 98th Brigade, on the northern flank, assaulted towards the 5th Australian Division in the face of heavy German resistance and met with the Australians at Cameron Covert at 4:50 p.m. Silence reigned until 4:30 a.m. on 30 September, when an attack was launched by the fresh 8th Division’s regiments and the 45th Reserve Division and the 4th Army Sturmbattalion, with flame-throwers and a smoke screen, from the Menin road to the Reutelbeek against the 23rd Division (which had returned from reserve to take over the 33rd Division front). Massed small-arms fire saved the 70th Brigade from retreating further despite losing some territory, despite SOS signals to the artillery being covered by mist and a smaller attempt at 6:00 a.m. was the last attempt before the counterattacks stopped for good in the sector.
[Note that any posts written are posted in Microsoft Word and sourced effectively beforehand.]

 

[Not Henry G.]

You should do it like in your summary. Not to be mean but you get too caught up in the meaningless details of each battle. But it's your TL so you can do what you want

 

[ghappy1000]

Isn't copying walls of Wiki and then making a few tiny changes still a bit dubious as a TL technique?

I'll make some necessary changes to the text and contemplate editing if possible. The articles are still sourced properly with the actual wikipedia links. If there's anything you have in mind, you can post otherwise. And, does this count under fair use? Also, once I get out of Passchendaele, Wikipedia usage should decrease.

 

[ghappy1000]

Second Battle for Passchendaele

The Second Battle of Passchendaele would be the final battle in the face of the struggles through mud, rain, German resistance and the decreasing morale. At the same time, an offensive to the south would require a French division taken from the fields of Flanders. Weakening of Entente offensives in the west wasn't the solution when Russia fell to the Bolsheviks and helping Italy sounded like a sideshow compared to any offensive that would devastate the Germans and force a last minute retreat and change in Russian government attitudes, even with the minimal impact brought. The imminent Caporetto Offensive would also require a further diversion of German troops from Russia, France and Italy, and only a Flanders Offensive could prevent this.
Heavy and persistent shelling had made Ravebeek Swamp so flooded that it was impassable for the attacking British soldiers. The Canadian-Anzac offensive had to be done in 2 phrases. It was suggested that the Anzacs capture vacant positions on Decline Corpse and close to the Ypres-Roulers Railway within no man's land before the offensive kicked off. Extensive resources were used by General Currie and the 8th, 9th and 10th Canadian Infantry Brigades were reserved for any breakthrough or counterattack, while the 7th, 11th and 12th Canadian Infantry Brigades, along with the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions, were in corps reserve. The Anzac Corps, despite the sufferings endured, had to undertake the major burden of the offensive.
A rolling barrage moving forward in lifts of 50 yards over an average of 4 minutes was needed to soften up the muddy ground and German defenders and permit the infantry to catch up. The Canadian 8th Brigade moved over the weakened defence and captured Wolf Corpse before being stopped by German defenders, who also stopped the Royal Naval Division's advance. The Bellevue pillboxes were initially captured after the Canadian 9th Brigade faced 1.5 hours of tenacious defence and the Canadians were shelled by concealed artillery from hidden or unconsolidated positions. The Canadian 10th Brigade and 1st Anzac Corps [consisting of the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions] captured Decline Corpse before losing their positions to a German counterattack. The Canadian Brigades faced minimal opposition in consolidating the frontline and prepared for a continuation of the offensive for the following night. The 9th and 10th Canadian Brigades took Decline Corpse on 27 October, but the first German Division to arrive from the Eastern Front and the 238th [with the latter having fought in Passchendaele previously] retook the position the next day. The higher ground and good tactical positions captured would permit a following assault.
The XVIII Corps sent a brigade each from the divisions in the unit to attack and Varlet Farm and Banff House. were in their hands shortly after beginning the offensive. The attacking troops in the centre were halted on the road between Bray Farm and the village of Wallemolen and Source Trench was where they consolidated. Baniff House was almost evacuated when reports of German troops were received, but the line stayed there. All the objectives were in British hands until a German counterattack threw the troops out. British 58th Division captured three pillboxes at Cameron House to the north, but German machine-gun fire from Spider Crossroads and tiredness from the sluggish advance set in. German counterattacks from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. severed contact with foremost troops and then moved from a sunken road between Papa Farm and Whitechapel, which forced the division's retreat to its starting line before the Germans also had their advance bogged in the mud and repulsed by British reinforcements.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Passchendaele
XIV Corps further to the north conducted diversions with one brigade each from the 57th and 50th divisions. The 57th Division offensive had to transverse into a marsh, which halted the attack at its earliest stage. The division, however, constructed positions after occupying Rubens and Memlings Farms 200–350 yards (180–320 m) forward. The right battalion of a 50th Division brigade reached 80 yards (73 m) of the objective, before fire from German machine-guns and snipers compelled a retreat. Another battalion attacking theYpres–Staden railway line reached Hill 23, Aden House and Tourenne Crossing before German counterattacks sent the troops back to the starting point by 4:15 p.m.. The left battalion was also stopped by machine gun fire at 2,000 yards (1,800 m) after advancing. All of the Fifth Army attacks had their progress slackened by mud, which also caused the barrage to be lost by troops and clogged weapons while German resistance was observed, which forced most attacks back to their starting trenches.
Diversionary activities by X Corps, which was located to the south of the Canadians, involved piecemeal units from British 5th and 7th Divisions. The British 7th Division commander only acceeded to the attack because of its diversionary nature to and stop German reserves moving north against the main attack. The 7th Division attacked Gheluvelt with the 20th and 91st Brigades, while Polderhoek and the Scherriabeek valley immediately to the north were assaulted by the 13th and 5th Division's Brigades. On the 91st Brigade's front, the battalion on the right was faster than expected in advancing as it was protected by a rise which prevented most of the German machine-gunners near the Menin road from snipping. A fortified mound near Hamp Farm was the target and the garrison located there was overwhelmed after some close fighting. The other two battalions of the brigade had worse fates when they had to advance along the forward slope of the spur running south-east from Tower Hamlets ridge. Lewis House was nearby with several machine guns and pillboxes. The centre battalion lost pace with the barrage and its advance was halted well short of Lewis House. Troops started gathering near Lewis House, which caused crowding and left holes in the line. An attempt to outflank the pillboxes failed and the brigade retreated without taking its objectives.
The 20th Brigade attacked along Menin Road. Marshy ground was transversed. It progressed into thick mud towards the Kroomebeek creek. As a result, the troops on the right were shelled by German machine-gun fire from pillboxes in Lewis House, on Menin road and Swagger Farm. Others considered the ground conditions so poor that they turned left towards the Menin Road and got themselves caught by fire from the pillboxes there. Despite the machine-gun fire, the assault had one pillbox captured and advanced up to100 yards (91 m) of Gheluvelt Church, at the village's western end. Luckily, two battalions that advanced north of the Menin road were able to follow the supporting barrage and reached its junction with the railway tracks immediately outside Gheluvelt captured. Both battalions mixed together and entered Gheluvelt at the same time with pillboxes along Johnson Trench being captured and a few parties managed to capture Gheluvelt Château. At 10:00 a.m., the Germans counterattacked when the British offensive was stopped by mud. After retreating, the remaining troops organised a defensive line south of the road towards Tower Hamlets and had the original front line under their control when it was finished. Then, British artillery fired a protective barrage to stop German counterattacks.
The 5th Division attacked along the Scherriabeek valley and experienced shelling from Gheluvelt, resulting in the valley being declared 'impassable'. Three battalions attempted to advance before German shells from Gheluvelt stopped their advance. One battalion took Polderhoek Château before losing it due to a counterattack along with Gheluvelt Chateau. As expected, troops and weapons were clogged with mud and the front line was vulnerable. The Germans promptly cleared the area to the west with massed machine-gun fire and pushed the brigade back to the start line.
The simultaneous advances to support Canadian Corps had not gone well. The diversion by X Corps resulted in 3,621 casualties while XVIII Corps suffered 2,510 casualties, the 63rd Division suffering some 2,000 casualties in the 188th Brigade and XIV Corps had 3,100 casualties. On 27 October, the 63rd Division retook Banff House and lost it to a German counterattack again. Two reserve battalions strengthened the 4th Canadian Division and captured the previous day's objective by 10:00 a.m. Next day, 3rd Canadian Division patrols searched Meetchele and Furst Farms with the 1st Australian Division and after shooting some isolated German units, occupied the positions.

French-Belgian operations
The French First Army attacked simultaneously north of Ypres and made notable progress. After transversing the St. Jansbeek stream, the villages of Aschhoop, Kippe and Merkem fell into French hands, enabling the advance to reach as far as Blankaart Lake.
The French First Army used the 133rd division and a Belgian division to capture Merckem peninsula in separate phrases, starting with an attack against the peninsula's south-east before extending the attack northwards.On 26 October, after heavy bombardment, French troops crossed the lower Steenbeek, entered Papegoed Wood and took Lucannes Farm and the surrounding pillboxes, forcing the Germans to retreat from the remaining pillboxes to the west of the woods and then captured the Corverbeek, which had shoulder-high positions. The Steenstraate–Dixmude road round Langewaede was later captured and the 8th Bavarian Reserve Division was rushed into the Merckem peninsula as a reinforcement. During the night, accompanying French engineers built pontoon bridges with water up to their armpits over the lower Steenbeek, west of Langewaede. At approximately 5:00 a.m. on 27 October, French troops on the right bank met troops on the left bank of the Steenbeek and a column left the bridgehead at Drei Grachten to assault the German defences on the causeway to Luyghem. The French on the far right of the flank, in front of Draaibank, protected the eastward direction of the advance for the troops in Papegoed Wood, who also assisted troops advancing from Steenstraate and Langewaede to Dixmude. The road was later found to be blocked by the villages of Verbrandesmis and Kippe, along with Houthulst Forest, Jesiutengoed Farm near the hamlet of Kloostermolen and the village of Aschhoop to the north, hampering the advance.
From Verbrandesmis, there was a road that ran north-west, and was parallel with the lower Steenbeek through Merckem to Luyghem, which was on slightly higher ground than the surrounding marshes; nests of hidden machine-guns nests in villages and pillboxes dominated the causeway from Drei Grachten and the peninsula's ground was soaked and covered with many blockhouses and pillboxes.The French artillery destroyed Verbrandesmis and permitted a quick capture, but the German garrisons at Jesiutengoed Farm and Kloostermolen resisted before counterattacking. Later, they retreated Kippe and Aschhoop. German artillery shelled the banks of the Steenbeek in front of Merckem and French troops crossed the pontoon bridges to reach the artillery. They struggled through the mud and shells to the objectives and then moved towards Kippe, Aschhoop and Luyghem, which were resisted by German garrisons with the support of defences from the causeway of Drei Grachten before being overwhelmed in the evening.
The French and Belgian offensive on Luyghem started after the causeway's capture with the help of flat-bottomed Belgian boats for navigation to the north of the village. The Belgians secured the southern shore of Blanckaart Lake and attacked the north of Luyghem, capturing the German pillboxes and blockhouses. By 28 October, the French and Belgians had the Merckem peninsula as a toptally secured objective with approximately 300 prisoners taken and many casualties on the German defenders despite resisting the attacks with great determination. The skill of the French artillery enabled success with few infantry casualties and the Belgians covered their flat-bottomed boats in the face of German vigilance before advancing to their objectives despite the floods, against heavy German shell fire.

 

[kung Zog]

I'll make some necessary changes to the text and contemplate editing if possible. The articles are still sourced properly with the actual wikipedia links. If there's anything you have in mind, you can post otherwise. And, does this count under fair use? Also, once I get out of Passchendaele, Wikipedia usage should decrease.

I would be tread very carefully given that you were kicked for this once before.

 

[ghappy1000]

Preparations for the Third Phrase

During the interval, the Germans recaptured several positions and wrecked British defence of the Blue Line. The second phrase of the battle was intended to consolidate the Blue Line positions and move further into Passchendaele, as well as permit the final offensive on Passchendaele to succeed. At the time, the new frontline was about 600 yards behind the newly captured and lost positions. Heavily reinforced Crest Farm at the southern end of the offensive and the hamlet of Meetcheele and the Goudberg area, to the north of a corps sector, were the objectives. The northern flank of the Canadian Corps advance was to capture Goudberg at Vapour Farm and link with the British Fifth Army, which would attack with the 58th Division, 190th Brigade and 63rd (Royal Naval) Division along both sides of the swamped Lekkerboterbeek creek. Contact with the I Anzac Corps had to be made along the Ypres–Roulers railway to the south of Vienna Cottage. The 4th Canadian Division planned to attack with the 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade and these units faced the burden of the offensive. The northern flank was left to the 3rd Canadian Division, with the 7th and 8th Canadian Infantry Brigades, and an Australian Division.
On the night preceeding the attack, a battalion assault by the Canadians managed to capture several German pillboxes on the northern bank of Ravebeek creek, which had delayed the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade's progress earlier, before being thrown out by hasty German counterattacks that disrupted planning. The advance extended the southern edge of the 3rd Canadian Division 500 yards (460 m) on pare with the 4th Canadian Division southwards. The main attack started at 5:50 am on 30 October after a preliminary artillery bombardment against pillboxes and a rolling barrage. The southern flank took Crest Farm and began sending patrols beyond its objective line into Passchendaele, which they found several Germans preparing to evacuate. By 8:30 am, Major General David Watson, the 4th Canadian Division commander, reported that every objective between the Ypres—Roulers railway and the Ravebeek creek was captured. Northwest of Crest Farm, the ground was heavily immersed by water that consolidation on the objective line was impossible.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Passchendaele
The 3rd Canadian Division faced heavy German resistance again in Passchendaele. Despite this, the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade managed to capture Source and Vapour Farms within the boundary of the corps. However, wading through the swampy ground in the Woodland Plantation was complicated and resulted in a division's advance being delayed. The 58th and 63rd Divisions faced German artillery fire even from the beginning of the attack and made little progress in deep mud against German machine-gun fire, preventing them from taking their rendezvous objectives and endangering the Canadian troops at Source and Vapour Farms. Later, two companies moved through the Canadian sector to capture Source Trench, but ended up reinforced Source and Vapour Farms' defences and supporting flanks. The 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade was in the assaulting centre and whule advancing between Ravebeek creek and the road to Meetcheele, one of the brigade's battalions took its intermediate objective, a pillbox by the name of Duck Lodge, at 7:00 a.m. Furst Farm was captured to the west of the roadway and Meetcheele with heavy casualties. Later in the afternoon, the brigade succeeded in advancing through a number of pillboxes and captured the crossroads and pillboxes at Meetcheele. However, the Germans maintained their strong hold at Graf House along the bank of the Ravebeek creek, creating a salient in the line directly threatening the two Canadian divisions.
By late afternoon, the advance reached its maximum extent and reports of a concentration of German troops north of Mosselmarkt suggested an imminent counterattack and causing the 3rd Canadian Division to consolidate its positions and patrol, rather than occupy, the Woodland Plantation swamp between the 7th and 8th Canadian Infantry Brigades even without fulfilling all of its objectives. There was doubt as to whether Source and Vapour Farms could be held without the 63rd Division's support. Currie and Plumer finally decided that every effort should be made to defend the line in the hope of eliminating the need to recapture the positions before the final assault on Passchendaele. As the night pass with only one German counterattack that failed despite the Canadian casualties inflicted, the remaining Canadians consolidated their positions. By 30 October, the Canadian Corps had suffered 2,321 casualties, consisting of 884 killed, 1,429 wounded and ten prisoners. Further north, the 63rd Division received 3,626 casualties during the end of October.
Relief of divisions was considered just as the 2nd German Division from the Eastern Front arrived and occupied several abandoned positions. XVIII Corps was to assist the II Corps in the event it was necessary and relieve the latter. A night attack up the Paddbeek failed on 4 November, but offensive operations weren't carried out as supplies and positions had to be consolidated in the face of German reinforcements. Supplies arrived by rail, along with necessary pack animals and the Canadian reserve [1st and 2nd] Divisions. The German 11th Division was reinforced by a second from reserve. All units, including the British diversionary divisions, were to assemble by 6 November for the offensive. By the time, the Green Line was the offensive objective and it was rough semicircle that ran 1,000 yards (910 m) from Graf House to the centre of the threatening salient to the Canadians. Besides Passchendaele itself, it included Mosselmarkt and Goudberg hamlets to the north-west.

 

[ghappy1000]

November at Passchendaele and the aftermath

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Passchendaele [Less reliance, but still used as a source in case of need.]
The third stage began at 6:00 a.m. on 6 November with a bombardment under clearer skies and weather before a German counter-bombardment fell on the advancing troops. The attack was smooth for the Canadians unlike previous occasions except for the resistance of a German brigade. The 2nd Canadian Division faced opposition from pillboxes at the north end of Passchendaele, but less than six hours after the start of the battle the village was secured from the Germans. However, 1st Canadian Division faced heavy resistance from the defenders of Vine Cottages and the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade reached and dug-out the Green Line by 9:00a.m.
Several smaller actions were initiated by the British and Australians to capture crossroads, pillboxes and ground surrounding the village by 10 November. Westrozebeke was the objective of capture or isolation and it was hoped that capturing it would result in a German retreat. Hill 52 was the key position and was defended by the Germans. Two Canadian brigades participating in the offensive suffered moderate casualties from German resistance while progressing through the Green Line and took a farm, while the British 1st Division was attacked by Germans and forced to retreat with heavy losses. A Canadian brigade had to occupy the gap, but the Germans wrecked a British brigade and prevented the continuation or reinforcement of the offensive. Though Haig wanted the entire Passchendaele–Westrozebeke ridge as a winter position, the British hadn't taken Westrozebeke village by 10 November when the decision to assist Italy came. It was ignored and debated due to the [imminent] Russian Armistice with the Central Powers.
Aftermath and casualties
Various casualty reports differed on the casualties suffered at Passchendaele, although the highest estimates seemed to be exaggerated. It was estimated that 250-500,000 British soldiers were killed in action, but the Germans suffered up to 400,000 at maximum, including prisoners taken, and 200,000 at minimum.
4th Phrase and Subsequent Operations
The British sent a division into reserve for Cambrai or Italy. Despite this, a final offensive was needed to totally secure Passchendaele from the Germans. The German garrisons were weakened and several small scale attacks took several prisoners. On 16 November, the final offensive began and the British took several prisoners before being stopped by a German counterattack. However, the village of Westrozebeke was under threat of falling and evacuated by the Germans by the 22nd after an intense battle. Several mopping up operations cleared the Germans from the ridge and surrounding ground. By 1 December, an offensive launched by the VII Corps and II Corps expanded the Ypres salient northeast and to attract surprise and counter German tactics, the British artillery didn't fire until the Germans began shelling, causing some casualties. The advance was also hampered by mud and night. Even when the Germans came under British fire, they still shelled the British and inflicted several casualties. The Germans counterattacked and pushed the British out of recently captured ground and threatened to recapture Westrozebeke.
Polderhoek Spur was assaulted by the New Zealand and 5th Australian Divisions. The low running ridge was to be occupied and denied to the Germans as observation ground for the offensive. In the event the assault failed, heavy bombardment would prevent German counterattacks. 3 December was selected as the day for the attack, but was conducted without coordination with the II Corps and VIII Corps, which attacked Passchendaele instead. A brigade planned a sunrise attack with the opinion that the unusual time would surprise any German defenders, especially those under cover and having breakfast or sheltering from the regular bombardments typically fired at that point every day. The British launched smoke and gas bombardments against Gheluvelt and Becelaere spurs and the local bombardment was supposed to start simultaneously with the infantry attack to maintain surprise.
Some of the British artillery fired shells that dropped short and the German defenders were alerted, engaging the New Zealanders with the Château's guns, pillboxes in the grounds and Gheluvelt ridge. A strong wind to the west blew away smoke screens and the British artillery were unable to suppress German machine-guns with bombardments, which halted the attack gradually. New Zealand machine-gunners did something similar to counterattacking German parties on the Becelaere road. The New Zealand Division's advance was stalled 150 yards (140 m) after the first objective's capture by a German counterattack. A continuation of the attack at night was cancelled because German reinforcements were observed reaching Polderhoek Château and the moon was full and illuminated. The next morning, German troops were dispersed by New Zealander artillery while preparing a counterattack and artillery shelled the area throughout the day; after dark, the New Zealanders dug up the new trench line. A German counterattack on 5 December dawn was halted and German artillery-fire continued shelling in clearer weather, assisted by an observation balloon. Another German attack later that day was also repulsed by British artillery before recently captured territory was lost to a German attack on 14 December.

 

[ghappy1000]

Defeat at Caporetto and the subsequent disaster
Source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Caporetto
After the attrition suffered through 11 Isonzo battles [note that the situation on the Italian Front is similar to reality], the Austro-Hungarians couldn’t sustain an extra bloodletting or two before Trieste and the Italian breakthrough would complete the Austrian defeat on the Isonzo Front. To maintain Austro-Hungarian strength, despite the fact that Russia would be defeated and the lack of another Italian offensive until November, which would make a defeat of Austria-Hungary too late even with the capture of Trieste. By the time, the expected German Eastern Front offensive and the subsequent Bolshevik or Russian Revolution would culminate the Eastern Front in 1917. However, the Austro-Hungarian survival sounded like a bigger priority especially with the upcoming 1918 spring offensives on the Western Front and inevitable defeat of Russia on the Eastern Front. As a result, Paul Von Hindenburg, the new German Army chief of staff since 1 January 1917, suggested a major offensive to defeat the Italian Army heavily and put it on the defensive, at least until summer 1918. Despite the opposition of Erich Von Ludendorff and Falkenhayn, who believed in the importance of maintaining the Western Front in the face of the British Ypres offensive and the German decisive offensive against Russia, which would capture the Baltics, and the strength of Austria-Hungarian possible resistance against the Italians, German concern over Austria-Hungary would result in the decisive offensive being launched against Italy.
In September, three Imperial German General Staff gas experts, under the leadership of chemist Otto Hahn, went to the Isonzo front to locate terrain with areas where gas attacks would be most effective against the Italian Army troops. They decided on an offensive against the quiet Caporetto sector, where a good road ran west to the Venetian plain through a mountain valley. The Germans organized a new 14th Army consisting of nine Austrian and six German divisions and commanded by the German General Otto von Below. The Italians unintentionally and surprisingly assisted the offensive with overconfidence and negligence among the soldiers, revelation of weather information with the radios, socialism and pacifism among conscripts; especially newer ones, lack of adequate defensive preparations in the 2nd Army sector; where General Luigi Capello was preparing a last ditch offensive to capture Trieste before year’s end, lack of mobility and strict positions maintained by the Italian soldiers, loss of effective command and demoralization under the rigidness of Field Marshal Luigi Cardona, the commander-in-chief of the Italian Army. This was unexpected until the success of the offensive and interrogation of Italian prisoners-of-war captured by Austria-Hungary.
Despite the information provided by Austro-Hungarian Slavic deserters, the Italians were unprepared for the offensive’s actual scale, which included German ‘super first-class’ stormtroopers and nerve gas. The Italian nerve gas masks weren’t very effective against the unexpected varieties of nerve gas used, contributing to the Italian retreat as units deserted from their positions when they couldn’t sustain combat with the chlorine gas for more than two hours, especially if inhaled. Although the poor weather and delays in arrival of German reinforcements delayed the offensive from the expected 14/15 October to 22 October, the foggy weather increased the delay by another 2 days. By the day of the offensive, the Bolsheviks had been in power since their seizure of the Winter Palace for a week and gave the ‘war would be over with a German or Socialist victory’ sentiment among the many Italian soldiers captured by the Austrians. In fact, anti-war and pro-German and Austrian feelings were prevalent among the workers inside cities and several families beside the soldiers captured during the offensive.
After the dawn of 24 October, the decisive day for the offensive, wind and fog were absent and the front was misty. At 02:00, 900 metal tubes (Gaswurfminen) dug into a reverse slope and were simultaneous firing of canisters with 600 ml of chlorine and phosgene gases in their contents after electrical triggers, filling poisonous gases into the Italian trenches densely in heavy amounts. With the knowledge that inferior gas masks only provided less than two hours’ worth of effective protection before being rendered ineffective in combat, the defenders fled for their lives despite approximately 750 casualties. Then, the front went eerily quiet until 06:00, when mortar fire resulted in the wrecking of Italian trenches to be captured through bombardments, if these were occupied and defended. Of course, the empty trenches were occupied when a lack of Italians to adequately defend them were inside, seeking to exploit the initial confusion.
At 06:30, 2200 artillery pieces started firing with the aim of wrecking the valley road to hinder reserves and counterattacks advancing to plug the gap. At 08:00, two large mines were detonated under defended points on the heights bordering the valley before a heavy infantry assault on Italian fortifications in the valley, especially those recently captured from the Austrians, found them virtually undefended and soon, the Central Powers’ troops on the Italian Front were breaching the defensive line of the Italian Second Army between the IV and XXVII Corps. To support the attackers’ flanks, although feared Italian counterattacks or resistance came to nothing with the mass surrender of Italian soldiers, Alpine Troops assaulted the strong points and batteries along the crests of the adjoining ridges, Mount Matajur and the Kolovrat Range, bringing up their telephone lines as they advanced to keep contact with their artillery. They exploited usage of the recent German model 08/15 Maxim light machine gun, light trench mortars, mountain guns, flamethrowers and hand grenades.
The offensive proceeding with little opposition along the excellent road toward Italy after bypassing the valley and mountains and wrecking the Italian 2nd Army and Carnic Corps, leading to their eventual surrender by 30 October. Some troops moved at an astonishing pace of 25 km (16 mi) on the first day. The remainder of the Italian army halted assaults on either side of the sector where the central diversionary column assaulted, but von Below's successful central penetration contributed to the disorderly retreat of the Italian Army. Forces had to be shifted throughout the collapsing Isonzo front to avert von Below's breakout futilely and attempt to increase Italian morale, but this only weakened other points along the line and permitted more attacks. At this point, the entire Italian position was vulnerable, especially with the possible loss of the Italian 3rd Army.
The Italian 2nd Army commander, Luigi Capello, was still commanding his defeated army despite having fever that made him bedridden. Recognizing that his forces were unprepared for this attack and were defeated, Capello demanded consent to retreat back to the Tagliamento River with him. He was countermanded by Cadorna, who thought the Italian Army could reorganize and resist the invaders. Finally, Cadorna asked the majority of the Italian Army to withdraw to the other side of the Tagliamento. It required four full days for the Italians to cross the river, and by this time, the German and Austro-Hungarian armies were stretched to their necks. By 2 November, bridgeheads on the Tagliamento were established by a German division. About this time, however, the rapid and unexpected success of the offensive caught up with the attackers as the German and Austro-Hungarian supply lines were stretched to the breaking point and consequently, they were unable to launch any attacks that would separate parts of the Italian army against the Adriatic. Cadorna was able to retreat further, and by 10 November, defensive positions on the Piave River were established.
Germany was having difficulties in provisioning its field armies. Erwin Rommel, who, as a junior officer, received the Pour le Mérite for his victorious participation in the battle, often criticized the demands placed upon his "poorly fed troops" He was the officer who compelled the Salerno Brigade’s astonishing surrender through surprise after the latter’s failed counterattack even though the risky assault could have killed all of his company’s troops. It seemed the Italians retreated or surrendered every time they encountered ‘German supermen’. The British-French blockade of the German Empire, which the Kaiserliche Marine had been unable to break despite its reduction through heavy losses, resulted in shortages of food and widespread malnutrition in Germany and its allies in general.
Besides, the combination of insufficient provisions and tiring night marches at high speed preceding and during the battle inflicted a heavy toll on the German and Austro-Hungarian forces involved. Despite these logistical issues, the offensive was extremely successful in the beginning. However, with the increase of captured Italian prisoners and territory under the Central Powers’ control, the limited logistical capacity involved was exhausted. When the attack reached the Piave, their soldiers were depleting supplies and suffering the consequences of exhaustion. As the Italians stopped the pressure imposed by the Central Powers, the German forces lost pace and strength, resulting in the return to attritional warfare on the reformed Italian front.

 

[ghappy1000]

German Naval Sortie of 1917 [Introduction]

Part 1 [Losses and deposition of Entente and Central Powers' battleships in October 1917]

Entente:
United Kingdom
Battleships:
Grand Fleet
HMS Dreadnought: Sunk by Konig Albert on 19 August 1916 action.
Dreadnought classes: All existing ships annihilated at Jutland, except for Audacious which was mined on 27 October 1914. [Thread is follow up to Jutland Version II , which indicates mutual destruction at Jutland or something similar. Includes Bayern, Queen Elizabeth, Royal Sovereign and Emperor of India.]
HMS Resolution [completed on 31 October 1916] and HMS Resolution [completed on 15 July 1917]
pre dreadnoughts
Lord Nelson class: Sunk in battle of 19 August
Swifture class: One sunk at Gallipoli, another in East Africa.
King Edward VII class: One sunk by minefield, 5 sunk in action on 19 August by dreadnought gunfire, 2 serving in Home Fleet, but combat ineffective.
Duncan class; One pre-war loss, one sunk by minefield, one sunk in action on 19 August, remainders in Home Fleet service.
Formidable class: One sunk by explosion in 1914 and two sunk in 1915. Others serving in the Channel Fleet.
Canopus class: Depositions similar to reality except without East African service.
Majestic class and older: decommissioned, disarmed or placed in reserve.
Battlecruisers: Every ship of this type as of 31 May 1916 was sunk at Jutland , except for HMAS Australia [sunk in 19 August action].
[Note that 18-19 August 1916 naval action would be explained in detail later. And, pre dreadnoughts don't stand a chance against a 1910 or later dreadnought unless the dreadnought is massively outnumbered.]
Renown class: Home Fleet
France:
Dreadnoughts:
Bretagne class: Home Fleet
Courbet class: Home Fleet
Semi Dreadnoughts:
Danton class: Channel Fleet
pre dreadnoughts:
Republique class: Sunk by u 64 and mines respectively in January 1917.
Liberte class: Central Mediterranean, watching the Austrian fleet [except for one explosion prewar].
Charlemagne class: All sunk in the Dardenelles straits on 5 September 1916 [one mined, one sunk from progressive flooding induced by gunfire and another sunk by explosion].
Henri IV: Sunk on 10 September 1916, after mine damage caused the bow's detachment and it was abandoned after being deemed incapable of reaching port.
Suffren: Damaged by mine at Dardenelles and later sunk by u boat on 27 December the same year.
Iena: Lost to explosion prewar.
Massena: Scuttled in the Dardenelles.
Jaureguiberry: Placed in reserve after battle damage and refit stopped.
Charles Martel and Carnot: Sunk by U52 enroute to the Mediterranean, 26 November 1916.
Brennus: Decommissioned
Italy [All in the Mediterranean]:
Dreadnoughts:
Dante Alighieri, Conte di Cavour, Andrea Doria: All at Taranto [except for Leonardo Da Vinci, which was sunk by a magazine explosion.]
pre dreadnoughts:
Regina Elena and Ammiraglio di San Bon classes: [Battleships of the Regina Elena class were sunk, one by explosion and another to mining by 1916].
Ironclad battleships: All placed in reserve, coastal defence duties or scrapped.
Russia:
None in Baltic Sea, one total loss in dockyards and multitudes of decommissioned ships in the Black Sea Fleet, 6 sold by Japan and transferred to the Arctic Flotilla [one sunk by u boat in 1917].
Japan: Similar depositions to reality except for one battlecruiser explosion in 1917 and selling of Russo-Japanese repatrations..
Central Powers:
Germany [all in High Seas Fleet]:
Dreadnoughts:
Nassau, Helgoland, Konig and Kaiser classes [all annihilated at Jutland except for Nassau, which was sunk at Riga, and Konig Albert, which was sunk on 19 August 1916 by gunfire induced progressive flooding].
Bayern class: Bayern sunk at Jutland, Baden completed in December 1916, Saschen commissioned in September 1917 and Wurttemburg under construction until December 1917.
Vulcan class: Confiscated Greek dreadnought expected to be finished in late 1917.
Battlecruisers:
Derrflinger class: Sunk at Jutland, except for Hindenburg, which was commissioned in May 1917.
Seydlitz: Heavily damaged at Jutland, reconstruction stopped after further damage from flooding.
Moltke class: Moltke under repair from damage by submarine torpedo on 5 November, Goeben serving under Ottoman control.
Von Der Tann: Sunk in action of 19 August 1916.
Blucher: Sunk at Dogger Bank [noted as an armoured cruiser in most sources].
Pre Dreadnoughts:
Deutschland class: 2 sunk at Jutland, one sunk by mines on 8 August, 2 sunk in the Battle of the Gulf of Riga.
Preussen class: One torpedoed at Jutland, one sunk on 8 August and others sunk in Gulf of Riga battle.
Braunschweig and Kaiser Friedrich III class: All sunk at Riga or decommissioned after battle.
Siegfried class coastal defence ships: Placed in reserve for existing ships, later used in Baltic operations and transferred to Finland.
Austria Hungary [All in the Adriatic]:
Dreadnoughts:
Viribus Unitis class
Pre dreadnoughts:
Habsburg, Erhezhog Karl and Radetzky classes
Coastal defence ships: Monarch class
[All afloat minus one damaged/sunk by torpedoes while supporting Caporetto Offensive.]
Ottoman Empire:
Dreadnoughts:
None [ships ordered by empire taken over by Britain and sunk at Jutland].
Battlecruisers:
Goeben [under repair and refit and preparing for breakout into the Mediterranean.]
Pre dreadnoughts
Turgut Reis class: One sunk by submarine in the Dardenelles, another defending the straits from French or British pre dreadnought attacks.
Coastal Defence ships:
Mesudiye [Sunk by submarine on 13 December 1914.]

 

[ghappy1000]

Order of battle for the Skagerrak sortie [part 1: battleships and cruisers]

Grand Fleet
Battleships:
1st Battle Squadron
HMS Resolution
HMS Ramilies
HMS Renown
HMS Repulse
[Latter two completed as heavily armoured Renown class battlecruisers]
1st French Battle Squadron
Bretagne
Lorraine
Provence
2nd French Battle Squadron
Courbet
Jean Bart
Paris
France
Cruisers:
1st Cruiser Division:
Monmouth class cruisers
2nd Cruiser Division:
HMS Courageous
HMS Glorious
3rd Cruiser Division:
HMS Lowestoft
HMS Bristol
HMS Newcastle
HMS Liverpool
4th Cruiser Division
HMS Weymouth
HMS Cardiff
HMS Concord
HMS Centaur
5th Cruiser Division [Destroyer Squadron leaders]
HMS Calypso
HMS Caledon
HMS Cassandra
HMS Caradoc
French 1st Cruiser Division:
Waldeck-Rousseau
Edgar Quinet
Ernest Renan
Jules Michelet
French 2nd Cruiser Division:
Jurien De La Graviere
Guichen
Destrees
Chateaurenault
High Seas Fleet:
Flagship Hindenburg
1st Battle Division:
Sachen
Wurttemberg
Vulcan
Baden
1st Scouting Group:
Flagship: Moltke
1st Cruiser Division:
Graudenz
Karlsruhe
Emden
Nurnberg
2nd Cruiser Division:
Coln
Dresden
Wiesbaden
Regensburg
3rd Cruiser Division:
Niobe
Gazelle
Lubeck
Thetis
4th Cruiser Division:
Siegfried class coastal defence ships [Used for Channel Coast attack.]
[This is for battleships and cruisers only until this update can be edited and researched further.]

 

[ghappy1000]

Order of battle for the Skagerrak sortie [part 2: British destroyers]

All in Grand Fleet unless name is not not mentioned or deposition is mentioned differently.
British 5th Destroyer Flotilla:
Destroyer leaders HMS Ithuriel and Gabriel
1st Destroyer Division:
HMS Obdurate
HMS Pelican
HMS Nicator
HMS Nerissa
2nd Destroyer Division:
HMS Moorsom
HMS Morris
HMS Acheron
HMS Lapwing
3rd Destroyer Division:
HMS Musketeer
HMS Paragon
HMS Victor
HMS Tigress
British 7th Destroyer Flotilla:
13th Destroyer Division
HMS Michael
HMS Pelican
HMS Landrail
HMS Lydiard
15th Destroyer Division
HMS Hardy
HMS Contest
HMS Christopher
HMS Achiates
18th Destroyer Division:
HMS Patrician
HMS Patriot
HMS Rapid
HMS Ready
21st Destroyer Division:
HMS Medina
HMS Medway
HMS Pheyton
HMS Phobe
23rd Destroyer Division:
HMS Portia
HMS Prince
HMS Plyades
HMS Pigeon
British 1st Destroyer Flotilla [Harwich Flotilla]
Attached scout cruisers
28th Destroyer Division:
HMS Relentless
HMS Rival
HMS Matchless
HMS Nobel
32nd Destroyer Division:
HMS Sabrina
HMS Strongbow
HMS Surprise
HMS Sybilie
34th Destroyer Division
HMS Tyrant
HMS Truculent
HMS Ulleswater
HMS Trident
British 2nd Destroyer Flotilla
Attached light cruisers
HMS Radstock
HMS Raider
HMS Romola
HMS Rowena
HMS Restless
HMS Rob Rob
HMS Rocket
HMS Rigorous
HMS Redgauntlet
HMS Sable
HMS Saphedon
HMS Sceptre
HMS Sturgeon
HMS Settler
British 9th Destroyer Flotilla
2 Parker class destroyer leaders
HMS Salmon
HMS Satyr
HMS Skate
HMS Sharpshooter
HMS Satyr
HMS Skilful
HMS Springbok
HMS Starfish
HMS Stork
HMS Salyph
HMS Sorceress
HMS Redoubt
HMS Recruit
HMS Restless
British 10th Destroyer Flotilla
2 Parker class destroyer leaders
HMS Valentine
HMS Valhalla
HMS Vampire
HMS Valkyrie
HMS Valorous
HMS Rosalind
HMS Radiant
HMS Taurus
HMS Retriever
HMS Teazer
HMS Ulysses
HMS Umpire
HMS Undine
HMS Ursa
British 4th Destroyer Flotilla [Rosyth escorts]
HMS Tancred
HMS Tarpon
HMS Tempest
HMS Telemachus
HMS Tenacious
HMS Tetriarch
HMS Thisbe
HMS Truster
HMS Torrent
HMS Torrid
HMS Trenchant
HMS Tristam
HMS Tirade
HMS Tower

 

[ghappy1000]

Order of battle for the Skagerrak sortie [part 3: Other destroyers]

German destroyers:
I Flotilla
S 32
G 104
several other unnamed vessels
II Flotilla
V 73
G 103
S 54
G 42
G 11
V 6
V 2
V 7
G 9
V 5
III Flotilla
V 70
S 55
V 43
G 55
V 46
G 37
S 50
G 41
V 87
G 46
IV Flotilla
B 98
B 110
B 111
B 97
G 112
V 26
S 36
S 41
S 34
S 30
V and VII Flotillas:
Transfers from the Baltic Fleet and older vessels [GrossTorpedoboot 1906 type]
French destroyers:
1st Flotilla
Opiniatre
Aventurier
Temeraire
Intrepide
Enseigne Roux
Mécanicien Principal Lestin
Bisson
Protet
Mangini
Magnon
Bouchlier
Casque
Commandant Bory
Dehorter
Flotilla of ex-Japanese vessels

 

[ghappy1000]

Introduction to the Skagerrak sortie

After the October Russian Revolution of 1917, which led to the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia, it was time for the High Seas Fleet to sortie. The navy was inactive since the August 19 1916 battle and enthusiasm was raging for a renewed battle, one that would lead to decisive victory against Britain. Coal stocks were loaded and the date was set for 25 October 1917, with a week for newly commissioned ships and transfers from the Baltic to take place. Although France was providing a fleet of ships to support the British, inferiority and the morale surge anticipated from the Russian surrender would lead to this battle. U boats stationed out of port were alerted as to the naval offensive, which would support Caporetto and determine Russian surrender conditions. It was a 'do or die' gamble, but if the offensive succeeded, the German Navy would encounter little opposition for 1918, when victory in France [and Italy] would dictate the course of the war. Admiral Holtendzorff would present his plans to Admirals Hipper and Bechnke as to the course of action taken. Also, supplies to France had to be disrupted and British fears of invasion were also critical, as well as the blockade.
To do this, Admiral Hipper, commander-in-chief of the High Seas Fleet since 31 March 1917, was to propose this operation. Battlecruiser Moltke and escorts were to operate off the British Channel Coast and sink civilian vessels, escorts, protected and scouting cruisers, pre dreadnoughts and monitors, besides bombarding the Entente coast and diverting British and French attention. If possible, the newly commissioned [as of October 1917] Mackensen was to breakout into the Atlantic and wreak havoc on convoys with one cruiser division, supported by oilers and colliers from the navy and immobilized civilian ships. Moltke, with its shorter range could later do a dash across the Channel to weaken French morale by sailing along the French coastline and bombard Portugal before deciding on commerce raiding or support of the Caporetto and submarine offensives in the Mediterranean. It was risky for the battlecruiser to contemplate such a mission with the minefields in the channel and submarines, including the 'friendly fire' possibility as well as Entente types. Otherwise, a raid along the entire British coast, shelling of ports and possible support of an Irish uprising might be another option.
According to the Admiralty Headquarters, Zeppelin activity over the week would increase gradually, but not drastically so as to prevent leakage of the operation to the Royal Navy and Room 40. Minor sorties with destroyers and cruisers might be considered over the Channel, but the presence of Entente battleships would provide superior firepower. Even if minefields sank any ship that passed through, it was unlikely that destroyers could get themselves mined with their small size and shallow draft. Diversion of Entente dreadnought-type capital ships to the Channel would be better because if these were diverted, the High Seas Fleet would chop their way pass the Grand Fleet with 2 15 inch gunned battleships. Wurttemberg, which was in training, might be a good alternative to Moltke as to accomplishing Moltke's mission. Should a destruction of the blockade and a breakout occur, the German ships in the Atlantic could also escort merchant ships trapped overseas home, providing Germany with extra resources.
The October 22 meeting between Admirals Hipper, Bechnke, Reuter, Holtendzorff, Kaiser Wilhelm ii, Hindenburg and Ludendorff [with the latter replacing Falkenhayn in December instead of August 1916] declared that it might help if the sortie succeeded, since this would alleviate the supply situation at home. Besides, the German Army was engaged with a life or death struggle at Ypres besides supporting Caporetto and dictating Russian peace terms. Since the German Navy codes were intercepted at least twice before a fleet sortie by the British, it was considered that leakage of codes might not be an issue, especially with inferior forces and improving morale. Although codes were changed earlier in 1917, all instructions given to the navy were still in written orders, flag and light signals. Radio silence was maintained with respect to communicating orders related to the sortie to prevent Allied intelligence through increased radio traffic. Codes were not to be changed again to prevent the Allies knowing that something was planned. After the battle, new codes were to be introduced depending on the battle course.
Auxillary cruisers, with the assistance of Gazelle class cruisers and coastal defence ships, were to lay mines, bombard ports and divert attention. Battlecruiser Moltke would support these raids with escorts of V Flotilla, light forces from Flanders and 1st cruiser division by engaging French forces involved. Battlecruiser Mackensen would still breakout into the Atlantic and coordinate the efforts with commerce raiding. Conversion of ships into aircraft carriers and submarine construction would be stopped for October to enable that the ships and crews were at their optimum states. The next day, at exactly 10:00am, Admiral Holtendzorff met with Kaiser Wilhelm II and explained about Field Marshal Hindenburg request to naval assistance for the Ypres and Caporetto Offensives by acting against the Allied Channel Ports. The plans had to be delayed by a week because of maintenance and last minute plans, but the final dice was set for victory.

 

[ghappy1000]

Final plans for the 1917 sortie

[Please read the posts above before making your own replies.]
As ordered on 25 October, Admirals Bechnke and Hipper reported their opinions back to the Admiralstab, where they had to meet Admiral Holtzendorff to submit to him their final plan and ship lists. Admiral Holtzendorff awaited them outside the meeting room and informed them that the Emperor wanted to be involved in this detailed presentation of plans, and had invited General Hindenburg to inform the German Army would support what the Navy was planning for Ypres and Caporetto, along with Chancellor Georg Michaelis. Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller, the Chief of the Naval Cabinet, was also invited in case his endorsement was needed to encourage the Kaiser and Chancellor. After saluting the Emperor, planning on the operation was elaborated on the operation based on details given to Admiral Holtzendorff five days earlier, including the numbers of each type of ship that were to be placed in each squadron. Discussion on finer details of ships could be postponed until the meeting with Admiral Holtzendorff next day.
It was planned that on 1 November 1917, the German destroyer flotilla from Flanders would leave harbour to hunt Allied submarines, followed by the Channel Assault Force of Moltke, Siegfried class ships, minelayers and slower cruisers with escorts. These would organize and head west for their destination at 15 knots. The main HSF would then depart and follow two hours after sailing at 15 knots as well. The course taken was at least 50 miles off the German and Dutch coasts to prevent observation by sailors and beach goers.
The Admirals wanted the fleet to sail under the strictest radio silence with no radio communication beforehand about the sortie and related information, such as ship conditions, to deny the British intelligence of the impending sortie. The Channel Squadron (CS) was to include only obsolete ships to free up modern ships for the High Seas Fleet despite the necessary speedy exit. Battle Cruisers SMS Hindenburg and Moltke were to be included in the squadron along with 20 destroyers. The Siegfried class was considered, but as the ships of the class could not sustain 25+ knots, they would serve as a diversion while the major attack was done by a battlecruiser.
At 05:00 hours on 2 November, the Channel Squadron’s flagship, Moltke, and Admiral Hipper would accelerate speed to 20 knots and proceed to the channel with Hindenburg. The orders were to enter the English Channel no earlier than 09:00 hours and no later than 09:30 hours on the 1 November 1917 and proceed to shell supply ports on the English and French coasts, attempt to sink ships in the harbours and destroy dockside facilities, then flee with the cover of Siegfried class ships. The Royal Navy's Channel Fleet was known to include only Danton-class pre-dreadnoughts and monitors. The Siegfried class was deemed to be insufficient for engaging and destroying the pre-dreadnoughts, but torpedo launches or mining, along with battlecruiser support would sink them. The SMS Hindenburg and Moltke would engage the pre-dreadnoughts and British reinforcements and the lighter armed Siegfried class would engage the smaller monitors, light forces and conduct bombardments, besides reconnaissance and interception.

After the Channel Fleet’s destruction, the ports of Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne and Dover would be bombarded and mined by cruisers involved, with dockyard facilities and ships in the harbour targeted. Ammunition wouldn’t be spent on civilian buildings [except for supply centres] to reduce wastage and enemy response. The purpose was to disrupt port operations and damage enemy supply lines. Simultaneously, any merchant shipping in the channel would be sunk by destroyers and submarines. The battlecruisers would start their retreat no later than 13:00 hours, and the cruisers would lay minefields outside the English and French ports of Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Dover and Folkestone, and in the shipping channels. Cruisers of the Koln, Wiesbaden and Graudenz Classes were to be considered for this task, as they were capable of steaming at over 27 knots and carried a minimum of 120 mines. Gazelle class ships would either support the minelaying or fleet escort.
It was anticipated that the Entente would observe this, but mines had to be swept from the area before merchant shipping would be allowed to recommence. This would reduce the transfer of Entente supplies in the Eastern Channel. It was also hoped that some minefields would be missed and later cause the sinking of merchant ships, forcing the Allies to re-sweep the channel and stretching the delays. Admirals Hipper and Bechnke voiced their opinion that if the sortie was successful and had results within the plans or better, then the English would just use ports at the Western end of the English Channel, but if the Germans attempted to bombard these ports, then they would be trapped in the English Channel by the Grand Fleet and destroyed, so operations against shipping wouldn’t be contemplated at the current time. Once the Channel Fleet retired, they would rendezvous with the bulk of the HSF and return to German ports at 20 knots, before the GF could intercept. Again, Admirals Hipper and Bechnke voiced their opinion that it would be possible for the last Grand Fleet battlecruisers to intercept them before they returned to harbour. In this scenario, the HSF could easily defeat any battlecruisers before the GF arrived, as the BC Squadron comprised of only four known BCs of the Renown class with 6x15" Guns each and the Courageous class with 2x15" Guns each, plus escorting CLs & DDs. Should this squadron intercept the HSF while withdrawing or supporting the bombardments, then after combat with them ended, the HSF would return at maximum possible speed. They would not be turned north by the easy to destroy BC Squadron as they were at Jutland, since these battlecruisers had little armour even with cordite improvements. Anyway, inferior French ships and a small squadron of modern British dreadnoughts could be dealt by 2 15 inch gunned battleships.

Before the sortie, submarines would sail into the North Sea to lay minefields outside of British harbours with utmost secrecy, and along the most likely course for the GF to intercept a retiring HSF. Submarines would also patrol harbour approaches and the projected line of approach, to attack advancing ships and only break radio silence to report the GF heading south.
It was mentioned that the HSF would be reorganized to maximize efficiency before the sortie. Unfinished, very obsolete [except for the Siegfried class] and not commissioned ships were to stay at port as they would hinder the operation. Each ship was to be checked for suitability for the operation. It was believed that this would ensure all ships that sortied had a full crew muster, and high morale as the core ability of the fleet was to be maintained. If the fleet was detected, the Allies might not consider the operation a full fleet sortie and reduce the Grand Fleet forces sent in return since several ships were in reserve. This issue was discussed with Admirals Holtzendorff and Müller in a few minutes and the proposal was accepted.

Finally, it was mentioned that since the German Army was threatened at Ypres and needed an exploitation of Caporetto, should the Navy not concentrate on several ports in France and wreck them with a submarine offensive to deny usage as soon as possible re-supply stations and prevent ships sailing in the English Channel, and further disrupt the Allied Supply lines? They hoped that the interruption to three crucial channel supply ports would prevent the British from advancing quickly and divert reinforcements from the Mediterranean, besides encouraging Italian surrender and an Austro-Hungarian naval sortie. The submarines making attacks in the English Channel, since they were incapable of halting trade across the Atlantic, could attack shipping in the confined waters of the English Channel as they stood much better chances , but within the days after the bombardment to obtain as many targets as possible while adverting friendly fire.

Once they had finished submitting their plan, they asked for questions from those present. Admirals Müller and Holtzendorff had none (Admiral Holtzendorff had told Admiral Müller the outline earlier), General Hindenburg took on board what they suggested about Dunkirk, and said he would consider assigning extra troops to counterattack Ypres and divert Entente attention, but that the German Navy would attack all three ports as planned. However, he supported the proposal of submarines operating in the Channel and disrupting Allied shipping at will as it would aid his Army in the future.

Chancellor Michaelis asked about the probability of naval success in its proposed objectives and returning to port intact. Admiral Bechnke voiced his belief that if the GF was unaware of the operation and only sortied upon receiving news of German attacks after shelling, then they couldn’t intercept the Germans before returning to port. As such, and given the force sent into the channel would overwhelm the Channel Fleet, they would achieve their primary aims and return triumphantly. The Chancellor then asked how likely they would be able to defeat the battlecruisers sent after, and still return to port before the interception of the Grand Fleet, if the BC Squadron intercepted them. Admiral Hipper mentioned that the overwhelming firepower of the HSF would destroy the four known ships of the BC Squadron, or drive them off as at Jutland, and that under all circumstances, the HSF wouldn’t be driven into the waiting arms of the GF, assisted by communication and range issues. If the location of the GF was known to be too far from assisting the BCs, then the opportunity presented to destroy a portion of the Royal Navy shouldn’t be frittered.

Admirals Müller and Holtzendorff both conceded with Admiral Hipper, but stressed that should the HSF choose to follow the BCs, they must be certain that the GF was not waiting for them as they were at Jutland since the fleet could not be unnecessarily lost for such a gain. It was time for Kaiser Wilhelm to intervene and he said that he had listened intently to the plan, and had no doubts regarding its success, but asked all present if they believed that the victories won were worth the potential loss of his entire fleet should the GF intercept the HSF before the Germans returned to port.

The admirals present all convinced the Kaiser that unless the Royal and French Navies sortied (to which their submarines would inform them) at the time they sailed, then there was no chance of the GF intercepting the HSF in the sortie timescale as the HSF required only half the distance needed to return to port that the GF had to go to intercept them. The Kaiser re-iterated his question: Were the potential gains to be achieved worth the potential sacrifice of the HSF and impacting of decision makings for 1918?
General Hindenburg believed the victories were worth it, as the interruption of supplies should allow the Army to easily achieve its objectives in March next year, after which Britain and France would surrender under the onslaught of the German Army, and as such, a sacrifice of the HSF in ending the war and Grand Fleet’s existence was worth it. Chancellor Michaelis replied that he did not support the idea that the fleet was worth losing, but that every possible effort should be made to allow victory by spring 1918, and if the Admirals did not believe that the GF was capable of intercepting them before they returned to port, then the operation should be permitted to proceed as planned.

The four Admirals all believed that the GF could never intercept the HSF which made the Kaiser's question irrelevant, so they all said yes. With everybody in agreement that the sortie could proceed, Kaiser Wilhelm II said that assuming the GF wasn’t at sea when the HSF sailed, and preferably did not set sail before the Channel Fleet was destroyed, then he would allow the sortie to proceed. If however the GF sortied before the Channel Fleet was attacked, then he wished for the HSF to return home to prevent a pointless sacrifice. Once again, the potential of French reinforcements for the GF would be the deciding factor, along with co-operation between different Entente nationalities regarding naval forces.

 

[ghappy1000]

Final meeting before the Skagerrak sortie

After obtaining the Kaiser's final consent regarding the sortie, it was finally decided that the High Seas Fleet would sortie on 1 November 1917. It was thought that not only the operation would succeed, but also be decisive. Demobilized destroyers would stay at home, along with any Siegfried or Gazelle class ships that weren't maintained. All ships involved were readied to set sail with the loading of ammunition and crew transfers from decommissioned or laid up ships that were to be completed by 1 November and the ships were laid up after transfer to safer Baltic ports. Also, the 1st submarine in port to attack or report the Grand Fleet would begin its patrol on the same day. Mine laying submarines were to lay mines only on the day of sortie to prevent effective counter-measures and Entente response, although the battlecruisers were to be informed regarding the mines.

Zeppelin sweeps across the North Sea noticed that there was no unusual activity that would indicate Entente anticipation for the operation. The submarines and destroyers on patrol would also prove this [lack of submarine and anti-submarine measures] on the day after the HSF's sailing. Sealed orders were given to captains that were to be opened only on 1 November itself. Before 2 November, only minelaying and reports of Grand Fleet movements would permit breaking of radio silence. About 25 submarines from home ports to the Channel and French Atlantic Coast were to sortie to their interception points.

Admirals Hipper and Bechnke had to ensure absolute secrecy regarding the operation was covered, but they also knew that absolute confidence was only possible and worthy if they returned to port triumphantly and intact after the operation. This was testified when they informed Admiral Holtzendorff during the last meeting before the operation, scheduled for 1 November morning. They were informed of the Kaiser's final instructions when dealing with the Grand Fleet that meeting. Since there were no submarine reports about the Grand Fleet's imminent sailing despite careful observation off the GF harbors, or from seaplane and zeppelin flying patrols over the North Sea, any fears regarding the Grand Fleet could be ignored, and they were informed that the operation could proceed as usual.

After returning to harbour, the Admiralty informed all ship captains regarding the operational details, especially to flagships and more senior officers than the captains aboard. They received their secret codebooks with the modified codes, sealed orders to be opened tomorrow and were asked about any last minute issues and decisions that were in disagreement to the orders given and the sortie. Although several captains were worried about the Grand Fleet's sailing, they were assured that its diminished size, victories over Russia and Italy, weaker reinforcements of French and obsolete ships and the possibility of avoiding any Entente naval interception if the new Grand Fleet didn't sail before 15:00 hours on 1 November [assuming maximum speed] increased and assured confidence and morale in admirals, captains, officers, sailors, gunners, torpedomen, engineers, coalliers and victualling crewmembers and the "do or die" order for the sortie was readied. There was only a break of a few hours after lunchtime and the completion of provision [food, possession, coal, shell and torpedo] loading before the storm began and crewmembers took advantage of the time to do leisure activities. The fleet waited before the order to sail was either received or the time arrived, depending on the earlier time, but it would begin by evening.