29 November 1971
Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, TX
29° 33’ 47” N 95° 05’ 28” W
How far off are we?
It was the question that had been hanging in the air, like a summer humidity that had the indecency to sweep through in late November. It was the most recent in a series of questions that had plagued NASA for the past 4 months.
How long of a delay?
How dangerous will that be?
Are we going to be ready for the crew?
The questions that had defined the autumn of 1971 were not yet finished. The one on the mind of Gerald Griffin right now could be answered with a distance. How far off are we? How far will the infernal machine have to drive to make the rendezvous point?
He glanced at the clock on the wall as it swept through 0334 and suppressed the urge to sigh. Even if he had the answer, he knew that it would only lead to more questions. Each one more troublesome than the last.
What’s the terrain between the new LZ and Alpha? Do we have what we need to plot a course? How long will it take to get there?
And that last, most pestering one:
Are we going to be ready for the crew?
Gerry turned to Glynn Lunney and rubbed his eyes, “Remember all the bitching we had back and forth on 7? All the bullshit about spam in a can and the guys in California saying we can do better with robots? My kingdom for an astronaut.”
Lunney let out a tight smile and nodded, “Yeah. Flyboys are gonna have a field day with this one. They’ll never let us live it down.”
Gerry had a quick reply, “Only if we don’t make the rendezvous. We get to Alpha and this’ll be old news.”
“Roger that.”
Four months ago, representatives from Grumman and the Bendix corporation had informed NASA that the MObile Lunar Excursion Module, or, as the guys in public relations had begged them not to call it: MOLEM, was going to be delayed for two weeks, due to an issue with mating it to the first Cargo LEM.
The delay was unfortunate, but not surprising to anyone who had paid attention to the development of spaceflight hardware for the past decade and a half.
The very concept of a mobile, pressurized lunar laboratory and shelter had been in development since 1966, but no one had really expected it to be called for until the first landing 2 years ago. With the influx of interest and support from the general public, MOLEM was one of the tent poles of Apollo’s second phase.
Even with a layout stripped down to the bare essentials for landing and return, the original Lunar Excursion Modules could only supply two men for three days of surface activity. With the long-term goals of Apollo shifting to longer and more productive stays on the surface, the priority became how to keep astronauts supplied and safe on the surface for extended periods of time.
Astronauts were very demanding. They demanded food, shelter, air, water, a place to sleep, and constant communication with Earth. The scientists who created mission objectives for the surface stays were even more demanding. They insisted that astronauts travel farther, have access to equipment that was sometimes heavy and cumbersome, and that they be able to visit sites that were out of the sightline of the lander.
With these demands at the forefront, Bendix and Grumman had gotten to work on two new spacecraft. The first, the Cargo LEM, was, at its core, a LEM descent stage which could deliver nearly 4000 kilograms of equipment to the lunar surface. The development of Cargo LEM was more complex than simply getting a computer and radio into a descent stage, but not much more complex.
The next priority was to figure out what Cargo LEM would carry to the surface.
Bendix had brought several options to NASA’s attention. A dedicated lab module, known as MOLAB, could be built specifically to maximize internal space and Cargo LEM capacity. It was the Cadillac option. The smooth cylinder of the MOLAB would have been perfect for the task at hand, but also had to be engineered from scratch. After a brief consideration of putting a stripped down command module on wheels, NASA had decided to run with a middle ground option that balanced utility on the surface with an ease in design and production.
MOLEM used the ascent stage of a standard lunar module, which contained life support and consumables for the crew, and put it on wheels. Extra space was created with the loss of the ascent engine and the simplification of the computer systems. Controls were added for steering and speed. Every bit of available internal volume was devoted to water, food and scientific gear for the astronauts. By the time it rolled off the line (literally, as driving tests were the first of its challenges) the MOLEM was capable of supporting 2 astronauts for twelve days and driving them up to 250 miles at a maximum speed of 10 mph.
The first one had been christened the
Beagle in honor of the ship that had brought Charles Darwin to the Galapagos Islands.
Originally, the idea for phase 2 had involved launching two manned Saturn V’s for each of the missions. One would deliver supplies to the surface, while a crew of 2 astronauts stayed in the CSM before returning to Earth. Presentations of this plan to non-engineering managers had gone very badly and other studies were commissioned on how best to deploy phase 2 hardware.
In order to land a Cargo LEM, one first had to achieve lunar orbit. The best way to do that was with the SPS on the Service Module. Pairing a stripped-down service module to a Cargo LEM was not sufficient, as neither spacecraft was designed to fly to lunar orbit without a command module. And as long as you had to send a module with the unmanned Cargo LEM, you might as well put it to some use.
Thus was born the Olympus space station.
Calling Olympus a space station was an exercise in vanity. The “station” such as it was, was not much more than a can which interfaced with the service module and the Cargo LEM.
The plans for the space stations of the 1980’s called for many cans like this to be joined together, each with a specific purpose, working together to provide an orbiting space laboratory. Orbiting over Earth, that is.
Olympus could support up to two astronauts for up to 3 months, which was the longest conceivable surface duration which was being explored. The can was equipped with a pair of solar panels and was approximately twice the size of an Apollo CSM. What it had in volume, it lacked in propulsion, navigation, and computing power. Olympus was little more than a habitat module with a few scientific platforms on board for long-duration orbiting experiments.
The idea would be to test the “cans” system of space station design in lunar orbit, using the CMP astronaut as a caretaker, since, on the longer flights of phase 2, he would have little to do in orbit that had not been done already.
A single launch to provide a mobile surface laboratory, an orbiting lunar space station and a platform to test hardware and procedures for Earth-orbiting space stations to be built in the near future.
It was a bold and audacious plan, born of the hubris that had brought NASA’s previous successes- at the cost of billions of dollars and several human lives.
Still, there was little doubt, both within the agency and amongst those of the general public who took an interest, that astronauts Grissom, White, and Chafee would approve of such a grand strategy to complete mankind’s first lunar explorations.
All of that was fine for newspapers and nightly news, but great plans are always accompanied by great challenges, and the flight of
Olympus I was no exception.
The wacky triumvirate of spacecraft were stacked and loaded upside down onto a Saturn V. The aerodynamic fairing concealed a kludge of a stack which featured the SPS engine bell pointed straight up. The absurd configuration would save the trouble of an autonomous docking after the third stage’s TLI burn.
After
Olympus and her Cargo LEM swung around the far side of the Moon, only a single firing of the SPS would be left to set her orbit. At which point the SPS would be out of fuel and Olympus would never change her orbital characteristics again. Fortunately, the plan was to settle her into one of the "frozen orbits," specifically the one at 27 degrees inclination.
After Olympus had established her orbit, all that was left would be the undocking, descent, and landing of the new, untested Cargo LEM, which would have to delicately land 4000 kilograms worth of payload without the benefit of an astronaut at the controls.
Military commanders are fond of the maxim that no plan survives contact with the enemy. Gerald Griffin was considering a modification of the maxim to “No autonomous flight survives contact with reality.”
Shortly after the TLI burn, the
Beagle-
Olympus stack had begun to drift. In a normal flight, the astronauts on board would have sensed the drift and would have seen the 8-balls slowly turning on their control panel. But the stack had no one on board to see what was happening.
While Houston could monitor the stack with a great deal of focus on its internal health, the inertial guidance of the stack was not as tightly controlled. For the majority of the lifespan of the stack’s components, navigation and propulsion systems would be passive or off-line. Therefore, lower priority was placed on their initial design.
A warning was built into the system when the gimbals approached 70 degrees of alignment. At 85 degrees, the IMU would lock the gimbals to prevent total alignment.
It took only a matter of minutes for the system to move from the 70 degree warning to the 85 degree freeze. There hadn’t been sufficient time to calculate a corrective burn and uplink it to the stripped-down AGC on board.
If all three gimbals slipped into alignment with one another, independent motion of any of them would be impossible. The lock at 85 degrees was designed to prevent total disaster, but triggering the lock meant that the entire platform would need to be realigned.
Realigning the AGC platform was a tedious and time-consuming process even with an astronaut on-board the spacecraft. It involved using a sextant and taking starfield readings. For the men of the guidance station in the MOCR trench, it would require a Herculean effort of calculation.
Armed only with the spacecraft's telemetry and photos that could be transmitted from the
Olympus module’s external docking cameras, the Guidance team started to align the platform. It took more than a day, consulting with astronomers and personnel from the contractors who manufactured both vessels.
The delay from the realignment meant that the flight plan’s schedule had slipped badly. Adjustments would have to be made to the burn parameters on both the course correction burn and the lunar orbit insertion burn. This was a further strain on the already taxed brainpower of the trench.
In a saga of star charts and slide rules, the Guidance station of the Mission Operations Control Room performed above and beyond the call of duty. But their best work still had led to an unfortunate adjustment to the mission schedule that put the separation of the Cargo LEM from Olympus on the 3rd lunar orbit, rather than the 2nd. As a result, the projected landing site for the Cargo LEM, known as LZ Alpha, had to be discarded in favor of a tertiary site.
The Cargo LEM had landed using its automated program. It was safe on the ground, but the boys in the trench were still working on exactly where it had come down.
Which brought Gerald Griffin back to the question of the day. How far off are we? How many kilometers would the
Beagle have to drive, over terrain that was rugged and more challenging than anything seen on the first 4 landings? The region known as Marius Hills was selected for its geological interest, not for being an “easy” site. The volcanic domes and boulders were set to provide many interesting facts about lunar history, but for right now, they were obstacles in Beagle’s path to meet the crew of Apollo 16.
Apollo 16, crewed by Scott Keller and Jack Swigert and commanded by the steady-handed John Young, would be launching just after Christmas. At least that was the plan. While Keller and Young would make a wide (and deep) exploration of the surface, Jack Swigert would rendezvous with the Olympus module and, over the course of a 2-week stay, prepare the station for a longer mission by a 2-man crew on a later flight.
It was a dynamite plan, on paper. But the numbers on the paper all depended on Young and Keller being able to meet the
Beagle on the lunar surface at a nice little flat spot that had long ago been designated in the mission planning phase. The target for Young and Keller, the secondary landing zone, was imaginatively designated LZ Bravo. The intended landing zone for
Beagle, LZ Alpha, was approximately half a mile away. The distance being necessary to avoid damage to either spacecraft with the arrival of the LEM.
The Cargo LEM had put down yesterday afternoon, Houston time, on an automated program. The descent program had been written to automatically adjust the landing point if radar had detected a problem with the LPD from 1000 ft altitude. The 3-second delay from Earth to Moon meant that it was more hazardous to the spacecraft to have ground commands interfering with the landing from that point on.
One thousand feet above the lunar surface, the radar had confirmed an object at the projected landing point and had begun a rotation of 34 degrees. The computer searched (as frantically as a computer might) for a circular zone of 100 feet in radius that radar did not detect an obstruction larger than 1 meter high within.
With 85 seconds of remaining fuel, the Cargo LEM had found a suitable site and issued a 10 degree right turn to land there. For the next 70 seconds, mission control was powerless to aid the unmanned ship. The final confirmation of touchdown came not from CAPCOM, but from TELMU, who gave the simple, “Contact light. Engine arm off. Safe. Chassis fault indicator negative. Flight, TELMU, the
Beagle has landed.”
After a long moment of exultation and back-slapping congratulations, the work began of analyzing the final descent to determine where
Beagle had set down. Almost 12 hours later, the work had nearly finished.
“Flight, Guidance.”
“Go, Guidance,” the room held its collective breath.
“Flight, we have the position now. We calculate 23 miles to LZ Bravo.”
“Copy, confirm 23?”
“Technically 23 and about a quarter, direct line, flight.”
“Copy understand. Does local terrain provide a good path from
Beagle to LZ Alpha?”
This was Griffin’s attempt to generate a bit of optimism. In truth, without seeing it on the ground, it would be difficult to know whether the terrain was suitable for driving a 12 foot tall buggy… without an actual driver at the controls… on a 3-second delay… from a quarter of a million miles away.
“Roger, Flight. We’re consulting with geology, but at the moment, we’ve plotted an initial course that appears to be clean. We project the path through the day 2 stop by the 16 flight plan. Total path distance to Bravo is 27 miles.”
“And geology is happy with the plot?”
One of the geologists who had joined the Guidance team in the trench stood up and turned towards the back of the room. He had the semi-delighted look of a man who loved what he was doing and was good at it, despite the challenges. Someone had given him a headset and he seemed excited to be issuing his first call on the loop, “Flight, Geology. We have confidence in the plotted course from the orbital photography on 15. We don’t expect any showstoppers from here to Alpha.”
Griffin issued a simple, “Copy that,” and nodded at the man, who sat back down. He continued, turning towards the second row, “Control, Telmu, are you happy with what you’re seeing on getting
Beagle unloaded?”
The Control station came on without looking up, “Affirmative, Flight. We are go for dismount and traverse.”
Griffin’s smile was returning. “Guido-Geology,” he said, amused at the fusion of the two groups for this little road trip. “What’s your projected time of traverse to Alpha, assuming all standard protocols?”
Those protocols were critical. The original plan was for
Beagle to be unpacked on the first EVA and only driven by the astronauts. After Young and Keller departed,
Beagle was to be remotely driven and observations made from its cameras, but that was a bonus program, to be done only after the astronauts were safely back in orbit. Still, the driving protocols had been written with the understanding that the current situation was possible. The protocols could be condensed down to, “Go slow. Look where you’re going. Don’t do anything stupid.”
“We’re still running the numbers, Flight. Early projections put us at around 200 hours.”
Griffin nodded and rubbed his head, “Roger.”
A beat passed as everyone did the math in their heads. The lunar day was approximately 28 days on Earth. Meaning that for every 28 days, a single spot, such as
Beagle’s current position, would have 14 days of daylight, followed by 14 days of darkness. Daylight was a commodity on the Moon. Young and Keller would have to land in daylight. Their explorations would have to be done in daylight. Their launch off the surface was scheduled near lunar sunset to maximize that exploration time.
Navigating
Beagle over the surface would require daylight.
Griffin let the silence hang over the room for a moment, then knocked on the top of his console to get every eye on him. “Okay, people! We have 2 weeks to drive to Bravo. We’re going to need every last bit of them. Take 5 minutes, get some coffee, whatever you need. We’re going to dismount
Beagle from the LEM and have it ready for White Team to start the traverse in 5 hours. I hope you’ve all finished your Christmas shopping, because we’re going to be very busy for the next 2 weeks. We’re going on a road trip. Get packed.”
The grins of engineers in their element met his display of geek bravado. The men of the MOCR knew what was about to happen. They were ready.
Griffin turned to his assistant flight director and put his hand over his headset mike, “Tell John that we’ll have to put a few miles on the odometer, but
Beagle will be waiting for him at Alpha next month.”