Occitania rebels in the 19th century.

But surely during an alternate age of Nationalisms, Aquitaine would most likely claim Languedoc, Catalonia and Provence.

Why? Aragon never did so (and don't bring the exemple of 1214, as it was about lands on the other side of Pyrenees already under Aragonese vasselage or presence), and Catalan nationalism wasn't about taking back all oc countries.

An distinct Aquitain identity would be about Aquitaine, not about occitan.
 
Why? Aragon never did so (and don't bring the exemple of 1214, as it was about lands on the other side of Pyrenees already under Aragonese vasselage or presence), and Catalan nationalism wasn't about taking back all oc countries.

An distinct Aquitain identity would be about Aquitaine, not about occitan.


An independent Aquitaine and Aragon will be in a situation analogous to Wallachia and Moldovia before the reunification of Romania.
 
An independent Aquitaine and Aragon will be in a situation analogous to Wallachia and Moldovia before the reunification of Romania.

Wallachia and Moldavia had an history of political and cultural unity before the XIXth. What you propose doesn't provides the same.
 
But that previous unity was Brief and lasted a few years or just a decade, Transylvania was not even a part of it.

It still build up a precedent, being furthermore symptomatic of a more close relationship between Danubian principalities that ever existed among the diverse occitan counterparts, and that continued long after they stand as distinct states once again.

That simply didn't existed in southern France in classical and late Middle-Ages, where the unifying identity was either religious and dynastical (locally, as with, for exemple, Raimondins; or royal with Capetians or possibly Aragonese).

Even before the Crusade, the Occitan lords considered themselves "Francs" and/or Provencals, Gascons, etc.* without an Occitan identity.

* See Senhor, per los nostres peccatz

If you split up Aquitaine from the rest, what you'll build up would be a distinct Aquitaine identity because it's all what would exist, as it was all existed in the crown of Aragon eventually.
Using Catalan as an exemple is really decisive there : we have what was a dialect of the Occitan continuum, and a part of Aquitaine political ensemble living its own separatly and eventually not considering itself part of the Occitan ensemble.

I fail to see why it would be different with Aquitaine on the sole point of being Aquitaine.
 
Both have the common point to have appeared in regions where the leading political structure didn't provoked the apparition of a common identity. They appeared really fast because, well, there wasn't much more to replace it.

In 1789, how was common identity of "French" in Occitan stronger than that of Polish in what is now western Ukraine, or Swedish in Finland, or Slovene in the Habsburg monarchy?

I'm not sure you get what was called "federalism" back then.

Yes, I understand it didn't really exist even among the Girondins, in our timeline. What I'm arguing is that some leading thinker could come up with the idea of proper federalism for France along the lines of the American example, and in the chaos of an alternate French revolution manage to come to a leadership position.


Arguably, you did have autonomists tendencies, especially in regions where Girondins were representatives of more than just moderate republican tendencies (but going up to royalism or what remained of Feuillants as well) but that was always tied up with really local circumstances and not a general program.

Could you elaborate on these more?

That's not going to happen. The court was opposed to the Revolution, and the King was opposed as a principle and along its interest to loose his powers. Having a King ready to embrace revolutionary changes would requires such a change of mental structures and such an important PoD that it would likely butterfly away the revolution in first place.

It all depends on what you need to count as a "revolution". But I'm imagining a scenario where the calling of the Estates still happens, and the King realises he can court popularity by speaking up for the "people" and curbing noble privileges, while cementing his own position at the top.


Basically, the city was less pro or anti, than having two extremly divided sides within.

Fair enough, but that clearly indicates there were elements of a revolutionary south back in the 18th century.
 
In 1789, how was common identity of "French" in Occitan stronger than that of Polish in what is now western Ukraine, or Swedish in Finland, or Slovene in the Habsburg monarchy?
I can't exactly tell you about these places on which my knowledge is limited, but here's roughly the situation.

To begin with, it was definitively present not only among all elites (nobiliar and bourgeois alike), but as well among other social layers.
Not only trough centuries of unifying policies, of domination of french as a language, but as well (for reasons more close to XVIIIth century) modernisation of transportation in France, structured military (when you mix different peoples inside one same army, you create trans-regional solidarities or at least identity), creation of more tied up town/countryside relations (it was not uncommon by the XVIIIth century, to have peasants surrounding cities able to speak French in non-francophonic regions)

While you certainly had as well included identities they were extremly localist or somewhat representative of a certain political traditionalism (as with the aforementioned Etats de Provence), they were not exactly conflicting with French Identity.

Again, the only exception I can think of would be Corsica at this time. Apart that, I simply can't think of one.

Of course, you had no Occitan identity whatsoever to speak of. That simply didn't existed and you had at best a more or less develloped provincial/regional/urban localism.

(I'm not sure about the implication of French identity being the only one put in commas there, to be honest.)

Yes, I understand it didn't really exist even among the Girondins, in our timeline. What I'm arguing is that some leading thinker could come up with the idea of proper federalism for France along the lines of the American example, and in the chaos of an alternate French revolution manage to come to a leadership position.
That would be extremly hard. French Revolution is all about the exhaltation of the nation as the one body politically, socially and culturally.

For a true federalist position coming out of nowhere, without real social or political support, without at least would it be a limited faction to have emmited such ideas, and to win the day looks terribly implausible.

Basically, if it didn't existed IOTL, there's usually good reasons, not just because they didn't tought about it.

Could you elaborate on these more?
Well, some elites were more tied up with regional institutions. For exemple, provincial Estates that were the usual social basis for provincial nobility and bourgeoisie (while not exactly determinating), and their dissolution being threatening to their social position.
Eventually, these links were more or less existant among other layers of the population, brigging a certain resentment on this regard.

I'd point out that their importance in the revolutionary crisis is definitely far less important than economic crisis, Civil Constitution of the Clergy and war and conscription.

It all depends on what you need to count as a "revolution". But I'm imagining a scenario where the calling of the Estates still happens, and the King realises he can court popularity by speaking up for the "people" and curbing noble privileges, while cementing his own position at the top.
Not regarding it would go, once again, again the royalists and court principle of the royal power...

Well, that would most certainly backfire. Estates Generals were what was more close of a popular representation : hopes were simply gigantic that EG would resolve the crisis, and not only among elites but as well popular layers.
Having the king trying to bypass them would at best encounter incomprehension, most probably riots, at worst some equivalent to the Great Fear.

Fair enough, but that clearly indicates there were elements of a revolutionary south back in the 18th century.
It doesn't. It simply clearly indicates that you have a strong revolutionary element during the French Revolution (I'm not sure it comes out as a scoop for many people there).
Furthermore, these revolutionary elements were tied to the overall revolutionary movement in France, rather than being a specifically "southern revolutionarism".

As for before the French Revolution, what you had was more ponctual riots that were never based on culture or identity, but on fiscal and economic points, such as the Day of the Tiles.
 
Thanks all.

I was looking for a good reason to break up France post Nap. Wars but language doesn't appear to be a fault line.

I may start another thread to see if there is another possibility.
 
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