But it seems to me that some cultural/lingual groups "push back" especially when they are pushed, that is, they cling to their language especially when it is persecuted, instead of just being marginalised (in whiche case it often peacefully fades away). I think Czech is a good example of that. It faded in the background in a time when the Habsburg government (except the somewhat outlandish reforms of Joseph II) did not do much to promote German, OTOH, Czech, uh, lingual consciousness lets say was always then highest if people actively pushed for the extension of the role of German.
I agree in part with you. But I think that the linguistcal conflicts are usually the more visible face of deeper problems. A language is not an isolated folklore trait. A language is a communication code, but it is too, specially when minoritary, a easily visible sign of colective self-identification. Thus, in my opinion the revival of certain european languages in the 19th century is related to colective political and economical interests. In other words, you need a previous community of interests to make the people spontaneously feel the necessity of being part of a cultural-political-linguistical excludent community. So, the direct prosecution shouldn't be the only path to make a language "push back" and not all languages push back when they are prosecuted.
In that sense, it seems to me that, mutatis mutandis, one common point between Austia-Hungary and Spain in the 19th century was the
décalage between the political centers (Vienna, Madrid -> Austria, Castille) and the peripherical economic centers (Catalonia, Bohemia).
However, all chances of sucess aside, there seems to not have been much resistance in the Occitan community to begin with, so it seems to me that needs to be changed first. If that is, maybe a PoD after the French Revolution is sufficient.
(And really, what with the often happening regime changes in France - I dont think France could reach the Spanish levels of the 19th century, but there certainly exist possibilities for way weaker central governments...)
You are right, I exaggerated with the "not after 1796" PoD. And of course, it's impossible France could reach the spanish levels in the 19th century, even a quarter of the spanish "chaos". Maybe we can also limite the french process of centralization in its begining in the second half of the XVIIth century, but I have no clue of how to do that. Another option could be a different Restauration, or a more succesful one, after the napoelonic wars.
Anyway, following my materialist perspective, the french industrialization has particularities. We don't see great industrial concentrations (except maybe in the Seinne basin and I think that those are from the late XIXth century) and we have a large rural population even in the beginning of the XXth century. Also the main commercial centers are in the north (exception made to Marseille, but the Mediterranian is not the Atlantic), closer to Paris, so there isn't a definite community of interest in the pays d'Oc...If you see, Catalonia, Bohemia or Padania were closer to the industrial bulk of Europe and its markets and dynamics in comparation to the rest of their states, that is not the case in southern France.
The problem with an Occitan revival is that the French state in the 19th and 20th centuries was too strong and too French. The much weaker Spanish state never managed to suppress its minority languages, as it lacked the capacity to impose itself at a local level for much of this period.
That is true. And of course, it is difficult to revive a language if it is completly dead.
But if speaking castilian (spanish) were a clair advantge, the catalan would have dispared as did other spanish languages or would be badly damaged as is the galician without the intervention of the State. The difference between Galicia and Catalonia is that Catalonia has a powerful bourgeoisie, that revived the catalan language as a prestige language, and in the poor and rural Galicia the galician was seen as a bumpkin language.