O tempora, O mores! The Catiline Conspiracy suceeds

Curio was pretty tight with Caesar, right? At least during the civil war, not sure at this stage. Could this be a part of Caesar's machinations?
 
Hats off to Curio here for being one clever SOB- Catiline's own paramilitaries and militias has been nearly destroyed and until the Catilinians get a real chance to nurse their wounds and are spared another campaign season (extremely unlikely this side of the decade) then Curio's legions are Catiline's military power with the only counterweight being the private retinues of the Cassian aristocrats so desperate for a return to normalcy and the political climate Curio once bleed for under their physical incarnation in Murena ...

will this be the normalization of the Catiline phenomena, where the mobs have their day but the "moderates" stage a soft self-coup and quiet things back down into something vaguely similar to the pre-war Senatorial nobility?

I actually fully hadn't seen that implication; Catiline has no doubt lost at least several thousand of his more militaristic and enthusiastic supporters and partially replaced with several thousand men whose loyalty is probably first to themselves, then to Curio, and only then to the Decemvirate/Catiline.

But that's a very good point so thank you for pointing it out . Curio's loyalty will not come cheap, to be sure.
 
Curio was pretty tight with Caesar, right? At least during the civil war, not sure at this stage. Could this be a part of Caesar's machinations?

Curio's loyalty was all over the place. His father I think defended Clodius during his trial for sacrilege; he opposed the first Triumvirate of Caesar, Crassus and Pompey (earning the respect of the Optimates); I understand Cicero wrote affectionate letters to him, and just before Caesar crossed the Rubicon he completely switched sides and supported Caesar.
 
Part VII
Part VII: Catiline Returns

Yet ultimately, it might be safely said that it was avarice that allowed Catiline’s fortunes to prosper – and not merely the fortunes of him and his followers, but also the avarice of men who were proud to call themselves his enemies. For avarice destroyed honour, integrity, and all other noble qualities; taught in their place insolence, cruelty, to neglect the gods, to set a price on everything. Ambition drove many men to become false; to have one thought locked in the breast, another ready on the tongue; to value friendships and enmities not on their merits but by the standard of self-interest, and to show a good front rather than a good heart – Sallust, the Wars of Catiline.



Catiline returned to Rome at the height of the Parentalia festival; the ancient rite in which Romans made sacrifices to the shades of their ancestors. Catiline made the most of the opportunity; not only demonstrating his piety by pausing his army so that he himself might offer wine and bread to his deceased forefathers, but also by publicly beseeching the Gods that those who had died at Narnia – of whatever side – might be honoured for their bravery. “For” as Varro told us “Catiline wept at the senseless slaughter of good Romans”.

Crowd pleasing this might have been, but it is hard not to share the sentiment of most other historians – that these were merely crocodile tears. By crushing Murena’s army – albeit at phenomenal cost to his own – he had, at the least, brought himself breathing space and proved he was still a force to be reckoned with. It is not unlikely that many of the men who greeted him on his return had fixed smiles on their faces. It likewise beggars belief that Catiline was unaware that some of these men had been, quietly, working against him in the previous month, as it seemed his own fortunes might fall.

Yet engaging on a wholesale purge, tempting as the idea no doubt was, was not an indulgence to which he could succumb. A mass slaughter of his opponents would lose him the fragile support – or at least, accommodation – he had built up with the richer and more influential men in the city. And so it was, for instance, that he embraced both Marcus Caecilius Metellus and Quintus Caecilius Metellus Creticus, as well as Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus – another one of Rome’s Optimates; and by inclination either, depending on one’s viewpoint, a pragmatic man who preferred order and peace to war, or a somewhat cynical and luxury loving opportunist.

Once again, Catiline tapped Crassus for funds, and once again, Crassus obliged; the army being given a large ‘donation’ and a public feast put on for the citizenry. Quite coincidentally, Crassus was later also awarded Murena’s old province of Cisalphine Gaul, with Crassus, in turn, appointing one of his supporters, Quintus Marcius Rufus, to run the place in his stead. At the same time, Catiline, through Rullus, proposed a massive program of urban renewal. Two new aqueducts would be built, old temples would be restored, and the Forum would be expanded. The sewage system would be expanded and roads repaved. Such a program, of course, would take more than the year a Consul had in office – but no term limit had been set on the Decemvirate.

It is tempting to chalk all this to mere demagoguery, and undoubtedly this played a role. But perhaps, too, it spoke to something more. Any of the writings Catiline and his supporters may have penned have long since been lost. Compared to the well planned cities found in Greece; Rome was in in many ways a great slum which had expanded and grown with almost no oversight. Catiline had travelled abroad, and there may, indeed, have been something more than mere rabble-rousing when he spoke and said, according to Varro, “it was not right that citizens of the greatest city in the world lived in squalor; whilst those they had conquered with their sweat and blood lived in luxury”. Likewise, his large scale program of land reform; though sniffed at as yet another tool to buy the support of ignorant plebs by his enemies, can also be seen as a tool to give an underemployed citizenry their own stake in society, rather than living in the filthy, crime ridden slums, subsisting on electoral handouts from patricians and intermittent work.

But, of course, before all these utopian visions could be put into practice, he still had to deal with the spectre of Scipio; who, based in Neapolis, had become a natural magnet for the Italian anti-Catiline forces. Scipio’s camp was a kaleidoscope of Roman nobility; backed by an ever-increasing army of at least six legions. Although Scipio had been angling to position himself as merely a neutral party with the power to force an end to civil strife, the fact was the army under his control was the only force in Italy now capable of overthrowing the Decemvirate.

However, this impressive force was, in truth, far less united than it seemed. Scipio was not an iron-willed leader who could stamp his will on the squabbling aristocrats in his train, and his motives were seen as hardly disinterested.

Cicero, assisted by Celer and Clodius, argued forcefully that the army should immediately strike north, march on Rome, and suppress the revolt. Lucius Manlius Torquatus and Gaius Marcius Figulus, two former consuls, joined in this request, pointing out that Scipio’s ultimatum to Catiline had long since expired. In this, they were opposed by another, rather more peaceable faction, favoured by Scipio and led by another former consul, Manius Aemilius Lepidus, and the former tribune Gaius Popilius, and Catalus himself. Further complicating the picture was the presence of the so-called ‘Pompeians’ – supporters of the great general Pompey the Great. These included the tribune Gaius Manilius, Marcus Petreius, Publius Piso and the ex-consul Gnaeus Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus, who had rather humiliatingly suffered defeat at the hands of rebel slaves during the revolt of Spartacus. This third faction, whilst not averse to a violent confrontation, at the same time talked of recalling Pompey – a prospect that filled Scipio, and indeed most of the other leaders, with horror. After all, after Pompey returned and defeated Catiline, there would be nothing to stop him taking power himself – although, as Tiro reported Cicero rather bitterly pointing out, Pompey’s dictatorship would at least be competent, unlike Scipio’s.

As might be expected, the swirling mass of loyalties, ambition, principle and self interest combined to paralyse Scipio’s forces. Scipio was mocked for his refusal to immediately march on Rome, advised to stand down in favour of Pompey, accused of wanting to take sole power himself, told by some of his closest intimates that Catiline only desired peace. Scipio, ambitious but hesitant, egotistical but weak – or, in the words of Cicero, “a man whose capabilities are entirely outmatched by his aims” – was hardly the man capable of welding together his unwieldly coalition.

As February turned into march, Cicero was alarmed to note that there was still no sign of a coherent plan. ‘Strategy’ meetings were little more than long squabbling sessions, where Scipio was openly insulted to his face. Two legion commanders – Marcus Petreius and Lucius Torquatus – fell out so badly that brawling between their men left a dozen dead. Even the arrivial of Lucullus, the hero of the East, who had done so much to defeat Mithridates, the King of Pontus and arch-enemy of Rome, failed to improve matters. Deprived of his command by political scheming and a convenient mutiny instigated amongst his men, he had recently acquired a reputation for extravagance, as well as military prowess; and lost no time in engaging with long, blazing arguments with the partisans of Pompey. The low point, however, came when he saw Clodius; now one of Cicero’s right hand men. Clodius, who himself had instigated the mutiny amongst Lucullus’ legions, made one too many quips about fish farming. In response, the grizzled general punched Clodius hard enough to knock out several of his teeth.

In this morass of squabbling, recriminations, backbiting and politicking, it is hard not to start to sympathise with Scipio; although his method of relaxation hardly endeared him to his peers. The hedonistic aristocrat took to holding long, drunken parties with slavegirls and courtesans whom were, it might be safely said, rather more convivial company than his followers.
 
This sounds like just the scenario to get some hot-blooded Roman aristo to go grab a legion and change and raise (and raze) the country themselves. This is likely disastrously ill-informed and unplanned and generally a massive gamble, but sheer reckless bravery counts for a lot more then our modern attitudes would appreciate and hey if the Gods smiled on Catiline for doing the same...
 
This sounds like just the scenario to get some hot-blooded Roman aristo to go grab a legion and change and raise (and raze) the country themselves. This is likely disastrously ill-informed and unplanned and generally a massive gamble, but sheer reckless bravery counts for a lot more then our modern attitudes would appreciate and hey if the Gods smiled on Catiline for doing the same...

That is indeed true - but Murena has already tried that, and most armed forces in Italy are now under the control of Scipio or Catiline.
Of course some hothead within Scipio's army gathering a couple of thousand men and trying something stupid is not unlikely...
 
That is indeed true - but Murena has already tried that, and most armed forces in Italy are now under the control of Scipio or Catiline.
Of course some hothead within Scipio's army gathering a couple of thousand men and trying something stupid is not unlikely...

*The fervently nodding, manically grinning Jack Nicholson meme, but it's Clodius.*
 
*The fervently nodding, manically grinning Jack Nicholson meme, but it's Clodius.*

He would definitely be my first choice. And indeed, my second, third and fourth as well!

"But first, I shall need women's clothes, a cartload of bribes, a tame lawyer, some gladiators and the names of the five most feared gang leaders in Rome."
"I'm not sure how this will help to overthrow Catiline?"
"Overthrow who now?"
 
"Pompey's dictatorship would at least be competent, unlike Scipio's"
OOOOOHH BURNNNN! Great update, thank you for your work.

Cicero could be pretty biting in OTL; I just like the idea of him making endless sarcastic asides.
Though I did always like the line from Tom Holland's Rubicon when Cicero joins Pompey after Ceasar crosses the Rubicon: "Even Pompey, after finding out his main contributions to the war effort were defeatist witticisms, publicly wished he'd go home."
 
This is an amazing TL, I'm a huge fan of both Cicero and the late Republican Roman period, so this is ticking a lot of boxes for me at the moment. Can't wait for more!
 
Part VIII
Wow, this took...longer than I thought. I refused to accept there wasn't a central repository somewhere of ALL Roman Governors in 63BC. With this one, I had to make up more facts than I normally otherwise do. Apologies to any historians/ shades of ancient Romans who are reading this and are annoyed. I do intend to keep this fairly focused tightly around Rome (there won't be anything on what's happening in China, for example, not less because any butterflies will take a long, long time to travel there) but here we're seeing what's going on in the provinces.

Part VIII: Greece, Gaul and Hispania

Now Catiline did all this from an unbounded love of power; but to that ancient infirmity of Crassus, his avarice, there was now added a fresh and ardent passion, in view of the glorious exploits of Pompey, for trophies and triumphs. In these alone he thought himself inferior to Pompey, but superior in everything else. And his passion gave him no rest nor peace until it ended in an inglorious death and public calamities

Plutarch; The Rule of Catiline and his Confederates

As the year 63BC gave way to 62, it is doubtful whether the vast majority of the Republic’s inhabitants had a clear idea of the convulsions that had taken place.

It is, of course, highly improbable that few knew nothing of Catiline's power-grab, nor that he had not succeeded in the immediate liquidation of all his opponents. But, in a world where communications relied heavily on the sea – risky, during the winter months – and were subject to delays of months, it is equally improbable that by the end of February even the most well informed Romans outside of Italy could say with certainty what was happening. Catiline and Cicero are both known to have sent dozens, if not hundreds of letters, giving their side of the story. Only a few of Cicero’s survive, and when compared with his rather more honest letters to Atticus they are indeed found wanting in terms of honesty. With a mixture of bravado, appeals to honour, veiled threats and implied bribes they only somewhat resemble reality; and it is doubtless fair to say that Catiline’s were of a similar nature, if not worse.

Their recipients, adrift in a whirlpool of rumour, lies, propaganda and misinformation, did not, on the whole, instantly pledge themselves to one cause or another. On the whole, they were sensible men, aware of the limitations of their knowledge and reluctant to back the wrong side in any civil war – the grotesque atrocities committed by both Marians and Sullans during the recent civil war were still fresh in the mind of many Romans. Besides, the shockwaves caused by Catiline’s revolt were reverberating around the Roman world.

Several Greek cities – mostly noticeably Athens –appear to have suffered outbreaks of violent rioting, spiralling at times into armed conflict; although whether this was class warfare inspired by garbled reports of Catiline’s revolt, the results of conspiracies of one or the other factions, attempts to break free of a weakened Roman yoke, or caused by wholly local factors isn’t known. Piracy, on the whole suppressed by Pompey the Great, surged back; even going so far as to sack Rhodes in a daring raid on the 24th of March. Tribesmen in Hispania proved particularly troublesome around this time, launching raids into Roman territory. Meanwhile, in Gaul, the Aedui tribe, allied to Rome, had been attacked by the Arveni and Sequani tribes (likewise technically a Roman ally) with the aid of the Germanic chieftain Ariovistus of the Suebi. The Arveni had been massacred, and the Suebi had started to move into Gaul – alarming both their former allies and the Romans. Unsurprisingly, the whole region had become unsettled.

Faced with these immediate local problems, the tendency of the local Roman governor was, it seems, to try and maintain stability in their own locale. Only the governor of Macedonia, it is known, publicly pledged himself to the cause of the Senate – and then did nothing further, distracted by outbreaks of unrest throughout Greece. Cicero also indicates in one of his letters that the governor of Corsica and Sardinia, one Gaius Erucius, had executed the envoy sent by Scipio on suspicions of espionage, and darkly speculates he was secretly in league with Catiline.

It is important to remember that in remoter provinces, Roman power was often more show than reality, depending on the fear of a couple of legions, the ruthless reputation of Rome and extensive collaboration with local elites – as is the case, of course, with almost all Imperial powers throughout history.

Neither Catalina nor his opponents made much of an effort to directly seize control of any provinces – much less to leave Italy and attempt to recruit support abroad. Scipio did briefly consider attempting to seize Sicily, a major source of grain for Rome, but Cicero realised the propaganda victory this would hand Catiline – indicating, of course, that he believed the war would be over relatively quickly. Quintus Caecilius Metellus Nepos, the brother of Celer (Cicero’s ally) had fled to North Africa, and it seems around April assumed governorship of the province, ruling from Carthage and adeptly supplying both Neapolis and Rome with grain.

The one exception to this policy was Hispania – and it appears to have been initiated not by Catiline, but by Crassus.

The silver mines of Hispania were a major contributor to the Roman economy; tens of thousands of slaves labouring in hellish conditions. Both provinces had been formally granted to Crassus by Catiline; but such a gift was not actually within his power. To Catiline, the defeat of Scipio and Cicero was the highest priority; Hispania was not. To Crassus, however, a man who had mortgaged his prospects, honour and fortune on Catiline’s cause, this was intolerable. The wealth of Hispania was almost beyond imagination – and it likely crossed his mind that, once he fully controlled the two provinces, he, not Catiline, would be the senior partner – able to negotiate from a position of strength with any other of the Republic’s powerbrokers – a prospect it is hard to imagine Catiline was unaware of.

Frustratingly, the exact outline of events has been almost entirely lost – both Varro and the later historian Valerian Calenius both refer their readers to Plutarch’s ‘History of Hispania’ for the full story; which is not entirely helpful as this entire work has been lost over the centuries. However, it seems around April two of Crassus’ henchmen – Scrophas and Mummius, both of whom had served under Crassus in the Servile War against Spartacus (the former being horrifically injured) were sent to Hispania – alongside Crassus’ own son Publius Licinius Crassus – and approximately two thousand men from the legions Crassus had started to recruit and train. (Catiline’s reaction when he discovered this can only be imagined).

The fleet appears to have reached Cartago Nova in late April. Cicero refers to the ‘disgraceful conduct of the legions there’ in a later letter, when it appears the soldiers stationed in the provincial capital mutinied and effectively seized power under the leadership of a legate called Gellius Publicola , imprisoning the governor and other notables. (It is a speculation, almost universally accepted but not actually proved, that this was Lucius Gellius Publicola, who had achieved initial success against Spartacus before being relieved of command; it is tempting that this disaster had led him to accumulate huge debts, making him vulnerable to bribery).

Taken together with other sources, it would appear the long hand of Crassus was already reaching out to Hispania before his fleet was even despatched – his father had been a Praetor there, and he himself had famously hid there in some luxury when Marius, years ago, had sought to have him killed. It is almost certain that Gellius had been bribed, that local magnates had been quietly recruited, that the ground, in general, had been almost perfectly prepared. No doubt many Romans, knowing the wealth and reputation of Crassus, felt little inclination to struggle when his henchmen claimed Hispania in his name. After all, so many of them might have rationalised, it had been a vote of the Roman people that appointed him Proconsul of Hispania.

Of source, in reality it was an almost bloodless coup financed by a wealthy businessman – and it was brilliantly executed. It is, in fact, a testament to the ruthless, pragmatic and coldly brilliant mind of Crassus.

At any rate, by the time the fleet docked and Scophas, acting as Crassus’ legate, entered the city, the province of Hispania Citerior - with its almost inexhaustible wealth – had dropped into the lap of Crassus like a ripe plum. The dismay felt by Cicero at this news is almost palpable through the centuries; and a cynic might feel that Catiline was only slightly less appalled. Crassus now had his own fiefdom, ruled by his own lieutenants, and was beholden to Catiline only by fragile chains of self-interest.

But, in the East, Pompey the Great was stirring.
 
Nice to see Crassus is following the Evil Overlord List and has a secure escape hatch, but there's still some like cosmic poetic justice crying out for Crassus to arrive in his private fiefdom only to have all his silver tribute paid to him in the form of a molten hot "crown" poured over his head,
 
Am I in the minority and cheering for Crassus? Sure, he was a selfish bastard, but he was a largely competent selfish bastard (leaving aside that little issue in the East ;) ). I've always wondered what influence a longer-lived Crassus might have on Rome, and doubly so what might happen if his son Publius Licinius Crassus lives.

I also admit to being insanely curious about Caesar's actions and fate here. He's tied to the conspiracy but has so far been quiet, but I can't see that man being quiet for too long!
 
Nice to see Crassus is following the Evil Overlord List and has a secure escape hatch, but there's still some like cosmic poetic justice crying out for Crassus to arrive in his private fiefdom only to have all his silver tribute paid to him in the form of a molten hot "crown" poured over his head,

Exactly! He's a nasty piece of work (or, at best, extremely pragmatic) but you don't rise to the top of the Roman snake pit and become possibly the richest man in history by being an idiot. With the resources of Spain behind him, he's probably at the level of the Senatorial loyalists in Neapolis in terms of resources, and a serious competitor to Pompey. Which, in turn, [redacted to prevent spoilers].
 
Am I in the minority and cheering for Crassus? Sure, he was a selfish bastard, but he was a largely competent selfish bastard (leaving aside that little issue in the East ;) ). I've always wondered what influence a longer-lived Crassus might have on Rome, and doubly so what might happen if his son Publius Licinius Crassus lives.

I also admit to being insanely curious about Caesar's actions and fate here. He's tied to the conspiracy but has so far been quiet, but I can't see that man being quiet for too long!

I think when it comes to Ancient Romans, we really just can't judge them by our standards. I guess from their point of view Crassus was a failure - yes, he amassed a huge fortune, but his only major victories were against slaves and fellow Romans. Somehow, I don't see him as a man who would be the sort to quietly reform the Roman state, either. But, on the other hand, you are right in that he is far more rooted in reality and so would probably be a better, long term leader than Catiline.

As for Ceasar - I'm shocked, shocked that you think the High Priest would be up to anything inappropriate.

For Julius, the situation is a bit up in the air at the moment. True, chaos does give young ambitious men a chance to rise far, fast. It also means that blind fate can easily cut a career short...
 
Though this is still a strong win for Crassus and (to a very lesser extent) the revolutionaries generally, I wonder how this must galvanize the Senate at Neapolis. I mean what Roman could forget Sertorius and his little Anti-Senate in Hispania? Now that the Catilineans are spreading their tendrils deep into the very machinery of Rome's empire, and with enough silver to buy the gods themselves, soon the rebels can corrupt the other provinces and compel the Senatorial cause to utter defeat, and even in the best case miraculous victory it would take years to root out of their new provincial sanctuaries. This is now something that cannot be contained and ended within Italy and the Roman aristocracy like the Social War, this is now a world war across the Mediterranean like the bad old days of Marius and Sulla... unless Scipio and the Neapolis legions take their last eleventh hour chance to do something. I mean even the previous Pompey loyalists have to be worried now that instead of cultivating the great general as the Senate's enforcer, these events would make Pompey's imminent arrival that of a new strongman taking from the subordinated Senate what he needed and enforcing Pompey's will only. The only way to avoid having to engage with that possibility and the thorny problem of keeping Pompey close-but-not-too-close would be to remove that temptation for Pompey and present him with a fiat accompli and bargaining position over the post-war future instead of the war itself. If there's anything at all that could ever unite the senatorial notables, it would be opposition putting their lives in the hands of new non-Senatorial authorities like Pompey, and the many, many Catiline mimics that are soon to follow. Of course once they decide they should do something, then they have to agree on how they should do it...
 
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Though this is still a strong win for Crassus and (to a very lesser extent) the revolutionaries generally, I wonder how this must galvanize the Senate at Neapolis. I mean what Roman could forget Sertorius and his little Anti-Senate in Hispania? Now that the Catilineans are spreading their tendrils deep into the very machinery of Rome's empire, and with enough silver to buy the gods themselves, soon the rebels can corrupt the other provinces and compel the Senatorial cause to utter defeat, and even in the best case miraculous victory it would take years to root out of their new provincial sanctuaries. This is now something that cannot be contained and ended within Italy and the Roman aristocracy like the Social War, this is now a world war across the Mediterranean like the bad old days of Marius and Sulla... unless Scipio and the Neapolis legions take their last eleventh hour chance to do something. I mean even the previous Pompey loyalists have to be worried now that instead of cultivating the great general as the Senate's enforcer, these events would make Pompey's imminent arrival that of a new strongman taking from the subordinated Senate what he needed and enforcing Pompey's will only. The only way to avoid having to engage with that possibility and the thorny problem of keeping Pompey close-but-not-too-close would be to remove that temptation for Pompey and present him with a fiat accompli and bargaining position over the post-war future instead of the war itself. If there's anything at all that could ever unite the senatorial notables, it would be opposition putting their lives in the hands of new non-Senatorial authorities like Pompey, and the many, many Catiline mimics that are soon to follow. Of course once they decide they should do something, then they have to agree on how they should do it...

Definitely.

I will admit, for the sake of dramatic tension, I'm giving the Revolutionaries extremely good metaphorical dice rolls, and the Senatorialists very bad ones. But you're right. They're rapidly running out of options, all of which are bad.

i) Catiline comes out on top, and either recruits or liquidates them (really not good).
ii) Pompey is invited in, smashes Catiline with his army and then rules as strongman (not good).
iii) Scipio marches on Rome and defeats Catiline. Probably the best option, with the high risk of Scipio (or someone else) taking this opportunity to make himself dictator.


The issue for Cicero et al is that to successfully prosecute a war they need a single commander. Quite aside from the bickering over whom should have that honour; there is also the very real threat that whomever gets that position will become, at least, the major power-broker in the Republic afterwards. (There's also the slightly more honourable fact that Catiline's lot does contain a lot of Roman nobles as well (not least Crassus). There's a lot of Romans seriously starting to question where their loyalty should lie. (From a purely legal standpoint, Catiline probably has the advantage - his Decemvirate was voted into power by the Roman people).

I know, it sounds unbelievable - politicians putting short sighted ambition ahead of everything - but it could happen.
 
I'm enjoying this. The butterflies are flapping nicely.
So, Catiline still holds Rome, but most of his loyalist soldiers are dead and he's dependent for military muscle on people like Curio. Crassus has seized Hispania (though it sounds like he himself is still in Rome) which comes with not just a money mine but also a veteran garrison. Scipio's army massively outnumbers Catiline's but it's rotting at Neapolis while its leaders squabble. And Pompey may be en route from the East with enough veteran legions to squash all of them and all the money he needs.

Hmm. Under the circumstances, I'd expect the army at Neapolis to either fall apart completely or go over en masse to whichever prospective leader can attract their loyalties - or offer the biggest bribe. I'd keep my eye on Lucullus - he's rich, he's aristocratic, he's the only one there with a serious military reputation and he isn't going to be sitting around waiting for Pompey.

Question - We've heard of Catiline using Sullan veterans, but are there any Marian veterans taking sides in this? Sulla kept his massacres for the moneyed classes so there must be a bunch of ex-Marian centurions and legionaries still rattling around Italy - but at the moment their choices appear to be an aristocratic demagogue who presents himself as the heir of Sulla and the bunch of squabbling Optimates at Neapolis. Anyone fancying themselves as the next Cinna?
 
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