Norwegian Rocket Incident Scenario discussion thing

[Rosencrantz]

Wednesday January 25, 1995
In the early hours of the morning a Russian radar station detected an unidentified object flying along an air corridor between the Minuteman III silos in North Dakota and Moscow. The rocket had appeared out of nowhere and soon reached an altitude of 1,453 km, resembling a submarine launched trident missile. The Russian people were not alerted to the incident. At current trajectory the missile would reach the Russian mainland in ten minutes.

With 5 minutes to impact, Russian submarine commanders were ordered to be combat ready and begin targeting their SLBMs. Boris Yeltsin was given the nuclear briefcase, the Cheget, and entered his nuclear key into the machine. The missile was suspected as being a high altitude EMP warhead designed to blind Russia’s defenses prior to a full American assault. Yeltsin was hung-over from drinking the night before and surrounded by advisers convinced that the US, having won the cold war, was trying to finish them off. With just three minutes to impact and no word from the Americans, Yeltsin sent the launch order for a limited counter force strike.

By the time the US missile crashed harmlessly near Spitsbergen, 24 minutes after launch, the Russian nuclear attack was already underway. The missile was revealed to be loaded with high altitude scientific equipment for observing the aurora borealis. The Americans had forewarned Moscow of the launch but nobody had told the radar station. Yeltsin had started world war three on a false alarm.

The US military, which still had a launch-on-warning doctrine, detected multiple Russian launches and feared the worst. President Clinton, confused by the betrayal of a man who had signed a detargeting treaty with him the previous year, ordered the reports to be verified. Double and triple checks confirmed the report, the Russians had launched a surprise attack. Bill Clinton was thus forced to authorize a retaliatory counter force strike. Though their nuclear weapons had been detargeted, they only needed 60 seconds to retarget them. The targets hadn’t really changed since the cold war anyway.

Global Nuclear Arsenals in 1995

United States of America:10,904
Russian Federation:27,000
United Kingdom:422
France:500
China:234
Israel:63
India:14
Pakistan:13

Yeltsin and his advisors, now aware of their mistake, made desperate calls to Washington trying to explain the accident. Yeltsin pledged to unilaterally and immediately cease fire. Upon observing the Russian ceasefire the Americans ceased launching their own missiles.

So, what happens next? Is this even remotely plausible or interesting? All feedback is welcome.

Sources:
Pry, Peter (1999). War scare: Russia and America on the nuclear brink. New York: Praeger. pp. 214–227
Norris, Robert; Hans M. Kristensen (July 1, 2010). "Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945−2010". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

 

[CaliBoy1990]

Wednesday January 25, 1995
In the early hours of the morning a Russian radar station detected an unidentified object flying along an air corridor between the Minuteman III silos in North Dakota and Moscow. The rocket had appeared out of nowhere and soon reached an altitude of 1,453 km, resembling a submarine launched trident missile. The Russian people were not alerted to the incident. At current trajectory the missile would reach the Russian mainland in ten minutes.

With 5 minutes to impact, Russian submarine commanders were ordered to be combat ready and begin targeting their SLBMs. Boris Yeltsin was given the nuclear briefcase, the Cheget, and entered his nuclear key into the machine. The missile was suspected as being a high altitude EMP warhead designed to blind Russia’s defenses prior to a full American assault. Yeltsin was hung-over from drinking the night before and surrounded by advisers convinced that the US, having won the cold war, was trying to finish them off. With just three minutes to impact and no word from the Americans, Yeltsin sent the launch order for a limited counter force strike.

By the time the US missile crashed harmlessly near Spitsbergen, 24 minutes after launch, the Russian nuclear attack was already underway. The missile was revealed to be loaded with high altitude scientific equipment for observing the aurora borealis. The Americans had forewarned Moscow of the launch but nobody had told the radar station. Yeltsin had started world war three on a false alarm.

The US military, which still had a launch-on-warning doctrine, detected multiple Russian launches and feared the worst. President Clinton, confused by the betrayal of a man who had signed a detargeting treaty with him the previous year, ordered the reports to be verified. Double and triple checks confirmed the report, the Russians had launched a surprise attack. Bill Clinton was thus forced to authorize a retaliatory counter force strike. Though their nuclear weapons had been detargeted, they only needed 60 seconds to retarget them. The targets hadn’t really changed since the cold war anyway.

Global Nuclear Arsenals in 1995

United States of America:10,904
Russian Federation:27,000
United Kingdom:422
France:500
China:234
Israel:63
India:14
Pakistan:13

Yeltsin and his advisors, now aware of their mistake, made desperate calls to Washington trying to explain the accident. Yeltsin pledged to unilaterally and immediately cease fire. Upon observing the Russian ceasefire the Americans ceased launching their own missiles.

So, what happens next? Is this even remotely plausible or interesting? All feedback is welcome.

Sources:
Pry, Peter (1999). War scare: Russia and America on the nuclear brink. New York: Praeger. pp. 214–227
Norris, Robert; Hans M. Kristensen (July 1, 2010). "Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945−2010". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Well, to be honest, while this would obviously be a nightmarish scenario, I'm also not terribly convinced that it would end in the complete destruction of civilization as we knew it, TBH, simply because of the efforts that had been made by both sides in the '80s.

Possibly the most plausible scenario I can think of is one similar to what takes place in Eric Harry's Arc Light: a lot of military bases would probably get blown to shit and some cities might be lost on both sides but I doubt there's much of a chance of the Russians just going all out for the hell of it and I feel the same about America as well: this wasn't 1983.

 

[Delta Force]

Is Yeltsin drunk when this happens? I heard that this was actually one of the rare occasions in which Yeltsin was sober (they had the Russian nuclear football out and everything).

 

[Rosencrantz]

I believe he was sober in OTL but in TTL i'm gonna leave it a bit more ambiguous. I think its pretty plausible that he'd be tipsy that morning. As for the exchange, I'm limiting it to a counter force strike as the Russians would realize their mistake pretty quickly. I guess what I'm asking is how bad the aftermaths would be and what would the other nuclear states do?

Also how likely would a bigger counter value strike/exchange be?

 

[Delta Force]

In 1995 the Ukrainians and Kazakhstanis might still have nuclear weapons. Ukraine might actually still be the third largest nuclear power, it inherited thousands of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and their deployment systems.

As for stopping the exchange, that's almost certainly impossible. SIOP and the EAM system was never set up to call things back in once activated, because there isn't much point in that.

 

[Rosencrantz]

They say a nuclear exchange would inevitably escalate into a counter-value exchange because neither side could trust the other to restrain itself but its different here.
As soon as the rocket proved to be non-military the Russians would be going hell for leather to try and explain themselves to the Americans...right? Guys?

 

[Delta Force]

They say a nuclear exchange would inevitably escalate into a counter-value exchange because neither side could trust the other to restrain itself but its different here.
As soon as the rocket proved to be non-military the Russians would be going hell for leather to try and explain themselves to the Americans...right? Guys?

We can only speculate on what SIOP entailed. SAC doesn't exist (as a unit or as a bomber force on ground alert) and the SLBM force probably has a delay of a few hours. The USAF ground force is going to be the main deterrent, and in the 1990s it still has Minuteman II and Peacekeeper missiles in addition to the Minuteman III force. That's a few hundred Minuteman missiles (perhaps around 1,000 or so, depending on the pace of Minuteman II retirement) and fifty Peacekeepers.

The USN force consists of the Trident I and II missiles of the various ballistic missile submarines. In addition to the Ohio class, a few older submarines were still in service in the 1990s.

In a best case scenario, the USAF land missiles are counterforce, and it ends there. But we can only speculate on what SIOP entailed, and it's possible (perhaps even likely) that a few countervalue targets would have been hit as well. Of course it's also possible that SIOP retained the SLBM force for countervalue. It's all speculation, and it can go either way. But the thing keeping most in line with American policy since the early 1960s and the Kennedy administration would be that America doesn't go countervalue first, in which case the first salvo is going to hit the Russian military hard (and perhaps Former Soviet, depending on what's in SIOP).

 

[Rosencrantz]

That makes sense as land based missiles will be the first to disappear when the soviet bombs arrive. Subs can survive the opening assault, in theory.

Any guess what soviet doctrine was like at the time? Again the historical documents are only going to be speculation. I'd say conventional forces wouldn't have enough time to do anything offensive or defensive on either side.

 

[Delta Force]

The Soviets didn't really distinguish between limited and full scale nuclear war, so the strategy was to use as many nuclear weapons as possible (they really stuck with a "use it or lose it" mindset). Given that, it's possible they didn't distinguish between countervalue and counterforcr targets. That's speculation of course, but "use it or lose it" was Soviet doctrine from the mid-1970s or so onwards. Presumably it would have been the Russian strategy as well, since the mid-1990s wasn't that far removed from the Cold War.

 

[Rosencrantz]

Luckily in this scenario the Russians have a reason to unilaterally cease fire before they could throw everything and the kitchen sink...maybe.

Reckon France and the UK would get involved? They probably wouldn't have enough time, same with China.

 

[bsmart]

I don't think explanations can be made fast enough to stop the madness. Once one side starts throwing missiles the other side has the choice of launching immediately or losing the capability. Given that there will be a couple minutes lost as the watchers go through the verification and 'I can't believe this is happening' thought process there is no time to listen to the opponents claims 'It was a mistake' (Which they may believe is simply a ploy to keep them from launching) So once the launch is verified they will begin their launch procedures.

I would say 'first side that flinches loses' but in this case both sides lose no matter who flinches (or doesn't flinch) first.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The Soviets didn't really distinguish between limited and full scale nuclear war, so the strategy was to use as many nuclear weapons as possible (they really stuck with a "use it or lose it" mindset). Given that, it's possible they didn't distinguish between countervalue and counterforcr targets. That's speculation of course, but "use it or lose it" was Soviet doctrine from the mid-1970s or so onwards. Presumably it would have been the Russian strategy as well, since the mid-1990s wasn't that far removed from the Cold War.

Thats my take, at least as far as most of us in the US think of 'full' & 'limited'. The descriptions of the Soviet war plans I saw back in the 1990s were not much for pissing around with half measures. Fast & decisive results were sought.

 

[Sanderford]

Even when the two leaders agree to ceasefire, tens of millions will die in this kind of scenario. Once those missiles are launched, communication with them from outside is literally impossible. They can self-abort due to technical issues, but that's literally it. ABM technology is very limited at best, so basically every missile which has been launched up that point will strike successfully. Missiles launched from submarines are the same way.

Needless to say, the level of destruction and the loss of life in both Russia and the United States would be unspeakable, like nothing seen before.

 

[Rosencrantz]

That's pretty much my assumption. So what of Europe and China? I guess France and the UK would disappear under soviet attack. Were the Russians targeting China in the 90's?

 

[Historyman 14]

That's pretty much my assumption. So what of Europe and China? I guess France and the UK would disappear under soviet attack. Were the Russians targeting China in the 90's?

Most likely. Poor China.

 

[Historyman 14]

And Coldplay was formed in 1996. So, no Coldplay.

 

[Lord Grattan]

Wednesday January 25, 1995
In the early hours of the morning a Russian radar station detected an unidentified object flying along an air corridor between the Minuteman III silos in North Dakota and Moscow. The rocket had appeared out of nowhere and soon reached an altitude of 1,453 km, resembling a submarine launched trident missile. The Russian people were not alerted to the incident. At current trajectory the missile would reach the Russian mainland in ten minutes.

With 5 minutes to impact, Russian submarine commanders were ordered to be combat ready and begin targeting their SLBMs. Boris Yeltsin was given the nuclear briefcase, the Cheget, and entered his nuclear key into the machine. The missile was suspected as being a high altitude EMP warhead designed to blind Russia’s defenses prior to a full American assault. Yeltsin was hung-over from drinking the night before and surrounded by advisers convinced that the US, having won the cold war, was trying to finish them off. With just three minutes to impact and no word from the Americans, Yeltsin sent the launch order for a limited counter force strike.

By the time the US missile crashed harmlessly near Spitsbergen, 24 minutes after launch, the Russian nuclear attack was already underway. The missile was revealed to be loaded with high altitude scientific equipment for observing the aurora borealis. The Americans had forewarned Moscow of the launch but nobody had told the radar station. Yeltsin had started world war three on a false alarm.

The US military, which still had a launch-on-warning doctrine, detected multiple Russian launches and feared the worst. President Clinton, confused by the betrayal of a man who had signed a detargeting treaty with him the previous year, ordered the reports to be verified. Double and triple checks confirmed the report, the Russians had launched a surprise attack. Bill Clinton was thus forced to authorize a retaliatory counter force strike. Though their nuclear weapons had been detargeted, they only needed 60 seconds to retarget them. The targets hadn’t really changed since the cold war anyway.

Global Nuclear Arsenals in 1995

United States of America:10,904
Russian Federation:27,000
United Kingdom:422
France:500
China:234
Israel:63
India:14
Pakistan:13

Yeltsin and his advisors, now aware of their mistake, made desperate calls to Washington trying to explain the accident. Yeltsin pledged to unilaterally and immediately cease fire. Upon observing the Russian ceasefire the Americans ceased launching their own missiles.

So, what happens next? Is this even remotely plausible or interesting? All feedback is welcome.

Sources:
Pry, Peter (1999). War scare: Russia and America on the nuclear brink. New York: Praeger. pp. 214–227
Norris, Robert; Hans M. Kristensen (July 1, 2010). "Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945−2010". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Glad you moved this thread to the proper forum.

Wait, the US aborts it's retaliatory strike altogether? The Russians may cease firing, but there are still hundreds of inbound Russian missiles. The US will launch a counter strike. No American President is going to turn the other cheek, so to speak, when the Russians are in the process of killing millions of Americans. These deaths are the result of an unprovoked and dastardly military attack. Now, after the counter attack, Yeltsin might be able to convince Clinton that he's not a lying, double-crossing SOB, which in turn could bring about a cease fire, but certainly not before.

 

[Delta Force]

Basically, the land based ICBMs are going to be used. The bombers are probably destroyed on the ground (they aren't on ground alert as of ~1991, give or take a year), and the SLBMs probably can be stopped before launch.

The big question is what SIOP actually looks like. I'll hazard something which is a guess, but seems to make sense. Each nuclear missile silo has a locked safe containing nuclear "cookies." Each probably programs a different attack plan into the launch computer, which makes sense as each missile has several targets programmed into its memory. A different Emergency Action Message (EAM) could lead to a different target being selected, missiles being launched or held back, etc. I would once again guess that the SIOP strategy for full nuclear war would be broken down into phases, giving time to allow for negotiations to try to halt the war. A phase (or EAM) probably can't be retracted, but escalating to the next phase can only occur if a valid EAM is sent.

Now this all works on the assumption that there are multiple EAMs as a war escalates. If there is one EAM that throws everything into motion I'm not sure if even the President could stop things. Here is the worst part of all. Depending on what is allowed under higher DEFCON levels and what happens to the chain of nuclear command and control, it's possible for command authority to balkanize among the major combat commands. At that point the nuclear war is likely to continue until they run out of nuclear warheads or (more likely) targets.

 

[bsmart]

"At that point the nuclear war is likely to continue until they run out of nuclear warheads or (more likely) targets."

As long as there is an unused warhead there is a target.

 

[Rosencrantz]

Glad you moved this thread to the proper forum.

Wait, the US aborts it's retaliatory strike altogether? The Russians may cease firing, but there are still hundreds of inbound Russian missiles. The US will launch a counter strike. No American President is going to turn the other cheek, so to speak, when the Russians are in the process of killing millions of Americans. These deaths are the result of an unprovoked and dastardly military attack. Now, after the counter attack, Yeltsin might be able to convince Clinton that he's not a lying, double-crossing SOB, which in turn could bring about a cease fire, but certainly not before.

Yes, sorry about that I'm a bit new to this.
The US would theoretically restrain itself to a counterforce strike as per one of the SIOP doctrines, Reagan had changed the US policy to counterforce, mostly using the vulnerable ground based launchers. What Delta has been saying is that its likely it would have escalated to a full blown countervalue exchange because the Russians have a 'use it or lose it' doctrine which the americans would want to match. That would include a second EAM to the SLBMs.

The issue is whether the russians phoning washington and saying 'sorry we fucked up' would have any effect on the americans by that stage. I've gotta say it seems unlikely.

Ergo Yeltsin being drunk has just atomized west europe, west russia, east china and the continental united states. Probably.