Northern Rhodesia General Election 1962: ANC-UFP Pact Holds

The Northern Rhodesia general election of September 1962 (followed by by-elections in December for unfilled seats) was the last to be held under the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It took place under a new constitution that gave all Africans the vote and greatly expanded African participation in the legislature, but still reserved 15 of 45 constituencies for a mostly-white "upper roll" of voters.

The election was fought primarily by three parties: Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP), Harry Nkumbula's Zambia African National Congress (ANC), and the mostly-white, pro-federation United Federal Party (UFP). The UNIP got 60 percent of the vote, but due to the gerrymandering created by the upper and lower rolls, won just 14 seats. The UFP won 16 seats on 21 percent of the vote, while the ANC won seven seats on 17 percent. Eight seats were left vacant because no candidate received a sufficient number of crossover votes.

Now here's where it gets interesting. Prior to the election, the ANC, which was a "moderate" party supporting a gradual transition to self-rule, formed an electoral pact with the UFP. However, as confirmed by David Mulford in his book on the election, this pact was highly controversial within the party, and was rejected by more than 125 delegates. After the election, IOTL, Nkumbula decided to rescind the pact and form a government with UNIP instead, becoming a junior partner in a cabinet led by Kaunda.

But what if Nkumbula had held to the pact instead, forming a "national government" with the UFP? The UFP was willing to give Nkumbula the post of prime minister, but it wanted half the cabinet, and it would have been the de facto senior partner due to its greater number of seats.

1. What effect on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland? Malawi was already a lost cause by this time, but an ANC-UFP coalition would keep Northern Rhodesia in, at least temporarily. However, the Rhodesian Front was already in power in Southern Rhodesia by this time, and given their absolute opposition to even the diluted majority rule that was being implemented in Northern Rhodesia, my guess is that the UDI crisis would still take place. At that point, the federation would end by default, albeit a couple of years later than OTL.

2. What would happen to Northern Rhodesia's legal status after 1965? There would be no more federation, and Britain wasn't interested in keeping it as a colony. Would the British government of the time consider the 1962 constitution enough of a majority-rule charter to grant independence, or would it push through a new constitution similar to the OTL 1964 one? A new charter would be opposed by both the UFP and ANC - but supported by a large majority of African voters.

3. How long could this state of affairs last? Kaunda and the UNIP would justly feel robbed, and the national government would have a terrible time meeting the expectations of both its white and black voters. The black voters would want land reform and universal suffrage, and while Africans in Northern Rhodesia weren't dispossessed to quite the same extent as in Southern Rhodesia, they were still land-hungry, and I doubt the UFP would countenance anything nearly enough to satisfy them. Nkumbula would want to show some progress, but he'd be held back at every turn.

There are several possibilities. The utopian one is that, as the crisis in Southern Rhodesia gets worse and as the ANC makes noises about crossing the floor, the Northern Rhodesian UFP has a "come to Jesus" moment and supports real progressive reform. Another one would involve the ANC getting fed up and actually crossing the floor to join Kaunda. A third would see the government hang on until 1966, at which point the UNIP would probably scoop up most of the African votes that went to the ANC in 1962 and win a majority despite the electoral rules. And the anti-utopian option is for Kaunda, enraged at his stolen victory, to join Mugabe in the bush, and for Northern Rhodesia to go UDI and erupt in flames like its southern neighbor.

Any thoughts on which of these is the most likely, or how else it might play out?
 
Giving this a second try.

A couple more ideas: If things get bad enough in Northern Rhodesia, might the British split off Barotseland and give it independence separately (most likely after TTL's equivalent of Lancaster House), resulting in a Lesotho-like traditional kingdom in the southwest? Also, would there be any conceivable situation in which the UFP and ANC actually merge?
 
One last shot, and if there's no interest (this means you, Julius Vogel), I'll accept defeat.

Anyway, does anyone have an idea of what could get Nkumbula to hold to the pact? He was, after all, an African nationalist, albeit a "moderate" one acceptable to the whites, and he was under enormous pressure from his voters to join Kaunda. The prospect of being prime minister in a national government as opposed to a junior minister under Kaunda would help, but it wouldn't be enough - he'd need some real gains to take back to his party.

I'm guessing that affirmative action within the civil service would be the easiest thing for the UFP to agree to - it's just jobs, not land. But I think the UFP would also have to give Nkumbula _something_ on land reform and voting rights, even if it's only a subsidized willing buyer-willing seller plan. Would the UFP's internal politics allow this?
 
I'd have commented earlier, but I honestly have no idea what I am about to talk about.

I would guess that, considering the internal division within the ANC that you described, that either 2 (best-case) or 3 (probable or worst-case) would happen. I'll go with three, because if someone is writing a TL (;)) then I think three is the most interesting.

Nkumbula is lured by hollow concessions and power for party cronies (mines, payoffs etc), albeit beneath the UFP dominance overall. Kaunda and ANC dissenters go off into the bush, absolutely enraged. Maybe Nkumbula gets assassinated, but only after the pact is cemented.

Barotseland is spun off as a new Lesotho, under British protection at first. By this time, the radicalization of politics has led the few black moderates to join the UFP as the majority of the ANC goes off with Kaunda. Cue a Rhodesia-style clusterfuck.

This leaves South Africa and the Rhodesias in Central Africa as white-minority states. We also have Salazar's Portugal, which historically was winning in Angola and Mozambique, but not in Guinea-Bissau. Here, Portuguese rebels can't use Zambia, and Nyasaland and Barotseland would be feeling the pressure to stay neutral. Nkumbula was also close with Moise Tshombe in Katanga. American leadership/CIA skullduggery also matters- Kennedy was a big fan of the African independence movements; if he fails in 64 or gets assassinated, I am unsure of how Nixon/Johnson/other would act in Africa. Most likely, the Luanda-Cape Town axis would hold up well...
 
Nkumbula is lured by hollow concessions and power for party cronies (mines, payoffs etc), albeit beneath the UFP dominance overall. Kaunda and ANC dissenters go off into the bush, absolutely enraged. Maybe Nkumbula gets assassinated, but only after the pact is cemented.

Barotseland is spun off as a new Lesotho, under British protection at first. By this time, the radicalization of politics has led the few black moderates to join the UFP as the majority of the ANC goes off with Kaunda. Cue a Rhodesia-style clusterfuck.

This leaves South Africa and the Rhodesias in Central Africa as white-minority states. We also have Salazar's Portugal, which historically was winning in Angola and Mozambique, but not in Guinea-Bissau. Here, Portuguese rebels can't use Zambia, and Nyasaland and Barotseland would be feeling the pressure to stay neutral. Nkumbula was also close with Moise Tshombe in Katanga.

I'm actually wondering what would happen to Nyasaland in this scenario. In 1962 and 1963, it was already governed by the Malawi Congress Party, but it was still a British colony. If there are bush wars in both Rhodesias, Whitehall might decide to delay Nyasaland's independence in order to prevent it from getting involved. That would result in Nyasaland being mostly self-governing but with defense still controlled by Britain and with its government subject to Whitehall veto. Banda being Banda, I can't imagine him being content with the situation. A worst-case scenario could see Malawi going UDI and supporting Kaunda, ZANU and ZAPU, following which its neighbors would treat it much like South Africa treated Mozambique.

Barotseland, on the other hand, would most likely take a leaf from Swaziland's book and stay neutral, although it might have to crack down hard on would-be volunteers.

This could be a hell of a mess, especially if Nkumbula gets assassinated and not even a figleaf of majority rule remains.
 
Barotseland's Rulers were traditionally conservative and wary of outside interference, so I could see it becoming a separate country at the behest of its Litunga. The issue being that this would be by far one of the least developed countries in Africa, with few paved roads and no economic resources. Even Lesotho and Swaziland had diamonds. An independent Barotseland would be dependent on the minority-ruled territories, South African-ruled Southwest Africa to the South, Portuguese-ruled Angola to the West. For South Africa and Portugal this is a bonus as SWAPO and the MPLA based their insurgents in this area with the assistance of the Kaunda government. For the Portuguese this will effectively end the guerrilla war in Angola by 1965. In addition, once independence was achieved (probably around 1968), the new country would be dependent on remittances from migrant workers in Rhodesia and South Africa.

As for land redistribution, 94% of Northern Rhodesia was set aside as Native Trust Land. Only 6% became crown land and was allocated to European settlers or corporations. Most of the nearly 80,000 Europeans in the country lived in the Copperbelt and to a lesser extent along the central railway corridor. The majority being engaged in mining or civil administration. By the early 1960s, the Dominion Party in the Federation called for this region being incorporated into a "Greater Rhodesia" with the territory in the East (a line running from the Katanga Border to Mozambique) being handed to Nyasaland, and Barotseland becoming a separate Protectorate. Keep in mind this proposal went back to the 1910s.
 
I'm actually wondering what would happen to Nyasaland in this scenario. In 1962 and 1963, it was already governed by the Malawi Congress Party, but it was still a British colony. If there are bush wars in both Rhodesias, Whitehall might decide to delay Nyasaland's independence in order to prevent it from getting involved. That would result in Nyasaland being mostly self-governing but with defense still controlled by Britain and with its government subject to Whitehall veto. Banda being Banda, I can't imagine him being content with the situation. A worst-case scenario could see Malawi going UDI and supporting Kaunda, ZANU and ZAPU, following which its neighbors would treat it much like South Africa treated Mozambique.

Barotseland, on the other hand, would most likely take a leaf from Swaziland's book and stay neutral, although it might have to crack down hard on would-be volunteers.

This could be a hell of a mess, especially if Nkumbula gets assassinated and not even a figleaf of majority rule remains.

Considering Banda is Banda, and considering the situation, I see that UDI and supporting Kaunda scenario as pretty plausible.

Combine that with poor and white-aligned Barotseland, independent Katanga and the twin pressures of Salazar and South Africa... sounds like a great mix for a dystopian TL.

And then there are other factors- an alt-Carnation going FUBAR or Mandela being executed/dying in prison....
 
Banda was very keen not too support the insurgent movements as Malawi relied on income from its migrant workers in South Africa and Rhodesia for foreign exchange. He hosted Vorster on a visit to Malawi in 1970 and paid a state visit to South Africa himself in 1971. The following year he paid a visit to Mozambique as a guest of the Governor-General there. As early and March 1967, Portugal and Malawi signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation.

These highlighted Banda's economic reliance on South Africa and Portugal. The Portuguese assisted his government in establishing a small navy consisting of patrol boats on Lake Malawi. This navy was staffed mostly by Portuguese personnel. New railways were built and Malawi relied on transport links through Portuguese Mozambique for access to the world through the ports of Beira and Nacala. In addition, the South African and Portuguese governments financed the construction of the new capital in Lilongwe. Also, in 1970 South Africa became Malawi's largest trading partner.

One of the ideas floated during the late 1960s was granting Malawi control over Northern Mozambique, or at least Niassa Province (District before 1975). The goal being to isolate Mozambique south of the Zambezi from the Tanzania-backed FRELIMO guerillas. In addition only 20% of the white population in Mozambique lived South of the Zambezi, however nearly 60% of the black population lived north of the river. Banda himself had said that Malawi's natural boundary was the Zambezi River to the south and the Indian Ocean.
 
Barotseland's Rulers were traditionally conservative and wary of outside interference, so I could see it becoming a separate country at the behest of its Litunga. The issue being that this would be by far one of the least developed countries in Africa, with few paved roads and no economic resources. Even Lesotho and Swaziland had diamonds. An independent Barotseland would be dependent on the minority-ruled territories, South African-ruled Southwest Africa to the South, Portuguese-ruled Angola to the West. For South Africa and Portugal this is a bonus as SWAPO and the MPLA based their insurgents in this area with the assistance of the Kaunda government. For the Portuguese this will effectively end the guerrilla war in Angola by 1965. In addition, once independence was achieved (probably around 1968), the new country would be dependent on remittances from migrant workers in Rhodesia and South Africa.

The Litunga would be fine with this arrangement, but many of his people wouldn't. Kaunda got a lot of Lozi votes in both 1962 and '64, and some of the younger people were UNIP militants who supported an end to the protectorate. They, the Angolan rebels and the bush fighters in the Rhodesias would find common cause. An independent Barotseland would become dependent on Portugal and Rhodesia for security as well as jobs, which would tie it closer to the minority-rule states but would also stretch Angolan and Rhodesian resources.

Also, speaking of Portugal, the Estado Novo can't last forever - winning the war in Angola would remove one of the factors that led to the Carnation Revolution, but conscripts would still get sent to fight FRELIMO and PAIGC, and there was still a lot of pent-up frustration with Salazar's repression. Caetano wasn't liberalizing nearly fast enough - maybe he'd last a few more years ITTL, but once Spain democratizes, Portugal would come under serious pressure. Would the government that replaces him want to keep the African colonies, or would it look for an exit like de Gaulle did?

As for land redistribution, 94% of Northern Rhodesia was set aside as Native Trust Land. Only 6% became crown land and was allocated to European settlers or corporations.

I'd thought it was more, but upon checking, you're right. So jobs and infrastructure probably would be more of an issue than land, and if Nkumbula could deliver civil-service preferences, development spending and rural schools, maybe he could make a UFP-ANC coalition last until 1966. One man one vote would still be a major issue, though, and one on which the UFP historically didn't show much flexibility.

By the early 1960s, the Dominion Party in the Federation called for this region being incorporated into a "Greater Rhodesia" with the territory in the East (a line running from the Katanga Border to Mozambique) being handed to Nyasaland, and Barotseland becoming a separate Protectorate. Keep in mind this proposal went back to the 1910s.

Like the periodic proposals for South Africa to retreat to the Cape, with or without a corridor to Johannesburg? I could see this making sense from the Rhodesian point of view - Greater Rhodesia would keep the richest mineral resources and would have fewer restive Africans under its rule - but that corridor between the Copperbelt and the Southern Rhodesia border would be narrow and vulnerable. This doesn't seem like a scheme they'd risk doing while a bush war was going on.

Banda was very keen not too support the insurgent movements as Malawi relied on income from its migrant workers in South Africa and Rhodesia for foreign exchange. He hosted Vorster on a visit to Malawi in 1970 and paid a state visit to South Africa himself in 1971. The following year he paid a visit to Mozambique as a guest of the Governor-General there. As early and March 1967, Portugal and Malawi signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation.

This was true in OTL, but a Banda who goes UDI because Whitehall is holding back Nyasaland's independence might not make the same choices, or be able to make them. Banda's natural instincts were conservative and pro-Western - he was a classicist to the core - but his main driving force was his own power. If that meant allying with Tanzania and Kaunda in order to make good Malawi's split from the UK, I think he'd do it.

Of course, if Portugal and Rhodesia offer to back Banda, he'd probably accept - but given how scared of majority rule they were, and given how much personal bad blood there was between the UFP's leadership on the one hand and Banda on the other, would they have realistically done so? Vorster didn't have the same personal history with him that Welensky did, and Welensky would be very powerful in a UFP-ANC-ruled Northern Rhodesia.

One of the ideas floated during the late 1960s was granting Malawi control over Northern Mozambique, or at least Niassa Province (District before 1975). The goal being to isolate Mozambique south of the Zambezi from the Tanzania-backed FRELIMO guerillas... Banda himself had said that Malawi's natural boundary was the Zambezi River to the south and the Indian Ocean.

Interesting. Do you have a source for Banda's Greater Malawi dreams? I don't doubt you, but I'd be interested in reading more.

In any event, Banda would have had a very hard time controlling that large a territory with Malawi's resources.

And then there are other factors- an alt-Carnation going FUBAR or Mandela being executed/dying in prison....

Hmmm, do you think a collapse in Northern Rhodesia would scare the South African government enough that it would push harder for a death sentence? If so, it might not be just Mandela who gets hanged.
 
Hmmm, do you think a collapse in Northern Rhodesia would scare the South African government enough that it would push harder for a death sentence? If so, it might not be just Mandela who gets hanged.

I was actually thinking it's done less as a planned thing and more as an events-get-out-of-hand thing; it depends on whether Vorster is smart enough to see the effects a dead Mandela would have.

And if the Litunga doesn't have all of the Lozi, and if Banda hates Welensky enough to ignore his Western biases... we could have ourselves a proper clusterfuck.
 
Regarding the Lozi people, more than likely they would have embraced a new Barotse nation just as they embraced a Zambian nation. The latter being a rather modern concept, but one has to keep in mind that as late as 1968 the literacy rate in Barotseland was only 15%. That is not to say that the monarchy could not be overthrown, but I suspect an independent Barotse Monarchy would have an authoritarian traditionalist pro-western government. It would more than likely be dependent on western aid, and portray itself as staunchly anti-Communist country. Perhaps its security forces would rely on South African assistance. Essentially I can see it being like Swaziland is today. However, once the Cold War ends and western military aid becomes scarce in the 1990s, the regime could be overthrown.

In Angola the war was essentially finished by 1972, mostly due to the MPLA's own internal problems. This was coupled with the USSR withdrawing aid from the group on 1973 and it splintering into two factions, in April 1974 it splintered into a three factions. UNITA operating in eastern Angola was essentially being aided by the Portuguese secret police to attack the MPLA. The FNLA was backed by Zaire, but it was hampered by the Portuguese coin operations along the Zaire border. With the war done by 1965, this would allow Portuguese forces to focus on Mozambique and Portuguese-Guinea.

If Malawi were given the Eastern portion of Northern Rhodesia, this would help the Portuguese too as in 1969 FRELIMO began moving its bases into Zambia north of Tete District with Kaunda's aid. In summer of 1970 the Portuguese organized the largest offensive using 8,000 soldiers to clear FRELIMO out of northern Mozambique, and Zambia's aid was crucial into moving the front to the under construction Cabora Bassa Dam.

This would leave the Portuguese to focus solely on Portuguese Guinea where the situation was a stalemate, but the casualty rate much higher than in Angola or Mozambique. General Spinola was the governor here and his book "Portugal e o futuro" published in 1973 was instrumental in sparking the Carnation Revolution.

With less pressure on Portugal, there is not as large of a need for conscription in such large numbers. However, one of two things could happen. This could allow Marcelo Caetano to liberalize and perhaps he has more support, or alternately the regime could harden its stance. In the first instance, perhaps Marcelo Caetano's UDI for Angola and Mozambique is pushed through.

Marcello Caetano had formulated a plan where Angolan black and white elites would declare independence for Angola and Portugal would simply act like it had nothing to do with it and accept it as a "fait accompli". Portugal could keep Cabinda with 2/3rds of Angola's oil and fewer than 100,000 people at the time,.

In Mozambique one of the plans was to gather pro-western blacks and whites and have Mozambique businessman Jorge Jardim engineer a declaration of independence there with the assistance of Malawi. Another proposal included the partitioning of the country with the "white south" of the Zambezi remaining in Portuguese hands. The north being a buffer state being run by pro-western black rulers.

Guinea-Bissau would be granted independence, whereas Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Cabinda, Macau and East Timor would remain Portuguese. This would allow Portugal to integrate itself slowly into the EEC and perhaps still join the EU as in OTL by 1986.

On the other hand a more intransigent right-wing regime led by the ultras could take the reins of power. My guess is that being Machiavellian enough they could control the country as an anti-Communist stalwart until the early 1990s. Once the bogey of Communism is gone they'd have to reform or fall, this would probably lead to a more peaceful transition of power in the former colonies two decades later than in OTL.

Spain is mentioned, but even democratization in Spain would not necessarily mean the same for Portugal. Portugal traditionally had its back towards Spain, with only 4% of Portuguese trade being with Spain before the EC membership. I would argue that by 1975 Portugal was much more socially conservative than Spain (even amongst those espousing left wing politics).

As for the Rhodesian Corridor, it would not be narrow, but simply imagine of line going straight northward from the Northwestern Corner of Mozambique to the Katanga. In addition, Barotseland would be its own country, Rhodesia would get the rest.

Finally, if there were a "Greater Rhodesia" the UDI Rhodesia would have benefit from it. The Bush War really didn't begin until December 1972 when white farms were attacked at Centenary on the Zambian border. However, the nationalist leaders had been imprisoned in 1964 and were only released due to South African pressure in December 1974, allowing the nationalists to regroup. In addition, the ability to use Mozambique as a base in 1975 greatly assisted ZANU and ZAPU.

Without this pressure, Rhodesia too may be able to survive until the 1990s. What happens to South Africa is anyone's guess. Keep in mind that Rhodesia still had more whites immigrating to the country than emigrating between 1967 and 1975, a reversal of the 1961-1966 period. With the laager still intact the pressure to reform may be gone. On the other hand, they save quite a bit of money by not having to spend so much on internal security. In addition, there wouldn't be any frontline states to pressure reform. Sanctions may still be there, but Rhodesia weathered tougher sanctions during the 1965-1979 period and only the escalation of the Bush War pressured change.

I'd assume that South Africa would democratize too, but you could get a situation where southern Africa except South Africa goes to majority rule by the 1990s. South Africa could become a regime run by right-wing extremists still fighting to maintain its control of Namibia and involved in destabilisation of neighbouring countries. They'd the most of the 2004-2014 commodities boom to sell minerals to China, a country not opposed to trading with rogue regimes. For military hardware it becomes friendly with Putin's Russia and Belarus, but is largely isolated from the international community.

As for Banda's claim he made it during a speech in the 1960s. He also claimed part of Tanzania in 1971, so the seriousness of his claims is to be questioned.
 
One last shot, and if there's no interest (this means you, Julius Vogel), I'll accept defeat.

Anyway, does anyone have an idea of what could get Nkumbula to hold to the pact? He was, after all, an African nationalist, albeit a "moderate" one acceptable to the whites, and he was under enormous pressure from his voters to join Kaunda. The prospect of being prime minister in a national government as opposed to a junior minister under Kaunda would help, but it wouldn't be enough - he'd need some real gains to take back to his party.

I'm guessing that affirmative action within the civil service would be the easiest thing for the UFP to agree to - it's just jobs, not land. But I think the UFP would also have to give Nkumbula _something_ on land reform and voting rights, even if it's only a subsidized willing buyer-willing seller plan. Would the UFP's internal politics allow this?

I just found the thread! I'll comment further later in the day hopefully (work is very quiet)!

I am now down the rabbit hole of House of Lords debates on the topic from 62 and 63. I fear I may never escape.
 
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I recommend to you all to read the link below, it being from the lords soon after the elections mentioned above. It is quite a useful insight into what the various parties in Britain were thinking. Huggins himself (as Lord Malvern) contributes.

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/...a-and-nyasaland-1#S5LV0254P0_19631217_HOL_186

Some gems

Lord Ogmore: As the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, has said, we now have two African nationalist Governments representing a 1161 majority of the population in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, and we have a Right Wing, white Government in Southern Rhodesia representing a small proportion of the population, although of course an important one. I am given to understand that the Rhodesian Front, led by Mr. Winston Field, is supported by about 40,000 European voters out of a population of some 300,000 whites and 3½million others. Of the Opposition in Southern Rhodesia, half of the members of the United Federal Party, led by Sir Edgar Whitehead, were elected in African constituencies with 1,500 votes in all, six of them being elected with fewer than 100 votes apiece. As the noble Earl said, no doubt that was due to the African boycott. Some of Mr. Field's followers, so it is reported, undoubtedly favour apartheid


...


Before I conclude I should like to says a word or two about the Congo, which, so far as I can recall, the noble Earl did not mention but which is very important in this context. What is the situation between Katanga and Northern Rhodesia? I have heard that just recently Mr. Tshombe has met Mr. Nkumbula and Mr. Kaunda in Northern Rhodesia. I do not know what they decided, or whether they decided anything. There is no reason why they should not meet; they control neighbouring territories and it is advisable for such people to meet to discuss matters. I have no objection to it at all, and I think that it is an interesting development.

The United Nations has suggested that Katanga copper and cobalt should be exported through the Port of Matadi so as to obtain revenue from it. We are very interested in this proposal, because Northern Rhodesia, as a present outlet for Katanga copper and cobalt, will be affected. In fact, if there is any forceful attempt to stop the export of copper and cobalt, we shall be expected to assist by blocking that route. We are also interested as taxpayers because we are one of the countries paying very heavily for the Congo operations. Several countries—Soviet Russia, France, Belgium, Portugal and others—pay nothing towards these operations. I believe that those countries which pay nothing should have no vote or say in regard to what happens in the Congo or in regard to other actions which may arise from the Congo; otherwise we shall find that those who do not pay the piper will call the tune.
 
3. How long could this state of affairs last? Kaunda and the UNIP would justly feel robbed, and the national government would have a terrible time meeting the expectations of both its white and black voters. The black voters would want land reform and universal suffrage, and while Africans in Northern Rhodesia weren't dispossessed to quite the same extent as in Southern Rhodesia, they were still land-hungry, and I doubt the UFP would countenance anything nearly enough to satisfy them. Nkumbula would want to show some progress, but he'd be held back at every turn.

There are several possibilities. The utopian one is that, as the crisis in Southern Rhodesia gets worse and as the ANC makes noises about crossing the floor, the Northern Rhodesian UFP has a "come to Jesus" moment and supports real progressive reform. Another one would involve the ANC getting fed up and actually crossing the floor to join Kaunda. A third would see the government hang on until 1966, at which point the UNIP would probably scoop up most of the African votes that went to the ANC in 1962 and win a majority despite the electoral rules. And the anti-utopian option is for Kaunda, enraged at his stolen victory, to join Mugabe in the bush, and for Northern Rhodesia to go UDI and erupt in flames like its southern neighbor.

Any thoughts on which of these is the most likely, or how else it might play out?

I don't think Kuanda would go to the Bush. He would be very angry and rightly so, but the tide of history is clearly on his side. He has the vast majority of African voters on his side, the current franchise is awfully skewed against him and will inevitably be rebalanced towards African voters, the ANC clearly are a waning force, reliant on foreign money (likely to dry up) and the federation almost certainly to dissolve very soon. New elections and a new constitution will likely come sooner rather than later. He also has the ear of the Labour Party in London and is likely to benefit from their support.

If he goes bush, he throws away most of this for uncertain rewards and personal risk. The men who went bush in the south knew they were unlikely to ever get a fair shake and so there was little alternative to violent revolution.
 
Regarding the Lozi people, more than likely they would have embraced a new Barotse nation just as they embraced a Zambian nation. The latter being a rather modern concept, but one has to keep in mind that as late as 1968 the literacy rate in Barotseland was only 15%. That is not to say that the monarchy could not be overthrown, but I suspect an independent Barotse Monarchy would have an authoritarian traditionalist pro-western government.

There certainly was some sentiment for the Barotse nation - it was able to keep its privileges when Zambia became independent, although Kaunda abrogated them within a couple of years. The older people especially would be loyal to the king and would support a conservative monarchy. On the other hand, the literate 15 percent were disproportionately supporters of UNIP, so Kaunda would have built-in support among the people who would make up the Barotseland civil service. I expect the monarchy would be able to survive in the short to medium term, but it would depend on Portuguese and Rhodesian help with security.

If Malawi were given the Eastern portion of Northern Rhodesia, this would help the Portuguese too as in 1969 FRELIMO began moving its bases into Zambia north of Tete District with Kaunda's aid.

I'm not sure that Malawi would be able to stop this from happening, though. The Malawi army was weak, and while some of the population of this area is Chewa, most of it isn't. The non-Chewa population would fight Banda and they'd accept help from FRELIMO to do so. They wouldn't get the kind of help they got from Kaunda, but the region might become anarchic enough for them to get a foothold.

With less pressure on Portugal, there is not as large of a need for conscription in such large numbers. However, one of two things could happen. This could allow Marcelo Caetano to liberalize and perhaps he has more support, or alternately the regime could harden its stance. In the first instance, perhaps Marcelo Caetano's UDI for Angola and Mozambique is pushed through.

This would be interesting. I could see it working in southern Mozambique or in the coastal provinces of Angola, where the black and white elites could make a go of things. Portugal would also have little trouble keeping Cabinda. If northern Mozambique becomes independent separately, though, its pro-Western government might only last a couple of years without the Portuguese army backing it.

Spain is mentioned, but even democratization in Spain would not necessarily mean the same for Portugal. Portugal traditionally had its back towards Spain, with only 4% of Portuguese trade being with Spain before the EC membership. I would argue that by 1975 Portugal was much more socially conservative than Spain (even amongst those espousing left wing politics).

I hadn't known that. Still, Portugal would probably want to join the EEC as a path to prosperity, and that would require it to reform much as Spain did.

As for the Rhodesian Corridor, it would not be narrow, but simply imagine of line going straight northward from the Northwestern Corner of Mozambique to the Katanga.

That would be defensible, yes, although it would also have a larger African population than a corridor that took in the railroad and the European-owned lands.

I recommend to you all to read the link below, it being from the lords soon after the elections mentioned above. It is quite a useful insight into what the various parties in Britain were thinking.

Interesting. ITTL, of course, they wouldn't be talking about the dissolution of the federation just yet, but it seems they were reconciled to majority rule in at least Northern Rhodesia - in fact, that it had largely passed beyond the point of controversy.

Hmmm, I wonder if a UDI in Northern as well as Southern Rhodesia, endangering strategic copper resources as well as thwarting majority rule in a country where Westminster was set on it, would have induced Britain to send in troops.

I don't think Kaunda would go to the Bush. He would be very angry and rightly so, but the tide of history is clearly on his side. He has the vast majority of African voters on his side, the current franchise is awfully skewed against him and will inevitably be rebalanced towards African voters, the ANC clearly are a waning force, reliant on foreign money (likely to dry up) and the federation almost certainly to dissolve very soon. New elections and a new constitution will likely come sooner rather than later. He also has the ear of the Labour Party in London and is likely to benefit from their support.

You're probably right - more than that, Kaunda would figure that the ANC's vote would melt away in the next election, and that he'd be able to win even under rigged rules. At that point, he'd be the one to negotiate a new constitution.

He'd go bush if he were forced to, though - say, if Welensky went UDI or joined Ian Smith in doing so.
 
I agree with Julius' assessment. The ANC's pole position is clearly temporary, and that much is obvious to Kaunda given his voter share. It's hard to think of just why the ANC would continue with the pact with the UFP under these conditions but if they did it would not surprise me if at least some ANC MPs expressed disquiet about the deal or maybe even outright crossed the floor, thus precipitating a collapse of the ANC-UFP coalition unless there were further by elections for the 8 vacant seats. Even 1 ANC MP crossing the floor would have meant the ANC-UFP majority would be gone and the ANC-UFP government would become a minority one (officially in the 45 seat parliament). Unless most of the ANC MPs were benefitting from the deal then the ANC is likely to meltdown.

This would in the end merely delay Kaunda's assumption of power by a factor of maybe a few weeks to a couple years at most.
 
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