North Korean Army issued SKS and AK-47s in Korean War

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Deleted member 1487

What if the Soviets had provided the North Koreans and later Chinese with SKSs and AK-47s to use in the Korean War? What impact would it have had on the US's views on small arms and the intermediate cartridge and would it have helped give the North Koreans an edge in the early fighting (beyond what they already had)?
 
There were issues with the pre-1952 AK, not reliable. So would probably be SKS

WWII casualty rates vs Korean War on US troops are pretty similar, with Shells and fragments responsible for most deaths 51.2%(WWII) and 49.6%(KW)

small arms deaths 31.8%(WWII) and 33.2%(KW)

Wounds is a little different, from the later introduction of Flak Vests after 1952 and MASH evac

non Fatal Shell wounds 57.5%(WWII) 50.7%(KW) and non fatal small arms 19.2%(WWII) 27.0%(KW)

Korean War had almost 3x the deaths from Hand Grenades from WWII, and 2.5% non fatal wounds in WWII vs 9.0% in the Korean War


tl;dr: fewer SMGs wounds in 7,62x25 to 7,62x39 intermediate rifle means the KW non fatal bullet wound percentage would be slightly less than OTL
 

Deleted member 1487

There were issues with the pre-1952 AK, not reliable. So would probably be SKS

WWII casualty rates vs Korean War on US troops are pretty similar, with Shells and fragments responsible for most deaths 51.2%(WWII) and 49.6%(KW)

small arms deaths 31.8%(WWII) and 33.2%(KW)

Wounds is a little different, from the later introduction of Flak Vests after 1952 and MASH evac

non Fatal Shell wounds 57.5%(WWII) 50.7%(KW) and non fatal small arms 19.2%(WWII) 27.0%(KW)

Korean War had almost 3x the deaths from Hand Grenades from WWII, and 2.5% non fatal wounds in WWII vs 9.0% in the Korean War


tl;dr: fewer SMGs wounds in 7,62x25 to 7,62x39 intermediate rifle means the KW non fatal bullet wound percentage would be slightly less than OTL
The North Koreans and Chinese used SMGs, so had to often close to within 100m or less to use them effectively, while the SKS would be been accurate and deadly at 300m or more. Early AKs did have some issues, but the ones that worked could have been sent.

Might it not influence US thoughts about adopting and intermediate cartridge themselves or developing their own SKS/AK?
 
The North Koreans and Chinese used SMGs, so had to often close to within 100m or less to use them effectively, while the SKS would be been accurate and deadly at 300m or more. Early AKs did have some issues, but the ones that worked could have been sent.

Might it not influence US thoughts about adopting and intermediate cartridge themselves or developing their own SKS/AK?

SKS accuracy, its a 150-200M gun even though it's listed as a 400M gun, it really isn't even the good shooting well made Soviet or Yugo SKS, are iffy past 200M.

But better than the PPSH, that's why flat shooting, wasn't much more than a 100M weapon

If they capture a bunch of AK that break frequently, that won't impress the US much.

In any case, the US is still stuck hard on what would be 7.62x51 NATO, the 7.62x39 won't change that
 

Deleted member 1487

SKS accuracy, its a 150-200M gun even though it's listed as a 400M gun, it really isn't even the good shooting well made Soviet or Yugo SKS, are iffy past 200M.

But better than the PPSH, that's why flat shooting, wasn't much more than a 100M weapon

If they capture a bunch of AK that break frequently, that won't impress the US much.

In any case, the US is still stuck hard on what would be 7.62x51 NATO, the 7.62x39 won't change that

I wonder if the US might change it's tune if they find the SKS being as or more effective at combat ranges than the Garand and thought they could make an AK type weapon that actually worked.
 

I wonder if the US might change it's tune if they find the SKS being as or more effective at combat ranges than the Garand and thought they could make an AK type weapon that actually worked.


I've had a number of SKS, from when they were first imported after the Wall came down for $80 bucks with a free spam can of ammo, to today, where they are over $300.

some were able to do real good accuracy at 150, while some were lucky to hit the barn, while standing inside of it. Most of them were closer to the latter, and I sold them off.

they just aren't a designated marksmans rifle, that's why they did the SVD. SKS is a good 200M rifle, and there is nothing wrong with that, cheap and dependable.

Like I said, it's not enough, Springfield Armory was stuck on 7.62Nato in the M-14, and an intermediate round wouldn't do it. They already ignored 7.92 kurz, and all the cartridges in the US civilian market that could be considered intermediates.
 
The North Koreans and Chinese used SMGs, so had to often close to within 100m or less to use them effectively, while the SKS would be been accurate and deadly at 300m or more.

Which was a better choice then semi-autos given that Chinese and North Korean troops preferred to infiltrate up close to American positions before executing their attack both to compensate for their own lack of heavy weaponry and help mitigate that of American forces. Trying to engage in longer range firefights, in addition to being the exception rather then the rule even among forces that tried for them, wouldn’t just be a death sentence for the communists in Korea... it would be deliberately throwing away any possibility of their potential deaths have any gain tactically, operationally, or strategically.

Assault rifles would have indeed been better but as Marathag noted the Soviets were still fleshing out the ‘47s design and couldn’t spare them until later.
 
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Deleted member 1487

I've had a number of SKS, from when they were first imported after the Wall came down for $80 bucks with a free spam can of ammo, to today, where they are over $300.

some were able to do real good accuracy at 150, while some were lucky to hit the barn, while standing inside of it. Most of them were closer to the latter, and I sold them off.

they just aren't a designated marksmans rifle, that's why they did the SVD. SKS is a good 200M rifle, and there is nothing wrong with that, cheap and dependable.

Like I said, it's not enough, Springfield Armory was stuck on 7.62Nato in the M-14, and an intermediate round wouldn't do it. They already ignored 7.92 kurz, and all the cartridges in the US civilian market that could be considered intermediates.
The M14 and 7.62 NATO did't exist in 1950 and the M1 could easily be adapted to something like or a bit more powerful than the 7.63x39 and adding a 30 round magazine was already done on M1 development models. With US ammo quality and manufacturing standards for rifles they could well actually make highly accurate intermediate weapon systems (BTW the Iraqis did turn out a 7.62x39 DMR that is apparently pretty good out to >500m; it's no SVD but it is possible to turn the round into an accurate weapon).

That said there was a push to modernize the M1/2/3 Carbine, which could perhaps be a stand in here, with a somewhat more powerful .30 carbine round developed with a Spitzer bullet (say lengthen the cartridge to 41mm instead of 33mm and use M2 ball bullets with a steel core for a 125 grain round) and a beefed up carbine to handle the round. In the end with the addition of the automatic feature in the M2/3 Carbines, it would probably be like an AK in performance, but considered a carbine. So perhaps this 'M4 Carbine' would effectively match the AK without displacing the M14.

As to SKS accuracy...if you're getting surplus Com Bloc rifles for $80 you're not getting their good stuff nor stuff that was new, so accuracy more likely that not going to be a mess especially if you're also using what is likely reject ammo.

Which was a better choice then semi-autos given that Chinese and North Korean troops preferred to infiltrate up close to American positions before executing their attack both to compensate for their own lack of heavy weaponry and help mitigate that of American forces.
Was that doctrine due to adapting to the needs of the equipment they had? If anything it seems the Chinese fought like that because they had to due to weapon range. Besides engaging at 2-300 meters isn't long enough range to allow the US to use their heavy weapons.

Trying to engage in longer range firefights, in addition to being the exception rather then the rule even among forces that tried for them, wouldn’t just be a death sentence for the communists in Korea... it would be deliberately throwing away any possibility of their potential deaths have any gain tactically, operationally, or strategically.
2-300m is long range? As it was the majority of combat happened over 100m range in Korea, so the Communist forces would actually have been able to engage at ranges where they were getting shot at rather than have to brave it until they got within 100m. Being able to provide covering fire on the move is pretty important if you're trying to close distance. They wouldn't really have to change their infiltration tactics, they'd just be able to engage in fire and maneuver at longer ranges, which would be pretty important if they didn't have things like MGs to back them up, which you claimed they lacked sufficient numbers of above.

Assault rifles would have indeed been better but as Marathag noted the Soviets were still fleshing out the ‘47s design and couldn’t spare them until later.
The could spare them given their lack of shooting war and potential to learn how they perform in combat conditions, especially as they weren't generally issuing them to their own troops anyway due to the production issues precluding full acceptance of the weapon until the mid-1950s.
 
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The big problem was that the soviets looked at Korea the same way we did. It was a secondary theater. The newest and best weapons went to Europe where the Cold War was speeding up. There were plenty of PPSH and Moisen Rifles available to give to the Chinese and Koreans so that was what they got.
 
Was that doctrine due to adapting to the needs of the equipment they had? If anything it seems the Chinese fought like that because they had to due to weapon range. Besides engaging at 2-300 meters isn't long enough range to allow the US to use their heavy weapons.

In part, yes. But the lack of equipment in question was heavy arms and communication. NATO Officers I’ve talked too have observed that had they the same sort of lack of comm gear and heavy weapons today, they would have probably resorted to using similar tactics as the Chinese. Small arms was more or less irrelevant. As for arty... hardly. Probable shot dispersion for a American 155mm round in WW2 at a range of 16.4 kilometers was 43 meters, probably slightly better in Korea, with a kill radius of 50 meters and casualty radius of 100 meters against ideal targets (which in most Korean War fights the Communists were closer too more then the Americans, usually being on the defensive hunkered down in fortifications and all). 200-300 meters would have been danger-close for artillery, yes, but hardly unusable unless their trying to call on siege or capital ship guns.

2-300m is long range? As it was the majority of combat happened over 100m range in Korea, so the Communist forces would actually have been able to engage at ranges where they were getting shot at rather than have to brave it until they got within 100m. Being able to provide covering fire on the move is pretty important if you're trying to close distance. They wouldn't really have to change their infiltration tactics, they'd just be able to engage in fire and maneuver at longer ranges, which would be pretty important if they didn't have things like MGs to back them up, which you claimed they lacked sufficient numbers of above.

Yes, 2-300 meters is long range for infantry firefights. Operational Requirements for an Infantry Hand Weapon released in 1952 show that “most” infantry firefights in Korea occurred inside of 100 meters and “almost all” inside of 300 meters. For covering fire, communist forces generally relied on mortars and LMGs and there is nothing about rifles which offer any meaningful advantage over those assets. I said the Koreans Chinese lacked heavy weapons, ie: artillery and armor (although they did start the war with some armor, that they quickly lost, and the Chinese did bring up some artillery when things stabilized along the 38th) but I said nothing about infantry support weapons, which they did have in adequate quantities.

The could spare them given their lack of shooting war and potential to learn how they perform in combat conditions, especially as they weren't generally issuing them to their own troops anyway due to the production issues precluding full acceptance of the weapon until the mid-1950s.

And potentially let the Capitalists get data on weapons that aren’t even ready for frontline service yet? I should report you to the MGB for suggesting we let the Capitalists gather such important state secrets! :p
 
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As to SKS accuracy...if you're getting surplus Com Bloc rifles for $80 you're not getting their good stuff nor stuff that was new, so accuracy more likely that not going to be a mess especially if you're also using what is likely reject ammo.

So most everything mere mortals can acquire are just like the Monkey Models, while somewhere on Earth, there are these magical Sov-Block wonder weapons, in storage apparently, since they never seem to show in real world tests

I've seen dodgy ammo, and pristine stuff in those sealed spam cans, and SKS in that marvelous east block cosmoline that seemed unissued, perfect condition, that still pattern like a shotgun, despite having a mirror perfect bore and zero wear and tear on the stock and mechanics. While other Chinese Type 56, looking like some peasant used it to pound in fence posts in outer Mongolia for 15 years, shot as well as any M-1 Carbine I ever had.
 

Deleted member 1487

In part, yes. But the lack of equipment in question was heavy arms and communication. NATO Officers I’ve talked too have observed that had they the same sort of lack of comm gear and heavy weapons today, they would have probably resorted to using similar tactics as the Chinese. Small arms was more or less irrelevant.
Where would lack of coms gear change small arms engagement distances given Chinese and North Korean tactics? As it was they weren't exclusively using SMGs and did use bolt action rifles at longer distances IOTL. The SKS would only increase their abilities given iron sight limitations.

Given the casualty rates caused by small arms in 1950-51 especially (noted in SLA Marshall's report on infantry weapon use, citing official US Army numbers, not his own concoction) and the lack of heavy weapons on both sides, but more the communist one, small arms are certainly not irrelevant. "This Kind of War" deals heavily with first person experiences in the Korean War and especially in 1950-51 the fighting described really mentions the primacy of small arms due to the lack of heavy weapons on both sides, plus the relatively restricted ranges encountered in Korean terrain (which is part of why multiple reports from the Korean was mention 300m was the max infantry weapon engagement range).

Besides if they were, why did the US transition away from bolt action rifles and the communists to SMGs?

As for arty... hardly. Probable shot dispersion for a American 155mm round in WW2 at a range of 16.4 kilometers was 43 meters, probably slightly better in Korea, with a kill radius of 50 meters and casualty radius of 100 meters against ideal targets (which in most Korean War fights the Communists were closer too more then the Americans, usually being on the defensive hunkered down in fortifications and all). 200-300 meters would have been danger-close for artillery, yes, but hardly unusable unless their trying to call on siege or capital ship guns.
https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/indirect.htm
The term "danger close" is included in the call for fire when there are friendly troops or positions within a prescribed distance of the target, specifically 600 meters for artillery or mortars and 750 meters for naval gunfire.

Minimum safe distance (MSD) is defined as the distance in meters from the intended center of impact at which a specific degree of risk and vulnerability will not be exceeded with a 99% assurance. MSDs allow for the maximum use of indirect fire while ensuring the safety of friendly troops. MSD's and not "danger close" distances should be used when in close contact or as a planning figure when echeloning fires.
Minimum safe distances are computed by adding the maximum pattern radius plus three circular error probable. The 1,2,3,4,5 "rule of thumb" is a good guide. This translates to:

100 meters - M203 & 40mm

200 meters- 60mm mortars

300 meters - 81mm

400 meters - 105 mm

500 meters - 155 mm/naval gunfire
So at even 300m the military would say that is well within the minimum safe distance that would be targeted even by a 105mm howitzer. I have no idea why you think that in WW2 and Korea dispersion was only 43m when even the modern military won't use their 105's within 400m except in extreme circumstances (like a unit being overrun).


Yes, 2-300 meters is long range for infantry firefights. Operational Requirements for an Infantry Hand Weapon released in 1952 show that “most” infantry firefights in Korea occurred inside of 100 meters and “almost all” inside of 300 meters. For covering fire, communist forces generally relied on mortars and LMGs and there is nothing about rifles which offer any meaningful advantage over those assets. I said the Koreans Chinese lacked heavy weapons, ie: artillery and armor (although they did start the war with some armor, that they quickly lost, and the Chinese did bring up some artillery when things stabilized along the 38th) but I said nothing about infantry support weapons, which they did have in adequate quantities.
~50% of infantry fights happened over 200m in that report. A bit over 50% happened between 0-200m. 95% happened within 300m. LMGs and Mortars were frequently without ammo especially in the winter fighting of 1950-51 in part due to ammo weight (the 7.62x39 being considerably lighter than the full powered rifle ammo even LMGs needed in large numbers) or lost their operators, so having longer than 100m range suppressive fire from a weapon more accurate with light recoil and light ammo (easier to carry a lot of especially over long distances) on a shot for shot basis and was FAR lighter than LMG or mortar would be a considerable advantage (which was the raison d'etre for the assault rifle.

BTW heavy weapons at the infantry level do include MGs and Mortars; they are after all quite heavy to carry and move around the hills and mountains of Korea and are difficult to keep supplied with lots of ammo.

And potentially let the Capitalists get data on weapons that aren’t even ready for frontline service yet? I should report you to the MGB for suggesting we let the Capitalists gather such important state secrets! :p
Yeah well it seems the AK was quite the state secret and unknown to the US until 1953.
https://www.popularmechanics.com/mi...a-agents-drawing-of-the-first-ak-47-sighting/

So most everything mere mortals can acquire are just like the Monkey Models, while somewhere on Earth, there are these magical Sov-Block wonder weapons, in storage apparently, since they never seem to show in real world tests

I've seen dodgy ammo, and pristine stuff in those sealed spam cans, and SKS in that marvelous east block cosmoline that seemed unissued, perfect condition, that still pattern like a shotgun, despite having a mirror perfect bore and zero wear and tear on the stock and mechanics. While other Chinese Type 56, looking like some peasant used it to pound in fence posts in outer Mongolia for 15 years, shot as well as any M-1 Carbine I ever had.
I mean a fresh off the factory line SKS is probably going to shoot better than milsurp, especially the stuff the Soviet/Russian military wanted to throw away (they keep everything!). Given that the SKS exited manufacture everywhere in the 1960s, by the time you got your hands on them they were probably pretty shot out or otherwise impaired in most cases. I wonder if your factor fresh SKS was a reject model turned away by the Soviet military, but sold off somewhere. If you're talking about Chinese made SKSs, those didn't exist until well after the Korean War, so using their quality to discuss SKS potential isn't really proof. Also interesting how you mentioned the 'new' SKS shot poorly, but the used one shot well...maybe that means the new one had that problem, so it was sold off new while the older one worked and was used until it no longer was needed.
 
Are we talking the first DPRK 10 division army which reached a culminating point of victory and couldn't achieve its political goals, or are we talking a reconstructed DPRK army?

Because small arms changes aren't going to change the logistics and politics.

yours,
Sam R.
 

Deleted member 1487

Are we talking the first DPRK 10 division army which reached a culminating point of victory and couldn't achieve its political goals, or are we talking a reconstructed DPRK army?

Because small arms changes aren't going to change the logistics and politics.

yours,
Sam R.
Original DPRK army, plus the later Chinese Forces. 7.62x39 ammo is a lot lighter than MG belts and mortar rounds if we want to talk logistics.
 
I mean a fresh off the factory line SKS is probably going to shoot better than milsurp, especially the stuff the Soviet/Russian military wanted to throw away (they keep everything!). Given that the SKS exited manufacture everywhere in the 1960s, by the time you got your hands on them they were probably pretty shot out or otherwise impaired in most cases.

Nah, most milsurp from the era got refurbished to factory standard when they were put into storage. 7.62x39 accuracy drops like hell at ranges past 150-200m.
 
Original DPRK army, plus the later Chinese Forces. 7.62x39 ammo is a lot lighter than MG belts and mortar rounds if we want to talk logistics.

I'm only familiar with the problems of outfitting and running the original DPRK army and southern revolutionary groups.

The main logistic hurdles will be artillery, armour, motorised and food of course.

There were a couple of problems with the DPRK's offensive:

1) They believed the southern revolutionaries when they said an uprising was imminent—despite the recent failures of these groups in politics and military endeavours.
2) Given the Soviet conception of strategic echelonment, they lacked a second echelon to drive their strategic triumph home.
3) They were primarily a motorised and armoured force based on late Soviet war doctrine, and did not have the strategic depth to engage in an end of campaign set piece against an equivalent force.
4) Based off 3), they were designed to maul the ROK's rather inept and ill equipped army, US intervention was not adequately foreseen or prepared for, see point 1).
5) They lacked a retirement plan after the culminating point of victory.

In the kind of operations being conducted, I'm not seeing the SKS being a game changer. Particularly if a strategic amphibious landing is the response from the US.

If we modify points 1, 4 and 5 they might be able to retire in good order and develop a capacity for 2 & 3 while maintaining much more of their force than historically. The SKS could prove useful here.

yours,
Sam R.
 
In the kind of operations being conducted, I'm not seeing the SKS being a game changer.

In the list of weapon effectiveness in percent between WWII and teh Korean War, the big standout in more deaths was something called 'other fragmentary explosions' that was 0.3% in WWII, and 7.4% in the KW, whatever that was.
It's not Grenades, Landmines, Boobytraps, Rockets and Bombs, those were all covered in other categories.

Besides whatever 'other' was, a change was in Grenades, that I listed upthread.

Weapons that caused fewer deaths in the KW vs WWII, was landmines, 1.7% less, explosive shells, 1.6% less and Rockets and bombs, 1.4% less

So that does show to me, the real weakness in the Chinese and DPRK arsenal was in artillery and bombs, and in defensive landmines, not small arms, that had 1.4% more deaths than WWII.

Bombs, hard to do, given the airpower situation, and having a good ground attack plane, the Il-10, the improved Sturmovik, had high losses against the Prop fighters like the Corsair and F-51, let alone the jets, so that's out.

That leaves more artillery and rocket launchers, that's probably doable.

And with all that, the change is likely to be just a few percent: I see nothing that could be introduced as a 'game changer'
 

Deleted member 1487

In the list of weapon effectiveness in percent between WWII and teh Korean War, the big standout in more deaths was something called 'other fragmentary explosions' that was 0.3% in WWII, and 7.4% in the KW, whatever that was.
It's not Grenades, Landmines, Boobytraps, Rockets and Bombs, those were all covered in other categories.

Besides whatever 'other' was, a change was in Grenades, that I listed upthread.

Weapons that caused fewer deaths in the KW vs WWII, was landmines, 1.7% less, explosive shells, 1.6% less and Rockets and bombs, 1.4% less

So that does show to me, the real weakness in the Chinese and DPRK arsenal was in artillery and bombs, and in defensive landmines, not small arms, that had 1.4% more deaths than WWII.

Bombs, hard to do, given the airpower situation, and having a good ground attack plane, the Il-10, the improved Sturmovik, had high losses against the Prop fighters like the Corsair and F-51, let alone the jets, so that's out.

That leaves more artillery and rocket launchers, that's probably doable.

And with all that, the change is likely to be just a few percent: I see nothing that could be introduced as a 'game changer'
Given that small arms was such a huge part of their ability to inflict casualties due to the deficiencies you mention, then improved small arms arsenals are more likely to have an impact all things considered when supply was such a problem around the Pusan Perimeter, including for 'heavy' small arms like MGs and mortars. The problem for my OP is the lack of a reliable AK-47 at this point and their very limited numbers that were kept a secret by the Soviets; had it been 'perfected' enough in 1947 it would have been a weapon that would have been the solution to relying on MGs for fire support in a way the SKS simply could not manage. Perhaps though the RPD, had it been made available, would have been best given it used a lighter round, was much lighter than the LMGs the North Koreans and Chinese were equipped with
(smatterings of Japanese, Soviet, and Czech MGs), and would have had the ability to give that stand off suppressive ability at 300-400m to cover SMG assaults while also having the ability to move quickly to displace if take under fire or to consolidate a captured position. With the tactics used by the North Koreans in 1950, having a much lighter, easier to supply LMG/SAW (substantially lighter than the BAR and belt fed) that could keep up with the rapid infiltration movements would have been a substantial boon.

http://www.koreanwaronline.com/arms/PrincipalWeapons.htm
Although newer series of infantry weapons, radios, and vehicles had either been developed or were in production on both sides, they were all largely withheld, along with nuclear weapons. The Communist bloc, fighting through its secondary powers, followed the same course in employing old or obsolescent weaponry, however many Communist arms were of more recent manufacture, or in better condition, than those in American and ROK hands in 1950. For example although the "burp gun" was very effective in the close infantry assaults of the Korean War it was not equal to the AK-47, a Soviet standard in 1949. From the infantry point of view, the KW was an anachronism.

Tokarev Semiautomatic 7.62mm: This weapon, fitted with flash hider and bipod, served a purpose similar to the US BAR, although less effectively.
http://www.koreanwaronline.com/history/Enemy Weapons/1.htm#LMG
The list is quite archaic and multi-caliber, which must have played merry hell with logistics.

Given how close the fighting for the Pusan Perimeter was, improvements in the ability of Korean infantry to maneuver their firepower and have more rounds on them for the same weight might have been enough to tip the balance.
 
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