If it stopped the Soviets from sending ships past the Blockade of Cuba - it would certainly stop tanks from rolling into West Berlin.
M.A.D as a deterent was real.
It is if your opposite number thinks you're willing to pull the trigger over what's at stake.
Nukes in Cuba in theory threatened the US's ability to deliver MAD which is obviously critical. Soviet tanks rolling West doesn't directly. If the U.S. lets two allies go down, it isn't crazy to think they're not willing to swap American cities for European capitals.
You're ignoring the fallout that "letting two allies go down" would have on the Western alliance system.
If you give up Germany and Korea just because you don't have "resolve" then NATO is utterly discredited. It's not just about trading cities for cities at that point, but cities for global hegemony and noone in the US is going to allow that to happen - even in the malaise of the 70s.
Also there's the fact that US forces were stationed in Germany and Korea. I guess the soldiers located there would be collateral damage when the Reds overrun their bases?
Absurd.
If it stopped the Soviets from sending ships past the Blockade of Cuba - it would certainly stop tanks from rolling into West Berlin.
M.A.D as a deterent was real.
America of 1963 was a unified place on foreign affairs with a draft and a foreign policy consensus.
America projected strength to the world at the time. Image matters when it comes to a nations credibility that it means what it says.
That has nothing to do with it.
An attack is an attack
(ex. see isolationist lobby on December 8th, 1941)
and if the DPRK moves on South Korea in '75, the US will respond. period. And if the Russians come in to help - Everything is on the table.
Anything else is ASB.
What's your source for this?heck Carter was seriously considering pulling out of South Korea after his election and letting them fend for themselves.
What's your source for this?
Carter's Decision on Korea Traced Back to January, 1975
Jimmy Carter's decision to withdraw ground troops from South Korea goes back at least to January, 1975, and the earliest days of his campaign for President. His original idea was to pull out all U.S. forces - ground and air - and to negotiate assurances from China and the Soviet Union that North Korea would not invade the south.
The origins and evolution of Carter's ideas are of unusual importance because his campaign stand has been translated directly into U.S. policy with a minimum of official review. In order to avoid a battle within the government, a National Security Council study leading to the U.S. withdrawal plan did not question whether American ground troops should be removed but focused instead on how many should be removed.
As sent to the White House in mid-March, the council's Presidential Review Memorandum 13 acknowledged that there are differences of opinion about the troop withdrawal policy and that the impact of it is difficult to predict. At the explicit instruction of Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, however, the State-Defense-Central Intelligence Agency study accepted as its promise Carter's previous announced conclusion that the troops should be taken out.
Without making an overt recommendation, PRM-13 reported the carefully hedged view that the risk will be within acceptable limits provided that the withdrawal of ground troops is carefully managed, that essential U.S. support elements remain, that adequate compensation be supplied to South Korea for the reduction in its defense capacity and that other U.S. actions do not send the wrong signals to North Korea.
While after-the-fact justifications have been made public, there is no indication that the government review considered Carter's own reason for the pullout and some responsible officials have conceded that they do not know what they are.
Major Gen. John K. Singlaub, who was relieved last month as chief of staff of U.S. forces in Korea after publicly criticizing the withdrawal, told Congress that the Joint Chiefs of Staff never gave its Seoul command a reason for the planned withdrawal despite requests for an explanation.
On Jan. 16, 1975, a month after declaring his condidacy for President and two weeks after leaving the governorship of Georgia, Carter told a meeting of the editorial page board of The Washington Post that he favored taking U.S. troops out of Korea and would be prepared to begin as soon as he became President.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/arch...ef9-bcac-25b8fc999559/?utm_term=.d245f6ec1ca8
Thanks.Carter campaigned on getting our troops out of Korea and finally 'ending the war' there. He even announced his decision to pull out as President as seen below, but under slow and building pressure he backtracked and we still have troops there.
Carter campaigned on getting our troops out of Korea and finally 'ending the war' there. He even announced his decision to pull out as President as seen below, but under slow and building pressure he backtracked and we still have troops there.
Thanks.
Also, though, such assurances from China and the Soviet Union might have been fickle, no?
Wouldn't the US be able to establish air superiority rather quickly on the peninsular which would put an end to the NK offensive rather quickly.
The question of popular will comes up with what will the US and SK and their allies do once the tide is turned.
Return to the status quo or demand concessions.
While reunification is not likely the US/SK forces would at the very least demand reparations.
Perhaps South Korea joins SEATO and that organization is reenergized[QUOTE
What NK would do is break the armistice so like it or not, I suspect not, China would be on NK's side and the US would continue it's UN action. Remember this is when US "opened" relations with China and they had very bad relations with the USSR. Plus it would show how weak China really was!
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