Assume the Allies do attempt to land on France without taking North Africa first (I think this was the British idea but the Americans ruled it out). IOTL the Germans occupied Vichy France in response to the French surrender in Algeria, but here there is still an 'indepedent' French authority when metropolitan France is invaded. Could Vichy France declare war on the Allies?
Normandy without Torch - How does Vichy France react?
- Thread starter Tocomocho
- Start date
Cook
Banned
Other way round; the Americans wanted the direct route across the Channel, the British wanted the indirect route.
You've got it the wrong way round.
But anyway, even if Torch doesn't happen and the Axis are just pushed out of Libya from the east, the Allies are still likely to occupy North Africa.
The Americans wanted to go the direct route from the very first moment they entered the War, the British didn't think the Allies were capable of doing this until the Mediterranean was secure.
The British were right in that neither the material nor manpower was available for a cross-channel invasion until 1944 and going through North Africa and Sicily provided vital experiance in both actual combat for the Americans and coalition warfare for both parties - in fact the invasion of Sicily was to provide many lessons which would make the invasion of Normandy a success - and taking southern Italy allowed the Foggia Air Fields to fall into Allied hands which in turn gave them a base to strike at Nazi-Controlled central and southern Europe with the added bonus of forcing the Axis to transfer hundreds of thousands of troops from both Normandy and the Eastern Front to garrison the entire Mediterran coastline.
Alan Brooke and Churchill never outrightly opposed the cross-channel invasion and Brooke freely admitted the necessity of it. The only issue that split the Allies on the cross-channel invasion was when to do it.
The Torch venture, however, was undertaken more through political necessity than a concensus of military thinking. Having declared war on Germany, and committed himself to a Europe First strategy, Roosevelt needed to get the American troops into action to appease his voters an if there was no concensus on the suitability of a cross-channel invasion in 1942 and no likelihood of the operation being undertaken until 1943 at the earliest then the Allies would have to turn their attentions eslewhere.
That Roosevelt was not-so-secretly fond of the North African venture anyway was a widely known fact amungst the American Chiefs of Staff, and it was a strong fear that Marshall harboured that should Churchill get hold of Roosevelt on his own he might sway the president into openly supporting the operation and diverting the Allied attention away from the cross-channel operations.
Marshall fought hard against the North African operation and, ironically, found himself an ally in the form of Brooke, who agreed with Marshall that the TORCH operation would reduce the amount of reinforcement available to the 8th Army with possibly disasterous consequences (this all occured slightly after Rommel took Tobruk and the 8th Army was in retreat to El Alamein), that it would result in thinning the Naval presence in other theaters especially in Aircraft Carriers and escorts, that the unknown factor of the French reaction to the landings made it a seriously risky business, that it would slow down the build up of troops and supplies in Britain for the cross-channel invasion to come and that it would dilute the Allied strenght rather than concentrate it.
Why, then, if Brooke agreed with Marshall did he side with Churchill and Roosevelt when the two military chiefs met their political masters? Well, that was simple. Alanbrooke may have had reservations about the North African venture but he had even greater reservations about the SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP operations Marshall supported for the invasion of France.
More so than anything did Brooke appose the SLEDGEHAMMER operation because it was designed to be a "sacrificial" invasion to appease the Russians, made up of primarilly British troops. CIGS had no intention of making any such sacrificial offerings, and certainly he would not be swayed by the notion of appeasing the Bolsheviks, he hated them with a passion and was deeply suspicious of them - no doubt Stalin would have mocked the attempt anyway.
Roosevelt and Churchill knew that Marshall and Brooke did not agree on the plans for the cross-channel invasion and were deadlocked over the issue and therefore stated that they were in favour of an invasion of France and the Low Countries only if Marshall and Brooke could agree on a sound and sensible plan to use. In doing this they made it appear as if they were supportive of an operation they knew was not going to happen anytime that year. They were passing the blame for undertaking TORCH onto Brooke's shoulders even though they supported it far more than he did.
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Brooke was probably one of the very few (if not the only one) with a clear global perception of the war shoud be fought.
He had his desing interms of North Africa very clear or rather the Med. Openig up the Med would free more than 1 million of tonnage by not having to use the around Africa trip.
He also saw the reality of NOT landing in Italy, except for the Southern part securing the air fields.
By NOT invading beyond Naples it would force Hitler to keep a bigger amount of troops in Italy, instead of allocating some (fewer) troops when a landing is made. At least that would be the rationale.
Brooke wanted more than anything to have Italy as a drain on Hitler's troops, not on his.
Sicily provided some real insight into Overlord's challenges.
Ivan
He had his desing interms of North Africa very clear or rather the Med. Openig up the Med would free more than 1 million of tonnage by not having to use the around Africa trip.
He also saw the reality of NOT landing in Italy, except for the Southern part securing the air fields.
By NOT invading beyond Naples it would force Hitler to keep a bigger amount of troops in Italy, instead of allocating some (fewer) troops when a landing is made. At least that would be the rationale.
Brooke wanted more than anything to have Italy as a drain on Hitler's troops, not on his.
Sicily provided some real insight into Overlord's challenges.
Ivan
To answer the OP here... the US ambassador to France, the retired Admiral Leahy had at some point in 1942 asked the French leaders what their attitude might be when the Allies landed in Europe. The response is suposed to have been: 'If you come with three divisions we will fight you, if you come with twenty divisions we will join you.' anyway thats the story. More to the point were the reactions of various French commanders when Operation Torch went down. Some fought the Allies as hard as possible, others shouted comrade! One division commander in Vichy France started his regiments marching to Bourdeux, with the intent of making it safe for any Allied convoys headed there.
Do you have a source for that? Sounds intriguing.
Either Paxtons 'Vichy France' or Jacksons 'The Dark Years'. Both English language histories of occupied France. I will try to remember to check next week. I keep most of the history books at my office, and am not able to spend enough time there lately.
When the operation Torch convoys assembled in the UK & set out the British Deception organization used one of the old Sledgehammer plans as one of the cover stories. They fed a warning about a invasion of France to one or more of the German spies. I am wondering if the French got wind of that deception story as well?
I'm reading a biography on Petain at the moment and one of the more intriguing episodes was the forced removal of Weygand as the Commander in North Africa. Weygand was a fervent patriot and was one of the few Vichy leaders to warn strongly against the slippery slope of providing limited military support to Germany. At first Darlan and Petain disagreed, but after allowing the use of airfields and Syria and losing that colony to the Free French they began to see his point. Otto Abetz, the German Ambassador to Vichy, had recently started negotiating with Darlan for the use of Vichy bases in North Africa and when Darlan soundly announced he was no longer interested Abetz found out it was Weygand who sabotaged the deal. Thus began a long and vicious campaign to force Weygand from that office, Hitler himself wrote to Petain arguing that Weygand was an impediment to future negotiations. Petain resisted this at first, but after a time pressure was brought to bear and eventually Weygand was dismissed.
This was important because Weygand had negotiated with the US for economic supplies in exchange he would guarantee that French North Africa would militarily resist any encroachment on those lands. The Americans had faith in this agreement and were appalled when he was dismissed. It is possible that if Weygand remained in power there the Americans would overrule any British plans for attack.
This was important because Weygand had negotiated with the US for economic supplies in exchange he would guarantee that French North Africa would militarily resist any encroachment on those lands. The Americans had faith in this agreement and were appalled when he was dismissed. It is possible that if Weygand remained in power there the Americans would overrule any British plans for attack.
TrekMaster51
Banned
If this is in 1942, you've just gift wrapped the Germans 100,000 POWs.
Into 1943, US doctrine was not up to par with what it was in 1944 and 1945. US and even British equipment was still not as great as it could be either.
Not that they where the greatest fighters, but basically ignoring North Africa and by extension Italy, this would probabl see the Italians not surrendering, at least not at the same time as they did IOTL. This would allow Hitler to supplement his forces with hundreds of thousands of Italian soldiers.
Another thing to consider, in 1942 the US and British didn't have any air superiority to speak of.
Into 1943, US doctrine was not up to par with what it was in 1944 and 1945. US and even British equipment was still not as great as it could be either.
Not that they where the greatest fighters, but basically ignoring North Africa and by extension Italy, this would probabl see the Italians not surrendering, at least not at the same time as they did IOTL. This would allow Hitler to supplement his forces with hundreds of thousands of Italian soldiers.
Another thing to consider, in 1942 the US and British didn't have any air superiority to speak of.
What is the title & author of the Petain bio?
I had not understood the role of Weygand in all this. Had he reained in charge in NW Africa it is possible the US reps would have been able to negotiate sucessfully the entire region coming over to the Allied side on the execution of Operation Torch. Darlans dithering in this more or less led to six months campaigning in Tunisia. Tho in hindsight that led to 180,000+ Axis PoW for the Allies.
Archibald
Banned
Vichy position in WWII is quite hard to grasp.
In 1940 within five months France endured its worse military defeat since Crecy / Azincourt. It was followed by the traumatic Mers-el-Kebir / Dakar affairs.
End result: unable to face (and truly understand) both aggressions and their root causes, Vichy forged the impossible concept of NEUTRALITY.
At the core that regime intended to be as neutral as Switzerland (or Franco Spain, for that matter).
that position explain (for example) why, in the month of November 1942, Vichy scuttled its navy (no love for the Germans) and fought Torch in North Africa (no love for the allies either).
Leave us out of this bloody war - it was a totally desesperate, if no suicidal, position. Courtesy of Verdun, Sedan and Mers-el-Kebir combined together.
It was, of course, a blissfull illusion that couldn't stand a chance against fast running events. Pétain was pretty much sénile and unable to grasp the pace of WWII. De Gaulle did not even bothered trial him, he was just send into exile on an island.
The true asshole was Laval and his clique, and he was rightly shot in 1945.
Vichy France was essentially a herd of cats grouped under the banner of senile Pétain. Big ego / ambitions clashed - those of Weygand, Laval, Darland... they fought for a ruined, soured regime.
In 1940 within five months France endured its worse military defeat since Crecy / Azincourt. It was followed by the traumatic Mers-el-Kebir / Dakar affairs.
End result: unable to face (and truly understand) both aggressions and their root causes, Vichy forged the impossible concept of NEUTRALITY.
At the core that regime intended to be as neutral as Switzerland (or Franco Spain, for that matter).
that position explain (for example) why, in the month of November 1942, Vichy scuttled its navy (no love for the Germans) and fought Torch in North Africa (no love for the allies either).
Leave us out of this bloody war - it was a totally desesperate, if no suicidal, position. Courtesy of Verdun, Sedan and Mers-el-Kebir combined together.
It was, of course, a blissfull illusion that couldn't stand a chance against fast running events. Pétain was pretty much sénile and unable to grasp the pace of WWII. De Gaulle did not even bothered trial him, he was just send into exile on an island.
The true asshole was Laval and his clique, and he was rightly shot in 1945.
Vichy France was essentially a herd of cats grouped under the banner of senile Pétain. Big ego / ambitions clashed - those of Weygand, Laval, Darland... they fought for a ruined, soured regime.
Short answer - Utter disaster for the Allies.
Longer Answer - EPIC utter disaster for the Allies that might lengthen the war to the point that Germany gets nuked ahead of Japan.
The Allies were flat out not ready for taking France in late 1942/early 1943. The Americans were grass green, amphibious tactics were not up to snuff and the Allied lacked air superiority, much less the air supremacy.
Longer Answer - EPIC utter disaster for the Allies that might lengthen the war to the point that Germany gets nuked ahead of Japan.
The Allies were flat out not ready for taking France in late 1942/early 1943. The Americans were grass green, amphibious tactics were not up to snuff and the Allied lacked air superiority, much less the air supremacy.
Marshal Petain by Richard Griffiths.
It's hard to say what Weygand would have done if he remained in power. He was adamant that Vichy should not deviate at all from the terms of the armistice. Vichy's only negotiating chip was French North Africa and the Fleet. Weygand would be concerned of the fate of the free zone in Metropolitan France if the whole of French North Africa defected to the Allies in one fell swoop. Depending on how strong his loyalty is to Vichy (which he still considered to be the legitimate Government) he might be able to negotiate the safe transit of Rommel's retreating army through North Africa in exchange for the return of French prisoner's of war (Rommel's Army would have to be disarmed to keep the territory officially neutral).
The Americans seemed to have faith in Weygand and his ability to keep Algeria neutral. It's possible they may tolerate Vichy neutrality until the invasion of Europe occurs. Several figures in Vichy had stated that if the Allies showed up in Europe in force they would be prepared to enter the war (they would need to be sure it was a properly coordinated invasion with a good chance of success).
The difficulty is the Allies need to take the pressure off Stalin and one possible option is an invasion of Northern Norway which has the added bonus of taking Finland out of the war. This frees up Stalin's northern front with Finland and reopens Murmansk as a supply port (although this is only of marginal benefit since it is a limited port). However the 'liberation' of Norway and the removal of Finland as an enemy would be an important morale boost.
It all comes down to the Americans. Churchill will still be pushing for an invasion of Greece or Italy while Roosevelt will still want an invasion of France.
Thanks. I'll add that to my much too long list to read.
Problem here is the Brits also wanted to reopen the Mediterranean sea route. The argument of reducing the transit from Atlantic to Indian Ocean by two weeks was difficult to refute in 1942. Even now it is a tough argument.
I've never 'gamed' the Norway gambit. Indeed the pros & cons I've never looked at very closely. Did discuss at length the consequences of the Brits trying to hang on to the Narvik enclave in 1940.
not to nitpick, but I think Roosevelt was indifferent. Whatever Marshal recomended for the most part.
Of course, Leahy had a pretty much rose coloured view of Vichy, id be very careful with his reporting of their intentions.
Ok. A POD:
Japanese do better in Pacific, Midway goes better than OTL, the Japanese are able to take Port Moresby, Guadacanal, Australia feels more insecure and wants American reinforcments, so a bigger Pacific build up earlier is needed. Allies decide to attack out of Egypt only in late 1942, pass on Torch and just build up for a 1943 cross channel invasion.
Montogmery wins a crushing victory in October 1942 just the same as OTL, Axis without Tunisia distraction try to feed in enough forces to stop British at Mersa el Brega but fail, Tripoli falls one month later than OTL February 19th 1943.
French North Africa status remains status quo. The Americans agree to continue to feed the place, they and the local French realize a pro Allied coup will just bring the occupation of Southern France by the Germans to the misery of the locals. The Germans with thier reserves now tied up by the Soviet Stalingrad counterattack in the east don't want to change the status quo either for now (Without operation Anton, Germans are doing better than OTL in the east and are just able to relieve the Stalingrad pocket but are still trying to hold onto a big chunk of the Caucasus). Allies follow up with an April invasion of Pantelleria but then shut things down in the Mediteranean. (with Pantelleria, Tripoli and a revitalized Malta as bases, and Tunisia still neutral, the Allies are able to open up regular convoys of shipping through the med.)
July 1943 brings the invasion of France across the channel. On the day of the landing the US ambassador to Vichy says "now is the time" (anybody not with us now is against us and will pay the price after the war), pro Allied coups take place in France and any all the remaining Vichy colonies.
At the same time: It is whispered to Italy that how they behave in the current situation determines the kind of treament the leadership and country might expect after the war and that if Mussolini and his family were to disappear into Spain right now no one would look too hard for them. Mussolini flys out the next day and a pro Allied coup occurs in Rome.
The Allies struggle a bit on the beaches in France, but Allied naval firepower is just too large, breaks up any counterattacks and a lodgement is secured. However the Hilter regime decides to retire to the Panther Line in Russia and commit massive reserves and all avaialble air power to France... Once the Allies are pushed into the sea then they will deal with Italians and French at their leisure (or so is the plan).
Japanese do better in Pacific, Midway goes better than OTL, the Japanese are able to take Port Moresby, Guadacanal, Australia feels more insecure and wants American reinforcments, so a bigger Pacific build up earlier is needed. Allies decide to attack out of Egypt only in late 1942, pass on Torch and just build up for a 1943 cross channel invasion.
Montogmery wins a crushing victory in October 1942 just the same as OTL, Axis without Tunisia distraction try to feed in enough forces to stop British at Mersa el Brega but fail, Tripoli falls one month later than OTL February 19th 1943.
French North Africa status remains status quo. The Americans agree to continue to feed the place, they and the local French realize a pro Allied coup will just bring the occupation of Southern France by the Germans to the misery of the locals. The Germans with thier reserves now tied up by the Soviet Stalingrad counterattack in the east don't want to change the status quo either for now (Without operation Anton, Germans are doing better than OTL in the east and are just able to relieve the Stalingrad pocket but are still trying to hold onto a big chunk of the Caucasus). Allies follow up with an April invasion of Pantelleria but then shut things down in the Mediteranean. (with Pantelleria, Tripoli and a revitalized Malta as bases, and Tunisia still neutral, the Allies are able to open up regular convoys of shipping through the med.)
July 1943 brings the invasion of France across the channel. On the day of the landing the US ambassador to Vichy says "now is the time" (anybody not with us now is against us and will pay the price after the war), pro Allied coups take place in France and any all the remaining Vichy colonies.
At the same time: It is whispered to Italy that how they behave in the current situation determines the kind of treament the leadership and country might expect after the war and that if Mussolini and his family were to disappear into Spain right now no one would look too hard for them. Mussolini flys out the next day and a pro Allied coup occurs in Rome.
The Allies struggle a bit on the beaches in France, but Allied naval firepower is just too large, breaks up any counterattacks and a lodgement is secured. However the Hilter regime decides to retire to the Panther Line in Russia and commit massive reserves and all avaialble air power to France... Once the Allies are pushed into the sea then they will deal with Italians and French at their leisure (or so is the plan).
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